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Abstract 
This dissertation explores and examines the process and structure of ethnic federal arrangement in 
Ethiopia.   Ethiopia contains about 70 million people and approximately about 80 ethnic and linguistic 
groups. The “ethnic- federal” experiment of devolving public sector powers to ethnic groups goes 
against the centralized nation-building project of the previous regimes. The previous regimes used a 
different model; they gave much emphasis to ‘Ethiopian nationalism’ as a unifying concept and 
promoted centralization rather than regional or ethnic autonomy.  
 
However, in 1991, the new ruling group in power, who had started their movement for the liberation of 
their ethnic region from the central Ethiopian administration, has advocated ethnic- federalism by 
stressing that it could empower and equalize the diverse ethnic communities and reduce conflict. As a 
result, the overall centralized structure of the previous regime has been replaced by a “federal” system’ 
consists of nine ethnically and regionally delimited states with various ethnic self-administrative 
constituencies that could exercise their own political power and legal personalities. Thus, ethnicity and 
federalism have become the major factors in organizing the political and territorial space in the country.  
 
Since the introduction of the ethnic federal project in 1991, there have been wide-ranging claims 
especially by many Ethiopian intellectuals that the ethnic federal structure would collapse in a short time 
and the country could immerse into ethnic conflict. Despite these claims, however, the ethnic federal 
arrangement has survived for more than a decade. This short period of survival may not be enough to 
assure the continuation or sustainability of the system; nevertheless it triggers an interest to understand 
how it has able to survive and also to engage in finding the possible explanations regarding the pattern 
and trend of the restructuring process. Thus, this study made a close exploration and examination of the 
process in order to determine whether ethnic federal formula in Ethiopia is an appropriate model to 
empower and equalize the diverse and disparate ethnic groups in the context of united and workable 
Ethiopia state.  
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Chapter One: Introduction, the Problem and Methodology 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Since 1991, the ideology of ethnic autonomy or ethnic entitlement has become a foundation in 
restructuring the state in Ethiopia. The centralized state structure and political thinking that had survived 
for more than a century has been replaced by new kinds of political ‘ambitions’ and ‘aspirations’ based 
on regional and ethnic autonomy. The overthrow of the military government by ethnically-based armed 
rebellion front of the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) has opened a trajectory for restructuring 
the State on a different ideology, which is described as ethnic federalism. In this new trajectory, 
ethnicity and federalism have become a twin vocabulary of the new group in power to organize politics 
and society in Ethiopia. Except for the few ethnic groups who have already engaged in armed struggle, 
for the majority it was totally a sudden awakening occasion. The new ruling elites openly and blatantly 
argued that the Ethiopia state had been built on subjugation and disrespect of the various ethnic groups 
that constituting the state, therefore they advised for rejecting the ‘Old Ethiopia’ and to replace it with 
the ‘New Ethiopia’ which would recognize and respect their existence and identity in equality. The ‘Old 
Ethiopian’ identity was depicted as the mirror image of a particular group cultural and ethnic trait which 
lack to reflect the genuine Pan-Ethiopian identity.  Consequently, according to the emerged new 
ideology Ethiopia is equated with the anthology of its ethnic groups that have an unconditional right for 
self-government and including secession.   
 
Ethnicity, which was associated with narrow-nationalism, tribalism or conspirators’ agenda by the 
previous regimes, has been treated by the new ruling elites as the emancipator and valuable asset to be 
protected and promoted. As Markakis states that ‘overnight, ethnicity became a legitimate and preferred 
principle of political organization, and provided the foundation for a reconstructed Ethiopian state’ 
(Markakis 1998: 139). As a result, the construction of a new political system and administrative 
structures has been undertaken on the bases of ethnic autonomy and ethnic equality that promised a right 
for every ethnic group to have its own administrative unit as well as a right to develop and promote its 
identity and language.  
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The new group in power proclaims that the nationality question in Ethiopia is closely linked to the 
question of democracy and thus it is the necessary outcome of democracy to allow nationalities to 
administer their own affairs. It considers the process as the only alternative for the survival of the 
country and to keep intact as a multiethnic state by creating ethnic equality and thus discouraging 
separatist tendencies and conflicts associated with ethnic dissatisfactions.  
 
Ethiopia contains about 70 million people and approximately about 80 ethnic and linguistic groups. The 
‘ethnic- federal’ experiment of devolving public sector powers to ethnic groups goes against the 
centralized nation-building project of the previous regimes. The previous regimes used a different 
model; they gave much emphasis to ‘Ethiopian nationalism’ as a unifying concept and promoted 
centralization rather than regional or ethnic autonomy. The rule of the emperor was based on absolutism 
and concentration of power on the king himself through a patrimonial network of power, resource and 
privilege accumulation and distribution system that benefits the rulers and their few collaborators at 
local, regional and central levels with very little ethnic references. The major orientation of the imperial 
state was to use the state power for voracious appropriation of resources mainly from the peasantry in 
order to reward the few ruling nobilities, viceroy and their clienteles that maintain the survival of the 
highly centralised state. Although the brutality of appropriation and mode of domination differ from 
place to place due to the historical process and mode of incorporation into the centralized state structure, 
the expansion toward the south accompanied with the assertion of cultural superiority of the Orthodox 
Christian core, the serfdom and slavery of the people of the south and the extraction of resources 
(Donham 2002: 01, Clapham 2002: 10, Teshale 1995: 176, Bahiru 1994, Messay 1995). As the emperor 
was a theoretical owner of all land in Ethiopia, many of the southern Ethiopian peasantry were turned in 
to serfs in their own land when the ‘ownership’ of their land was transferred to the nobilities and loyal 
followers of the imperial authority. Though the predatory state had showed inconsequential favouritism 
based on ethnicity, it promoted ‘state nationalism’ and ‘national integration’ of course, with the 
perception of national identity as the mirror-image of the Shoan ruling elite’s ethnic and cultural 
manifestations such as Amharic language, Orthodox Christianity, self-proclaimed moral superiority and 
military triumph over others. However, it is undeniable that language proficiency plays a significant role 
to determine better access to education and employment by putting in a disadvantageous situation those 
groups whose language is not used in employment and education.      
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The military regime, after 1974, repeatedly stressed that it preferred ‘socialist’ solution to the 
nationalities question but promoted militaristic nationalism by means of authoritarian and strongly 
centralized political system. It initiated, however, few measures like broadcasting radio programmes in 
Afar, Somali, Oromiffa and Tigrgna language, establishing national research institution for studying 
nationalities and drawing a new internal boundary based on ethno-territorial bases. It also made a radical 
shift in landownership in 1975, particularly in the southern part of Ethiopia by destroying the 
exploitative and unjust land appropriation of the nobility and others. Although the radical change 
abolished serfdom by distributing the land to the peasants, land remained the property of the state and 
thus made the peasantry highly intervened and controlled by the state. Nevertheless, it did not make any 
attempt to link ethnic rights with politics or governance issues. Rather without any regional or ethnic 
prejudices, it imposed its greater centralization and brutal governance system, controlled at the core by 
junior military officers regardless of their ethnic affiliation or orientations. Militaristic state nationalism 
blended with socialism was promoted by hoping to obliterate regional and ethnic movements, however, 
excessive centralization backed by ruthless coercion did not abate regional and ethnic movements. 
Rather, it exacerbated internal turmoil and massive resentment of the population, which provided a good 
opportunity for the expansion of ethnonational movements that finally overrun the state’s centre in 1991 
by defeating the military regime.   
 
In 1991, the new ruling group in power, who had started their movement for the liberation of their ethnic 
region from the central Ethiopian administration, has advocated ethnic- federalism by stressing that it 
could empower and equalize the diverse ethnic communities and reduce conflict. Thus, ethnic 
federalism is considered as the only alternative for assuring the survival of the country as a united, 
peaceful and democratic entity. As a result, the overall centralized structure of the previous regime has 
been replaced by a ‘federal’ system’ consists of nine ethnically and regionally delimited states with 
various ethnic self-administrative constituencies that could exercise their own political power and legal 
personalities. Generally, the political structure is reorganized on the basis of constitutionally legitimised 
terms of ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’.  
 
As a result, ethnicity and federalism have become the major factors in organizing the political and 
territorial space in the country. However, it remains to be seen how far this social, territorial and 
political arrangements is really successful in transforming the Ethiopian state into a workable ethnic 
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federal model. Close exploration and examination of the process will determine whether ethnic federal 
formula in Ethiopia would be appropriate model to empower and equalize the diverse and disparate 
ethnic groups.   
 
1.2 The Research Problem 
Structuring of society and politics on the basis of ethnicity has been viewed by many scholars as a risky 
approach for the reason that politicisation of ethnicity could excessively awaken ethnic consciousness 
and unleash ethnic groupings at the expense of shared identities and interspersed settlements (Horowitz 
1985, Mammo 1998; Messay 1999, Clapham 2002). It is held that ethnic entitlements could give much 
more leverage to blood relationships and ascriptive loyalties in place of rights and duties (Kedourie 
1993). It could also promote the rule of kin, instead of the rule of law, because ascribed ethnic solidarity 
is more important than merit and other achieving qualities in the ideology of ethnic entitlement therefore 
sharing the same genealogy will be a reassurance for assuming political leadership. Thus, ethnic 
entitlement can also be used by ethnic leaders to gather justification or legitimisation for autocratic rule 
in the name of their ethnic community, as the famous aphorism of John Stuart Mill echoed that: ‘Free 
institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities’ (Mill, 1977: 547). 
Similarly, Ali A. Mazrui also asserts that the preponderance of affinitive or kinship ties within societies 
would pose formidable barriers to build tolerant multiethnic societies (Ali. A. Mazrui 1975: 67).        
  
Moreover, emphasis on ethnic solidarity could justify the primacy of group rights over individual rights. 
Individuals would be differentiated first and foremost by their kinship identity and thus, their rights will 
be recognised primarily so far as they belong to a particular ethnic group; their right as individuals 
would become secondary or even unrecognisable without their ethnic domain. The individual therefore 
must belong to the group; there is heavy restriction to operate outside the bond of the group. This limits 
the liberty of individuals to freely choose their membership in any group based on their interests, 
aspirations or other preferences. As Hobsbawm argues ‘ethnicity can mobilize the vast majority of its 
community- provided its appeal remains sufficiently vague or irrelevant’ (Hobsbawm 1990: 170). It 
assumes that the rights and interests of the people would only be better managed through the leadership 
of their kin-persons by the mere assumption that members of the kin group would always operate within 
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evenly shared social, economic and political environments. Such ethnic structuring assumes that 
individual and his ethnic groups always operate within the same social, economic and political settings.   
 
Moreover, ethnic entitlement could easily give a venue for the rise of ethnic elites into political power 
by exaggerating the benefit of genealogical solidarity, and construct the sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
dichotomy. The ethnic elite could easily utilise the opportunity for acquiring political power through 
superficial and unchallenging support in the name of ethnic empowerment and ascriptive rights to 
political power, but in many cases simply to gain 'new strategic positions of power': places of 
employment, taxation, funds for development, political position and so on (Cohen 1969). It can also lead 
for personal enrichment and other benefits by ethnic elites through ethnic gerrymandering or 
manipulating and using ethnic causes to secure benefits and objectives (Mazrui 1975).  
 
On the other hand, scholars concerned about ethnically fragmented societies suggest that in order to 
reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts, it is imperative for multiethnic states to engineer accommodative 
structure in order to achieve peaceful coexistence (O’Leary 2002, Lijphart 1994; 2002). A prominent 
scholar in the field of ethnicity, politics and power-sharing in multiethnic societies, Arend Lijphart 
(1994) advises for designing ethnic power sharing arrangements or consociational model in segmented 
or divided societies. According to Arend Lijphart that successful political accommodation of diverse 
ethnic groups could be achieved through recognition and devising appropriate institutions for 
accommodation and power sharing. In his discussion of consociational politics, Lijphart enumerated 
four necessary institutional arrangements in accommodating diversities. These are power sharing 
government (grand coalition), mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1977). In 
his discussion Lijphart outlined the necessity to have proportional representation from all significant 
groups, a protection for minority groups and a territorial autonomy or non-territorial division of power 
or functional autonomy.  
 
In line with Lijphart’s argument other scholars suggest also that stability in culturally fragmented 
countries increases if these countries adopt a political system characterised by proportionality, grand 
coalition, federalism and strong veto points (Steiner et al 2003: 82). Ethnic federalism is suggested as a 
relatively preferable institutional arrangement in the case of geographically concentrated ethnic groups. 
Federalism can provide an autonomous space for power exercise and a space for expression for 
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territorially concentrated homogeneous ethnic groups. In such case it could reduce demands for 
separation and other tensions associated with secession. Although Lijphart's consociational democracy is 
criticized for its high reliance on the good will of elites, it may be used as a way in for engineering 
appropriate institutional structures in places where diverse ethnic groups are competing and fighting for 
controlling the state power. 
 
In contrast, scholars like Donald Horowitz (1985 & 2002) and Basta Fleiner (2000) argue that ethnic 
federalism as a means to ensure ethnic self-government could further radicalise ethnic problem by 
turning ethnic demands into political principles rather than providing a remedy or cure.  They argue that 
as ethnic federalism demands inter-ethnic coalition therefore it could be very unstable form of 
government, because ethnic elites could be possessed by their own sectional self-interest to pull apart the 
coalition or they could also be constrained by their ethnic community if they concede much for the sake 
of cooperation. Horowitz therefore argues that federalism should aim to create an integrative dynamics 
by encouraging ethnically heterogeneous groups or political units to work together within a shared 
structure that can provide incentives for inter-ethnic co-operation. For Horowitz, non-ethnic federal units 
could help to forge common interests, other than ethnic identities, among people living within the same 
federal units in order to compete against the other federal units beyond ethnic interests. Horowitz 
believes that the remedy for ethnic problem is institutionalisation of ‘ethnically blind’ structures and 
policies that could reduce or undermine ethnic divide.  
 
Empirically also ethnic associations and ethnic parties have been discouraged and banned in many 
countries and in majority cases due to fear of the presumed radical and destructive backlashes of ethnic 
demands and ethnic rights. Vindictive horrors of ethnic conflicts, genocide and ethnic cleansing in cases 
like in Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Nigeria and also relatively less but unrelenting and destructive 
ethnic strives in places such as in Sudan, India, Malaysian, Sri Lanka and others are signalling the 
recalcitrance nature of ethnic demands and also indicating the difficult challenges connected to ethnic 
entitlement and ethnic rights.         
 
However, in Ethiopia, ethnic restructuring and ethnic entitlement has become the foundation for state 
restructuring since 1991. Recognising and institutionalising ethnic entitlement and ethnic rights in 
politics has been officially endorsed through ethnic federal restructuring. Subsequently, ethnic-based 
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parties and association are becoming a favourable political association mainly because of a strong 
encouragement by the new ruling group. The new Constitution even went to the extent of granting the 
rights of self-determination including secession for every ethnic group constituting the Ethiopian State. 
This is known as the 'democracy of ethnic groups' and according to this notion that the Ethiopian State is 
a summation of several ethnic identities, and therefore if Ethiopia is to be held together, it is only on the 
‘free will’ of its constituent ethnic groups. Although ethnic solidarity may contribute to personal 
identity, self-esteem and cultural expression, its insertion into politics as a basis for organisation and 
competition could be counterproductive in multi-ethnic society such as Ethiopia 
 
In Ethiopia where there are more than 80 ethnolinguistic groups, the promotion of ethnic restructuring 
through ethnic federalism may end up in the proliferation of non-viable mini-states or, in the worst case, 
the disintegration of the whole federal framework by encouraging competition for power and hostilities 
among the diverse ethnic groups. Structuring internal boundaries along ethnic lines in ethnically mixed 
areas could alienate many people and could result in exclusion and ethnic cleansing and abuse of 
individual rights. The ethnic federal arrangement could also put limit on the liberty of individual citizens 
and minority ethnic groups by institutionalising despotism of ethnic leaders from majority ethnic groups. 
So the mix of ethnicity with federalism could become an antithesis of liberty. Violating the rights of 
individuals and ethnic minority groups could unleash hatred and hostility that could culminate into 
reciprocal and revengeful violence and ethnic fighting. As a consequence, ethnic federalism could be a 
wobbly model to promote peace and stability in the country, which has already experienced a long 
period of internal turmoil and conflict. Based on this background, therefore, it is essential to ask how the 
ethnic federal model could protect the country from such unpromising and disastrous future. 
 
Moreover, the majority of the populations in Ethiopia have no adequate access to education, health and 
other social services. The expansion of administrative and bureaucratic structures in each ethnic 
constituency as a result of ethnic federalism could divert the already scarce resources to administrative 
and bureaucratic purposes at the expense of other more pressing social needs. Subsequently, it could 
downgrade other important issues like tackling poverty and improving the well being of the people. 
Would the majority of the poor care much whether their kin or others are ruling them in the situation 
where their main concern, that is, tackling poverty, is relegated to a minor issue?  
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The introduction of new regional/ethnic languages as an official language in each ethnic area could 
create formidable challenges for creating a common single social, economic and political space for the 
constituting numerous and disparate ethnic communities. It could also hinder a proper utilisation of the 
available human resource that has been accumulated for a century but has not trained to communicate 
with these new regional/ethnic languages. In worst scenario, this could make this trained human 
resource irrelevant and out of use in the ethnic areas. Preference could also be given to the professed 
‘natives’ or ‘indigenous’ inhabitants of the ethnic areas regardless of qualifications or experiences, 
which could result in inefficiency and mismanagement. Hence, is it becoming a counter movement of 
modernisation? 
 
Ethnic restructuring could also create obstacles in developing a common citizenship and identity.  It 
would erode shared identities that have been developed through the long history of interaction among 
the Ethiopian people. In diverse society like Ethiopia, ethnic entitlement could result in a tendency to 
overstate the importance and virtue of one's identity and playing down the others'. These would finally 
produce ethnic hatred and conflict and in the long run, it could break-up the Ethiopian State into 
fragmented and nonviable mini-states. 
 
Since the introduction of the ethnic federal project in 1991, there have been wide-ranging claims 
especially by many Ethiopian intellectuals that the ethnic federal structure would collapse in a short time 
and the country could immerse into ethnic conflict. Despite these claims, however, the ethnic federal 
arrangement has survived for more than a decade. This short period of survival may not be enough to 
assure the continuation or sustainability of the system; nevertheless it triggers an interest to understand 
how it has able to survive and also to engage in finding the possible explanations regarding the pattern 
and trend of the restructuring process. It becomes therefore essential to examine whether the ethnic 
federal system has allowed the various ethnic groups the right for self-government or it has adopted a 
different strategy. Has the system managed to create a stable and workable polity? What are its concrete 
implications for the Ethiopian society at large? The dissertation therefore by investigating the above and 
other relevant issues, it wants to answer the main questions of the research, which are:  
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How effective has ethnic federalism been in Ethiopia in fulfilling the demands of various ethnic 
groups for self-administration at the local level, and promoting equal representation and 
participation at the national level within the context of a workable Ethiopian state?  
 
How successful is ethnic federalism in Ethiopia in promoting self-rule and shared rule 
simultaneously?  
 
1.3. Methodology  
This study utilized an empirical exploratory research method that helped in collecting a considerable 
amount of empirical information and data in order to answer the research questions of the dissertation. 
Moody argues that while primarily used in academic research, empirical research method could also be 
useful in answering practical question (Moody 2005). In situations where the prior knowledge is not 
adequate, the best strategy may be to employ the empirical research approach (Armstrong 1970: 27).  
The method is often preferred and used in entering completely unexplored fields, and it could become 
less purely empirical as the acquired mastery of the field increases. Indeed, a higher degree of intuitive 
ability may be required to successfully utilize this particular method.  
 
Thus, the empirical research method can be an effective tool to investigate how ethnic federalism is 
actually working in Ethiopia. Ethnic federalism, which started in 1991, is comparatively a new 
phenomenon in Ethiopian politics. To date adequate academic work has not been done regarding its 
actual operation, particularly at the regional states level. A methodology has to be chosen as a focusing 
device in discovering empirical regularities and possible explanations of the actual operation of the 
federal system. An attempt will be made to find possible explanations to some of the emerging trends in 
the process of the investigation as the buildup of the empirical understanding grows. Furthermore, the 
most important approach in investigation of any federal system would be acquiring of an empirical 
knowledge at the operational level of the system. Pragmatically, how it function and what challenges 
and opportunities it has faced empirically in order to understand the process and structure of  the 
arrangement.  
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 The selection of theories is based on their contribution in explaining and interpreting the reality as well 
as their ability in establishing a framework for observing and conceptualising the empirical research. As 
Stoker explains without theory ‘no effective observation can take place’ (Stoker 1995: 17). Theories can 
help to restructure empirical observations and also to pick out ‘certain factors as the most important or 
relevant,’ if one is interested in exploring or providing an explanation of an event. Although 
accumulation of empirical information is valuable, a proper theoretical foundation is helpful to 
restructure empirical findings or observations. Moreover, as Elazar claims that the practical application 
of federal arrangements must always rest on some set of theoretical principles (Elazar 1987). 
 
 In this regard theories of ‘federalism’ and ‘ethnicity’ have been selected in order to set up an analytical 
tool for exploring the actual working of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. I assume that the theoretical 
investigation can reveal the tensions between ethnicity and federalism at the conceptual level. The 
theories will also help to understand and identify the contending positions and ideas in the debates 
concerning ethnicity and federalism. In particular, theories of federalism are derived from a number of 
historical-geographical experiences; therefore it would be inappropriate to treat them as a standard to 
judge other wide range of settings. The assumption is that the theoretical examination would make 
possible to establish a body of knowledge about the in/compatibility and tensions between ethnicity and 
federalism at normative level and this could help to establish an analytical tool or framework to explore 
ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The theories of ethnicity is used mainly in its synthesis with federalism 
and for the purpose of identifying the challenges ethnicity could pose to federalism, rather than to 
engage into the whole theoretical debate about ethnicity.    
 
The main method used in investigating the empirical information regarding the actual operation of 
ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is divided into two: examination and analysis of documents, and 
qualitative interviews of individuals. In order to enhance quality and validity, the study used multiple 
sources. The examination of various categories of document included academic and research papers, 
government and regional state documents, press reports in local vernacular and evaluative studies of 
local government and various sources statistical data. A qualitative interviews were carried out involving 
the members of the federal parliament and states councils, states’ executives, federal and states civil 
servants, officials and members of the ruling parties and opposition parties at states and federal levels, 
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resigned or expelled officials at the states and federal levels, local opinion maker, elders, leaders of self-
help associations at regional states level, rural development agents and other relevant sources. 
 
The qualitative interview method is preferred because the actual operation or ethnic federalism in 
process can be best captured through an analyses of data gathered by such primary interviews. It fits 
Yin’s methodological observation that qualitative methods tend to be more appropriate at the early 
stages of research and when a subject area is not well understood (Yin, 1994). It is also suitable when 
applying research in revealing real world settings and dynamics (Moody 2005). Qualitative interviews 
can give a better opportunity to observe, discover and interpret information through close interaction and 
relationships with the respondents. Open-ended interviews, which allow the respondents to talk at length 
about experiences, views and events, could facilitate a better opportunity for the respondent to express 
opinion and respond freely. It is also helpful for the researcher to closely understand the interviewee’s 
subjective interpretations and meanings they prefer to assign and hold about views, behaviors, actions 
and events. The researcher’s close interaction with the respondents could also give a better opportunity 
to understand how they build the logic of their arguments and the basic thinking behind their 
conclusions. In the Ethiopian context, political polling is non-existent and often may not be suitable. 
This is because very often the interviewees, especially at the local areas are not at ease in giving their 
political opinion in open and written forms. Therefore face-to-face interview and discussion in non-
stressful settings could be better alternatives. The qualitative interview method may appear subjective, 
as the interpretation and analyses of data rely ‘heavily on the researchers knowledge and experience to 
identify patterns, extract themes and make generalizations’ (Ibid). However, the study also utilizes the 
findings of some quantitative researches, such as studies carried out by the World Bank, national and 
regional census data and findings from other academic works that could help for further substantiation. 
The key contribution to knowledge is to find out how ethnic federalism actually works. It goes beyond 
those who wish to sell the idea it is good and those who reject as bad. It concentrates its source of 
analyses on those who experience by listening to the voices of those who in the system. 
 
A total of sixty-four qualitative interviewees were conducted: thirty were government officials and 
members of the ruling party at the regional and local levels; twenty-seven were from the civilian 
population who have strong local community whose hears are on the ground and who may be close the 
views of the ordinary people. Particularly the Eder leaders and elders are very vital and key sources of 
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local information because of their proximity to the ordinary people and their relatively better tuning on 
the political process in their locality. Eder is a community association, democratically and voluntarily 
established by local people to organise a variety of community services for its members. In the majority 
of cases, Eder leaders are highly respected and reliable individuals. Thus, in most cases, information 
gleaned from Eder leaders is considered to be relatively reliable. Similarly, elders, particularly those 
who command high respect in the community, can be a valuable source of valid and reliable 
information. On the contrary, in many cases, information from the officials and politicians (including 
opposition groups) are disputable and controversial, but it is necessary to register their views and claims, 
in spite of the fact as politicians they are bound to pursue specific interest. As Yin claims that the use of 
multiple source or triangulation could be helpful to confirm the validity of the process (Yin 1994). The 
strategy employed in this research may not deliver total validity but it is most likely to provide 
reflections and understandings by those who loose and gain in the unfoldment of ethnic federalism. 
Information and claims from the politicians and officials were rechecked through interviews of elders, 
Eder leaders, and non-political and opposition groups and vice versa in order to confirm the accurate 
description of the process or glean alternative explanations. 
 
From the total of sixty-four qualitative interviews, fourteen interviewees were conducted in Benishangul 
Gumuz, twenty-three in the SNNP and twenty-seven in Oromia regional states. The greater number of 
interviews was conducted in the Oromia region, which has the largest population in the country. The 
next greater number of interviews was conducted in the SNNP, which has the largest number of ethnic 
groups in the country. In the Benishangul, which has five small ethnic groups (of which the three are 
very small) and relatively smaller population, relatively a smaller numbers of interviews were 
conducted. Although the number of interviewees may look smaller in numbers, a qualitative interview, 
which mainly utilises unstructured questionnaires, brings a great deal of vital information through face-
to-face discussion. In some cases, an interview from a single individual took more than five pages. In 
addition, most of the interviewees were selected purposefully because of their roles, status and 
knowledge in connection to the process of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. Therefore the quality of the 
interviews is fairly adequate in providing vital information   
 
As it was promised to the interviewees to protect their privacy and in order to avoid risks they may face 
regarding possible retribution because of the interview, the names of all of the interviewees are not 
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revealed in the dissertation. The interviewees are identified in their roles and status in a way that would 
not compromise their safety. The same documentation procedure was applied to the officials and 
members of the ruling party. As revealed in the dissertation, many officials and ruling party members 
had expressed contrary views and disagreements to the official policies and positions of their party and 
the ruling party in many issues due to various reasons, but they prefer to remain anonymous. Thus, to 
protect the anonymity of the interviewees and yet to satisfy the requirement of documentation of the 
research, the interviewees or informants are identified by common names and numbers. For instance, the 
documentation sample: ‘(A member of the regional executive from Gumuz, Interviewee 4, 2002: 5)’, 
refers to the political roles of the interviewee, the interviewee number, the year of the interview 
conducted and the page number in my field note respectively. The numbers assigned to the interviewees 
are classified as follows: from number 1 to 19 to the Benishangul Gumuz regional state, from 21 to 49 to 
the SNNP regional state and from 51 to 79 to the Oromia regional states.   
 
At the outset, the investigation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia starts with exploring the factors behind 
ethnic federalism in Ethiopia as well as the initial phase of the implementation process. A coalition 
formation and negotiation process at the initial phase or the transitional period can provide useful 
information regarding the intention and role of the actors involved and the opportunities provided for the 
concerned people at large. Drafting of the new constitution, redrawing of internal boundaries along 
ethnic lines, the formation and coalition of ethnic political parties and other major activities have been 
carried out in the transitional period. Generally speaking, the basic foundations of the ethnic federal 
arrangement were laid during the transitional period. The launching period becomes critically relevant 
for the analysis.  
  
By extending the study at the actual operational level, the assessment will be divided into two main 
empirical parts. The first empirical part will make a detailed assessment of the procedures of delimiting 
regional states, the provisions of the constitution, and the distribution of political and fiscal power 
between the federal and state governments. In this part the attempt will be to explore three key issues. 
One, it will examine the political economic and social essence of the regional states. Two, by examining 
the constitution, it will attempt to identify the extent of how the federal-states relationship is governed 
by the basic federal principle of ‘self-rule’ and ‘shared rule’. It is vital to identify the role and power of 
the states in policy-making and implementation process at the federal and state level. The extent of the 
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states representation, not only through their physical presence, but also their active involvement at the 
federal level would reflect to some extent the tendency of the federal framework. The modalities of their 
representation could also inform about the trend and pattern of the federal system. Three, it will 
investigate the distribution of fiscal resource and power between the federal and regional states. 
Distribution and control of resources are of crucial importance in federal-state interaction. The power to 
control resources could also provide an opportunity to exercise power in other domains of the federal 
and regional states relations, and this could also in turn shape the function of the overall federal 
structure.     
 
The second empirical part focuses on the selected three regional states, which are believed to be 
appropriate to make holistic and in-depth investigation in order to bring sufficient knowledge regarding 
the operation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The focal areas of the investigation are the internal 
operations and structures of the regional states, the governance process in relation to the people, the 
rights of various groups and minorities within the respective states.  
 
The three selected regional states are the Oromia Regional State, the South Nation, Nationalities and 
Peoples regional state (SNNP) and the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. These regional states are 
selected because of the different features and structures they exhibit within their respective states. This 
would help in bringing a variety of experiences and factors that could help to explain the operation of 
ethnic federalism at regional states level that could present the overall national picture in, somewhat, 
adequate manner.  
 
To illustrate some of the main characteristics of the selected three regional states: First, the Oromia 
regional state has the largest population in the country (accounting for about one-third of the country’s 
population) and also it contains significant (about 15 per cent) non-Oromo population dispersed 
throughout the regionally states, especially residing in many of the urban areas in the region. It has 
introduced a new regional language (Oromiffa) in administration and education. It has the major 
concentration of the country’s industrial establishments and other infrastructures.  Some of the Oromo 
political elites and many of the intellectuals have been suspecting of harbouring and promoting 
separatist or secessionist agenda.  
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Second, the SNNP (Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples) regional state accounts for about 20 
percent of the population and 75 percent of the ethnic groups in the country. As the name itself indicates 
the regional state has about 60 diverse ethnic groups, and most of these ethnic groups are very small and 
lack qualified and educated manpower to run their own self-administration structures. It is a very vast 
region but without an effective transportation and communication infrastructure to connect the different 
parts of the regional state. The region has faced huge challenges due to compacting these numerous and 
disparate ethnic groups in a single political framework. This has aggravated ethnic competition and 
violent conflicts.  
 
Third, the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state is comprised of five small ethnic groups which are 
relatively marginalized and undeveloped. It has a very critical shortage of trained and educated 
manpower in all aspects of modern services and bureaucracies due to the fact that it was very rare to find 
a trained or educated individual from the five indigenous groups. The five ethnic groups did hardly get 
any experience in statecraft and administration. Consequently, the regional state is highly dependent 
upon support from the federal government.  
 
In addition to the different aspects that will be emphasised in each regional state based on their varied 
characteristics, the study also examines the interactions between the rulers and people.  It attempts to 
show how the ordinary people living in these regional states are perceiving the ethnic federal 
arrangement; what they found positive or negative in it; what they would like to see changed and their 
overall anticipation regarding the federal process and structures.  How they relate to the federal and state 
administrations? What are their expectations from each level of government that impact on their lives? 
In this connection, the study is also interested in discovering how ethnic federalism does affect politics, 
the behaviour of individuals and politicians, and societal relationships at the regional states' level. It tries 
to discover the overall trend whether the community has been threatened by the very essence of ethnic 
federalism.  
 
Particular consideration will also be given to understand specific effects of ethnic federalism on 
language and education. New regional/ethnic languages are in use in many areas thereby replacing the 
previous official language; therefore it is very essential to examine impacts of using regional and local 
languages. As regard to education, local languages have been introduced in many schools as a teaching 
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medium in order to educate children in their mother tongue, but most of these languages were not used 
before in education.  It is therefore essential to understand to what extent the teaching practices have 
been affected by the introduction of the new languages. More importantly, the introduction of the local 
language alone without simultaneous use of other regional or ‘national’ language could create 
communication gaps in the long run, so it is necessary to find out whether there is any other mechanism 
that has been laid out to mitigate this problem? The empirical analysis will highlight whether the ethnic 
federal arrangement in Ethiopia is successful in providing the rights of self-government to the various 
ethnic groups that constitute the Ethiopian State.  
 
With regard to epistemological issues, this research adheres to an interpretative theory that recognizes 
humans as social actors who are in a constant engagement in making their own social reality. Thus, the 
study recognizes that both the researcher and the interviewees are subjective actors who have their own 
belief, opinion and conviction and therefore the outcome of the research can be influenced by such 
subjective traits. As a result, utilization of interpretative theory with accessing and checking multiple 
sources (or triangulation) may become helpful in reducing subjectivity. In connection to qualitative 
interview, for example, if the ‘local officials’ express that the source of troubles in their locality are 
‘non-native’, this ‘discovery’ does not necessarily lead to accept their claim as genuine without checking 
other sources through triangulation. However, the information can provide clues concerning the 
relationship between the ‘non-natives’ and the officials in the local area. As a researcher also, before 
starting the field research I held a conviction and belief that ethnic federalism would be a better political 
framework for Ethiopia to survive as a workable multi-ethnic nation. I also believed that the ethnic 
organizations and their leaders are committed in maximizing the benefits and interests of their respective 
ethnic communities. But in the process of the research and after the empirical analysis, I have come 
through with knowledge to the contrary. Thus, the study remained open and flexible in permitting 
knowledge production based on the empirical information’s new insight. 
 
Methodological direction in this research is not selected based on comparing the values of methods, but 
the choice was made on a judgment based on their closer relevance to the research subject. It is not the 
conviction of this research to exaggerate the virtue of one method and understate others. Rather, it is 
believed that, in many instances, the findings of the research are the most important indicator whether 
the method used is beneficial or not. In this regard, the utilization of qualitative interviews research 
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method with an interpretative framework has been very helpful in getting closer to perceptions and 
convictions of the people in approaching and understanding the process of state restructuring in 
Ethiopia. The empirical analysis approach has also helped the study to dig out vital information that 
helps to give reflection about the actual operation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia 
 
1.4 Challenges and limitations in collecting and analysing the empirical 
information   
To start with published documents, in many cases the documents are highly influenced by the intentions 
and subjective interpretations of their authors. Government documents are very biased in exaggerating 
the positive achievements whereas disregarding or rejecting other bad or negative consequences. Non-
government’s and other reports are also biased to the intentions and interpretations of their authors; 
those who are convinced (for various other reasons) that ethnic federalism is undesirable (or desirable), 
they attempt to link or associate every negative (or positive) effects as a consequence of the federal 
system. Though, it is not accurate to take this type of evidence at face value, it is also very difficult to 
identify the intentions, which is, of course, a very difficult task for any research that wants to discover 
facts as they are in the ground. 
  
The interview process itself was affected by the above and other factors as well. Political discussions, 
especially in the regional and local areas, are viewed as very risky dealings; people fear that revealing 
some important information can compromise their security and livelihood. Sometimes, therefore, private 
interviews on political matters take the form of intelligence or spy work to understand the facts in the 
ground. Collection of confidential information mainly depends on personal trust; therefore, it is very 
difficult to validate such kinds of information in other interviews without compromising the safety of the 
respondents; as a result some valuable information could be discarded. In some cases individuals give 
official statement that are contrary to what they claim in non-official conversations, and thus it becomes 
difficult to identify which one is the ‘truth’; so in such situation personal interpretation and subjectivity 
was used but still with a danger of contaminating the information.  
 
An ethnic solidarity also influences the data collection process; in areas where the presumed threats 
from other ethnic groups are felt imminent, those who ethnically identify themselves with the regional 
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and/or local administrations tend to portray the system as valuable to them. Whereas, in other areas, in 
the absence of such presumed threats, they tend to criticise vigorously the regional or local 
administration even if they belong within the same ethnic group. In other cases, those individuals who 
are member of a minority ethnic group or member of other ethnic groups that are not ethnically 
belonging to the regional/local administrations tend to vehemently criticise and reject the federal process 
and structures. Though their information may have different intentions, it still could indicate the 
magnitude and depth of mistrust and exclusion that have been created due to the ethnic restructuring 
arrangement. Thus, all these factors have to be taken into account in gathering, interpreting and 
analysing the empirical information.  
1.5 The structure of the dissertation  
The dissertation is divided into nine chapters. The first chapter is consisted of three sections: an 
introduction, the main focus of the dissertation and the methodology. The introduction section begins by 
introducing the emerging state arrangement in Ethiopia since 1991 that has made an ideological change 
from the previous state structuring philosophies. It presents a brief description of the founding ideas and 
modalities of the two previous state arrangements in order to show the ideological shift in the current 
arrangement. The discussion will be extended to the main focus of the dissertation that tries to highlight 
the challenges that ethnicity could pose in the process of state structuring. It tries also to indicate, at least 
at theoretical level, a danger the country could face in elevating ethnic entitlement and ethnic autonomy 
as a core ideology of state restructuring. The major questions of the dissertation are also introduced in 
this section.  The methodology section introduces the research method, the theoretical considerations 
and the empirical cases. It also offers explanations for selecting the research method, the theories and the 
empirical cases. Lastly, the first chapter concludes by presenting the challenges and limitations of the 
empirical information. 
 
The second chapter presents a theoretical consideration of the dissertation. The theoretical presentation 
is divided into three main sections. The first section provides an account on the meaning and 
characterisation of federalism. It attempts to underline the various classification of the essence of 
federalism and also makes an attempt in identifying an operational definition of federalism. The second 
section of the theoretical chapter highlights the basic essence of federalism that is identified as a non-
fixation political arrangement that needs to be constantly adjusted and negotiated. The third section of 
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the theoretical chapter focuses on the challenges of federalism in multiethnic societies. This discussion 
is highly relevant and crucial to the main focus of the dissertation. It begins by defining the term 
ethnicity as well as presenting the main competing theoretical debates and critiques on ethnicity. It 
concludes that though ethnicity is an elusive and intractable phenomenon, it continues to create 
formidable challenges in state construction, particularly in deeply divided societies. By extending the 
theoretical arguments, a connection is made between ethnicity and the state in the theoretical analysis 
concerning ethnic federalism. The theoretical debate on ethnic federalism is focused between those 
competing positions that advocate and reject ethnic federalism. Finally, the theoretical chapter concludes 
by understanding that ethnicity is an elusive and fluid but increasingly expanding social phenomenon, 
thus it demands for engineering an acceptable political frameworks that could mitigate the inherent 
destructive inclinations of ethnic competitions.   
 
The third chapter investigates the reasons behind for the emergence of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The 
chapter underlines three crucial factors for the emergence of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. Firstly, an 
examination is made concerning the origin and objectives of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF) for waging an armed struggle by demanding regional autonomy or secession. Secondly, an 
examination is made concerning the process and rationale behind the establishment of the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The investigation on the establishment of the 
EPRDF indicates how the TPLF has been able to extend its authority from its ethnic constituency to 
other areas in Ethiopia. It also exhibits the nature of an ethnic coalition formation strategy. Thirdly, an 
investigation is made regarding the transitional period. In this investigation, the June 1991 conference, 
the charter and the transitional government are the major focus. The investigation emphasises the 
modalities and validity of the June 1991 conference, the essence of the charter and the operation and 
legitimacy of the transitional government. Overall, this chapter attempts to determine whether the ethnic 
federal arrangement in Ethiopia is evolving from a genuine aspiration as well as participation of the 
disparate ethnic groups that constitute the Ethiopian state.  
 
The fourth chapter provides an empirical description and analysis of the process and structure of ethnic 
federalism in Ethiopia. It focuses on investigating the process of structuring and characteristics of the 
ethnic territories, the constitutional distribution of political and financial power between the federal 
government and the regional states. The chapter also tries to determine what kind of ethnic federal 
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model is evolving in Ethiopia by investigating whether the relationship between the federal government 
and the states are based on the core principles of the federal relations. Overall, the chapter reveals the 
asymmetrical character of the regional states, the flaws and superficiality of the constitution and the 
vertical and horizontal imbalances in financial relations.  
 
Chapter five, six and seven are empirical chapters that explore the operation of ethnic federalism in the 
regional state. The chapters provide an account of ethnic configurations, administrative structures, 
constitutional and political processes, and financial capacities in the three regional states. The chapters 
bring empirical evidences that show the challenges in delimiting the states on ethnolinguistic criteria 
alone. The empirical exploration in the three states determines whether the arrangement is successful in 
nurturing a shared-rule and self-rule arrangement among the existing ethnic assortments. It also provides 
a clue whether the Ethiopia’s ethnic federal model suits the configuration of ethnic cleavages and 
rivalries on the ground.  
 
Chapter eight determines the advantages and disadvantages of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia by 
analysing the emerging trends in the three regional states. It also aims to determine whether the 
Ethiopia’s ethnic federal model is successful in promoting ethnic autonomy and ethnic equality as it 
professed. Is it successful in nurturing: ethnic cooperation or ethnic conflict; ethnic empowerment or 
ethnic dissatisfaction. Is it the empowerment of the ethnic communities or the ascendancy of the ethnic 
elites? Is the federal arrangement going in a direction of forging a workable polity? Is it a sustainable 
political arrangement for the people of Ethiopia?  Generally, the chapter attempts to determine the 
essence of the federal model that is evolving in Ethiopia.     
 
Finally, chapter nine makes a conclusion by presenting the conceptual and empirical flaws of the ethnic 
federal model in Ethiopia. It also tries to make a contribution to the scholastic debates on the challenges 
of state restructuring in the multiethnic societies.   
 
 25  
Chapter Two Theoretical Consideration on Federalism and 
Ethnicity 
Methodologically, the selection of the theories is based on their contribution in explaining and 
interpreting the reality as well as their ability in establishing an analytical framework for observing and 
conceptualising the empirical findings. In this regard theories of federalism and ethnicity have been 
selected in order to help in setting up a framework for observation and examination of the actual 
working of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The theoretical investigation could help to clear up the ground 
for the study by indicating tensions in synchronising ethnicity and federalism at least at the theoretical 
level. Hence, the analysis of theories will be used as a tool to approach the empirical material of the 
study and to understand the theoretical debates, but without being a 'grand narrative' to evaluate the 
empirical case. This dissertation assumes that a prior prescription or commitment to a single institutional 
form may not be helpful, however, political arrangements in multiethnic societies should take into 
consideration the configuration of ethnic cleavages and rivalries on the ground. In this connection, thus, 
federalism is not considered as a fixed formula of territorial division, rather it is an evolutionary political 
arrangement that could be applied in a manner to give meaning and relevance for particular societies and 
contexts.   
2.1 Understanding Federalism 
Scholars describe the term ‘federalism’ in various ways, such as political philosophy (King 1982), 
normative ideal (Elazar 1987b), ideological position (Burgess 2000), programmatic orientation (Smith 
1995) and historical phenomenon (Oyovbaire 1985). It is therefore essential to consider the various 
interpretations and definitions of the concept for the benefit of understanding the debates and to be as 
clear and explicit as possible when using the concept in this dissertation. A good point of departure is 
the definition developed by Daniel Elazar, one of the leading experts in field of federalism. According to 
Elazar ‘federalism has to do with the need of people and polities to unite for common purposes yet 
remain separate to preserve their integrity. Federalism is concerned simultaneously with the diffusion of 
political power in the name of liberty and its concentration on behalf of unity or energetic government’ 
(Elazar 1987, 33). Here, the basic federal principle is concerned with the combination of ‘self-rule’ and 
‘shared rule’. It is the framework that involves the linking of individuals, groups, and polities in lasting 
but limited union in such a way as to provide for the pursuit of common ends while maintaining the 
respective integrities of all parties. Accordingly, federalism is considered as a comprehensive system of 
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political relationships which emphasises the combination of self-rule and shared rule within a matrix of 
constitutionally dispersed powers.  Elazar interpreted federalism, as the contractual combination of self-
rule and shared-rule, as a broad genus of political organisation encompassing a range of different 
species. In his article, From Statism to Federalism, Elazar explicitly used the term ‘federal’ in its largest 
sense, not simply to describe modern federation like the United States, Canada, or Switzerland but all 
the various federal arrangements in use in the world today including federations, confederations and 
other confederal arrangements, associated states, special interest joint authorities with constitutional 
standing, and others (Elazar, 1995). 
 
In contrast, however, Ronald Watts warns that though defining federalism as a broad generic term 
encompassing a variety of forms is helpful, the use of ‘federalism’ as both a normative and a descriptive 
term opens some potential for logical confusion. Consequently, he argues, following Preston King’s 
distinction that making the three terms- ‘federalism’, ‘federal political systems’ and ‘federation’ -distinct 
is essential. According to Watts while ‘federalism’ should be seen as normative concept, ‘federal 
political systems’ should be understood as the generic descriptive term for the whole genus 
encompassing the wide variety of political systems combining ‘self-rule’ and ‘shared-rule’. In addition, 
he considers ‘federation’ as one specific form or species of federal political system, nothing as well that 
there may be hybrids combining some features of the different forms of ‘federal political systems’ 
(Watts 2000a, 14). 
 
In his vital contribution to the theoretical discussion, Preston King made a distinction between 
‘federalism’ and ‘federation’ as normative and descriptive terms respectively. Thus, ‘federation’ is 
defined ‘as an institutional arrangement, taking the form of a sovereign state, and distinguished from 
other such states solely by the fact that its central government incorporates regional units in its decision 
procedure on some constitutionally entrenched basis’, whereas, federalism is an ideological and/or 
philosophical position (King 1982: 75).  In accordance to this definition, there may be federalism 
without federation, but there can no be federation without some matching variety of federalism. 
 
Following King’s distinction of ‘federalism’ and ‘federation’, Michael Burgess explains that ‘federation’ 
as a constitutionally entrenched institution that recognises diversity in a state or as he puts it:  ‘the 
institutionalisation of those relationships in a state which have political salience,’ (Burgess 2000, 25).  
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Accordingly this type of political institution takes many forms and his definition is concerned chiefly 
with those diversities which have the capacity for political mobilisation. However, he makes the point 
that ‘federation is not a universal panacea to the politics of difference, on the contrary, it is one direct 
response to those diversities which can determine the very legitimacy and stability of the state itself’ 
(Ibid.). Thus for Burgess, ‘federation’ is a specific organisational form which includes structures, 
institutions, procedures and techniques. It is a tangible institutional reality. It is ‘a case of corporate self 
rule, which is to say as some form of democratic or constitutional government’ (Ibid. p. 26).   
 
There are however, many forms of democratic and constitutional rule, and federation is only one of 
these’ (Ibid.). In this line of thinking the gist of the matter is constitutional autonomy rather than mere 
division of power between central and local governments. The constituent units in a federation have the 
constitutionally endowed right of existence together with the right to area of legislative and 
administrative autonomy. ‘Constitutional entrenchment is, therefore, the key to their political, economic 
and cultural self-preservation. Indeed it is, the guarantee of their very survival as states within a larger 
state’ (Ibid.). 
 
Following his argument of the distinction between ‘federalism’ and ‘federation’, Burgess conceptualise 
‘federalism’ as ideological, in the sense that it can take the form of an overtly perspective guide to 
action, and as philosophical, to the extent that it is a normative judgement upon the ideal organisation of 
human relations and conduct (Ibid. p. 27). However he adds an operational dimension by considering 
that federalism can also as loaded upon as empirical fact in its recognition of diversity- broadly 
conceived in its social, economic, cultural and political contexts-as a living reality, something that exists 
independent of ideological and philosophical perceptions. This means that in practice, authority should 
be divided and power should be dispersed among and between different groups in a society. But, 
according to Burgess, the significance of federalism can be understood and appreciated when the 
concept is taken to manifest a particular meaning when it comes to its application to specific cultural and 
historical milieus. Like federation, federalism is rooted in its contexts, and meaning derives from the 
contextual background. ‘We must therefore locate the concept in its own distinct setting: historical, 
cultural, intellectual, social, economic, philosophical, and ideological. In this way we can begin to 
appreciate its huge multidimensional complexities’ (Ibid). To demonstrate the distinction between 
‘federalism’ and ‘federation’, the author brings in the case of the European Union. ‘The EU of course is 
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not a federation; it does not fit the established criteria by which we conventionally define such a state’ 
(Ibid. p. 29). As we can grasp from this distinction it is not given that every type of ‘federalism’ will 
always lead to ‘federation’, in the sense that Europe will simply be a national state. Here, we have a 
classic case of federalism without federation.  
 
On the other hand, Graham Smith questions the notion of considering federalism as an ideology. Rather 
than considering federalism as an ideology that has developed and exists autonomously from the main 
tradition of political thought, he writes that ‘federalism is best treated as traversing a broad range of 
what we can more usefully call programmatic orientation (Smith, 1995: 4).  In his opinion, the term 
‘federalism’ has been subjected to different meanings and applied to different situational contexts. He 
states that ‘federalism as ideology is best considered as an amalgam of doctrines, beliefs and 
programmatic considerations reflect in the very paradoxes and tensions inherent in thinking about the 
politics of modernity’ (Ibid). In making a distinction between ‘federalism’ and ‘federation,’ Smith 
considers that federation can be referred as one of the end stages of federalism. However, to distinguish 
federations from other types of political formations in order to reduce the risk of self-ascription, Smith 
suggests that an explicit definition of ‘federation’ is appropriate and he agrees with King who identifies 
‘federation’ as an institutional arrangement on some constitutionally entrenched basis.  
 
Generally speaking, King’s definition of federation is considered as appropriate and helpful in the study 
of federalism (Smith 1995:7; Watts 2000a: 14; Burgess 2000: 25). Consequently it is useful to keep in 
mind King's conception of federation which contain the following four essential features: 
• The base of its representation is preponderantly territorial;  
• The territorial representation has at least two tiers (local government and regional 
government)  
• The region units are electorally and perhaps otherwise incorporated into the decision 
procedure of the national centre;  
• The incorporation of the regions into the decision procedure of the centre cannot be easily 
altered, as by resort to the bare majoritarian procedure which serves normal purposes: 
regional, territorial representation, in short, must be ‘entrenched’ (King, 1982: 143). 
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It follows that federal arrangement necessarily involves not only devolution of power to constituent 
territorial units, but also constitutionally guaranteed autonomy and representation of these units. In 
principle, therefore the centre does not have legal right to abrogate or redefine the territories of the units.  
 
In contrast, Riker understands ‘federalism as a range of phenomena rather than a single constitutional 
thing’ (Rikker 1975: 103). Federal arrangement does not always mean that the boundaries of power are 
clearly fixed on a permanent basis, but rather a continuous political bargain and process. It is not a static 
and fixed phenomenon. Riker places federalism on a continuum scale with respect to centralisation and 
decentralisation. ‘Federalism is a political organisation in which the activity of government are divided 
between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has 
some activity on which it makes final decision’ (Ibid. p. 101). Federalism is a contextual phenomenon. 
The central government may enter the sphere of actions provided for regions but of course, without 
completely endangering their autonomy. Therefore, federalism depends on circumstances and the 
balance of conflict, consensus and resource. As John Agnew put it ‘federalism is an evolutionary 
political arrangement rather than a fixed formula for the territorial division of government powers. The 
balance of power between central and regional units could change over time’ (Agnew 1995: 294). 
 
Following Riker and Agnew, Sam Egite Oyovbaire, in his work on the Nigerian federalism, argues that 
federalism is an historical phenomenon and should be studied outside ideological premises (Oyovbaire, 
1985: 19). By supporting Riker's position, he argues that the dominant intellectual viewpoint confuses 
federalism as a means with federalism as an end in itself. He contends that this kind of approach 
presupposes an assessment of federal governments to start from a normative position and then to 
exclude other arguments for other variants of federalism. As a result Oyovbaire argues that rejecting 
federalism as an end in itself would allow treating federalism as an historical phenomenon. Thus he 
asserts ‘one does not decide on the merit of federalism by an examination federalism in the abstract, but 
rather on its actual meaning for particular societies’ (Ibid. p. 37). In this option, viewing federalism as an 
historical phenomenon has two advantages. Firstly, ‘it makes conceptually possible to study federalism 
without the constraints of the received paradigm of federalism; secondly, it enables one to study the 
actual power distribution outside the formal (or alleged) constraints of the regime in power’ (Ibid. p. 21). 
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Nonetheless, the weakness of this historical approach is that it may create confusion by stretching the 
concept too widely so as to become vague and meaningless, or to serve other purposes of 'false 
federalism'. However, detaching federalism from ideology does make sense; as it may otherwise become 
an ideology or an end in itself rather than a means of restructuring society-state relationships. 
Consequently, it may be possible to study federalism without attaching ideological considerations or 
values like democracy and other related concepts to the nature of the regime. But, in this sense, there 
may be a danger to view federalism as a project that depends on negotiation and consensus among 
groups or elites without considering the interests of the involved peoples. It is very problematic 
argument, unless we associate some feature to this kind of federal arrangement, which could be 
classified as ‘elites’ federal system’ or consociational framework (Lijphart 1977; 2002) where the 
interests of the people are considered to be, to some extent, as same as those of the elites. Nevertheless, 
a federal system that does not entail accountability and misrepresent popular interest can easily develop 
into an oligarchic rule, or regional (local) tyranny.  
 
Without basic consensus on some form of federal principles and processes it is likely that the concept 
could become too flexible and any regime could call its system ‘federal’ on the basis of the mere 
existence of the structures alone. AS King states that ‘if it is to be used meaningfully, it has to be given 
some reliable and fairly fixed sense (King 1982: 90). Otherwise ‘the variety of meanings associated with 
federation creates a genuine basis for misunderstanding’ (Ibid. p. 71). Hence, the gist of the matter is not 
determined only by the presence of the structures, but indeed, the reflection of the process as well and in 
the senses of relationships that exist between and within the federal and the states structures as well as 
peoples-states relations. The process could reflect, in some justifiable form, to the extent the structures 
embody the interests of the people. ‘It not only embraces individual citizens, with an equal entitlement 
to vote, but also individual territories or states or provinces, which also enjoy some form of equal 
influence at the federal centre’ (Ibid. p. 91). Subsequently, without such a process, the federal structure 
could just serve as a means for the concentration of power or the tyranny of local oligarchy in the name 
of federalism or regional government. 
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2.2 Federalism as a continuing political bargain 
The above discussion suggests that federal arrangement is to be understood as associated with some kind 
of constitutionalised or legally binding division of governmental powers and functions on a territorial 
basis within a single country. More specifically it could be understood as a state structuring established 
on the principles of ‘self-rule and ‘shared rule’ in order to attempt in creating a union of units while at 
the same time by preserving their specific integrity. This could be said to designate one of the basic 
objectives of a federal arrangement that tries to promote both unity and diversity at the same time. It 
involves both structures and processes that determine the division of power and functions between the 
centre and the regions, an agreed covenant and the existence of self-rule and shared rule simultaneously. 
It is a process that each part has an ‘equal’ or fair distribution of power in decision-making and 
implementing process.  
 
The preservation of self-rule together with shared-rule is also a very challenging task for any federal 
arrangement. The proper function of the federal arrangement highly depends on keeping the balance 
between what appears to be intrinsically conflictual objectives. In order to keep the balance, a federal 
arrangement relies on political bargaining in a continual process. As Elazar clearly put it every covenant 
involves consenting, promising and agreeing (Elazar, 1987: 06).  Covenantal arrangements do imply 
contractual relationships which should be founded on negotiation and compromises.  
 
As a result, covenantal relationship in federal arrangement does not intend to function on the principle of 
‘the winner takes all’ formula, rather it is characterised by continuous negotiation and bargaining. It is 
like a ‘give-and-take’ arrangement; to attain self-rule, it is a pre-requisite to participate in a shared-rule 
structure. It is not either one or other, but both must exist for the proper functioning of federal 
arrangements. This should not be taken to mean that units of the federal system have no power of 
unilateral decision in their jurisdiction, but rather this capacity should be made in the context of the 
principle of shared-rule.  
 
Unilateral decisions or actions that violate the principle of shared-rule are contrary to the federal 
principles that are agreed beforehand. It is not always easy to respect these seemingly contradictory 
principles of federalism, the elements of self-rule and shared-rule, at the same time. Especially, in cases 
of different and irreconcilable fundamental interests between ethnic groups it may be difficult to respect 
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the constitutional agreements rigidly on permanent basis. But considering federalism as a continuing 
political bargain could lessen this tension. After all, federalism is not a static process. 
 
In theory and practice, the federal principle does not entail the imposition of a decision of the whole on 
the part; otherwise it would assume a ‘tyranny of the majority’. In the federal principle there is as such 
no lower or higher units of power, but only smaller or larger units, since power is agreed to function in a 
matrix or non-hierarchical way. The whole is not greater than the parts.  However it is not always 
straightforward to follow the non-hierarchical power function especially when we observe or investigate 
a variety of federal systems in the real world where there are examples of majoritarian arrangements. In 
some asymmetrical federal systems there may be variations in the distribution of power among the 
federal units.  
 
Federations have enormous variations in aspects such as in relationships of the constituent entities to the 
federation, degree of symmetry or asymmetry in relative powers and the number and size of their 
constituent units. Ronald Watts enumerates the variations of federations as follows: ‘in Canada, largely 
majoritarian in their character and process, or are predominately consociational as in Switzerland and 
Belgium. The federal and state institutions are parliamentary in form or emphasise the separation of 
powers, as in the United States and Switzerland (Watts 2000a: 7).  India shows ‘a federation with a 
strong centre’. Nigerian federalism is characterised by polarisation along regional lines.  
 
However, each models’ of federalism are driving from a number of historical-geographical experiences 
of the respective societies, therefore it could be irrelevant to impose any of the ‘models’ of federalism 
across the board to a wide range of other settings (Agnew 1985). Specifically, Agnew holds that 
‘imposing ‘models’ of federalism drawing from the experiences of the four ‘classic’ cases (US, 
Switzerland, Canada and Australia) has been largely unsuccessful’ (Agnew 1995: 295). More 
specifically, he questions US federalism for its inability to guarantee representation in State legislatures 
and the US Congress for under-representation of minority groups such as African-Americans.  
 
Broadly, there are two wide categories of federations. In the first category, federalism is adopted to 
accommodate and reconcile territorial diversity within fundamentally multilingual and multiethnic 
societies such as in Switzerland, India, Malaysia, Belgium, Span and Nigeria. The second category of 
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federalism is adopted in more or less homogeneous societies without consideration of multilingual or 
multiethnic characters, such as in the United States, Australia, Austria and Germany (Watts 1999: 117).    
 
In accordance with the above discussions, it becomes evident that there is no fait accompli on the subject 
of federalism. The most important and crucial task for a successful construction, however, is the ability 
to create a functional federal arrangement in a given context that could give a room for expression to 
diverse groups which demand and need such political space. In ethnically divided societies moulding a 
unified and strong power centre is often perceived as oppressive and challenged internally as a structure 
of ‘hegemonic’ control; thus, violence and destructive conflicts could become strategies to capture the 
centre. Control of the centre is not always motivated by a desire for a 'hegemonic' rule but it could be a 
strategy for averting a rule by 'others'. Forging an arrangement that could build trust among diverse 
groups by providing a fair space for self-expression and representation would appear a matter of 
necessity in the construction of a functioning state structure in multiethnic societies. Federal 
arrangement, as a continuing political bargain, could be one of the best, but not perfect alternatives, to 
address problems of representation and self-administration in ethnically divided societies. Federal 
arrangement, in practice, should be conceived as a non-static and non-fixed political framework that 
could be negotiated, deliberated and compromised by its constituent entities in continuous time and 
space. The purpose of such a construction should not be to end or unite different identities; rather it 
could be an arena to provide for peaceful co-existence, respectful cooperation and compromise between 
groups in order to forge a cohesive political entity.   A federal system may help to provide a 
reconciliatory framework for opposing demands of integration and separation.   
 
2.3 Federalism in Multiethnic Societies 
As the central focus of this dissertation is on ethnic federalism or federal system based on ethno-
linguistic lines, a theoretical discussion on the application of federalism in multiethnic societies will be 
presented below. The workability and tractability of ethnic federalism is contentious. The cases of 
dissolved ethno-federal arrangements such as that of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia 
resonated pessimism about the feasibility of federalism based on ethnolinguistic lines. In contrast, some 
relatively successful ethno-linguistic federal arrangements like those of India and Switzerland have 
shown the feasibility of ethnic federalism in divided societies. Both, critiques and advocates of ethnic 
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federalism have their justifications. Advocates hold that ethnic federalism could reduce groups’ 
disparity, promote accommodation and self-rule, encourage ethnic harmony through co-existence and 
reduce secession or disintegration tendencies (Lijphart 1977 and 2002, Gurr 1993; Kymlicka 2006). In 
contrast, critiques argue that ethnic federalism could institutionalise ethnic discrimination, obstruct 
individual citizens rights, strengthen centrifugal forces, introduce zero-sum ethnic competition and 
generate dangerous reactions like ethnic cleansing, expulsion and disintegration (Nordlinger 1972; 
Lipset 1963; Fleiner 2000).     
 
As this PhD dissertation explores implementation of ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia, it is vital to 
have an understanding of the theoretical discussions and major contending views on the subject. The 
theoretical discussions in this chapter regarding ethnic federalism generally focus on the association 
between ethnicity and federalism. It explores the relationship between federalism and ethnicity while 
attempting to discover whether federalism and ethnicity are/are not compatible. This theoretical analysis 
thus aims to generate understanding concerning the factual or assumed tensions, conflicts or concurrence 
between ethnicity and federalism. This meant to help the study in establishing an analytical framework 
or investigating tool to understand the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia. Moreover, the theoretical 
discussion certainly helps to structure the observations of the operation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. 
However, before making an examination of the relationship between ethnicity and federalism, a 
theoretical examination of ethnicity will be presented.    
 
2.3.1 Ethnicity 
 
2.3.1.1 Defining Ethnicity 
There is no generally agreed definition or theory of ethnicity; scholars define and describe the term in 
various ways, such as a modern cultural construct, a universal social phenomenon, a personal identity, a 
peculiar kind of informal political organisation or affective association. To begin with those who 
identify the symbolic and subjective side of ethnicity, Smith and Hutchinson (1996), for example, define 
ethnie (the French term used to denote an 'ethnic community' or 'ethnic group') as 'a named human 
population with a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of 
common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its members’ 
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(Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 7). In this definition, the subjective and ethno-symbolic importance and 
orientation to the past play a key role as 'the destiny of the community is bound up with ethno-history, 
with its own understanding of a unique, shared past.  
 
Contrary to this approach, Fukui and Markakis refute the attempt to define ethnic identities on the basis 
of genealogical or cultural criteria by claiming that a complex pattern of fusion and fission among 
groups is the reality.  They argue therefore that ethnic identities are to be understood as essentially 
political products of socially defined and historically determined specific situation (Fuku and Markakis 
1994:06). Similar to this argument, David Turton argues, 'an ethnic group is not a group because of 
ethnicity but because its members engage in common action and share common interests’ (Turton 1994: 
17). However this assertion does not necessarily mean that the assumed genealogical or cultural traits 
are completely irrelevant. Fuku and Markakis recognize Allen's (1994) concern regarding the mere 
dismissal of ethnic/tribal labels, on the grounds that they do represent a social reality, despite the 
genealogical and cultural lacunae in their make-up. In his study of two ethnic groups in the Sudan and 
Uganda border area, Allen observes how collective fears and hatreds serve in the production and 
concretisation of ‘specific cultural qualities, the elaboration of tradition, the definition of moral spheres 
and the articulation of social boundaries’ (Allen 1994: 114).  Likewise, for Thomas Eriksen (1993) 
ethnicity simply refers to relationships between groups whose members consider themselves distinctive 
and, these groups may be ranked hierarchically within a society. He therefore describes ethnicity in 
terms of ‘the classification of people and group relationship’ that has ‘a political, organisational aspects 
as well as a symbolic one’ (Eriksen 1993: 13) Similarly, for Paul Brass 'ethnicity is a sense of ethnic 
identity that can be used ‘to create internal cohesion and differentiate themselves from other groups’ 
(Brass 1991: 19).  He posits that ‘ethnicity or ethnic identity also involves in addition to subjective self-
consciousness, a claim to status and recognition, either as a superior group or as at least equal to other 
group’ (Ibid).  
 
Nevertheless, Horowitz argues that: ‘Many of the puzzle presented by ethnicity become much less 
confusing once we abandon the attempt to discover the vital essence of ethnicity and instead regard 
ethnic affiliations as being located along a continuum of ways in which people organize and categorize 
themselves’ (Horowitz 1985: 55). According to Horowitz that although ethnic groups believe in 
extended kinship and putative common descent, ethnic groups can be placed at various points along the 
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birth-choice continuum, but not a dichotomy between them. ‘There are fictive elements here, but the 
idea, if not always the fact, of common ancestry makes it possible for ethnic group to think in terms of 
family resemblance’ (Ibid. p. 56). Thus, membership to the ethnic group is typically not chosen but 
given because the putative kinship ties is the basic criterion (Ibid). As a result, for political mobilization, 
kinship tie due to their inducing power could be used to establish a compelling organization to pursue 
political goals.  ‘If group members are potential kinsmen, a threat to any members of the group may be 
seen in somewhat the same light as a threat to the family’ (Ibid. p. 64). However, Horowitz holds that 
‘the putatively ascriptive character of ethnic identifications makes interethnic compromise so difficult 
and poses special difficulties for democratic politics in divided societies’ (Ibid. pp. 53-4). Besides, he 
warns that ‘ethnic affiliation is not just a convenient vehicle by which elites satisfy their own class 
aspirations’ (Ibid. p. 89).  
 
Despite the fact that the study of ethnicity is confronted with such various terminological and conceptual 
problems as well as without a shared perspective, much of the literature on the theories of ethnicity is 
often divided into two broad approaches of primordialists and instrumentalists. These two approaches 
are discussed below.      
 
2.3.1.2 The Primordialism Argument 
The primordialist conceptualisation of ethnic community is founded on the belief of the ‘overpowering’ 
and ‘ineffable quality’ of primordial attachments that arise from being born into a particular religious 
community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language and following particular 
social practices (Geertz 1973). Steven Grosby associates the terms ‘primordial’ as a cognitive reference 
to the objects of attachments or ties around which various kinds of kinship are formed (Grosby 1994: 
168). It was Edward Shils (1975) who coined the term ‘primordial’ in his argument that family 
attachment are embedded in a primordial relational quality that attaches ineffable importance to blood. 
Following on the line of primordialism, Clifford Geertz argued that primordial identities are given and 
ineffable that can be overpowering or coercive (Geertz 1973: 259). According to this explanation some 
attachments flow more from natural affinity than from social interaction. Primordialists maintain that the 
importance human beings attribute to biological connection is neither capricious nor accidental, but is 
connected to unique and very close nurturing and relationships that make a bond from generation to 
generation with an experience of deeply rooted, intimate and eternal belonging. The congruities of 
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blood, speech, custom, and so on, are overpowering and coercive. To that effect Grosby claim that ‘this 
is one of the reasons why human beings have scarified their lives and continue to scarify their lives for 
their own family and for their own nation’ (Grosby 1994: 169). In other words, primordialists believe 
that pre-modern attachments and historical memories are crucial in shaping and mobilising groups. 
‘Ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action toward primordial 
objects such as biological features and especially territorial location’ (Ibid. p. 168).   
 
The primordialists argue that though primordial discontent strives more deeply and is less easily 
satisfied as ethnicity has been manipulated for racism and horrific purposes, modern man has 
perpetuated similar horrible acts because of philosophical, political, economic, and religious reasons 
connected to modernity. As Fishman states ‘modern man’s capacity for committing horrible acts is a by-
product of modernity basically unrelated to ethnicity or to the biological assumption of ethnicity in 
particular’ (Fishman 1980: 86). Likewise, Pierre van den Berghe points out that ‘brothers do murder 
each other, but not gratuitously and not as easily as strangers’ (van den Berghe 1995: 362). Furthermore, 
Fishman claims that the manipulation of ethnicity ‘to attain political, economic and cultural goal is a 
modern manifestation and certainly one of the least unique feature of ethnicity’. Thus, according to 
Fishman, ‘ethnicity must be approached seriously, even sympathetically, as a social dimension that has 
received too little attention and too much abuse during the past two centuries’ (Fishman 1980: 84).   
 
Primordialists reject the linear association of ethnicity with conflict or racism, rather they emphases the 
need to take advantage of the emotional benefit imbued within ethnicity. In this respect, Fishman 
believes that ethnicity can serve to exert responsibility to preserve and transmit the great heritage of 
human existence to generation after generation and its unashamed and vigorous devotion to be related to 
others as kin ‘is one of the most powerful motivation of human kind’ (Ibid. p. 85). Especially, at times 
of uncertainty and change, ethnicity could give direction and identity to preserve our own existence. 
Fishman argues that ethnicity is continuity within the self and within the link to a common ancestor by 
experiencing being ‘bone of their bone, flesh of their flesh, and blood of their blood’ (Ibid. pp. 84-85).  
 
In its extreme version, radical primordialists or sociobiologists, such as Pierre van den Berghe (1981), 
go to the extent of regarding genetic reproductive capacity as the basis, not only of families and clans, 
but also of wider ethnic groups. Sociobiologists claim the continuity between kinship and ethnicity and 
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thus consider ethnic groups as wider kinship-based groupings. Pierre van den Berghe holds that kins are 
likely to cling together than strangers and the chance of cooperation can depend more on the extent of 
how closely people are related, while cooperation between strangers depends on the incentives or 
rewards created for all. As he claims that ‘an altruistic transactions can be expected if, and only if, the 
cost benefit ratio of the transaction is smaller than the coefficient of genetic relatedness between the two 
actors’ (van den Berghe 1981: 20). Thus, he argued that because ethnic groups share more genes with 
co-ethnics therefore they tend to exhibit more self-sacrifice towards kin than non-kin because of, what 
he identified as an impulse of ‘ethnic nepotism’ or ‘extended kin selection’. In short, people are likely to 
show nepotistic leaning toward kinsmen and fellow ethnic as ‘all social organisms are biologically 
programmed to be nepotistic, i.e. to behave favourable (or ‘altruistically’) to others in proportion to their 
real or perceived degree of common ancestry’ (van den Berghe 1995: 360). The main argument of 
sociobiologist is that a desire of human beings to identify themselves with kith and kin is inherently 
natural. Ethnicity is like an extended family and therefore it is explained in terms of a biological 
paradigm or a genetic aspect. For van den Berghe, ethnicity is both primordial and instrumental, as it 
‘cannot be invented or imagined out of nothing. It can be manipulated, used, exploited, stressed, fused or 
subdivided, but it must correlate with a pre-existing population bound by preferential endogamy and a 
common historical experience’ (Ibid. p. 361). 
 
With regard to nation-state construction, the primordialists maintain that the drive for efficient, dynamic 
modern states could directly interact with the drive for personal identity, which is based on primordial 
ties. The primordialists therefore claim that in areas where the practice of civil politics is deficient or 
weak, primordial attachments (such as territorial location) could be used to devolve political power and 
delimit territorial units. In his attempt to establish a link between ethnic identity and state formation, 
Greetz (1973) claimed that ‘in modernizing societies, where the tradition of civil politics is 
weak…primordial attachments tend, as Nehru discovered, to be repeatedly, in some cases almost 
continually, proposed and widely acclaimed as preferred bases for the demarcation of autonomous 
political unit’ (Geertz 1973: 26). Geertz warned that ‘primordial discontent strives more deeply and is 
satisfied less easily’, while ‘civil discontent finds its natural outlet in the seizing, legally or illegally, of 
the state’s apparatus’ (Ibid. p. 261). Thus, he argued that ‘economic or class or intellectual disaffection 
threatens revolution, but disaffection based on race, language or culture threatens partitions, irredentism 
or merger, a redrawing of the very limits of the state, a new definition of its domain (Ibid.). Similarly, 
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Hameso Y. Seyoum in his optimism regarding ethnicity in Africa (1997) argues that if properly guided, 
ethnicity could serve in mobilising resources to achieve favourable goals of the human society like 
social justice, political change and economic development in Africa. He explains that if ethnicity is part 
and parcel of African identity, it is appropriate to be positive about oneself. ‘What is wrong in 
unashamed love for ones people and land or even emphasising one's own roots in a community or 
cultural group without necessarily disparaging other groups (Hameso 1996: 03)? Hameso claims that it 
is favourable and desirable for people who share common symbol, history, destiny, and future 
aspirations to have their own self-administration. Based on the basic assumption of their approach, 
primordialists criticise the social constructionist thesis of ethnic groups for its disregard of tradition and 
the fundamental features of human existence. John Armstrong (1982), for example, claims that ethnicity 
and nationhood are identical and ethnic identities are instrumental in the gradual emergence of modern 
national identity and territorial-national formation after a long historical process. 
     
On the other hand, primordialism has been criticized for presenting a static and naturalistic view of 
ethnicity that mystifies emotion and reduces cultural and social behaviour to biological drives. Jack Eller 
and Reed Coughlan, for example, argue that: ‘Ethnicity is surely an affect issue, making it distinct from 
strictly material or instrumental issues, but this by no means makes it primordial but has a clear and 
analysable socio-genesis’ (Eller and Coughlan 1993:200). Furthermore, the ‘given-ness’ of ethnicity 
does not entail that people are condemned to their ethnic attachment forever. The destiny of man is 
progressive (Kedourie 1993: 69). The primordial assumption ignores ‘change and dissolution of ethnic 
groups, not to speak of the more modern processes of fusion of ethnic groups through intermarriage’ 
(Llobera 1999: 04). Many ethnic groups are often characterised by internal diversity that reflecting 
various political commitments, lineage cleavages, ideologies, class and occupational backgrounds, as 
well as differentially located communities (Forrest 2004: 25).    
 
In addition, primordialists underemphasize people’s passions and strong dedication to rational values, 
sense of duties, classes and other socially constructed supreme goals. Cooperation and intimacy among 
people do not take place only between kin, but also can extend to non-kin groups based on belief system, 
ideological commitments, professional interests and other pragmatically required or developed shared 
commonalities beyond primordial sentiments. Economic, social, political or environmental conditions 
have a capacity to generate both conflict and cooperation among humankind.  Likewise, the primordial 
 40  
theories generally claim that racial and ethnic identities are affectively fulfilling, but fail to address those 
circumstances in which such identities are used as the basis for inequalities and might thus be socially 
‘bad’ in breeding ethnic inequalities. Thus, the value dimension of primordialism is as incomplete and 
inconsistent as the theoretical analyses on which they hinge (Thompson 1989: 181).      
 
2.3.1.3 The Instrumentalist Argument 
Instrumentalists highly differ from the primordialist conception of ethnicity. They grasp ethnicity as ‘a 
social construct that emphasizes the sharing of cultural and linguistic characteristic and, kinship roots for 
the purpose of group mobilization (Messay, 2001: 268). Instrumentalists treat ethnicity as a socially 
constructed focal point for mobilization. They argue that ethnicity is constructed by particular elite or 
group driven by competition for political power, economic benefits, social status or other objectives and 
motives. It is a social, political, and cultural construct for specific and different interests and status 
groups and consequently an elastic and highly adjustable instrument to serve particular or multiple 
objectives.  
 
According to Paul Brass (1991) ethnicity or ethnic identity involves a claim to status and recognition, 
either as a superior group or as group at least equal to other groups; therefore it seeks the articulation 
and acquisition of social, economic and political rights for the member of the group or for the group as a 
whole. He describes ethnicity as ‘a sense of ethnic identity, consisting of the subjective, symbolic or 
emblematic use by a group of people of any aspect of culture, in order to differentiate themselves from 
other groups  (Brass, 1991: 18). He holds that the process and benefit of modernisation could unleash 
ethnic self-consciousness and ethnically based demands if it proceeds unevenly by favouring some 
ethnic groups or some regions of a country more than others. Thus, ‘ethnic communities are created and 
transformed by particular elites in modernising and in post-industrial society undergoing dramatic social 
change…through competition between competing elites for political power, economic benefit and social 
status within and among ethnic category’ (Ibid. p. 25). Particularly, competition and conflict between 
inter-ethnic elites is considered as the major cause behind ethnic self-consciousness and ethnic-based 
demands. Basically, for instrumentalists, ethnicity is essentially a political phenomenon, in the sense that 
it is the association of cultural differences with political cleavages (Cohen 1969). It is the identification 
of political domination and oppression with identity manifestations in order to mobilise and organise 
political resistance and action. Ethnic consciousness usually has a political connotation as it easily 
provides the basis for joint political action in case of threat or opportunity. Accordingly, instrumentalists 
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hold that rather than common descent, shared political experiences and commonalities of political 
memories are crucial in forging ethnic consciousness and belief in a common ethnicity. According to 
Barth, ethnicity is a form of social organization that emphasizes cultural difference between groups 
whose symbolic and social boundaries have been established due to specific ecological, economic, 
historical or political situations (Barth 1969). Moreover, Barth argues, that ‘ethnic identities function as 
categories of inclusion/exclusion and of interaction about which both ego and alter must agree if their 
behaviour is to be meaningful’ (Barth 1969:132). Thus, to a great extent ethnic leaders or ethnic 
entrepreneurs are the major agents in articulating ethnic group’s political and other factional demands 
(Barth 1969). 
 
Similar to the instrumentalist approach, rational choice theorists like Hechter (1994) assume that 
‘individuals adapt means to their ends in such a way as to approach the most efficient manner of 
achieving them’, therefore ethnic group will engage in collective action only when they estimate that by 
doing so they will receive net individual benefit (Hechter 1986: 268). The major assumption of the 
rational choice argument is that individuals always act in a manner to maximize their benefit. Also, in 
some circumstances, individuals could choose to act in accordance with the interest of their ethnic group 
though their net individual benefit at face value may seem less than the collective benefit.  
 
In the case of Africa, Leroy Vail (1985) posits that, in many cases, individuals’ commitment and 
membership to a particular ethnic group is not induced because they dislike others, or not because being 
a member of the group made them feel good, ‘but rather because the ethnic apparatus of the rural area- 
the chiefs, ‘traditional’ courts, petty bourgeois intellectuals, and the systematised ‘traditional’ values of 
the ‘tribe’ as embodied in the ethnic ideology- all worked to preserve the very substantial interests which 
these men had in their home areas’ (Vail 1985:15). Accordingly, Vail that ethnicity has been attractive 
both to the elites and ordinary men in Africa, particularly, appealed to the elites because it can ensure 
them a leadership role in the rising political mobilisation. And for the ordinary African men, ethnicity 
could help them bring a measure of control to the difficult situations in which they have found 
themselves in their day-to-day life. Moreover, Vail explains that appeal to ethnicity in Africa is also 
made ‘to conserve a way of life that was in the process of being rapidly undermined by the growth of 
capitalist relations’ and then, it may be interpreted as ‘a form of popular resistance to the forces that 
were reshaping African lives’ (Ibid.).   
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In many of ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa, historical memories and ideology based on real 
historical event or myths such as population movements, conflicts, alliances and other similar events 
also played an important role in the creation and maintenance of ethnic identities (Fukui 1994: 33), 
(Lamphear 1994: 63), (Matsuda 1994: 61). In his study of the formation and transformation of ethnic 
boundaries in the Omo valley of southern-Ethiopia, Katsuyoshi Fukui argues that: ‘It is obvious that an 
ethnic group is not a separate and impervious unit, but one that is in a constant state of flux in relation to 
its neighbours, merging with one, separating from another, over the course of time’ (Fukui 1994: 44). 
Similarly, David Turton (1986) in his study of ethnic groups in southern Ethiopia finds that in a number 
of cases, ethnic identities at the periphery have been formed through relationship with other groups.  He 
also discerns a phenomenon whereby a minority group accepted subordination and stigmatisation by the 
majority group in return for receiving protection against other groups (Turton 1986: 158). Ties formed 
between groups therefore can also reinforce ethnic identities of the partners (Matsuda 1994: 60).   
 
Furthermore, inclusion of many ethnic groups in the same territory does not necessarily bring ethnic 
conflict or ethnic hostilities. In his study of ethnicity in the Sudan and Uganda border, Tim Allen (1999: 
121) explores how generational durable peaceful relations between two ethnic groups in Uganda’s 
villages was turned into ethnic cleansing because of actions and behaviours of ethnocratic leaders at the 
state’s centre1. Similarly, Wendy James in her study of ethnic groups in the Sudan-Ethiopia border area, 
observed how threats of persecution on basis of ethnic identification had contributed to a growing sense 
of collective ethnic identity or ethnic ‘visibility’ for survival among the people who found themselves 
caught involuntarily in a conflict (James 1994: 162). She argues that ‘visibility’ as a distinct ethnic 
group can be both advantageous and disadvantageous, according to whether one is seeking protection 
and aid, or avoiding attack and victimization (Ibid. p. 163).  
 
In a study of ethnic conflict in the Horn of Africa, Markakis also concludes that ‘ethnicity is an 
imperative embedded in the foundations of the political order and functions as a controlling factor in the 
political process, long before an ethnic movement appears to challenge that order’ (Markakis 1994: 
                                                 
1 Durable peaceful relations for generations between the Acholi and Madi ethnic groups in Uganda was turned into 
mass murder and expulsion because of Idi Amin’s brutality in 1971 in the execution of hundreds of Acholi soldiers 
that had served the preceding Milton Obote regime and also due to Milton Obote’s revengeful policies when he 
returned to power in 1980, with the support of Tanzania, the hostile relation between Acholi and Madi was further 
exacerbated.  
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236). Markakis argues that ethnicity has become catalysts for political conflict in the Horn of Africa due 
to two objective factors: competition for resources in condition of great scarcity and the role the state 
plays in controlling the allocation of these resources (Ibid. p. 217).  
 
In such a situation, ethnicity has become the preferred and most efficient basis for political mobilization 
against the 'ethnocratic state', whose capacity in the distribution of resources is paramount. In his 
analysis of ethnicity in Africa, Messay (2001) also argues that ‘the African ruling elite have fashioned 'a 
patrimonial system of authority' intent on excluding competitors and rewarding followers. Ethnicity and 
ethnonationalism is born of protest against this exclusion, for the purpose of controlling the political 
resources of the state’ (Messay 2001: 272). Conflict is not waged for its own sake, but for desired 
objectives (Fukui 1994: 44). The postcolonial African states ‘introduced a new prize for rival ethnic 
communities over which to fight and a frightening new force with which to contend’ (Smith 2000: 22). 
Hence, in some cases, the rise of ethnic identity is attributable to specific types of interactions between 
the leadership of centralizing states and the elites from the local ethnic groups, especially but not 
exclusively on the peripheries of those states (Brass 1991: 29). ‘Conflicts either between competing 
landholders and alien conquerors, between competing religious elites or between religious leaders and 
local aristocracy that the first stage of ethnic transformation often begin’ (Ibid).      
 
In these respects, Markakis, in his ‘situational perspective’ approach based in the context of the Horn of 
Africa, concludes that: ‘an ethnic group as a political actor is a product of the situation, not of history, 
and what mobilises its members to take collective action is concern for future prospects, not an atavistic 
attachments to the past’ (Markakis 1994: 236). Ethnic groups’ sense of sharing the same material and 
social prospects are more important than ethnic identity because identity is defined in the process of 
interaction- co-operation, competition, confrontation, even war- among groups (Ibid).  In a similar vein, 
though Forrest (2004: 02) argues that collaborative political behaviour in precolonial times- among 
villages, localities, groups, leaders, and polities- provides historical and cultural subtexts for the 
assertion of regional autonomy, he states that these precolonial traditions cannot explain the rise or 
expansion of autonomy-seeking ethnic or regional movements. Rather, he emphasises the overarching 
instrumental, situational, ascriptive and economic factors that were present in colonial and post-colonial 
periods. He asserts that ‘when ascriptive and instrumental political behaviour coincides with the 
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evolution of constructivist and materialist factors, the conditions for subnationalist movement 
mobilization are favourable’ (Ibid.).    
  
Consequently, Messay argues ‘that contrary to atavistic remnant, ethnicity is a strong social force that 
must be properly considered and managed in order to obliterate its destructive roles in politics’ (Messay 
2001: 283). Without careful approach and proper treatment, ethnic plurality therefore would lead to 
conflict production, as the elite becomes the key actors in the creation of ethnic ideology and ethnic 
politics for acquisition of political power. Political power is the focal point of ethnic claims because it 
constitutes one of the important ‘rituals by which status is determined’. In this climate of elite 
competition ‘a fear of ethnic domination and suppression is a motivating force for the acquisition of 
power as an end and it is also sought for confirmation of ethnic status’ (Horowitz 1985: 187). Public 
offices or honorific state responsibilities could be used to instrumentalise discrimination or favouritism 
in distribution of statuses and resources. Particularly, in multiethnic African societies an exclusive 
access to state’s resources and power by a particular group could create a process of ‘social closure’ that 
can alienate others groups from playing any significant role in politics and economics. An ethnocratic 
state that monopolises politics and economics in favour of a specific ethnic group is the major breeding 
ground for producing ethnonationalist movements. As Max Weber states that ethnic group ‘can has a 
political meaning, it easily provides the basis for joint political action on the part of the group members 
or Volksgenossen who consider one another as blood relatives’ (Roth and Wittich 1968: 394).  
 
Aware of the potential difficulties involved in nation-building, the instrumentalists belief to consider 
ethnic identity as a core criterion in state construction may be very awkward since there is always 
incompatibility between state territories and ethnolinguistic homogeneity. On the other hand, the awful 
option of using brutal force to bring about the desired homogeneous space with a single language and 
uniform conception of history has become difficult and also considered to be ineffective in many places.  
 
In sum, the core argument of instrumentalism is that ethnicity is flexible and changeable; circumstances 
can shape or change the symbolic and social boundaries that define the ethnic group. Ethnicity is 
therefore dynamic and changes according to new circumstances; group shifts their content and boundary 
according to circumstances. Individuals or groups do not belong to a particular ethnic group on a 
permanent basis. Through the process of fission and fusion, and other considerations like sense of 
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security or material interests, people change their ethnic affiliation or can belong to more than one ethnic 
group at the same time.   
 
The critique of instrumentalists points out firstly, the instrumentalist’s underestimation of the subjective 
and affective side of human society by reducing them to instruments of mere material or other interests 
by undervaluing ‘the roles of both the sacred and ethnicity in kindling mass fervour and self-sacrifice’ 
(Smith 2000: 25). In Africa, ethnic groups often retained a significant portion of their precolonial 
linguistic and cultural identity (Forrest 2004: 29). Secondly, the instrumentalism claim of excessive 
mutability of ethnic group is challenged by experiences of some nations in which identities are more 
fixed for longer period of time or have shown strong ethnic component like in France, Greeks and 
Switzerland. Anthony Smith argues that: ‘…the civic-territorial and ethnocultural ideals of the nation are 
closely interwoven…in logic there may be a good case for such distinction, but in practice it is difficult 
to find any examples of a ‘pure’ cultural nationalism, freed from its ethnic moorings. It is certainly not 
to be found in Europe’ (Smith 2000: 18-19). Thirdly, instrumentalist’s approach is also criticised for its 
exaggerated belief in the power of elite manipulation of the masses and neglecting of the wider cultural 
environment in which elite competition and rational maximization take place (Hutchinson and Smith 
1996: 09). Forrest explains that in Africa, ‘certain aspects of social and cultural lineage enable 
contemporary peoples to identify with specific precolonial collectivities… even if identities did not 
always congeal as ethnic group in precolonial Africa, there may not have been as clean a break in social 
continuity as hard-line constructivists presume’ (Forrest 2005: 28).     Instrumentalist and primordialist 
influences are in many cases closely interlinked. Ethnic groups behaviour are influenced by a ‘double 
action’ between elites’ goal and individuals’ conceptualisation of identity. It involves a dynamic 
interaction (Ibid. p. 10). Fourthly, the instrumentalists approach is criticized for reducing qualitatively 
different beliefs into some putatively uniform ‘real’ cause, for example, ‘interest’, ‘power’ ‘emotion’ 
due to reductionism thereby denying the relative independence of the achievements of the mind and the 
plurality of orientation of human action (Grosby 1994:167).       
 
2.3.1.4 Summary and relevance to Ethiopia 
Despite the various approaches and interpretations, as presented above, ethnicity remains a theoretical 
challenge and an empirical nuisance. It is often associated with conflict, instability and carnage. The 
cause can vary from case to case. Though there is no necessary connection between ethnicity and 
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conflict as Horowitz argues, the basis for confrontation may emerge due to the inclusion of two or more 
ethnic communities within a single or adjacent territory of a state characterised by discriminatory and 
uneven status and resource allocations. ‘An ethnic contrast that has produced an extraordinary amount of 
conflict in many African, Asian, and Caribbean states is the juxtaposition of ‘backward’ and ‘advanced’ 
groups’ (Horowitz 1985: 148). A system of oppression and subjugation of ethnic groups, elitist 
manipulations for autonomy or separation, reassertion of a once-predominant role, uneven regional 
development and other visible or putative inequalities could trigger ethnic hostilities and conflicts. 
Particularly, when the economic inequalities and the lop-sided distribution of political rewards in 
multiethnic states are attached to specific ethnic groups due to the process of state formation and 
expansion, the likelihood of separatist ethnic movements and conflicts could be high. As Ted Gurr 
(1994) in his cross-national study of communal based conflicts, shows that in many instances ethnic 
tensions and conflicts are more likely when certain groups perceive discrimination or exploitation in the 
context of state formation. Gurr notes that ethnic conflicts are usually centre on three general issues: ‘the 
desire for ‘exit’ or independence from the state, the demand for greater autonomy within the state or the 
recognition and protection of minority interests within a plural society (Gurr 1994: 111). He also adds 
that ‘ethnic identity and interest per se do not risk unforeseen ethnic wars; rather, the danger is 
hegemonic elites who use the state to promote their own people’s interest at the expense of others (Gurr 
2000: 64). Thus, he warns that ‘the push of state corruption and minority repression probably will be a 
more important source of future ethnic wars than the ‘pull’ of opportunity’ (Ibid). 
 
Similarly, Joshua Forrest (2004), in his investigation of the process of political mobilisation of 
subnational movements in Africa, argues that growing tendencies toward regional assertions and 
autonomy seeking are increasingly challenging the African states (Forrest 2004: 20). He enumerates four 
overarching processes that were manifest in the colonial period and the post-independence era as 
important causative factors that could help to explain the expansion of autonomy or secession seeking 
subnational movements in contemporary Africa. These are the history of state intervention in regional 
affairs (‘situationalism and constructivism’), long-term economic inequalities (‘material’), individual’s 
conscious or ascriptive adherence to ethnic or regional identity pattern (‘ascriptive identity’), and 
manipulation by regional political leaders or elites (‘instrumentalist leadership’) (Ibid, pp. 9-14). He, 
furthermore, suggests that the growth of autonomy-seeking ethnoregional movements and the pattern of 
mobilization in the present-day Africa necessitates a negotiated political framework based on 
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indigenously legitimate forms of power that can provide sufficient autonomy at the regional or local 
level (Ibid. p. 250). Another scholar also maintains that ‘if indeed ethnicity and ethnic organisations 
provide security to groups in an uncertain environment, then attempts to replace or outlaw them may 
have the effect of increasing insecurity’  (Horowitz 1985: 567-8). As Connor (1994: 83) points out that 
ethnonational group members are ‘obsessed with a vision of freedom from domination by non-members’ 
and therefore they inclined to persistently struggle for self-rule or autonomy (Ibid.).  ‘A fear of ethnic 
domination and suppression is a motivating force for the acquisition of power as an end and it is also 
sought for confirmation of ethnic status’ (Horowitz 1985: 187). 
 
Understanding such circumstances, it is essential to embark on a sensitively designed political 
engineering in order to device appropriate power-sharing frameworks that could mitigate destructive 
conflicts in deeply divided societies. Rather optimistically, Horowitz asserts that even if ethnic problems 
are intractable, they are not altogether without hope; ‘even in the most severely divided societies, ties of 
blood do not lead to ineluctably to rivers of blood’ (Ibid. p. 682). Power-sharing political frameworks 
that could encourage inter-ethnic cooperation by ensuring recognition of some prominent group’s rights 
could be one option to minimise group’s resentments and mitigate destructive conflicts. As Gurr 
suggests that ‘with a little bit of luck and a great deal of international engagement, ethnic conflict’s 
heyday will belong to the last century’ (Gurr 2000: 64). Horowitz also stresses on the importance of 
timing in engineering a political process and structure, because ‘accommodation long delayed may be 
accommodation ultimately denied’ (Horowitz 1985: 617). Although prior prescription or commitment to 
a single institutional form may not be helpful, federalism is often considered to be an appropriate 
arrangement in the provision of accommodative and flexible political frameworks notwithstanding 
ethnic cleavages and competitions.   
 
In the Ethiopian context, in many cases, the emergence of ethnic consciousness and ethnic mobilization 
may not due to inherent atavistic or primordial sentiments, but due to social, political and economic 
reasons. However primordial factors such as putative common descent, ancestral linkage, language and 
the like have become a foundation for nurturing of solidarity and political mobilization. It is not to claim 
that ethnic classification and solidarity is a widespread phenomenon among the population. It is more 
common among the elites than the ordinary people (Messay 2002). Three major intellectual perspectives 
exist in Ethiopia’s political debate in connection to Ethnicity. The first perspective believes that the 
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Ethiopian society has reached a stage of common identity by nurturing a common Ethiopian citizenship 
by obliterating primordial attachments and loyalties (Daniel 1992; Alem 1993). The second perspective 
believes that Ethiopia is a home for numerous distinct ethnic groups that need to get some form of 
political representation and self-administration (Merera 2003; Fasil 1997). The third perspective argues 
that the Ethiopian state was established through a series of conquests and colonization of various nations 
and societies such as Oromo and Somali, which were beyond its jurisdiction (Hassen 1999; Assefa 1993; 
Dolal 1992).  
 
At the political level, there have been ethnic organizations in the name of various ethnic groups such as 
Afar, Oromo, Somali, Sidama, and Tigrayan since the 1970s. At present due to the policy of ethnic 
restructuring and ethnic entitlement since 1991 there are nearly hundred ethnic organizations that are 
legally registered in Ethiopia (National Election Board of Ethiopia 2005).  Although a detail study is not 
carried out on the nature and conviction of these ethnic organizations, it is plausible to claim that in 
many cases that the major inspirational forces for these ethnic organizations are the attainment of social, 
political and economic objective rather than primordial or atavistic drives. In almost all cases, the claims 
for ethnic mobilization and solidarity have been made in the context of redressing ‘injustices of the 
past’, reclaiming of dignified existence and self-administration, developing of culture and usage of 
languages which were ignored and barred in the past. These claims are more of a demand for social 
status, political power and economic benefits (instrumental) rather than preserving or nurturing 
relationships that make a bond from generation to generation or recognising the overpowering and 
coercive congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on (primordial). However, putative generational 
bond or primordial attachment has been exploited to advance these social, political and economic 
objectives and this has inclined to create a ‘permanent’ cleavage that could widen and has opened a 
venue for further exclusion, discrimination and carrying out other horrible acts.  
 
Markais (1994) claims that the rise of ethnic mobilisation and movement in the Horn of Africa 
(including Ethiopia) has been aiming in controlling or weakening the state that has a great role in the 
allocation of resources, political power and social status.  Especially, when the central state is identified 
or accused with ethnic category or ethnic favouritism, the chance for ethnic mobilisation would be high. 
In this connection, the central rule in Ethiopia has always been accused of favouring particular ethnic 
groups. Prior to 1991, some ethnic and regional liberation movements from Eritrea, Tigray, Oromo and 
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Somali described the central rule as an ‘Amhara rule’, and this gave an advantage for the movements to 
mobilise significant supporters and fighters in ethnic lines. A call for a ’primordial’ solidarity has 
become a crucial factor in consolidating a struggle and fight to achieve non-primordial political, 
economic and social objectives.  
 
Since 1991, the federal government in Ethiopia has been described as a Tigrayan dominated government 
and thus various ethnic movements are rising to challenge the alleged domination of the Tigrayan group 
on the principle of ethnic solidarity. Thus, it can be plausible to assert that the rise of ethnic solidarity in 
Ethiopia is not because of primordial tendencies but rather because of the social and historical factors of 
suppression, alienation, differentiation and exclusion. It is misleading to describe the rise of ethnic 
resentments and demands in Ethiopia in terms of 'primordialism' as it may discolour the essence of the 
problem. It is not because people wanted to preserve or glorify their ‘primordial’ identity, but because 
they wanted to protect their social, political and economic rights in the face of alienation, subordination 
and domination of the southward expansion of the central rule. As Messay eloquently put it that 
‘exportable products such as coffee and gold were already being produced [in the south]. Land was 
plentiful and most appropriate for cash crop products of whatever kind. There emerged a form of ethnic 
mentality imbued with a sense of superiority. This ideological evolution had one single goal: to justify 
land appropriation and install the rights of private property.  (Messay 1999: 53). Moreover, ‘the ethnic 
difference made land extortion easier both ideologically and politically’ (Ibid.). 
 
Thus, ethnic classification and categorisation in Ethiopia is a social-historical construct, which has been 
born out of a resistance against the injustice of a central rule that identified itself (and also identified by 
others) in terms of a ‘Shewan tribalism’. However, in the process the ’force of blood’ has brought 
emotionalism and rigidity among the ethnic movements and strengthened primordial sentiments in order 
to build politically significant social movement by exaggerating claims and distinctiveness. This 
dissertation will examine in detail the emerging trends in Ethiopia since 1991, in subsequent chapters, as 
it is part of the major focus of the study. 
      
2.3.2 Ethnic Federalism 
The above discussion reveals that ethnicity is a very elusive and fluid phenomenon both at empirical and 
theoretical levels; under such circumstances the task of constructing a political framework like 
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federalism using such elusive and fluid conceptualisation would certainly be difficult. The discussion 
below will attempt to bring some of the major theoretical arguments with regard to the issues of 
compatibility/incompatibility between ethnicity and federalism. It will also try to examine the possible 
tensions between federalism and ethnicity.     
 
Though it remains difficult and complex to establish a federal arrangement based on ethnicity, many 
scholars in the field argue that one of the characteristics of federalism is its aspiration and purpose to 
generate and maintain both unity and diversity simultaneously (Elazar 1987: 67; Watts 1999: 06; 
Agranoff 1998: 11). Although Elazar argued that federal systems operate best in society with sufficient 
homogeneity of fundamental interests, he thought of Switzerland as the first modern federation built on 
indigenous ethnic and linguistic differences that were considered permanent and worth accommodating. 
Elazar recognized that political integration – federal or otherwise – is likely to be more difficult in 
places in which strongly rooted primordial groups continue to dominate political and social life (Elazar 
1987: 191). Nevertheless, in his view, federalism might be the best political framework in the existence 
of essentially permanent religious, ethnic, cultural, or social groups around which political life must be 
organized. Besides, he added ‘territorial divisions of power can also be used to protect minorities and 
minority communities by allowing them greater autonomy within their own political jurisdictions’ (Ibid. 
p. 73). He recommended, particularly, in most of the Third World countries in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic diversities are deep, federal arrangement which might be the only helpful device that could 
help to create inter-ethnic cooperation and co-existence by erecting ‘good fences’ that could maintain a 
certain degree of territorial separation.  
 
Accordingly, with the aim of accommodating ethnic diversity, Elazar specified two forms of federal 
frameworks (Ibid. p. 236). The first form is the structure of a polity cutting across ethnic cleavages and 
thereby diluting them through the creation of a cross cutting civic community and, the second form is 
structuring a comprehensive polity to give each people a primary means of expression through one or 
more of its constituent polities. Elazar, however, held the idea that federalism should transcend the 
recognition of differences eventually by structuring relationships that permit the groups bearing those 
differences to function together within the same political system. As a result, Elazar supposed that under 
certain circumstances, federalism offers the possibility of creating a civic community that transcends the 
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divisions among ethnic collectivities and thereby makes possible the establishment of civil society and 
workable political order (Ibid. p. 232).  
 
Generally, Elazar recognized that federal arrangements could be structured on the bases of territorially 
segmented ethnic, linguistic or religious groupings, but he also acknowledged the trouble associated 
with institutionalising primordial entities in political organization because federalism requires 
negotiation and compromise, while ethnonationalist demands could be uncompromising and thus make 
federalism more difficult, if not impossible. As a result he maintained that ‘ethnic nationalism is 
probably the strongest force against federalism’ because ethnic ideology could undermine power sharing 
arrangements and consequently, ethnic federations could degenerate into civil war. Taking this aspect 
into consideration, he preferred to promote political order based on non-primordial or civic ties 
whenever the condition permits, but without disqualifying ethno-linguistic federal arrangement where 
the purpose is to promote both self-rule and shared-rule which are far better than more violent and 
genocide-like solution such as ‘ethnic cleansing’ with impunity or perhaps the imposition of very severe 
authoritarian rule.      
 
Similarly, Lijphart (1977; 1994; 2002) also advocates some kind of political engineering that can 
provide territorial or political space for ethnic communities in which they could exercise some form of 
autonomy within the context of the larger political framework as well as participation in the political 
decision-making process within the larger political framework. In his consociational theory Lijphart 
stresses that ‘group autonomy’ and ‘power-sharing’ (or  ‘sharing of executive power’) as two essential 
elements in establishing a common political framework in deeply divided societies (Lijphart 1994). In 
this respect, ‘group autonomy’ and ‘power-sharing’ could be identical with ‘self-rule’ and ‘shared-rule’ 
respectively which are the essential elements in federal arrangements. Accordingly, ‘power-sharing 
means the participation of the representatives of all significant groups in political decision-making, 
especially at the executive level and, group autonomy means that these groups have authority to run 
their own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture’ (Lijphart 2002: 39). He also 
believes that groups would find satisfaction in the ability to manage their own affairs, and that would 
contribute to stable democracy (Lijphart 1977).  
 
 52  
If ethnic groups are geographically concentrated, Lijphart argued federalism could offer an excellent 
opportunity for group autonomy. Thus, by accepting the inevitability of drawing federal arrangements 
based on ethnic boundaries in case of geographically concentrated ethnic groups, he recommended that 
federal framework with relatively many and small constituent units could make the federal dividing lines 
coincide as much as possible with the ethnic boundaries (Lijphart 2002: 51). Nevertheless, Lijphart 
stresses that the task of safeguarding group autonomy and minority rights in federal systems should also 
contain the following four additional institutional characteristics: ‘The degree of bicameralism—with 
two houses that have equal power and are differently constituted as the strongest form—the degree of 
strong and active judicial review, the degree of constitutional rigidity [that are difficult to amend, but not 
unamendable], and the degree of independence of the central bank’ (Ibid. p. 52).  
 
If ethnic groups are geographically dispersed and synchronized, Lijphart (1977) recommends 
‘consociational democracy’ which include four essential attributes: grand coalition, segmented 
autonomy, proportionality and minority veto. Grand coalition entails power sharing of all significant 
groups in political power, particularly in executive power. Segmented autonomy entails a delegation of 
decision-making power to every significant group. Proportionality entails that political representation, 
civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds, etc. should consider proportion of each 
significant groups. Lastly, minority veto entails the power given for minority groups to veto any 
decision that can put their vital interest at stake due to majorities’ outvotes. Empirically, Lijphart 
enumerates a variety of more or less functional power-sharing models in deeply divided societies. Some 
of the models were such as executive power sharing in a form of grand coalition cabinet of ethnic parties 
like in Malaysia and South Africa; equal representation of ethnolinguistic or other groups in government 
like in the Belgian cabinets; and proportional shares of ministerial positions to the different linguistic 
groups, states and regions like in India (Lijphart 2002: 46). 
 
Generally, Lijphart emphasises for the importance of erecting consociational or constitutional 
frameworks including ethnic federalism in deeply divided polities in which essentially permanent 
religious, ethnic, cultural, or social groups could be represented or structured. He holds that deep ethnic 
and other societal divisions have become a most serious source of violent conflict and continue to 
present a grave problem to the establishment and maintenance of democracy in divided societies partly 
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because of the failure of constitutional designers to deal constructively with the problem. As a result, he 
maintains that power-sharing, autonomy, and other aspects of the consociational model can be an 
effective means to obliterate destructive conflicts in deeply divided societies. In parallel with Lijphart’s 
assertion, Gurr argues that ‘those truly looking to reduce ethnic bloodshed should embrace autonomy 
[within the existing state system], not fear it’ (Gurr 2000: 56). A regional autonomy could be an optimal 
approach that assures a functional place of communal groups through positive sum coexistence. Thus he 
argues, that ‘serious ethnic disputes should be best settled by negotiation and mutual accommodation’, 
and ‘democracy also implies resolving civil conflicts by peaceful means’ (Ibid. p. 58).  
 
On the other hand, scholars like Donald Horowitz, argue that federal arrangement based on ethnic 
homogeneity or ethnic homeland is detrimental to the creation of inter-ethnic cooperation. Horowitz 
recognises the importance of power-sharing and territorial devolution, as he states that territorial 
compartmentalization with devolution of generous power can have tranquillising effects in countries 
with territorially separate groups, significant sub-ethnic divisions and serious conflict at the centre 
(Horowitz 1985: 614). However, he emphasises more the ‘incentive approaches’ that could create inter-
ethnic harmony within a shared political framework ‘for societies severely divided by ascriptive groups, 
whether the lines of division are said to be national, ethnic, racial, or religious’ (Horowitz 2002: 19). 
Horowitz holds the idea that group identities are flexible and therefore political frameworks that 
discourage crystallization of identities would be the better approach to promote inter-ethnic cooperation 
in divided societies (Ibid. p. 25). Furthermore, he adds that: ‘Even states that start out multipolar, with 
several ethnic groups, can become bipolar and bifurcated—witness the growth of northern versus 
southern groups in many African states—thus obviating the need for a coalition across group lines for 
the group that is slightly larger’ (Ibid. p. 20).  
 
Moreover, Horowitz contends that a political framework that crystallizes and legitimises ethnic 
cleavages would be of limited utility to bring about compromised power-sharing arrangement in states 
with disparate ethnic groups, because elites of majority groups would not be so easily self-abnegating as 
to give some of their political power and privileges to the minority groups. He maintains that both ethnic 
majority rule and ethnic minority rule are very ineffective and destructive type of arrangements in 
ethnically divided societies. Majority rule permits perpetual domination of the major group or the 
‘tyranny of the majority ethnic group’. If a minority ethnic group is in power, it is likely for it to resort 
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to authoritarian, centralized, statist policies, controlling the economy and societies at the exclusion of the 
majority of the population as has been the case in many parts of Africa (Horowitz 1994:46). In his study 
on ethnocentrism, Horowitz, claims that ‘educated elites in some countries to be less ethnocentric than 
their followers, in others more, in some others neither less nor more, and in still others more with respect 
to some groups and less or the same with respect to other groups’ (Horowitz 2002: 21). Likewise, he 
explains that ethnic leaders who have compromised across ethnic lines are paying a high price by being 
blamed or labelled by counter-elites for betrayal and sell-out of the ethnic interest (Ibid. p. 21).  
 
Horowitz (Ibid. p. 23) makes the point that in severely divided societies, matters such as equal control of 
the state, the designation of official languages and educational issues, such as languages of instruction, 
the contents of curricula are very divisive question on which groups are not very willing to concede; 
they are more worried about ‘who gets what’ in a kind of zero-sum competition. As a result, approaches 
or models that could crystallize or encourage ethnic entitlement may not be a viable option to bring 
inter-ethnic compromise and cooperation, because of the fact that ‘divisive issues are not easy to 
compromise’ and symbolic demands such as language seem to be less compromisable than claims that 
can be quantified (Horowitz 1985: 566). Consequently, he argues that hybrid approaches that reward 
inter-ethnic accommodation coupled with autonomy would be required to quell exclusive and egoistic 
ethnic demands. Autonomy coupled with incentives for accommodative structures like carefully crafted 
connections of the regional population with the centre, such as vote pooling arrangements (e.g. to set a 
requirement for victory the getting of some votes from other groups than their own) are essential. For 
Horowitz the most important objective in divided societies should be to design a constitutional and 
institutional process that ought to demonstrate to the different groups that accommodation is a 
prerequisite.  
 
Aware of the pitfalls, Horowitz warns that hesitation about allowing recognition and autonomy can also 
trigger separatism tendencies: ‘Late, grudging devolution, coupled with a view at the centre that 
members of a group residing in the autonomous territory should henceforth look exclusively to the 
regional unit for their satisfaction, is far more likely to encourage departure from the state’ (Horowitz 
2002: 23). He considers that ‘where groups are territorially concentrated, devolution may have utility, 
not because it provided ‘self-determination,’ but because, once power is devolved, it becomes somewhat 
more difficult to determine who the self is’ (Horowitz 1985: 617). Since homogeneity doesn’t exist often 
 55  
because of the likely intra-ethnic cleavages and these may be conducive to promote inter-ethnic 
cooperations.  
 
Related to federalism, Horowitz (Ibid. pp. 613-4) argues that in severely divided societies, such as in 
Nigeria, India and Malaysia, federalism has helped to reduce conflicts at the centre because many 
contested issues become state-level issues within ethnic groups; it has dispersed the flow of conflict in 
linguistically homogeneous states into sub-ethnic channels; it provides career opportunities for groups 
not well represented at the centre and it helps to restructure institutions so as to alter ethnic balances and 
alignment. He also observed that ethnic federalism has mitigated or exacerbated minorities’ exclusion: 
‘a group that is a minority at the centre may be a majority in one or more states and may be in a position 
to rule these states, at the same time it may also produce other minority groups that feel exclusion and 
domination at the local areas’  (Ibid. p. 617).   
 
Illustratively, Horowitz considers the federal arrangements in Nigerian and Malaysia as two discernible 
models of federalism that aim to promote interethnic cooperation.  The Nigerian federal arrangement is 
‘using homogeneous and heterogeneous states, at first whittled down the power of the largest Northern 
group, thereby heightening incentives for interethnic cooperation at the federal level.’ The Malaysian 
arrangement encourages ‘interethnic cooperation at the state level in heterogeneous states, so that state 
politicians who find their way to the centre have already had experienced in dealing with leaders of 
other groups’ (Ibid. pp. 619-20).  A federal arrangement that encourages competition among ethnically 
heterogeneous units against another and institutionalises competition based on state’s interests rather 
than ethnic interests would provide opportunities for interethnic cooperation (Ibid. p. 620). The author 
also warns that in cases of heterogeneous constituting units, power devolution should not endanger 
interethnic cooperation that can be built up within the constituting units. Issues need to be defined in 
terms of state’s interests rather than ethnic interests. The gist of Horowitz’s position is that: ‘Federalism 
is not for everybody. The federal judgement must be a differentiated and prudent one. Even so, it is safe 
to say that federalism or at least some devolution has conflict-reducing possibilities for many more 
countries than have so far contemplated it’ (Ibid. p. 619). 
 
In more or less a similar way, Yash Ghai (2002) also makes the point that a federal model or territorial 
autonomy could be worthwhile in maintaining unity while conceding claims of self-government by 
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allowing ‘ethnic or other groups claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs of 
special concern to them while allowing the larger entity to exercise those powers which cover common 
interests’ (Ghai 2002: 155). He explains that naturally, ethnic federations emphasize diversity and 
multiplicity of values and may provide representation for marginal groups such as indigenous peoples 
whose traditional culture is central to their way of life. Thus, he cautions that since over 1500 ‘nation-
states’ will not be a feasible possibility, multiethnic states based on mutual recognition of diversity are 
inescapable (Ibid. p. 142). Though group rights and autonomy may meddle in the private sphere, he 
mentions that regimes of human right, which are well known by their adherence to individual rights, also 
campaign for the necessity of group entitlements.  
 
Nevertheless, Ghai acknowledges, that recognition of diversity is not always a virtue. Recognition of 
autonomy or diversity was used for the purpose of discrimination in the colonial times and used for 
edifice of oppression and exclusion in apartheid South Africa. Real or alleged past injustices are also 
used to wage revengeful atrocities against neighbouring or coexisting communities. In addition, ethnic 
entitlement could obscure social and economic interests and may strengthen the inclination to 
exaggerate primordial differences and appeal for separation or prejudices that could be to the interests 
and benefits of the elites. As a result he argues that: ‘Whether the political recognition of diversity is fair 
or beneficial depends on the context, the preferences and aspirations of the various communities, and the 
forms that political recognition takes’ (Ibid. p. 144). Providing entitlement for ethnic groups should also 
be coupled with policies that could layout incentive mechanisms in promoting cooperative and 
integrative communities that could be bases for social and political cohesiveness and viability of a 
political polity by discouraging crystallization or accentuating real or putative cleavages. Generally Ghia 
maintains that claiming or enjoying autonomy is not necessarily a destructive phenomenon, but political 
elites at the centre or region could play harmful roles to take the matter to extreme sides.   
 
Moreover, Ghai draws the conclusion that in ethnic federations, the normal tensions of federalism like 
resource redistribution and regional influence are likely to be aggravated by assuming ethnic 
dimensions. ‘Inter-regional mobility is likely to be contentious and distinction between the private and 
public spheres may be less sharp than in other types of federations’ (Ibid. p. 158). Furthermore, he 
argues that federal or autonomy arrangements need great administrative capacity, political skills, and 
abundant resources therefore narrow group or ethnic interests alone may not create a desirable 
 57  
arrangement. It could produce ‘poorly equipped provinces struggling to carry out new responsibilities 
which they neither understood nor wanted or producing less efficient bureaucracies or with politicians 
not given to compromises. The result, therefore, could be domination by central bureaucrats and 
curtailment of autonomy (Ibid. p. 160-1).  
 
On the other side of the argument, there are scholars (Nordlinger 1972; Lipset 1983) who completely 
reject or exclude ethnic federalism in deeply divided societies by claiming that ethnic entitlement in 
deeply divided societies is a slippery slope that will lead to secession and partition.  They argue that 
autonomy reinforces rather than reduces ethnic groups’ self-aggrandizement and narrow interests. Eric 
A. Nordlinger (1972), for example, maintains that ethnocentric groups are unlikely to be satisfied with 
autonomy in a federal system and thus would press for outright secession. He states that: 'The 
combination of territorially distinctive segments and federalism's grant of partial autonomy sometimes 
provides additional impetus to demands for greater autonomy', and, when these demands are refused, 
'secession and civil war may follow' (Ibid. p. 32). In the same vein, Seymour Martin Lipset (1983) 
opposed the formation of federal units on the basis of ethnic, religious, or linguistic areas and advocated 
for a federal arrangement that ‘crosscuts the social structure’ by emphasising that ‘democracy needs 
cleavage within linguistic or religious groups, not between them' (Lipset 1983: 81). He argues for a 
federal structure that ‘increases the opportunity for multiple sources of cleavages by adding regional 
interests and values to the others which crosscut the social structure’ (Ibid. p. 32). With respect to 
ideology and a political process in the post-colonial era in Africa, federalism was considered as insertion 
of an element of ‘paralysis into the state machinery, thus the outstanding ideology of the time was a 
strong unitary state that could overcome ‘tribalism’ and ‘balkanisation’. According to Kwame Nkrumah, 
‘in order to improve effectively and quickly the serious damage done to Africa as a result of Imperialism 
and colonialism, the emergent African states need strong, unitary states, capable pf exercising a central 
authority for the mobilization of the national effort and the co-ordination of reconstruction and progress. 
For this reason, I consider that even the idea of regional federations in Africa is fraught with many 
dangers. There is the danger of the development of regional loyalties, fighting against each other’ 
(Nkrumah 1963: 214). In the same period, Rothchild (1966) also reflects that as African ideologue and 
politicians have considered concessions to tribal and ethnic autonomy as divisive manoeuvre, thus 
Africa ‘continues to need a formula which will reconcile the requirements of central leadership with the 
demands of regional autonomy. At the same time, classical federalism is ideologically suspect, and the 
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political, economic and social conditions of the continent are such as virtually to preclude the adoption 
of federal model at this time. (Rothchild 1966: 292). As a result, Rothchild hoped for the emergence of 
some model of ‘neo-federal constitutional system which owe their life and vitality to African rather than 
European initiatives’. He echoes optimism that ‘reconciliation constitutional systems are not dead in 
Africa; they have yet to find their African expression’ (Ibid. p. 293). Although four decades have passed 
without fulfilling the optimism, Africa is still struggling to search for viable state structures that suit its 
ethnonational configuration. Consequently, the ethnic-federal model in Ethiopia may be considered as 
an attempt by the Africans to constitute a reconciliatory constitutional system to address the 
ethnonational demands, though its applications are apparently producing contrary results.       
 
 
2.4 Summary 
The theoretical discussion concerning federal arrangement in multiethnic societies shows the difficulties 
associated with structuring federalism on bases of ethnicity and other similar primordial identities. In 
most cases, ethnicity is viewed as an elusive and complex phenomenon that can create challenges for 
political organizations.  Paradoxically, ethnic solidarity appeals to a primordial attachment of ‘kin and 
kith’ in order to achieve political objectives, which are mostly non-primordial. Nevertheless, despite its 
nebulousness, ethnicity is becoming a reality in mobilizing large numbers of communities under its 
ethos and desires. The most important question, therefore, is what kind of political frameworks are ready 
to cope with this elusive and fluid but increasingly expanding social phenomenon. As Walker Connor 
(1999) articulates that ethnonational movements’ are found worldwide, they 
‘are to be found in Africa (for example, Ethiopia), Asia (Sri Lanka), Eastern Europe 
(Romania), Western Europe (France), North America (Guatemala), South America (Guyana), 
and Oceania (New Zealand). The list includes countries that are old (United Kingdom), as well 
as new (Bangladesh), large (Indonesia), as well as small (Fiji), rich (Canada), as well as poor 
(Pakistan), authoritarian (Sudan) as well as democratic (Belgium), Marxist-Leninist (China) as 
well as militantly anti-Marxist (Turkey). The list also includes countries which are Buddhist 
(Burma), Christian (Spain), Moslem (Iran), Hindu (India) and Judaic (Israel). (Connor 1999: 
163-4).  
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Various political thinking and arrangements that have been proposed and tried in order to obliterate 
diversity have not been successful so far, rather some of the extreme measures such as forced 
centralisation, assimilation, expulsion or ethnic cleansing have brought about unending and colossal 
violence and humanitarian crises. As a result, there is general agreement- both scholarly and 
empirically- that there must be a less violent and non-offensive political design that could accommodate 
rather than aimed to obliterate ethnic diversity. Although, the primordialists’ emphasis on the ‘givens’ 
and ‘permanency’ of ethnic identities is highly exaggerated, the instrumentalists assumption of fluidity 
of ethnic identities is equally overstated. Ethnic identities and ethnic solidarities have become reduced 
and subtle when societies find other solidarities on the bases of professionalism, class, political opinion 
and other opportunities. On the other hand, ethnic identities and solidarities become essential and 
meaningful when people are facing real or imagined threats of persecution or discrimination based on 
their identities; and it is in such situations ethnic solidarity are consolidated until the menace has 
subsided. Some identities have remained solid and active for many generations due to unforgettable past 
experiences and on-going threats and opportunities, while others have diluted early and easily. As a 
result, the existing societal relations in the political, social and economic arenas and other factor like 
historical memories are very important in shaping the pattern and magnitude of ethnic relations and 
ethnic solidarity. Needless to say, encouraging ethnic entitlement simply because of glorification of 
primordial attachments could be a recipe for institutionalising ethnic hostilities and ethnic competition 
that could represent serious risks for public cohesion and governability in multiethnic societies.    
 
Similarly, the feasibility or unfeasibility of ethnic entitlement in state restructuring could also depend on 
the pattern and trend of statehood traditions and the power of centrifugal and centripetal forces in 
multiethnic societies. However, the behaviour of state elites could have varied implications. As Conversi 
(2000), for example, discovers from the case of Spain that ‘whenever the state reacted tolerantly towards 
nationalist aspirations, peripheral demand were softened. In Contrast, whenever the state increased its 
repression against the most salient aspects of regional specificity, the movement grew more radical’ 
(Conversi 2000: 124). Thus, in states in which centrifugal ethnic or regional demands and secession 
sentiments are strong, impositions of unitary or centralized political structures are not a guarantee for 
obliterating such demands for autonomy or secession. Rather, granting autonomy arrangements in a 
framework of federalism could be used as a political bargain to dissuade entrenched and resolute 
separatist groups that are vigorously demanding for autonomy.  
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It can be argued that recognizing the legitimacy of ethnic demands for autonomy could strengthen the 
distinctiveness and cohesiveness of ethnic identity, which is a fluid and elusive phenomenon. On the 
other hand, denying the rights could also strengthen the distinctiveness and cohesiveness of ethnic 
identities by providing a breeding ground for elevating resentments against the centre; such a denial 
could be used to consolidate and crystallize a group’s identity in order to mobilize resistance against the 
centre. In cases of deeply divided multiethnic societies, in which demands for ethnic autonomy are 
vigorous and feasible, it is very important to design a hybrid federal model that could promote autonomy 
and power-sharing but without encouraging the proliferation of further ethnic claims. Of course, this is 
the most problematic scenario. Recognition of diversity in federal system must be anchored in a national 
ideal that transcends any fixed divisions of power. A hybrid federal model that guarantees group 
autonomy with high incentives for integration and inter-ethnic cooperation could be a forward-looking 
approach. As Agranoff put it ‘there must be a fabric of wholeness that moves the federal idea forward’ 
(Agranoff 1998: 14). However, the wholeness and the national idea should not be promoted through 
coercion, but through recurrent bargaining progression and flexible arrangements based on the principles 
of self-rule and shared-rule. Political arrangements in multiethnic societies should take into 
consideration the configuration of ethnic cleavages and rivalries on the ground. As Watts sees it the 
effectiveness of federalism ‘in accommodation shared-rule with self-rule for constituent ethnic groups 
depends upon the degree to which the groups are geographically concentrated and so can be territorially 
demarcated (Watts 2000b: 40).     
The following chapters, will explore the implementation and operation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia 
in order to determine whether the Ethiopia’s ethnic federal model is based on the configuration of ethnic 
cleavages and rivalries on the ground and whether it is capable of providing an appropriate political 
framework that could promote shared-rule and self-rule that reflect and suit the ethnic configuration on 
the ground? 
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Chapter Three: Factors behind the emergence of ethnic 
federalism in Ethiopia 
In this chapter, the major focus will be to investigate the major impetus behind the ethnic federal 
arrangement in Ethiopia by exploring the very rationale behind the conception and development of 
ethnic federal arrangement. It investigates whether the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia is 
evolving from a genuine aspiration as well as participation of the disparate ethnic groups that constitute 
the Ethiopian state. Thus, the chapter starts by examining the origin and goal of the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF), because it is the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) that has initiated 
ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia after defeating the military regime in 1991. In addition, the 
chapter examines the justification of the TPLF for waging an ethnic liberation movement against the 
centralized Ethiopian state and its strategy in establishing the EPRDF.  
 
The chapter also scrutinizes the process of ethnic federalism was conceptualised, negotiated and 
endorsed. In this connection, the focus will be on the three most important activities of the transitional 
period, namely the July 1991 conference, the charter and the transitional government. The July 1991 
conference was the first step that wedded ethnic discourses in official Ethiopian political terrain. The 
matrimonies of the conference were filled by an intriguing and unadorned stratagem of modalities in 
enrolling the participants, setting the agendas and reaching agreements or consensuses. As a result, it 
begs an investigation in order to unfasten the bolts and nuts of the process of the conference. The 
charter, which was also the main progeny of the conference but filled with a lot of controversial and 
ambiguous notions of the Ethiopian society, had become the first ‘legal’ document in Ethiopian history 
to reminisce ethnic recognition and ethnic rights. It can be certainly established that the charter was the 
basic document that imbued the succeeding Ethiopian constitution in 1994, as its tone and vocals were 
visibly stamped in the core principles of the constitution. Therefore it is a paramount task to unpack the 
charter in order to understand the orientation and frame of reference of the framers with reasonable 
clarity. Lastly, the chapter attempts to determine whether the transitional government can be considered 
as a genuine coalition government of the ethnic groups that constitute the Ethiopian state. It ties its 
analytical investigation by focusing on the essence of the transitional government in which the actual 
political power fixture was conducted with a blend of Machiavellianism and political naivety. By doing 
this, the chapter attempts to throw a light upon the validity, theoretical clarity, justifications and 
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empirical evidence and legitimation of the initial phase of the implementation of the ethnic federal 
arrangement in Ethiopia.            
 
3.1 The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF): Origin and   
Objectives  
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was established in 1975 by the Tigrayan university 
students2 who had been motivated by an idea of waging a class-based revolution to guarantee a regional 
autonomy for the people of Tigray (Harold Marcus 2002: 221). According to a key activist of the 
movement that the TPLF’s motivation was born out of the conception that the modern Ethiopian State 
was created by the process of domination and imposition of the language, religion and culture of the 
Amhara ruling elite’s over the other ethnic communities in the neighbouring territories which therefore 
has resulted in sufferings of the various ethnic groups from ethnocentrisms, xenophobia, and national 
inferiority (Kinfe 1994: 23). TPLF holds a belief that the present day Ethiopian state was created as a 
result of the successful conquests and expansions of Emperor Menelik at the end of nineteenth century.  
The Menelik’s expansion was largely so violent which destroyed the traditional self-governing 
institutions of the peoples of the south and brought their territories under the control of the expanding 
army. As a result the contemporary Ethiopian state was created and emerged as a unitary centralized 
state by undermining and disregarding the rights of various ethnic communities that constituted the state, 
therefore for the TPLF, Ethiopia need to be taken apart and put together again by respecting the 
identities and autonomy of every group (Clapham 2002: 26).      
 
However, the TPLF conception of the Ethiopian state was influenced by the 1960s and 70s student 
movement in Ethiopia which had extensive debates on various issues and problems of Ethiopia, such as 
land reform, class struggle, nationalities’ question and Eritrean secession. At the time, the student 
movement and debates were highly influenced by the contemporary radical thinking of Marxism and 
Leninism, and the Leninist solution of the nationalities question which theoretically up-holds the 
principle of self-determination including secession for resolving national questions (Teshale 1995: 176, 
                                                 
2 According to Harold Marcus that they were about thirty-seven members, of which eleven started the armed struggle, nine 
went to the towns to agitate and recruit fighters, seventeen went to EPLF for military training, Marcus 1994: 222) 
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Messay 2002: 12; Marcus 2002: 221). Therefore being part of the Ethiopian student movement, there 
was a great motivation for the Tigrayan students to pursue the same doctrine. As Adhana (1998: 48) 
confirms that the participation of Tigray university students in the student movement was, ‘in essence, 
the first school of revolutionary thought and practice’ that produced a new cadre of Tigray nationalists’ 
(Ibid. p. 48).  The student movement was very radical in its tone of criticising the ruling class for the 
whole misery and neglect of the nationalities in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian radicals in 1970s espoused a 
belief that a nationalities question in Ethiopia should be considered favourably to allow some sort of 
regional autonomy or self-government (Clapham 2002: 21).  Thus, the Tigrayan university students, 
who were highly troubled by the miserable socio-economic condition of their province, had got an 
affirmation for the view broadly held in Tigray which claimed that ‘the misery in Tigray was due to a 
deliberate neglect of the province by the ruling Amhara elite at the centre’ (Aregawi 2004). As a result, 
the Tigrayan nationalism, which was articulated by the educated Tigrayan elite, was espoused for the 
liberation of Tigray province from the Amhara domination (Teshale 1995: 173). Interestingly, Leenco 
stresses that the Tigrayan were the junior partner of the Amharas in creating and dominating the present 
Ethiopian state. In due course they ‘became increasingly dissatisfied with their position within the 
Amhara-dominated ethnic hierarchy to such an extent that they too joined the struggle for self-
determination’ (Leenco 1999:41-42). Similarly, Marcus also states that ‘Tigrayan felt marginalized by 
their Christian Amhara cousins, even though the Tigray had participated in Emperor Menelik’s empire 
building and in Emperor Haile Selassie’s effort to establish a nation’ (Marcus 2002: 221). 
 
Accordingly, Kinfe Abreha argues that ‘the Tigrians also resent the unfair historical process through 
which the Tigrians overloardship of Emperor Yohannes IV was lost to Menelik II, leading to the gradual 
decline of the region from the citadel of the Empire’ to a quasi autonomous one’ (Kinfe 1994: 159). He 
writes that: ‘The Tigray resistance is naturally the outcome of the gradual decline of the region whose 
human and material potentials was spent in the preservation of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. It was 
the case of a candle that consumed itself while giving light to its surroundings’ (Ibid.).  This assertion 
may reflect the disquiet of the Tigrayan elite on lost pride due to ‘a humiliating sense of exclusion from 
the important centre of power’. Similarly, Adhana claims that Tigray, defined by its predominant 
Christian character, formed not only a durable component of the Ethiopian nation but was also part of 
the backbone of the Ethiopian state and thus ‘everything that defined the Ethiopian state was a result of 
Aksumite invention and innovation.’ (Adhana 1998: 43). 
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However, Adhana states that the history of Tigray since 1889, after the death of Emperor 
Yohannes, was full of conspiracy ‘against Tigray emerging as a fully fledged nation’ and the 
subversion of Tigray’s identity (Ibid. p. 47). He adds that ‘the newly introduced system of state 
education, which promoted Amharanization, not only constituted an onslaught on the language 
of and culture of the Tigray, but also worked to distance the Tigray from the Amhara concept 
of the Ethiopian nation-state’ (Ibid.). 
 
No doubt that the introduction of Amharic language in school and state institution had an impact in 
hampering the inclusion of the Tigray elite’s admittance into the emperor’s loyalist networks. However, 
the TPLF’s claim of a deliberate neglect of the Tigray province by ‘Amhara rule’ is very controversial, 
since the emperor rule had neglected also every province in Ethiopia including the King’s ancestral 
province. Moreover the excessive centralisation policy of the emperor had weakened all regional power 
bases throughout Ethiopia, so it was not unique to Tigray. So, what were the motivating factors for the 
growing resentment in Tigray since 1950s? Messay argues that the emperor’s excessive centralisation, 
which was introduced by nominating mainly ‘Shewans or individual closely related to the Shewan 
aristocracy to regional and local positions of power,’ had resulted in alienation of regional elites 
including non-Shewan Amharas. (Messay 1999: 316). So, in Tigray, wherein the Aksumite legacy has 
always inspired provincialism, rebellious attitude against the Shewan Amhara domination and state 
centralization had emerged. ‘This same legacy defined the goal of the Tigrean uprising against the Derg 
and sustained its combative mood’ (Ibid. p. 398). Similarly, Teshale states that ‘the competition between 
Tigray, on the one hand, and Shewa, on the other, was not an ethnic competition between Tigrayans and 
Amharas,’ rather it was because of the reduction of Tigray from a regional power broker into a minor 
status due to the beginning of modern education, and centralisation of power in Addis Ababa  (Teshale 
1995: 175). Thus, Teshale concludes that the nature of Tigrayan nationalism is ‘a compound of 
aspirations for hegemony and struggle against Amharic linguistic oppression’ (Ibid.). It is very difficult 
to determine the reasons with accuracy that the TPLF’s origin in 1970s was whether motivated by the 
desire for re-claiming hegemony, however, the lost pride and glory coupled with material 
impoverishment in Tigray province might have triggered a vigour force for rebellion. 
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As it has been the case in Ethiopia, controlling the state institutions meant power, prestige, status, 
honour, and access to economic benefits (Ibid. p. 116). Thus isolation from the state power could result 
in loss of these privileges.   
 
The Tigray province, a home of the famous Aksum obelisk and the source of Ethiopian civilisation, has 
been suffering from recurrent drought and famine and, thus its population has been highly impoverished 
and experienced forced as well as voluntarily migration to other regions. Therefore, the Tigrayan elites 
could have worried on this sorry situation of the land and the people, which was once depicted as the 
beacon of Ethiopian as well as African civilisation. Thus, TPLF flamed nationalism in Tigray by 
blaming ‘Amhara rule’ for the material, environmental and psychological degradation of Tigray. Adhana 
claims that ‘Yohannes IV presided over the Ethiopian state for seventeen years, (1872-89). Ruling the 
Tigray and the Gonder region directly, he kept Wollo under close supervision, while he ruled Gojjam 
and Shoa indirectly by unifying the local dynastic houses and expansion of the Tigray political elite  
(Adhana 1998: 44). However, after the death of Yohannes in 1889 Tigray found itself politically 
orphaned, militarily battered, economically shattered and psychologically disoriented’ (Ibid. p. 45).  
Thus, there was a great rage to eliminate the constraints that had stood in the way of Tigray (Ibid. p. 49). 
 
Hence, ‘Amhara rule’ was held responsible for such impoverishment and disorientation (Kinfe 1994, 
Adhana 1998, Aregawi 2004). As a result, it was constructed as a targetable enemy to wage war against. 
The Tigray political elite explained the centralised Ethiopian authority in terms of Amhara rule- an 
ethnic classification- that was a powerful symbolic factor to mobilise the Tigrayan peasantry to fight 
against an ethnic domination. Ethnicity was used, as a decisive factor in mobilising resistance, without 
describing the target in terms of ethnicity; it would have been difficult to create a concrete target to wage 
a war.    As Thompson claims that when an individual or a group's collective identities have been forged 
in the context of primordial communities, and when these communities' autonomy is threatened by the 
present-day necessity of forging a new and as yet unstable state order, then primordial sentiments may 
serve to define politically significant social movements. (Thompson 1989: 58). Subsequently, the 
Tigrayan population was imbued with an emotional and cultural significance that could bring significant 
social movement that should challenge the centre in which the Shewan Amhara was accused of 
monopolizing, therefore the Amhara and its concomitant identities were depicted as the major target to 
be resisted, rejected and dismantled. Thus, the TPLF constructed a powerful enemy in order to give a 
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rational and justifiable cause for its struggle.  As Pierre Van Berghe claim that ‘ethnic and racial groups 
can be politically mobilised, even on a huge scale, with greater ease and rapidity, than other social 
groups, especially under external threat from an enemy who is himself defined in ethnic or racial terms’ 
(van den Berghe 1995: 362).   
 
Similarly, the Tigrayan nationalists or TPLF’s leadership reflected a narrow outlook in framing their 
liberation goal as the dismantling of the imposition of Amhara rule over Tigray. The Haile Selassie 
regime (1936-1974) was relied to a great extent on ‘Shewan tribalism’ that equally alienated non-
Shewan Amharas from his autocratic rule (Messay 1999: 122). The military regime (1974-1991), had no 
preference based on ethnic classification, rather it was the one that ruthlessly dismantled the autocratic 
rule of Haile Selassie and his loyal Shewan aristocracy and replaced it by leadership of junior officers. 
The ethnic origin of these junior officers neither was a criterion nor did have any significant meaning in 
assuming a leadership role. Moreover, the 1975 land reform was a radical measure that abolished the 
exploitative domination of the Shewan aristocracy over the southern peasants.   
 
However, this is not to claim that there were no justifiable reasons for the rising of resistance in Tigray, 
there were many factors that fomented and aggravated resentment in Tigray. First, the emperor Haile 
Selassie’s centralization policy in 1940s drastically reduced the power of the regional nobility and made 
Addis Ababa the center of power and privilege.  Though the trend was similar in the countrywide, ‘the 
autonomy of Tigray was eroded due to the concentration of power on Haile Selassie, who preferred to 
rely ‘on a bureaucratic class as the vehicle of control and change’ (Marcus 2002: 155). Second, the 
response of the emperor for the 1943-1944 peasants uprising (or the Woyane insurrection) in Tigray was 
so brutal, many peasants were slaughtered by the air bombing. The peasants uprising were ‘sparked by 
misadministration, excessive taxation, official corruption, and consequent brigandage’ (Ibid.). Third, 
more severely, ‘Tigray was reduced in size, part of it added to Wello, which was the domain of the 
Crown Prince’ (Teshale 1995: 115). Fourth, with the introduction of modern education and state 
institutions, Amharic language, which was a language of the rulers, has become a language of 
instruction in schools and government offices since 1940s (as it happened everywhere that the language 
of the rulers used to be the language of administration). There is no doubt that this practice ‘hampered 
all those whose mother tongue was different, and Amharic language proficiency acting as a principle of 
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selection, and hence of exclusion’ (Messay 1999: 315). Hence, in Tigray it created the hegemony of the 
Amhara language over the Tigrean language in public offices and elementary schools.  
 
Fifth, Tigray was one of the worst hit areas in the 1984-85 famine and while children and parents were 
dying in camps in Mekele and Korem in connection to the famine, Addis Ababa was preparing for a 
massive and expensive celebration for the ten year accession of the military junta to power. More sadly, 
Mengistu used proffered food aid as a weapon against his enemies by refusing to allow relief supplies to 
enter rebel-held territory, in effect seeking to starve partisans of the TPLF and EPLF into submission.’ 
(Marcus 2002: 209). Sixth, in the 1986 resettlement programme, hundreds of thousands peasants from 
Tigray were forcefully resettled to south and west of Ethiopia. The programme was inadequately 
planned and pre-prepared, as a result many families had been broken-up, and many people had died 
during the trip and after the resettlement. In Tigray, especially by TPLF, the resettlement programme 
was considered ‘as a political and military ploy for reducing the popular support for its movement 
among the rural Tigrayan population’ (Kinfe 1994: 98).  Seventh, the military government measure that 
prohibited peasants from working in the towns had severely affected the farmers’ household economies 
in Tigray. ‘Given the decreasing ability of the province’s exhausted land to support a growing 
population; over 200,000 Tigrayans annually had sought periodic work in commercial centres or 
followed cash crop harvests around Ethiopia. Now that these practices prohibited, the standard of life in 
the average household deteriorated.’ (Marcus 2002: 222).  
 
It is obvious that the above factors had strengthened Tigrayan resentment against the central rule of the 
Ethiopian state and provided a golden opportunity for the TPLF in building up moral and human support 
for their adoration of Tigrayan particularism. However, the enemy was defined in terms of ethnicity as 
‘an Amhara rule’ in order to fit the agenda of Tigrayan particularism which was upheld by TPLF. 
Defining the enemy in terms of ethnicity would make easier to mobilize the Tigrayan peasants in the 
name of defending their identity and rights against the incursion and threat of Amhara rule. As van de 
Berghe (1995) claims that defining the enemy in ethnic or racial terms is relatively easier to mobilise 
support through ethnic or racial solidarity. A struggle defined in terms of ethnic factors like the Tigrayan 
people to rebel against Amhara domination could be more motivating than, to rebel against the Shewan 
Amhara aristocratic class who did not have any exploitative relation in Tigray. It was certainly known 
for the Tigray elites that Yohannes army was highly dependent on supply from Menelik from Shewa 
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(Marcus 2002: 76). Tribute and generous supply of food, cattle and other items from Menelik’s Shewa 
were well known among the Tigray nobility as well as their armies (Afework 1909). So, Tigray’s 
economic importance was very marginal to invite Shewan aristocracy’s economic exploitation when 
compared to the southern Ethiopia which was structurally and materially more conducive to penetration. 
‘Exportable products such as coffee and gold were already being produced in the south. Land was 
plentiful and most appropriate for cash crop products of whatever kind’. (Messay 1999: 53). More 
importantly, ‘the impinging world economy was changing the subsistence based Ethiopian feudalism 
into a complex absolutist system sustained by a more rigorous exploitation of the natural economy and 
international trade (Marcus 2002: 77). Thus, expansion to the south was more attractive and rewarding 
to the Ethiopian state. The expansion to the more abundant south was carried out under overwhelming 
dominance of the Shewan aristocracy, which resulted in further marginalisation of the Tigray province 
and alienation of the Tigray elite. Thus, the response of Tigray was to rebel against its marginalisation 
and alienation by rejecting the power of the Shewan aristocracy who didn’t incorporate the Tigray elite 
who claim a historical right to rule Ethiopia. The excessive centralisation and brutality of the military 
government in mid 1970s added significant impetus to build up and buttress the resentment in Tigray 
against the centralised Ethiopian state. Though TPLF was formed in 1975, the factors for its emergence 
could be traced to the accumulated bitterness of Tigray for many decades, especially since the 1889’s 
death of Emperor Yohannes, mainly due to the exclusion and marginalisation of Tigray from the power 
centre rather than the domination of Tigray by the power centre of the Ethiopian state. Because 
‘appointment to state office meant power, prestige, status, honour, and access to economic benefits’ and 
thus exclusion meant loss of these privileges’ (Teshale 1999: 116).  As Markakis also elucidates that:  
‘Competition for resources in conditions of increasing scarcity is the process that shapes the 
confrontation between groups and individuals in the Horn of Africa. The mediating role the state 
plays in it renders this process intrinsically political, and this mean only groups can compete. 
Competition takes place not in the economic but in the political realm, and the immediate object 
is access to power, the key to the acquisition of material and social resources.’ (Markakis 1994: 
235).            
 
Nevertheless, there are still unresolved controversy concerning the initial objectives of TPLF- regional 
autonomy or secession- some claim that at its inception, TPLF’s goal was to fight for regional autonomy 
within the context of the Ethiopian state, but in the face of an oppressive Ethiopian state, the TPLF stood 
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for the province’s separation and independence (Marcus 1994: 224). Marcus argues, ‘in the TPLF 
inaugural Fighters Congress held in Agame on 18 February 1976, the first anniversary of the front, its 
entire membership of 170 approved the Manifesto of TPLF, which asserted that the organization’s first 
task was to establish an Independent Democratic Republic of Tigray’ (Marcus 2002: 223).  Likewise, 
the founding members3 of TPLF also reveals that the idea for an independent Tigray republic was stated 
in the TPLF manifesto of 1976 by section of the leadership4, but the idea was not supported by either the 
majority members of the Front or ‘by the people of Tigray, who constituted the historic core of the 
Ethiopian polity’ (Aregawe 2004: 591). Aregawi also argues that the secessionist ethos was also faced 
strong opposition from the EPLF, thus faced with such opposition from inside and also significant 
pressure from EPLF, TPLF officially dropped the independent Tigray option in 1978. 
 
According to Aregawi that the notion of Tigray independence was mainly espoused by a section of 
TPLF leadership who committed for ‘an ultra-left ideological brand of Marxism-Leninism which 
culminated in the formation of a group called the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT)5 in 1986’ 
(Ibid. p. 392). Aregawi argues that an independent Tigray republic has never been an objective for the 
Tigrayan liberation movement, even from the start. Rather, according to Aregawi, in 1970s the 
university students from the Tigray region believed that the miserable condition and poverty in Tigray 
were by far the worst than other regions of Ethiopia. As a result, the Tigrayan university student agreed 
to start a national armed struggle for ‘the formation of a democratic Ethiopia in which the equality of all 
nationalities is respected’ (Ibid. p. 579). However, he concedes that the comparative poverty assessment 
of Tigray was ‘often expressed sentimentally, in relation to the past glory of Tigray and its standing in 
the history of the Ethiopian nation’ (Ibid. p. 576).  
 
Nonetheless, it is still an unresolved issue since the chief protagonists of the idea of an independent 
Tigray republic are still member of the core leadership of the TPLF and particularly the sole ideologue 
of the idea, Prime Minster Meles Zenawi is the leader of the TPLF and EPRDF. It should also be kept in 
                                                 
3  Former members of the TPLF, Tesfay Atsbeha, and Kahsay Berhe in their article September 2002: ‘TPLF-Two Groups 
of the TPLF and Two Issues of Ethiopia’ argues that the secession idea within TPLF is espoused by few leaders of TPLF 
including its head, the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi who was the chief ideologue of the idea. 
4 Which include Abay Tsehay, Sibhat Nega, Seyoum Mesfin and Meles Zenawi 
5 Aregawe states that that ‘the inclusion in the current Ethiopian Constitution of a right to secession for every nationality 
(article 39.1), and the adoption of ‘revolutionary democracy’ as a guiding ideology by the current government, are 
intrinsically linked to both the ethno-nationalist and ultra-leftist stances of the faction led by Meles Zenawi, who governs 
Ethiopia today’, contrary to many of Tigray nationalists. (Aregawi 2004: 592). 
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mind that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was an ardent advocate of the inclusion of the right-to-secession 
clause in the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution (Alem 2005: 326). Among the TPLF’F leadership, many of 
those who opposed the independent Tigray republic idea have been either expelled or left the 
organisation. As a result, it is difficult to ascertain whether the independent Tigray option is completely 
abandoned or kept latent for the time being as TPLF has transformed itself from the antitheses of the 
Ethiopian state to the owner and custodian of the Ethiopian state via EPRDF.            
 
3.2 The creation of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
In 1989, following the liberation of the entire Tigray province from the central authority, the TPLF 
adopted a new strategy to continue the fight against the military regime by establishing a new front 
called the EPRDF. The establishment of a ‘coalition’ front under the name of the EPRDF in 1989 could 
be a kaleidoscopic cursor that would indicate the direction and motives of the TPLF. In the TPLF’s 
perspective, the major argument of the TPLF to transform itself from a uni-ethnic autonomy movement 
to a pan-Ethiopian movement was that the liberation of Tigray would be a temporary phenomenon if not 
supported by the liberation of other ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Though many Tigrayans questioned the 
need to continue fighting, the TPLF leaders argued that unless the military government was completely 
overthrown, the Tigray province could still be re-occupied or became a target of a harsh punitive 
military hit by the central military government (Marcus 2002:229). It is hinted that the after liberation of 
Tigray, about 35,000 TPLF fighters had laid down their arms and headed for their village and civil life, 
but with significant pressure placed on their parents and relatives, the fighters were persuaded to return 
to the front (Leenco 1999: 123). In their unrelenting motivations, the leadership of TPLF also able to 
manoeuvre and secure support from Orthodox priests who echoed that the liberation of the whole of 
Ethiopia from the atheist Marxist military regime would be an advantage for the revitalization and 
strength of the Orthodox Church of Ethiopia (Marcus 1994: 230).  
 
Strategically and politically, the decision of the TPLF to continue the fight might be correct, but there 
are also other crucial factors that might have pressed the TPLF leaders to continue the war. An 
independent Tigray province may not be a viable option in terms of economic consideration. The Tigray 
province has suffered from frequent drought and famine, deep environmental degradation and it is also 
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without any viable economic or natural resources to tackle the extensive and chronic poverty in the 
province. The Tigray province was highly dependent on the rest of Ethiopia in many aspects; therefore it 
could have terrified the TPLF leaders to think about seceding the province without any tangible 
economic benefit to the people. Had they chosen secession, they could have quickly lost the sympathy of 
the Tigray people. As a result, the TPLF leaders shifted their objective by changing themselves from a 
uni-ethnic liberation front to a multi-ethnic liberation one, from TPLF to EPRDF and thus, to fight for 
the liberation of the whole of Ethiopia from the brutal military dictatorship, the objective which was 
more feasible and rewarding to fight for.  
 
Thus, by forming the EPRDF, the TPLF has transformed itself from an ethnic liberation movement to a 
‘multiethnic’ liberation movement by forging separate organisations for the Amhara, Oromo and after 
victory, for Southern Ethiopia various ethnic groups under the EPRDF, but under the leadership of the 
TPLF (Clapham 2002: 26; John Young 1989: 321). In reality, the creation of the EPRDF has helped the 
TPLF ‘to play a role beyond the bounds of Tigray province’ (Markakis 1994: 230). The EPRDF is 
comprised of four ethnic organisations namely, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Amhara 
National Democratic Movement (ANDM), Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and 
Southern Ethiopia Peoples’ Democratic Front (SEPDF).  
 
The ANDM was established in 1980 by former members of the EPRP under the name of the Ethiopian 
People Democratic Movement (EPDM) with an encouragement and subsequent support of the TPLF at 
the time of the armed struggle (Clapham 2002: 26. At its inception, the EPDM was a multiethnic pan-
Ethiopian movement without any reference to a particular ethnic group and its members were also 
drawn from various ethnic backgrounds. In 1989, the EPDM made a ‘coalition’ with the TPLF to form 
the EPRDF in order to expand the liberation struggle in Amhara areas such as Gonder, Gojjam, Wello 
and North Shewa and, thus it played a great role in liberating these areas from the military government 
and eventually facilitated for the downfall of the military government in 1991. In 1994 the EPDM was 
declared as an Amhara organisation by changing its name to the Amhara National Democratic 
Movement (ANDM) and re-assorting its members (Tegegne 1998: 122). Though the leaders of the 
ANDM claim that they represent the Amhara people, many Amharas, particularly the majority of 
educated Amhara elite considers the ANDM as an instrument of the TPLF to rule the Amhara people 
through surrogate organisation (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 115). Besides, large numbers of Amhara 
 72  
are not happy to accept ethnic classification, for them Amhara is virtually coterminous with being 
Ethiopian, but for ANDM/EPRDF, Amhara is now a constituent identity within a larger state (Clapham 
2002: 29). It is argued that both the TPLF and ANDM (former EPDM) were created as Marxist guerrilla 
movements and, organised and trained to fight for state power in the bush, they were not political parties 
to compete in a democratic arena and their structure and conditioning have not altered greatly since 1991 
(Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 119). 
 
The Oromo Peoples Democratic Organisation (OPDO) was established by the TPLF in March 1990 by 
ex-prisoners of war and deserted soldiers of the military regime. In its final offensive operation toward 
Addis Ababa and the central Ethiopia territories, which are surrounded by the Oromo territories, the 
TPLF used Oromo fighters and cadres who would made easier for the mobilisation of the Oromo people 
against the military regime under the name of OPDO. Since 1991, the OPDO, allied with the TPLF, has 
become the sole ruling party in Oromia regional state, apparently by producing a one-party exclusive 
controlled politics. Expression of Oromo identity outside OPDO is not tolerable in the Oromia regional 
state (Clapham 2002: 29). Significant number of Oromo intellectuals inside Ethiopia and majority of the 
Oromo Diaspora believe that the OPDO was created by the TPLF to undermine the Oromo Liberation 
Front (OLF), which was not willing to accept a subordinate role to TPLF. The OLF enjoys a 
considerable support among the Oromo community inside and outside Ethiopia and becomes one of the 
most important political movements in Ethiopia (Markakis 1994: 232; Mohammed Hassen 1999: 241; 
Forrest 2004: 158; Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 115). Since its inception, the OPDO has suffered a 
series of defection and dismissal of its top leadership members. More discussion about the OPDO will 
be made in Chapter 7 that examine the Oromia regional state.   
 
The establishment of the South Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Front (SEPDF) in 1992 was orchestrated 
by the EPRDF for the aim of extending its authority in the southern Ethiopia in incorporating the diverse 
ethnolinguistic groupings under a single political command and structure. The SEPDF was a coalition of 
20 ethnic based political organisations which most of them were established by EPRDF as PDOs 
(peoples democratic organisations) by specially trained EPRDF’s cadres from the various areas of the 
south who were ‘pre-positioned’ to move in their home areas in order to mobilise the people to facilitate 
the EPRDF’s rule (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 116). In September 2003, the SEPDF was reorganised 
by dissolving its 20 constituting ethnic organisations and merging their members into a single 
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organisation called the SEPDM (South Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement). SEPDF has 
remained weak and marginal within the EPRDF coalition. Further discussion about SEPDF will be made 
in Chapter 6 that examines the SNNP regional state.        
  
Thus, the EPRDF is considered to be a coalition of the Tigrayan, Amhara, Oromo and Southern ethnic 
groups and since 1991 the TPLF has assumed the reins of power in Ethiopia in the name of the EPRDF. 
An asymmetry of power among the coalition members has taken ethnic ingredients. Despite its 
multiethnic façade, many, including the EPRDF coalition members, believe that the Tigrayan ethnic 
ingredient has been very dominant within the EPRDF coalition. The TPLF, which is one of the four 
ethnic groupings in the EPRDF, is the building block and founder of the front. The TPLF is highly 
skilled in manipulation and control, as it played a pivotal role in establishing the three political 
organisations and other many People Democratic Organisations (PDOs). As Merera put it that the PDOs 
‘is the strategy of manufacturing a political support base by creating controlled ethnic-based 
organisations for the various ethnic groups of the country (Merera 2003: 146). Due to the nature of their 
conception and incorporation, therefore, the three parties are regarded as puppet for the TPLF and 
greatly lack the genuine support of their respective ethnic communities. As a result they faced 
formidable challenge to get the legitimacy of their respective ethnic communities in free and fair 
elections due to the strength and independent of main rival ethnic parties. EPRDF’s coalition formation 
strategy was not made based on equal terms, rather it appeared to be based on a sort of a patron-client 
relationship, in which TPLF, the Tigrayan core has acted as a patron that can protect, favour, punish and 
lead the other groups. EPRDF emerged in such controlled process and thus has derived its operational 
guidelines from the ethos and logics of its conception. Its deficiency has originated from the stage of its 
conception and thus has become the poison of its modus operandi in dealing with other ethnic groups; it 
seems to be a defective organisation at its birth. TPLF ventured on bringing together individuals from 
disoriented, deserters and prisoners of war to form ethnic associations and coalition to forge intrinsically 
impaired EPRDF in the name of a power-sharing scheme.  
 
There are two different views regarding the coalition strategy of EPRDF. First, it is argued that the best 
means for the TPLF to retain a leading position in Ethiopia, where the Tigrayans constitute a small 
proportion of the country’s population, is to maintain an ethnic-based coalition with elements of the 
numerically superior Oromo and the historically dominant Amhara (Young, 1996: 534). The second 
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argument is that the strategy is designed mainly to weaken other opposing ethnic movement of the 
Oromo, Somalis, and others that did not want to organise themselves under the domination of TPLF 
(Scherrer, 1998: 51). 
 
However, the TPLF argue that the creation of the EPRDF was motivated by two major objectives: the 
liberation of the whole of Ethiopia from the brutal military regime and ensuring the formation of a 
democratic Ethiopia in which the equality and self-administration of all nationalities is respected (Young 
1997). However, this claim will be scrutinised in the next section, which explores the essence of the 
EPRDF by considering the actual activities on the ground by investigating, first the transitional period, 
second post-transitional federal-state relation, third the operation of ethnic federalism in three regional 
states.  
3.3 The July Conference, the Charter and the transitional 
government  
The July 1991 conference is the first step that facilitated the way for the imposition of ethnic 
restructuring in Ethiopia. In the May conference, the TPLF-led EPRDF argued that the future of 
Ethiopia lies on establishing a state structure that could guarantee self-administration rights of the 
various ethnic groups. The transitional period charter which was produced by the conference, made an 
explicit provision that the right to self-determination including secession was the inviolable right of the 
‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ of Ethiopia (Article 2 Transitional Charter, 1991).  For the EPRDF, 
the major cause of conflict in Ethiopia was the ‘oppression of nationalities’ due to the imposition of a 
centralised state that rejected the rights of the various ethnic communities to use and promote their 
language and to develop and promote their culture and to determine their affairs.  
 
Consequently, the EPRDF argued that many ethnic groups, which include the TPLF, OLF, ALF, ONLF, 
had taken arms to resist the central state domination that rejected their existence and as a result the 
country has been immersed into unending conflict and constant bloodshed that could have lead to the 
disintegration of the Ethiopian state altogether.  For the EPRDF’s leadership, therefore, the only solution 
that could guarantee the survival of the country in united and peaceful manner is through the 
introduction of an ethnic federal system that could provide self-administration for every ethnic group in 
Ethiopia. Ethnic federalism was presented as a choice beyond disintegration or oppression’ (Meles 
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Zenawi, 1994: Interview Efoyita Magazine). ‘The better alternative to relying on force of arms is the 
mutual consent of the people to live together’ (Nahum 1994: 158). Similarly, a staunch TPLF’s advocate 
argues, ‘neither the Amharas and Tigrians nor the Oromos have a monopoly to dominate Ethiopia’s 
political scene on the basis of dynastic credentials, traditional claims, demographic advantages or the 
advantage of being better endowed with resources. The less endowed and the small nations also have 
legitimate rights to participate in its political process, economic life and in the burdensome task of 
rebuilding it. (Kinfe 1994: 63). Thus, in 1991, ethnic federalism was considered as the only option that 
could save the state collapse. The EPRDF leader Prime Minister Meles Zenawi asserts that without 
giving assurance to the ethnic communities for self-administration and equality, the 1991 Ethiopia was 
not in a steadfast position to protect its territorial integrity within the centralised mould (Marcus 1995). 
However, there are disagreements whether the 1991 Ethiopian situation was in a verge of state 
disintegration or not. It is well known that some liberation movements were actively operating in the 
country, but except some of the movements like the EPLF, TPLF and to some extent OLF, the others did 
not show any noticeable military pressure to challenge the centralized military regime.   
  
Rather it was the TPLF and the July 1991 conference that have given an exaggerating impression that 
the ethnic question was a very fundamental issue in Ethiopia and thus claimed for the right of ethnic 
self-administration for various ethnic groups.  The conference was the first step that wedded ethnic 
discourses in the official Ethiopian political framework. The procedure of the conference was filled by 
intriguing and adorned modalities in enrolling the participants, drafting the agendas and reaching 
agreements or consensuses. The charter, which was the main offspring of the conference, was filled with 
some controversial provisions such as the right to secede. This was the first ‘legal’ and official 
document in Ethiopian history that endorsed ethnic recognition and ethnic rights. It can be certainly 
established that the charter was the basic document that impregnated the succeeding 1995 Ethiopian 
constitution as its tone and vocals were visibly stamped in the core principles of the constitution. 
Therefore it is a paramount task to unpack the charter in order to understand the orientation and frame of 
reference of the framers with reasonable clarity. Finally this chapter tie its analytical investigation by 
focusing on the transitional government in which the actual political power fixture was conducted with a 
blend of Machiavellianism and political naivety. By doing this, the chapter will attempt to throw light 
upon the theoretical justifications and empirical evidences of the initial phase of the implementation of 
ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia 
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3.3.1 The July 1991 ‘Peace and Reconciliation’ Conference: was it a 
representative and legitimate convention? 
The entrée of the transitional period was commenced with the July 1991 conference which was 
organised by the EPRDF, as it had promised in May 1991 London agreement6 which was brokered by 
the United States of America that it was ready to establish a coalition government with other political 
organisation in Ethiopia. The EPRDF, a victorious interim government which removed the military 
regime in May 1991 had appeared to keep its promise to establish a transitional government 
collaborating with ‘representatives’ of the various ethnic groups and political organisations in order to 
prepare a national constitution and to transfer power to democratically elected government. However, its 
uncontested position made it to play a dominant role in setting the agenda and procedures of the 
conference and nominating the participants. The conference was attended by about twenty-seven 
political organisations, in which most were organised in ethnic lines. Since the preceded military regime 
had banned all forms of domestic civilian political organisations and movements, the July 1991 
conference was attended in most cases by self-appointed individuals, who simply claimed to represent 
their ethnic communities and political parties operating inside and outside the country. All the 
participants were specially selected by the victorious EPRDF in a very swift and arbitrary manner. 
Moreover, most of the ethnic organisations were established during the one-month interim rule of the 
EPRDF. ‘The new regime, itself a coalition of ethnic movements and apparently determined to re-
fashion the political system in its own image’ (Markakis 1998: 145) As Merera stresses that ‘the EPRDF 
leaders, keen on the consolidation of their hard-won victory, made sure to selectively invite weak parties 
most of which were created overnight, and selectively excluded the actual or potential real power 
contenders from the process’ Merera 2003: 121) Very popular non-ethnic political movements such as 
the EPRP were barred from attending the conference.7  The reason provided by the EPRDF was that 
these groups rejected the transitional conference and engaged in armed struggle to disrupt the process. 
                                                 
6 The London agreement was scheduled between the Ethiopian military government and the opposition forces, 
mainly EPRDF, EPLF and OLF, but because the leader of the military government, Mengistu H/Mariam fled the 
country and EPRDF had controlled the whole part of the country except Addis, it became useless to involve the 
delegates of the military government. Therefore the agreement was signed only between EPRDF, EPLF and OLF. 
At the time the US State Department for African Affairs declared that no support to EPRDF if it was not ready for a 
power-sharing and democratisation government in Ethiopia.)  
7 TPLF-led EPRDF accused EPRP for engaging in military operation against its rule, but the June ‘Peace and 
Democracy’ conference in June 1991 was aimed to address the demands of various armed groups in the country to 
find out peaceful solution in democratic manner, therefore barring EPRP because of such reason was a mistake. 
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But the main reason could be more than that. Parties like the EPRP, which had a significant influence in 
Ethiopian student movement and also eliminated by the TPLF from the Tigray province, could have 
made an impact in the conference by setting contrary agendas that could derail the ambition of the 
EPRDF (Kiflu 1998). As it was observed afterwards that the ambition of EPRDF could have suffered if 
it had invited the EPRP, which had a significant role in Ethiopia’s political history. At least, it could 
have been very difficult for the EPRDF to get an endorsement of the transitional charter so easily. 
 
The conference adopted a transitional charter as an interim period constitution and appointed a 
representative council that became a legislative body for the interim period whish was agreed to last a 
maximum of two years period and to transfer power to an elected government. The conference also 
recognized the de facto government in Eritrea and agreed to respect the rights of the Eritrean people for 
independence given that Eritrean people in a referendum would decide the matter8. However, the 
Eritrean question was decided beforehand by the TPLF and the 1991 conference simply accepted the 
TPLF’s deposition. As Marcus confirms that   ‘Meles visited London and Washington in February and 
March 1990 …When Meles did not demur to Eritrea’s claim of independence, US officials scrapped the 
long-standing policy of supporting the inviolability of Ethiopia’s frontiers (Marcus 2002: 230). 
 
Advocates of the process described the conference as the first multinational convention in Ethiopia 
where delegates of various nations and organisations were given a fair and equal chance to voice their 
unheard views (Kinfe 1994: 23). Some of the participants also claimed: ‘the transitional period 
definitely did take off by signalling the dawning of new pluralist era in Ethiopian political history, 
(Leenco 1999:26). A staunch critique of the EPRDF also comments that the conference had produced a 
charter, with the hope, that it could facilitate the transition to democracy in Ethiopia (Mesfin 2000: 156).   
 
Though many of the participants had claimed that they could negotiate on behalf of their respective 
ethnic communities, it can be certainly established that they were simply self-appointed representatives 
without a valid mandate to negotiate on behalf of the community that they had claimed to represent. As 
a result, it can be inferred that the conference did not have a mandate from the Ethiopian people as well 
                                                 
8 Legally it is very difficult to accept a major nation wide decision from loosely organized, non-representative body which 
needs people’s approval or should be decide by elected government, but the conference should not have such mandate to 
decide such crucial matter. It is even very surprising for the international community, such as the UN to accept the letter from 
this transitional government which did not have a political mandate over the Ethiopian people.  
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as the various ethnic communities in Ethiopia.  In addition, the conference participants simply 
transformed themselves into the transitional government by appointing themselves as a representative 
council or the transitional parliament and establishing a cabinet largely among themselves. Thus, 
ethnicity has become a political asset that provides access to resource by attracting numerous ethnic 
entrepreneurs eager to turn it into political capital (Markakis 1998: 145) 
 
At the start, it was a great success for the EPEDF since the conference did not bring any challenge or 
alteration to its core policies and principles. As Kinfe claimed that the charter, the basic document of the 
conference was a proposal of the EPRDF and was completely approved by the convention (Kinfe 1994: 
24). However, the apparently initial positive step forward in the Ethiopian political tradition has taken a 
disappointing path in a while.  
 
3.3.2 The Charter: was it a genuine covenant? 
The Charter was one of the major outcomes of the July 1991 ‘peace and democracy conference’. It 
served as a supreme legal document for the transitional period. The charter included crucial human and 
democratic rights provisions based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, 
which declared for unconditional respect of human rights.  Notably, it claimed to have the beginning of 
a new chapter in Ethiopian history in which ‘each nation, nationality and people have the right to 
administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the central 
government on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation’. The formal recognition of 
ethnic diversity and equal treatment of all ethnic groups had become the core principle of the charter. 
Article 2 of the charter declared that: the right of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination 
is affirmed and to this end, each nation, nationality and people is guaranteed the right to: 
• Preserve its identity and have it respected, promote its culture and history and use and 
develop its language; 
• Administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the 
central government on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation; 
• Exercise its right to self-determination of independence, when the concerned 
nation/nationality and people is convinced that the above rights are denied, abridged or abrogated. 
 
 79  
However, the distinction between the three terms- ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ was not clearly 
defined. Nahum, a constitutional advisor in the EPRDF-led government, confirms that no explanation 
was given the difference between a nation, a nationality and a people (Nahum 1997: 160). In defining 
the three terms together, the charter stated that  ‘nation, nationality and people’ denote ‘a group of 
people who have or share a large measure of common culture, or similar customs, mutual intelligibility 
of language, belief in a common or related identities, and who predominantly inhabit an identifiable 
contiguous territory.’  
 
This definition is similar with Smith’s categorization of ethnic community that classifies it as 'a named 
human population with myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of 
common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its members 
(Smith 1996: 6). In this case, the subjective identification and orientation to the past play a key role. 'The 
destiny of the community is bound up with ethno-symbolism with its own understanding of a unique, 
shared past.' 
 
The EPRDF’s classification of ethnic groups is very close to Shilean’s and Geertzean’s primordial 
classification of ethnic communities, which views ethnicity as extended kinship which emphasize the 
primacy of biological and psychological bias toward kin in any group’s social relations. It is the 
construction of the affective dimensions of group by amplifying the maxim ‘blood runs thicker than 
water’. This conceptualisation of ethnic community is founded on the belief of the ‘overpowering and 
‘ineffable quality’ of primordial attachments that stems from being born into a particular religious 
community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language and following particular 
social practices (Geertz 1963). As Meles claimed that Ethiopia’s peoples had to sort out their identities 
before mobilizing their energies to build a new nationalism (Marcus 1995). 
 
The EPRDF’s advocate argues that the approach is ‘a psychological and political breakthrough for the 
majority of Ethiopians, especially the small and large nations’ that had been denied legitimate 
recognition (Kinfe 1994: 28). Nahum (1994) also stress that: ‘Ethiopia is made up of many ethno-
linguistic groups at different stage of development and with varied life-style. There is also general 
agreement that they are entitled to some sort of self-expression. There has been a strong feeling of ethnic 
and cultural suppression and resentment among some ethnic groups- these are some of the salient issues 
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that need to be properly understood and carefully addressed’ (Nahum 1994: 157). Consequently, ethnic 
federalism is considered as a best framework to enhance ethnic equality and democracy by allowing 
ethic groups to develop their cultures openly and equally (Ibid. p. 185).   
 
Thus, the EPRDF used the conference for legitimising its agendas and policies in re-organising the 
Ethiopian State in ethnic lines. In the main, the conference by adopting the transitional charter resonated 
the beginning of an era of ethnic entitlement in Ethiopia as it utterly endorsed the EPRDF’s conception 
and propositions that required the precedence of ethnic right in re-organizing the society and state in 
Ethiopia. As Merera writes that in the EPRDF’s state re-construction project, the rights of ethnic groups 
have become ‘the cornerstone of all the policy initiatives, be political issue, economic matters or 
educational, linguistic, and cultural domains’ (Merera 2002: 118). The EPRDF assumed that the basic 
political question in Ethiopia is the recognition and protection of the rights of ethnic groups and their 
absolute right for self-determination.  
 
Though, the EPRDF has considered the transitional period charter as a legitimate contract to restructure 
the Ethiopian polity into an ethnic federal system, the charter was produced by an assembly which had 
neither the direct representation of the Ethiopian peoples or the approval of the various ethnic groupings. 
It was just a collection of self-appointed ethnic elites who assumed that they could know and represent 
the interests of their respective ethnic communities. But in what kind of representative modality this 
kind of self-appointed representation could be justified to make a fundamental political decision?   
 
It can be clearly established that the ethnic federal structure in Ethiopia was negotiated in a manner that 
neither the Ethiopian people nor the ethnic groupings have been provided an opportunity for 
consultation; it was engineered by the EPRDF and agreed by the ethnic elites. The assumption was that 
‘the leaders of the different nations bear the moral and political burden of guiding and counselling the 
people in their national and political constituencies (Kinfe 1994: 62). In this view, the major 
responsibility in transforming politics and society in Ethiopia was laid upon the ethnic elites rather than 
the ethnic communities or the people because that it was that ethnic elites kinship tie with their 
community would give them a better chance for leadership and privileged position. Basically, it was an 
imposed structure. The ethnic elites may have naively and egoistically legitimised the EPRDF’s blue 
print. However, once its power was anchored, EPRDF started the process capturing the ethnic 
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communities through manufacturing surrogate ethnic organisations and of course by sidelining the 
ethnic elites that established the transitional government. 
 
Initially, some non-EPRDF ethnic movements such as the OLF, ONLF and many southern elites, who 
voiced that their ethnic identity was a matter of disgrace and derision, supported the EPRDF’s policy 
orientation (Marcus 2002: 232). The Oromo nationalists claim that the Ethiopia state was created by 
Christian highland rulers, largely through a process of political subjugation and economic exploitation of 
outlying populations such as the Oromo, Sidama, Somalis, Wolaita, Afar, Anuak, Benishangul etc in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries (Leenco 1999: 41).  However, their support to the EPRDF was quickly 
evaporated by claiming that the TPLF-led EPRDF was not genuine in its policy, rather it is an 
instrument to install the hegemony of the Tigrayan elite on the rest of Ethiopia (Ibid. p. 76).     
 
In general, added to its military muscle and political intrigue, the EPRDF had got a support from the 
United States, which was very happy to see the overthrow of the Mengistu’s ‘socialist’ regime. This 
helped the EPRDF to easily achieve the approval of the Charter and the establishment of the transitional 
government based on its best interest. These two most important outcomes of the conference had 
facilitated the EPRDF’s dominant position. 
 
3.3.3 The transitional government: was it a genuine coalition 
government? 
It is vital to determine whether the transitional government was a coalition or a coalesced government. 
Was it a façade coalition or patron-client network? The transitional government was established after the 
July 1991 conference and lasted about four years from 1991-1995, despite the initial plan of two years. 
The legislative responsibilities of the transitional period were carried out by a council of representatives, 
which was the supreme power of the transitional period. Its 87 seats were filled by representatives of 
about 29 ethnic movements and political associations and most of the members were also participants of 
the conference. As I have discussed above that the participants of the conference promoted themselves 
to become members of the transitional government.  
 
The seats of the council were distributed based on vague criteria, and which were of course very 
arbitrary. Accordingly, out of the 87 seats 32 (36%) seats was allocated to the EPRDF, 12 seats for the 
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OLF (14%), various southern ethnic groups together took 19 seats (21%), the other three Oromo 
organizations 7 seats, four multinational organizations each got one seat, workers’ representative and 
university teachers’ representative each got one seat, and the rest 12 seats were allocated/distributed to 
other minority ethnic groups (Kinfe 1994: 22). Only 24 ethnic groups were represented in the council, 
from the total of about 80 ethno-linguistic groups in the country. The Council of Representatives was 
given a power to elect a president and to approve the appointment of a prime minister and other 
ministers who were members of the council of ministers, which was a cabinet of the transitional 
government. The council of representative was also given a responsibility to constitute a commission to 
draw up a draft constitution and to arrange the modalities for a national election to transfer power to an 
elected body. Though no legal or political explanation was provided why the Council seats are limited to 
87, it was very clear that because the EPRDF control 32 seats which was more than one-third of the 
seats (36 percent) that was enough to allow the EPRDF to block any legislative declaration that could 
obstruct its interest.  
 
The executive responsibility of the transitional government was carried out by a cabinet, which was 
called a Council of Ministers. The then president, Meles Zenawi with the approval of the Council of 
Representatives, appointed its members. The appointment in the cabinet was done based on ethnic 
representation. Though there were no pre-determined and official agreements on the allocations of posts, 
there was a tacit agreement that was stipulated from the power sharing notion that key posts such as a 
president, prime minister and vice chairmanship and secretary of the council would go to different 
nationalities (Kinfe 1994: 25). However, there was no reference made to party representation, and thus 
the allocations of posts on ethnic background but without considering party affiliations did mask a single 
party monopoly as the EPRDF had appointed individuals from different ethnic groups. Most of the vital 
posts such as the president, prime minister, foreign ministry, defence force, security and police activities 
were occupied by the EPRDF9. This clearly depicted the underlying motives of the EPRDF to remain 
the uncontested power in the transitional period. Besides, low-ranking TPLF’s officials appointed in 
various ministries were acted with full power without respecting the higher authorities in the ministries 
and they were accountable only to their party, the TPLF10. Thus, this superficial or cosmetic power-
                                                 
9 There was a demand from the OLF group to get the prime ministerial position (Marcus 2002: 232; Kinfe 1994: 25). 
10 According to Leenco (1999: 57), during the early months of the transition the leader of the Ministry of Information 
happened to be a senior OLF official, however TPLF used anti-OLF propaganda through public media which was controlled 
by the Ministry, because the public media department was headed by a low-ranking TPLF official). 
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sharing arrangement, which was aimed to embellish appearances, had created a flimsy power-sharing 
structure, which was highly monopolized by the TPLF-led EPRDF in a name of ethnic power-sharing. 
 
The coalition of the transitional government faced with a major blow on 23 June 1992 when the second 
largest representation in the legislative body, the OLF, withdrew itself from the transitional government 
in connection with the July 1992 district and local government election by accusing the EPRDF of 
creating an unfavourable environment for conducting free and fair elections by intimidating opposition 
candidates and blocking access to the public media, for its goal to win the election and also to remain as 
the sole winner of any future elections (Leenco 1999: 67). Leenco Leta, who was an executive member 
of the OLF and member of the transitional government, writes that the OLF’s initial expectation was 
that the coalition nature of the transitional government would be expanded further by embracing 
additional groups from societal sectors, however, in contrast, some of the coalition parties were forced to 
withdraw and the transitional government became under complete control of the TPLF-led EPRDF, thus 
‘the transition was aborted before it even got off ground’ (Ibid). In addition, the EPRDF was also not 
showing conciliatory attitude toward other parties in the coalition government. Many members of the 
Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) were also forced to withdraw in 1993 from 
the transitional government (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 127).  
 
In the June 1992 district and local government election the EPRDF and its allies controlled 95 per cent 
of regional and local government structures. In the absence of major competitors, the EPRDF became 
the only political power in the transitional government. According to observers the election was reported 
as a total failure and flaw (NDI 1992; Marcus 2002: 235; Pausewang 2002: 31) (Merera 2003: 125).  
3.4 Summary 
Though the July 1991 conference and the transitional charter declare the establishment of a transitional 
government composed of the coalition of various ethnic groups in power-sharing arrangement, the 
ambition of the TPLF-led EPRDF to remain a dominant force has immediately resulted in breeding 
scepticism, mistrust and tensions within the transitional government. The EPRDF by being the only 
military force and exclusively monopolizing the national security apparatus became a very powerful 
force in the country. In comparison with other group in the coalition, the EPRDF/TPLF power was 
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uncontested and unmatched. Besides, its military success had fashioned a political arrogance to 
disrespect and reduce other groups in the coalition as its vassals.  
 
A power-sharing arrangement requires the participation of the representatives of all significant groups in 
political decision-making, especially at the executive level in order to construct a genuine power-sharing 
device that can mitigate the danger of destructive ethnic rivalry and antagonism that could be generated 
due to ethnic cleavages and dissimilarity. (Lijphart 1994: 856). A successful ethnic power-sharing 
system often needs proportional representation that must reflect the ethnic assortment in the ground. In 
ethnically divided societies a power-sharing mechanism can certainly collapse or become dysfunctional 
because of unfair representation of groups (Ibid.). Beside, power-sharing mechanism needs to be based 
on incentives to compromise, rather than for the sake of convenience, because coalitions of convenience 
could dissolve so easily (Horowitz 1991: 171, 175). 
  
Although, at the initial stage of the transitional period, the EPRDF established a coalition government 
with many ethnonational movements, such as the OLF, ONLF and other southern ethnic groups, the 
EPRDF’s coalition making strategy in the transitional period was not based on a genuine desire for 
coalition arrangement but rather purely motivated by the EPRDF’s exclusive interest. Contrary to the 
EPRDF’s style of operation, coalition-making approach requires an implementation of a conscious and 
effective trust building measures. There were three most important factors behind the EPRDF’s 
motivation for the coalition arrangement in the transitional period. The first was motivated by a need for 
presenting a good image internationally in order to secure a much needed foreign assistance both 
politically and financially. The pressure from foreign powers, especially by the US, which was the 
mediator of the ‘London peace accord’, required the Front to invite other groups in the transitional 
government. Moreover, the Front was very keen to get massive external assistance in order to jump-start 
the economy, which had been devastated by the long years of conflict and misguided economic policies 
of the overthrown regime. As Merera also argued that ‘the TPLF, with its narrow ethnic support base in 
the North has to outflank other contending forces in securing support from the Western powers, 
especially from the Americans (Merera 2002: 118)’.  
 
The second factor was because of a need for protecting and ascertaining its victory over the military 
regime. Though the military regime was overthrown in May 1991, the EPRDF was not in full control of 
 85  
the country. Many thousands soldier of the military regime were not properly demobilized and most of 
them were still armed, the countrywide administrative structures completely collapsed, some non-
EPRDF armed liberation groups such as the OLF had managed to control some territories, and overall 
the country was in the sate of lawlessness and disorder. As a result, the EPRDF needed support and 
cooperation of various ethnonational movements and groups in order to create stability and to extend its 
effective control throughout the country. As one of the signatories of the transitional charter, Leenco 
concludes that ‘they feel cheated and used at a critical moment merely to lend a façade of plurality to a 
set-up that was, in reality, intended to culminate in the ascendancy of a basically Tigrean-dominated 
regime’ (Leenco 1999: xiii).   
 
The third and most important factor was focused on seeking support internally for its objective in 
dismantling the ‘old order’ and constructing the new one in its own image. The EPRDF needed a 
support and cooperation from the ethnonational movements in its battle against the Amhara elite, what 
the EPRDF called as the hegemony of Amhara in the Ethiopian state. Thus, it sought alliance with other 
ethnonationalist movements ‘in containing any possible resistance by the overthrown elite’ (Ibid. p. 
134). Many ethnonational movements such as the OLF, and ONLF had similar claims. The OLF claims 
that Oromo people and territory were conquered by the Ethiopian armies since 1890s by systematically 
dismantling the traditional Oromo self-rule structures, like the Gada system and by imposing a harsh 
and violent system of the Amhara overrule (Asafa 1993), (Mohammed 1990 and 1999), (Leenco 1999). 
Mohammed Hassen (1999: 235) argues that the Ethiopian rulers instituted a policy of cultural 
‘Amharisation’ in the Oromia area by banning the Oromo language in schools and public use.  
 
Particularly, the TPLF’s temporary cooperation with the relatively independent Oromo organisation, like 
the OLF, could be motivated by the need to balance the power equation against the pro-unity or one-
Ethiopia forces, as the OLF was well known by its secessionist agenda. Though the OLF declared that 
its intention was independent for Oromo people by seceding from Ethiopia, in 1991 it showed a 
willingness to remain in Ethiopia if Oromia had been granted meaningful autonomy’ (Forrest 2004: 157) 
As Leenco argues ‘a new free federal Ethiopia was to be built on the grave of the empire’ out of free 
choices of all concerned communities. Thus, ‘recasting the Ethiopian state on totally new basis was thus 
hoped to lend a sufficiently plausible rationale for maintaining the remainder of Ethiopia [minus Eritrea] 
as a new entity’ (Leenco 1999: 209).  He adds that ‘the adoption of federalism was bound to result in the 
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scrapping of subordination of some communities by the elite coming from a particular nation’ (Ibid. p. 
209-10).  
 
Nevertheless, the TPLF-led EPRDF was unwilling to adopt a genuine power-sharing formula’. Rather it 
uses a strategy to divide and conquer. No frank dialogue with other members who signed the charter 
rather it acted, according to Edmond ‘to control and manipulate the group in a hegemonic fashion’ 
(Keller 1998: 113). For the Oromo nationalists, the change since 1991 was from Amharic towards 
Tigrean domination, and thus still with Abyssinian domination of the South (Leenco 1999: 46). 
Consequently, the TPLF itself was charged of ethnic chauvinism, as discredited by its own claim and 
ambition.  So, the OLF, which claims to represent the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, has regarded the 
ethnic federation scheme as a ploy for the continuation of the northern hegemony over the Oromo. 
Frustrated by the behaviour of the ruling party, the OLF asserted that the Oromo deserves the right and 
freedom to create their own state and thus, self-determination is the objective of their movement 
(Scherrer, 1998: 43). Since 1992, the OLF has been engaged in armed struggle against the EPRDF. 
Clandestine political movements in support of the OLF have been expanding in many parts of Oromia 
and among many Oromo university students, and government security forces have been constantly 
accused for several killings and massive arrest in Oromia region (Amnesty International 2003, 2004, 
2005). However recently there is a modification in the OLF’s secession ethos that its current leadership 
and Oromo intellectuals are signalling that Oromo’s self-determination quest could be met within the 
context of the Ethiopian state with genuine federal arrangement by creating an opportunity for the 
Oromo people to be administered by their own true representatives in democratic process. (An Interview 
by the Chairman of the OLF, January 2006; Leenco 1994: 242-44). More detail discussion concerning 
the political situation in Oromia will be presented in chapter 7 that deals about the Oromia regional state.  
 
Nevertheless, the OLF also made a tactical error in its political mobilisation of the Oromo people in 
1991. First, its reckless historical interpretation that portrayed the Amhara people as oppressors of the 
Oromo people and its impish slogan of ‘Oromia for Oromo people’ kind of extreme positions greatly 
helped the EPRDF to intervene as guardian of the rights of non-Oromo people in the Oromo areas. If the 
OLF leadership were clever enough, they could have advised their followers to respect the rights of non-
Oromo people in Oromia, but divert the whole attention on the EPRDF, which was a ruling government 
with a superior military force. Instead, the OLF wasted much of its attention and action to denounce ‘the 
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Amhara rule’, which was not the problem at the time. The OLF’s ideology alienated, the Amhara and 
other non-Oromo groups in Oromia that could be its potential supporters against the EPRDF, which was 
generally seen as a force that stood for the dismemberment of Ethiopia by undermining Ethiopia’s 
historical right to have its own outlet to the sea. However, the OLF’s imprudent political position and 
campaign resulted in violence against non-Oromo resident in Oromo areas, which resulted in killings, 
displacement and expulsion of non-Oromo as well as Oromo people. This created physical and 
psychological insecurity among the large number of non-Oromo people residing in Oromia, and this 
benefited greatly the ruling EPRDF party to intervene successfully to establish itself as a guardian of 
peace and security. Second, the OLF’s obsession with secession was highly evident. Its political 
programme and propaganda were filled with exaggerating the dissimilarity of the Oromo people with the 
people of Ethiopia, particularly with Amhara and Tigrayan people. Though its willingness to join the 
transitional government in 1991 could be seen as its intention in changing its secessionist goal, its 
reluctance to declare its intention unequivocally for the public created suspicion among the people 
concerning the goal of the OLF. The EPRDF argued that the OLF was not genuinely interested to work 
within the context of Ethiopia, rather its participation in the transitional government was motivated in 
using the transitional period as a stepping stone to facilitate its secession agenda (Kinfe 1994: 170). 
Thus, this appeared a justifiable reason to contain the OLF.        
 
In transitional period, the EPRDF also benefited from the Amhara elites’ outright rejection of ethnic 
rights and ethnic entitlement. The outright rejection of the Amhara elites helped the EPRDF’s claim to 
get approval and support from the various ethnic communities who found justification for the EPRDF’s 
accusation of the ‘Amhara rule’ as oppressive and detrimental to ethnic rights. Thus, the EPRDF got an 
opportunity to attract elites from various ethnic groups to work in its coalition by hoping to protect and 
ascertain their rights and interests. The rejection also created division and confusion among forces 
outside the EPRDF. The big cry mainly by the Amhara elite in portraying ‘ethnic rights’ as some kind of 
bizarreness and wickedness created suspicion among elites of various ethnic communities concerning 
the motives of the Amhara elite. Leenco argues that the word ‘ethnic’ was employed by the Amhara elite 
to demonise those who spoke up for Ethiopia’s subject peoples as ‘tribalists’ or ‘narrow nationalists’ 
(Leenco 1999: 235). He writes that: ‘It is about convincing the Oromo, Sidama, Somali, Wolaita, and 
other peoples not to use their own language in courts, public administration offices, and schools…it is 
about persuading these peoples that administration by a person other than one of their own is the only 
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way by which their interests are best served (Ibid. pp. 235-6). He holds that the national rebellion 
movements in Ethiopia came into existence mostly in reaction to Ethiopian nationalism that was 
identical with Amhara nationalism by upholding what is Amharic is national and what is not is either 
‘tribal’ or ‘ethnic’ (Ibid. p. 236). Merera also argues that the Amhara elite vehemently opposed those 
who accept the reality of national inequality in the past, and even accuse them of ‘national nihilism’ 
(Merera 2003: 96). Consequently, it became beneficial for TPLF to manoeuvre among the various ethnic 
communities in order to build up support and enlist allies.  
 
The southern region political elite were highly divided and fragmented among ethnic lines and they were 
not strong enough to resist the TPLF’s manipulation and domination, but few were able to forge a strong 
coalition against the EPRDF in the transitional government. The SEPDC, which was formed in 1993 by 
several smaller parties from Southern region, was very critical of the undemocratic actions of the 
EPRDF. Most of the SEPDC’s member organisations were expelled from the transitional government in 
1993 when they participated in the ‘reconciliation meeting’ in Paris, which was organised by opposition 
parties in exile that demanded for general ‘reconciliation conference’ among all Ethiopian political 
organisations and civil society groups to establish all-inclusive political process in Ethiopia. The EPRDF 
was actively working to weaken the SEPDC by encouraging and threatening its members to defect and 
thus to join new parties established by it (Pausewang 2002: 35).   
 
Thus, by alienating the main political elites from the two majority ethnic groups- the Oromo and 
Amhara- and the Southern region, and by relying on its exclusive military supremacy, the TPLF became 
a dominant force but with narrow legitimacy and flimsy coalition in the transitional government. A 
report from three, internationally well-known organizations- National Democratic Institute, Norwegian 
Institute of Human Rights and Heinrich Boll Foundation- concluded that ‘the EPRDF members parties 
were given the local and regional administrative positions, and based their authority on the presence of 
the TPLF troops. They established their control at the local level and discouraged, inhibited or even 
penalized all other political activities’ (Ibid. p. 30). This exclusive control of the transitional government 
helped the TPLF-led EPRDF to put down the foundation and conditions for its subsequent hegemonic 
desire and goal, but at the expense of derailing the process of forging effective and genuine coalition 
among the various ethnic communities in the country. All major opposition groups boycotted the 
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subsequent key political activities such as the 1992 local election, the 1994 election for constitutional 
assembly and the 1995 and 2000 general elections.    
 
The above presentation reveals that, at its inception, the ethnic federal process in Ethiopia lacks genuine 
negotiation and bargaining among the country’s major political and national forces. Ethiopia’s ethnic 
federal arrangement was founded on a very wobbly and fictitious foundation as it reflects only the desire 
of the ruling government, which came to power through armed struggle. Initially, the TPLF may have a 
genuine cause shaped because of frustration and hopelessness in Tigray, but in the process, when it was 
near in capturing the state power, it is conceivable that the TPLF was simply guided by a selfish desire 
of its interest to remain a dominant force in commanding the Ethiopian state. The TPLF would have 
believed that its hegemonic control of the state would provide various advantageous for itself. First, it 
could compensate the peasant and people of Tigray who paid much sacrifice to fight the military 
government. Second, to be sure that the subsequent political system in Ethiopia would be founded on the 
best interest of Tigray. Third, the Tigrayan political elite may have desired that they have the right to be 
the contemporary rulers of Ethiopia to re-claim the lost pride of the Tigrian dominance of the Ethiopian 
State. Fourth, in Ethiopia, the state has a tremendous power in controlling and distributing resources and 
benefits. As a result, capturing the state power has created a golden opportunity for the Tigrayan elite to 
access wealth and privileges. Thus, ethnic discourse becomes more an excuse and ploy to rule rather 
than govern with fair representation and coalition.  
 
Had EPRDF really desired for inter-ethnic elite consensus, it could have done so by embarking on 
genuine trust building approach rather than choosing such an intriguing and unworthy journey. 
However, TPLF was inherently and structurally deficient to embark on establishing a genuine inter-
ethnic coalition. The TPLF claims to represent the Tigray province and the Tigray people. The Tigray 
people constitute less than 10 percent of the total population of Ethiopia, a very minority in Ethiopia’s 
ethnic configuration when compared to the Oromo and Amhara people that represent 35 and 30 per cent 
of the Ethiopian people respectively. The Tigray province has been the most impoverished, famine 
stricken and environmentally degraded province in Ethiopia. Without siphoning or supplementing 
resource from the other part of Ethiopia, it is unlikely that the province could sustain the current, though 
still precarious, life standard. Conceivably, therefore the TPLF’s ethnic empowerment discourse 
damages more the interest and benefit of the Tigray people and the TPLF, if it is to be implemented 
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genuinely. The TPLF would have been undermined by its own ethnic empowerment discourse, had it 
established a genuine ethnic coalition government.  As a result, the TPLF would not willingly accept a 
genuine ethnic coalition government in Ethiopia that would undermine its ambition to remain a 
hegemonic power. Rather, the TPLF attempts to remain in power through superficial and deceitful 
coalition device that has been emerging as the political culture of the EPRDF. The TPLF-led EPRDF is 
striving to sustain a political travesty that would assure its hegemonic project by using ethnic rights 
discourse in the way to protect its interest. Division of people into ethno-linguistic groups could ensure 
the political dominance of TPLF. Ethnic rights and ethnic entitlement have become an attractive 
inducement for many of elites from various ethnic groups to fell so easily in the trap of the TPLF’s 
manipulation and machination. These self-appointed elites, which did not have any legitimacy from their 
respective ethnic communities, have become an instrument of the TPLF’s hegemonic desire, as they 
were easily susceptible to TPLF’s rewarding or/and coercing power. In this case, the TPLF has been 
consistent in its original policy in promoting first and foremost the interests of the Tigray people via the 
Tigray nationalism. As Merera claims, ‘the ultimate goal has been to ensure the centrality of Tigrayan 
elite in the reordering of the Ethiopian State and society’ (Merera 2002: 119).       
      
Except for a fierce opposition from the OLF, which finally withdrew from the council in June 1992 and 
some fragmented resistance from the Southern groups, the EPRDF did not confront with any serious 
challenge to its hegemonic position in controlling the transitional government. It was highly likely, as it 
was evidenced afterwards, that the transitional government was deliberately designed by the EPRDF to 
create an ample opportunity for itself to remain the unchallenged power for the objective of 
predominantly influence the subsequent political process (which I will discuss in the next chapter) 
including the constitutional drafting and adoption process, electoral processes and procedures, and other 
vital political activities that were important to ensure its ambition to remain an hegemonic political 
power in Ethiopia.  The next part will present the empirical evidence in this context.  
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Chapter Four: The Process and Structures of Ethnic 
Federalism in Ethiopia 
4.1 Constructing the ethnic states  
4.1.1 The challenges of delimitating the ethnic states 
The transitional charter of the transitional period (1991-1995) declared that each ‘nation, nationality, 
and peoples’ was provided with ‘the right to administer its own affairs within its own defined 
territory and effectively participate in the central government on the basis of freedom, and fair and 
proper representation’ (Art. 2 The Charter, 1991).  As a result, the transitional government enacted 
Proclamation of 7 of 1992 in January 1992 for the establishment of regional self-governments. Thus, 
the 1992 Proclamation (7 of 1992) enumerated about 60 ethnic groups, and provided for the 48 of 
the ethnic groups to establish their own ‘National/Regional Self –Governments’ at the wereda level 
or above (see table 4.1 below for detail). The remaining 17 small-sized ethnic groups were 
incorporated within some of the 48 self-governing ethnic enclaves as minorities. (Fasil 1997: 40). 
The ‘nationalities and peoples’ with small-size population, which were identified as ‘minority 
nationalities’ were provided with a right to have an appropriate representation in their respective 
woreda legislative body or council (Article 5, 7/91). By going very far, the proclamation affirmed 
each ethnic group’s right to exercise its right to secession if it is convinced that its rights for self-
administration and self-promotion are denied, abridged, or abrogated.  
 
The proclamation can be described as a first official decree in laying down the foundation for 
restructuring the Ethiopian state in a federal line. By the proclamation, 14 regional governments 
were established in which the total of 48 ethnic groups were provided with the right of self-
governing status within the 14 regional administrative structures and other 17 ethnic groups, who 
were classified as minority groups, were provided with the right to have adequate representation 
within their respective regional government and wereda administration legislative structures (see 
table 4.1 below for detail). The territorial delimitation of these self-governing entities was declared 
to be determined based on ethno-linguistic criteria and settlement pattern. In the proclamation 
‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ or ethnic groups were defined by common definition as ‘a people 
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living in the same geographical area and having the same language and a common psychological 
make-up of identity (Proclamation 7/1992).  
 
Table 4. 1 List of ethnic groups provided with the right to establish National/Regional Self-
Governments in 1992 
Region Ethnic groups 
One Tigrai*, Saho**, Kunama** 
Two Afar* 
Three  Amhara*, Agaw-Kamirgina*, Agaw-Awongigan*, Oromo* 
Four Oromo* 
Five Somali* 
Six Berta*, Gumuz*, Shinasha**, Koma**, Mao**,  
Seven Gurage*, Hadiya*, Kembata*, Alaba*, Tembaro*, Yem* 
Eight Sidama*, Gedio*, Burje*, Amaro* (Kore), Gidicho* 
Nine Wolaita*, Dawuro*, Konta*, Aydi*, Gewada*, Melon*, Gofa*, Zoyisse**, 
Gobez, Bussa*, Konssa*, Gamo*, Gidole** 
Ten Basketo*, Murssi*, Ari*, Hamer*, Arbore*’, Dassenech*, Gnangatom**, 
Tsemai**, Maley*, Dimme**, Bodi*’ 
Eleven Keficho*, Nao*’, Dizo*, Surma*, Zelmam**, Shekocho* (Mocha), Minit**, 
Chara*, Bench*, Sheko* 
Twelve Agnwak*, Nuwer*, Mejenger* 
Thirteen  Harari* 
Fourteen (Addis Ababa)* 
* They shall establish their own National/Regional Self-Governments at the Wereda level or 
above 
** They shall have adequate representation within their respective National/Regional Self-
Governments 
Source: Proclamation No. 7/1992, A Proclamation to provide for the establishment of 
National/Regional Self-Governments. Negarit Gazeta 51st Year No. 2  
 
According to Fasil Nahum11, that the selection of an ethnolinguistic criterion was preferred due to 
the fact that the ‘psychological make-up of the Ethiopian people contains a heavy dose of emphasis 
of ethnic backgrounds. The spontaneous ethnic political grouping so strongly reflected in the 
                                                 
11 Since 1991 he is working as a legal advisor to the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi 
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Council of Representative is a good example’ (Fasil 1997: 45) However, Fasil ignores the fact that 
the political groupings in the Council of Representative was not a true initiation and representation 
of the Ethiopian society, it was a reflection of TPLF’s policy and conditionality in explicitly 
encouraging ethnic parties in its interim rule period that was opportunistically and quickly responded 
by the elites from various groups at the transitional period. ‘The value of ethnicity attracted 
numerous ethnic entrepreneurs eager to turn it into political capital’ (Markakis 1998: 145). The 
process did not necessarily reflect the verdict of the people or ethnic communities; rather, it was 
facilitated by the ideology of the ruling group that monopolised power and ideology in Ethiopia after 
overthrowing the military regime in 1991.  
 
 
Although ethnolinguistic classification was the favoured criterion for granting self-governing entity, 
given the presence of about sixty-five officially identified ethnolinguistic groupings in the country, it 
became a difficult task to grant every ethnic group its own self-governing structure. Consequently, 
many ethnic groupings have joined with much larger ethic groups to form a state. (Fasil 1997: 52). 
Nonetheless, no convincing explanation has been provided in granting a separate regional state status 
for some very small ethnic groups like Harari (with 20, 000 population, only half of them do live in 
the regional state) whereas denying the same status to the larger ones such as Sidama, Wolaita and 
others who indeed have more than a million populations. Thus, neither the population size nor the 
ethnic identity was a systematic and operational criterion for establishing self-government entities.  
It was arbitrarily and feebly constructed and imposed without a proper bargaining process among the 
constituting units, because ‘had population size, ethnicity, and the consent of the people been the 
criteria, there would be at least forty to fifty regional states making the constituent parts of the 
federation’ (Mesfin, 1999: 162).  
 
The fickleness in demarcating regional states has created many rolling challenges for the federal 
system in Ethiopia. There are many ethnic groups with significant population and better economic 
capacity that can fulfil the working procedure to get a separate regional self-government. By making 
comparison of their capacity and their population size with those who have already been granted 
regional government status, the political elites from many ethnic groups such as the Sidama, 
Wolaita, Benishangul (Berta), Sheka, have a belief that they can definitely get the consent of their 
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respective people to get their own self-administration territory. For example, the demand from the 
Sidama political elites within the EPRDF coalition, the ordinary citizens and opposition groups like 
the Sidama Liberation Front (SLM) have agreement in the demand for separate regional state for 
Sidama people. Sidama ethnic group has about 2 million populations (1994 Census) with relatively 
viable economic capacity and territorially concentrated Sidama population that can make it feasible 
to get its own regional states when one make comparison with others regions such as the Harari, 
Afar, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz. As a result, it is very essential to provide a convincing and 
stronger argument why some ethnic groups like the Sidama were not allowed to establish their own 
regional government whereas very lesser population groups like Harari and others have been 
provided the right to establish their own regional government. The tension in SNNP and particularly 
in Sidama need to be addressed in terms of the principles of federalism rather than the application of 
force and state violence. A forceful suppression of demand for rights is inimical to the federal 
process and principles (Elazar 1989), especially when the demand is raised based on pledged 
promises and agreed covenants. In a legal term the demand of the Sidama elites are legitimate and 
accurate. (I will discus this issue in detail in chapter 6 that deal about the SNNP regional state). 
According to Vaughan and Tronvoll, such tensions have emerged because the TPLF’s policy of 
ethnic rights in Ethiopia incorporates two contradictory notions. The first notion follows that ‘a 
community can be mobilised better in its own language, using its own culture, by its own people – 
effectively ‘from within’. The second notion is that ‘the criteria for the establishment of ‘nations, 
nationalities, and peoples’ are objectively and externally identifiable, and verifiable by a vanguard 
organisation independently of the views of the groups’ members- effectively ‘from above’ (Vaughan 
and Tronvoll 2003: 13). 
 
Furthermore, the ethnic make-up and stature in Ethiopia reveal the difficulties associated with the 
discourse of self-government to every ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ in Ethiopia. It becomes a 
challenging task to adequately and fairly represents the 80 ethnic groups in nine regional states. Only 
few ethnic groups like the Tigrean, Afar, Amhara, Oromo, Somali and Harari have got a privileged 
position and right to satisfy their rights for self-government from the total of about 80 ethnic groups 
that are promised to have their own self-administration rights.  Though the Federal constitution came 
into force in August 1995, the restructuring of internal boundary on basis of ethno-linguistic lines 
was started at the transitional period, earlier than enacting the federal constitution, the period in 
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which the transition government did not have any popular or constitutional legitimacy to embark on 
such fundamental restructuring of the Ethiopian state. The transitional period Charter, article 13 
vaguely assigned a duty to the transitional government to draft a law that to establish a local and 
regional councils through election, but without making any specific identification with regard to 
restructuring the whole state in ethnic federal lines. As a result, Ethiopia’s ethnic federal 
restructuring was implemented before any popular or constitutional legitimacy. It was decided by the 
self-imposed elites who assumed that ethnic federalism would be the best option for the Ethiopian 
people.            
 
Practically, the 7/1992 Proclamation was a precursor for an ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia 
by officially endorsing the establishment of a federal-like state arrangement that had two levels of 
governments: the transitional government at the centre and the regional governments at regional 
level. The transitional government at the centre was responsible for foreign affairs, national defence, 
economic policy, monetary and fiscal policies and management, citizenship, building and 
administering major development infrastructures and establishments. It was provided with a power 
for budget allocation to the regional governments. (Article 9, Proclamation 7/92). Likewise, the 
regional governing entities were provided broad powers on all matters within their territorial 
jurisdiction except for those assigned to the transitional/central government. Some of the major 
responsibilities provided to the regional governments were: 
• Full power on matters related to language, culture and education policies 
• A right to establish their own legislative, executive and judiciary bodies 
• A right to enact their own constitution, but in conformity with the central government (or the 
federal constitution) 
• To establish, direct and supervise social and economic development establishments or 
enterprises       
 
Theoretically, the promise was very comprehensive but the most important matter is how far it was 
respected practically.  In many regards, the newly established regional and local self-governments at 
the transitional period were highly subordinated to the centrally located transitional government. The 
central government was superior over the regional ones due to its exclusive control of key areas such 
as budget allocation power to the regional governments, and control of the countrywide security and 
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military apparatuses and operations. It may be not surprising in situation where the tradition of 
statehood in Ethiopia has been in favour of highly centralized and autocratic state system. In addition 
to the above norm, the new regional government leadership posts were staffed by inexperienced, less 
educated, submissive and non-popular individuals who were calculatingly handpicked by the 
EPRDF in order to facilitate its ambition in dominating the overall political space in Ethiopia.  
 
The efficiency and capacity of the leadership of the regional states were extraordinarily low. For 
instance, in some regions like Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, Gambella there were many regional 
government officials who did not attend a level of education above elementary school.  
Due to its ethnic right and ethnic entitlement policy, the TPLF/EPRDF has been keen to employ and 
appoint local elites regardless of their education background. According to Yong ‘in Gambella, with 
its limited population of educated people, many of those appointed had not completed high school 
(Young 1999: 330). There were also individuals at a leadership position who cannot read and write 
at all (A member of the regional executive from Gumuz, Interviewee 5 2002: 4). It is complained 
that ‘the combined requirements to recruit personnel on the basis of ethnic quotas, and political 
affiliation or loyalty means that the most able and efficient functionaries are continually overlooked’ 
(Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 14). Thus, better-educated, self-assured and prominent individuals 
were deliberately pushed aside by EPRDF cadres from the leadership position may be because of a 
fear that these people may not be submissive and faithful followers of EPRDF’s hegemonic project. 
The hegemonic motive of EPRDF has become the main factor in alienating the major section of the 
Ethiopian society and set the foundation for the unpopular and lonesome journey of EPRDF’s 
federal project. 
 
As a result, the professional capacity and efficiency in the civil services and other public institutions 
of the regional states were also very weak. According to the World Bank’s report on regionalisation 
in Ethiopia that ‘in several regions a lack of professionals such as accountants, economists, 
engineers, managers and planners, hinders the implementation and efficacy of public programs’ 
(World Bank 2000: 11). In 1997, 85.8 percent of the 300,000 civil servants in the country are serving 
in the regional states. But the education level of more than three-quarters were not above 12 grade or 
less than higher (tertiary) education; only 13 percent had college or university education and most of 
them were working in the federal government. (UN Country Team, 1999: 40). Especially, regions 
such as Afar, Somali, Gambella and Benishangul (combined have 10% of the total population) have 
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very little experience in self-administration; in the past, local as well as provincial administrators 
were usually appointed by the central governments and nearly all of the administrative personnel 
were staffed by ‘non-indigenous’ personnel. This historical factor has made these regional states 
highly dependent on the central/federal government and thus makes them highly vulnerable to the 
federal intervention. Political instability in Benishangul, Gambella and Somali regions clearly 
manifest the vulnerability.   
4.1.2 The features of the regional states 
Initially, in 1992, fourteen regional states were established; see the detail in Table 4.1 above. The 
five of the regional states, Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, Afar and Somali were designated as more or 
less a single homogenous ethnic territory although they inhabit a significant size of mixed groups 
and minority ethnic groups within the regional states. The other seven states were highly 
heterogeneous and inhabited by more than two ethnic groups. For example, in the 5 of the regional 
states in the South there were about 45 identified ethnic groups. Region 13, designated for the Harari 
ethnic group, but the majority (about 70 %) of the inhabitants of the region are non-Harari ethnic 
group. Region 14, Addis Ababa city established its own self-government. However, the 
proclamation didn’t give any clear territorial delimitation except identifying ethnic group that were 
incorporated in each regional states and this brought compounded problems to make official boarder 
demarcation of the regional states.  
 
 Nevertheless, in 1993 the regional states were reduced to nine after merging the five regional states 
(Region 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11) in the South into one single regional state under the name of the 
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (SNNP) regional state. There was no clear explanation 
how the merger was initiated, negotiated and agreed. The merger decision was made through closed-
door agreement among the self-appointed ethnic organizations in the name of the people. Whatever 
was the justification of the decision, such kind of decision, which has a tremendous political 
implication for the concerned people, should have been decided in open and transparent manner. 
Many prominent individuals in SNNP such as Beyene Petros, Tefera Meskelea and the SNNP 
Council speaker, have believed that the decision was imposed on them by EPRDF in inconsistency 
and contrary to the agreed covenant or the transitional charter). Even if the 7/92 proclamation 
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allowed for merger, it had made a specific condition in a manner that the merging should not hinder 
each ethnic group’s right to preserve its own local self-government capacity against its will.                   
 
Thus, the regional states that were established during the transitional period were officially endorsed 
by the 1994 constitution as constituent units of the Ethiopian federation. The constitution states that 
‘the federal democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall comprise of States, and the States shall be 
delimited on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and the consent of the people 
concerned’ (Art. 46, 1994 Constitution). The constitution also affirms the establishment of nine 
Regional State, which are: 1) the Region of Tigray, 2) the Region of Afar, 3) the Region of Amhara, 
4) the Region of Oromia, 5) the Region of Somalia, 6) the Region of Benishangul/Gumuz, 7) the 
Region of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, 8) the Region of Gambella Peoples, and 
9) the Region of Harari People. The city of Addis Ababa was designated as a city administration, but 
directly responsible for the federal executive and the Addis Ababa people.  
4.1.3 The asymmetric features of the regional state   
Although the Constitution determines that the component units or states should have equal rights and 
powers (Article 47). As shown on table 4.1, the regional states in Ethiopia exhibit extraordinary 
imbalances or asymmetry in terms of natural and human resources, population size, territorial space, 
societal diversity as well as a political influence and roles in the federal government. Even 
ethnically, a Tigrean bureaucrat or politician has more freedom and confidence than others within 
the EPRDF coalition wherein evidently  ‘all are equal, but some are more equal than others’. 
 
In terms of population of the regional states, the population size ranges from 20 million in Oromia to 
150 thousand in Harari regional state. Two regional state alone, Oromia and Amhara regional states 
comprise about 62% of the total population of the country and when the figure from SNNPR adds 
into it, the three regional states alone contain 80% (which is far more than two-third majority) of the 
population. Politically, this has a serious repercussion; if these three regional states work closely for 
their advantage they can overwhelmingly dominate the federal government in all significant matters. 
Ethnically, based on the 1994 census, the two largest ethnic group Oromo and Amhara have 20 
million and 15 million people respectively which is about 60% of the total population, and followed 
by 3.3 million Somali, 3.2 million Tigrayan, 2.2 million Gurage (three main sub-groups combined) 
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and 1.8 million Sidama. From officially identified about sixty-five ethnic groups, about fifty ethnic 
groups (the three-fourth) have less than a million population, about forty ethnic groups (about two-
third) have less than 100,000, and about twenty ethnic groups (about one-third) have less than 
10,000 population.  
 
Nevertheless, census results have become political due to the great importance attached to the 
population size of the ethnic groups in granting political power, allocating financial transfers and 
selecting working and schooling languages. Some ethnic groups such as the Sidama, Anuk and 
Oromo have complained that the 1994 census might have significant errors that could affect their 
numerical strength. In Gambella region, for example, the Anuk elite claims that the 1994 census 
mistakenly made Nuer (60,000 population) a majority in Gambella regional state by erroneously 
registering a significant number of Nuer population who are Sudanese residents that have happened 
to be in Ethiopia because of the conflict in Southern Sudan (Young 1999). Anuak elite also believes 
that in the 1994 census many Anuak were uncounted because their village was inaccessible at the 
time of the census, which was conducted during the rainy season in Anuak area (UN-EUE 2002). 
Thus, Anuk, claim being a majority in the Gambella. In the SNNP, the Sidama political elite claims 
that the census result for the polio vaccination for the Sidama zone was 4 million against the 1994 
census result of 2.4 million (A member of the Sidama zonal legislative (also member of the ruling 
party), Interviewee 30, 2002: 13). 
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Table 4.2 Some characteristics of the Regional States 
Regions Population* 
1994/95 
(The 
‘Indigenous’ 
group) 
Urban/Rural 
(percent) 
Area in 
Sq.km 
Density 
Sq.km 
No. of 
Ethnic 
groups 
(The 
dominant 
group) 
No. of 
zone 
No. of  
Special 
wereda 
No. of  
Wereda 
Tigray  3,358,358 17/83 60,000.2 62.6 3 
(99.4%) 
4  35 
Afar 1,131,437 8/92 77,000.0 14.6 1 5  28 
Amhara 14,769,360 10/90 188,000.8 86.9 3 (92%) 10 2 102 
Oromia 20,012,952  12/88 360,000.0 53.1 1 (85%) 12  176 
SNNP 11,064,818 8/92 112,000.0 92.4 50+ 
(20%) 
9  
 
5 71 
Somali 3,378,600 15/85 215,000.9 15.7 1 9  47 
Benisha- 
ngul-
Gumuz 
492,689 
(60%) 
9/91 46,000.8 9.3 5 3 2 20 
Gambella 194,755 
(76%) 
17/83 26,000.1 7.0 4  2  8 
Harari 
(city-state) 
143,587 
(6%) 
60/40 300 421.3 - 3  19 
Sources: Condensed from The 1994 Population and Housing Census; Ministry of Economic 
Development and Cooperation, Welfare Monitoring Unit, Poverty Situation in Ethiopia, Addis 
Ababa, March 1999); Ethiopia UN Country Team, 1999, Common Country Assessment, 
September 1999, Addis Ababa 
*The 1994 Population and Housing Census projection, the country’s population has reached 
59.9 million in 1998, Population size (millions) 1994= 53.5 Census 1994; (2000= 63.5 Census 
projection) (2005= 73.0 Census projection) 
 
4.1.4 The ethnic configurations of the regional states   
Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali regional states are considered as a single-ethnic-constituency 
regional states in the sense that they are characterized by the existence of a single dominant ethnic 
group, as it is evident from the names of the regional states that are designating by the names of the 
respective dominant ethnic groups.  The Tigray region has 3.5 million populations, of which the 
Tigrayan ethnic group accounts 98 percent of the regional state population and the two very small 
ethnic groups, Irob and Kunama accounts 0.5 and 0.05 percent respectively, and only one percent 
non-’indigenous population’ or only less than 2 percent non-Tigrayan people. Tigray is a highly 
homogenous region, and thus the Tigray ethnic group is provided with the full right of self-
administration.    
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The Amhara regional state, which has about 15 million people of which Amhara ethnic group 
accounts 92 per cent, is a single-ethnic constituency in which the region is designated as a self-
administrative constituency of the Amhara people. However, the Oromo that accounts 3 per cent of 
the regional population and the Agew-Awi people are also provided with a self-administration right 
in a special woreda constituencies because of their concentration in a particular area.  
 
The Oromia regional state, which has about 20 million people, is a single-ethnic constituency for the 
Oromo people to exercise their self-administration rights because the Oromo people accounts 85 
percent of the regional state’s population. However, 15 per cent the non-Oromo people of the 
regional residents are without any political representation. Especially, a significant concentration of 
Amhara population is living in many towns and urban areas that should enjoy a comparable status as 
the Oromo live in Amhara regional state. Such measures are very important to create inter-ethnic 
collaboration and respect. Since the regional state is located very strategically by bordering most of 
the regional states and serving as a central and essential landmass of the Ethiopian state, most of the 
urban areas are predominately inhabited by ethnically mixed people. At the inception of the regional 
state in 1991, violent ethnic clashes occurred between non-Oromo and Oromo groups that took the 
lives of many civilians. Still there have been pocket of ethnic strife and widespread ethnic hostilities 
especially in many towns wherein in some cases the majority of the urban dwellers are non-Oromo, 
but the Oromo group exclusively controls the town administrations.  
 
The Afar and Somali regional states are also designated as single-ethnic self-administrative 
constituencies for the Afar and Somali people respectively. The Somali regional state has about 3 
million population of which the majority about 95 per cent are Somalis. However, despite ethnic 
similarities there have been never-ending hostilities among various clan groups that deter an 
establishment of an effective and viable regional state. The Somali regional state has been in the 
state of crisis since its inception and thus become a constant trouble for the federal government.  The 
Afar regional state has about one million populations of which the Afar people account about 95 
percent of the regional population. The Afar and Somali regional states also contain mixed ethnic 
communities who lack any form of political and administrative representation within their respective 
regional states.    
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The SNNP, the Benishangul-Gumuz and the Gambella regional states are designated as multi-
ethnic constituencies regional state.   The Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) 
regional state has about 11 million population of which five ethnic groups account about 52 
percent (Sidama people accounts 18 per cent, Wolaita 11 per cent, Guraghe 8 per cent, Hadiya 
8 per cent, Siltie 7 per cent) and the rest about 60 ethnic groups accounts less than 50 percent 
of the regional population. Because more than 60 ethnic groups are compacted in a single state 
structure, there has been intense competition for representation, resources and government 
positions at the regional, zonal and woreda structures. From about 60 ethnic groups that are 
officially identified in the regional state, only 21 ethnic groups have been provided with self-
administrative constituencies at zonal or special wereda level. Moreover, at regional 
government level, there is competition among the major ethnic groups like Sidama, Wolaita, 
Gurage, Hadiya and others to get a prominent position in the regional state structure. The 
Sidama political elites are threatening to secede from the regional state. Ethnic hostility and 
conflicts have been observed in many places since the inception of the regional state. Constant 
fissure and some times bloody conflicts and splits have been manifested like in the North Omo 
Zone, Alaba-Kembata-Timbaro Zone and Sheka zone. At woreda level also violent clashes 
have occurred to control political power and in selecting working languages. (I will present 
more concerning SNNP regional state in chapter 6.  The Benishangul-Gumuz regional state has 
about half a million population, of which the five indigenous ethic groups account 57 per cent 
of the regional population (Benishangul (Berta) people 26 per cent, Gumuz 23 per cent, 
Shinasha 7 per cent, Mao 0.6 per cent and Komo 0.2 per cent of the regional population). The 
rest 43 per cent comprised of ‘non-indigenous’ groups such as Amhara 22 percent, Oromo 12 
percent and others 9 per cent. Although the regional state was designated as a multi-ethnic 
constituency, the ‘non-indigenous’ people are not considered as part of the multi-ethnic 
constituencies. The ‘indigenous’ groups dominate the political power in the region by curbing 
the political and civic rights of the ‘non-indigenous’ groups. Moreover, the region is 
overwhelmed by unhealthy competition and tension among the ‘indigenous’ group for power 
and resources (I will discuss about the region separately in chapter 5).       
 
The Gambella regional states which has about 200, 000 population, is designated as a multi-
ethnic constituency for Nuer, Anuk, Mejinger, Opos and Komos indigenous groups that 
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accounts 75 per cent of the regional state’s population. Among the ‘indigenous groups’, Nuer 
accounts 40 per cent, Anuak 27 per cent, Mejinger, 6 per cent and Opos and Komos 3 per cent 
(Census, 1994). Among the ‘non-indigenous’ groups, Amhara accounts 8 percent, Oromo 6 
percent and 8 percent from SNNP.   The regional state suffers from frequent conflict mainly 
between the two dominant ethnic groups- Anuak and Nuer and also sometimes between 
indigenous and non-indigenous groups. In 2002, bloody conflict was occurred and resulted in 
the loss of many lives, destruction of houses and displacement of thousands of people (UN-
EUE 2002). The federal government defence force was accused of murdering Anuak civilians 
(Amnesty International 2005).   
 
From all regional states, a very unique one is the Harari regional state. The regional state has 
about 150,000 populations, of which the Harari people account only 7 percent, the Oromo 52 
percent and the Amhara 32 percent, but despite such population make-up the regional state was 
designated as a self-administrative constituency for the Harari people. The leadership position 
of the Harari political elite, who are a very minute minority in the regional state, has been 
fiercely resisted by the two dominant ethnic groups in the regional state- the Amhara and the 
Oromo. The regional state is a case for the distortion and arbitrary nature of the ethnic federal 
arrangement in Ethiopia. According to Merera that ‘the Harari arrangement seems to be more 
primitive than democracy in the days of Aristotle, however it is perfectly consistent with the 
role of the Tigrayan political elite who claim to represent 7 percent of the Ethiopian population 
and are the rulers of the whole of Ethiopia in the name of ethnic rights and ethnic equality 
(Merera 2003: 139). Moreover, the Harari case is serving as a reference for many other ethnic 
groups to demand and emulate for their separate administrative structure. It is argued that 
Harari people were provided for self-administrative constituency mainly because of the 
closeness of some prominent individuals to the TPLF/EPRDF. 
 
4.1.5 Socio-economic variations among the regional states  
Except for a few self-governing urban areas like Addis Ababa, Harari and Dire Dawa, most of the 
regional states exhibit a similar pattern of low-level socio-economic conditions (see the details on 
Table 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4). Obviously, there are variations in some indicators, but the variations are not 
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manifesting a pattern of severe regional imbalances in a consistent way. The four emerging regional 
state- Afar, Somali, Benishangul and Gambella- which account 10 percent of the total population of 
the country, are showing a lower level of socio-economic advancement, particularly Afar and Somali 
are the least advanced of all regional states. A major cause could be linked to the low level of social 
and economic infrastructure developments in the past and their desert-like harsh climatic condition. 
Benishangul and Gambella regional states, which account about 1 per cent of the nationwide 
population are also considered as neglected and disadvantageous regions, but except in few 
indicators such as road network and infant and child mortality (see table 4.3 and 4.4 below), both 
regions have shown relatively similar pattern in socio-economic developments with other regional 
states. However, there may be discrepancies between the ‘indigenous’ and the ‘non-indigenous’ 
population and the situation among the ‘indigenous’ population is certainly worse than the regional 
states’ average indicators. For instance, in Benishangul-Gumuz 40 percent of the population is 
considered as ‘non-indigenous’ who are mostly living in urban areas.  Access to social service like 
education and health facilities by the ‘indigenous’ population are extremely lower than the ‘non-
indigenous’, because, in most cases, the ‘indigenous’ populations live far from the urban areas in 
scattered villages in the peripheries. 
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Table 4.3 Regional states’ access to social services 
 
 
Population 
1998  
(Million) 
% of  
people 
below 
poverty  
line, 
1995/96 
Access 
to safe 
water, 
HHs 
(%) 
1994 
Access to 
sanitation, 
HHs (%) 
1994 
Households 
with 
electricity  
(%) 
1994 
Literacy 
rate (%) 
1994 
Primary 
Gross 
enrolment 
(%) 
1994 
Road  
network 
(density  
in 
000 km2) 
1996/97 
National  45.5% 24 13  23.4 25.1  
Tigray 3.5 57.9% 21.3 7.0 48.4 20.47 52.6 25.9 
Afar 1.2 51.8% 13.0 8.3 53.0 7.28 7.0 10.9 
Amhara 15.4 56.7% 21.4 5.8 55.2 17.79 16.1 25.6 
Oromia 21.0 34.7% 22.4 12.9 61.8 22.4 21.7 28.6 
Somali 3.5 34.6% 15.0 10.9 20.2 7.96 6.7 5.8 
Beni- 
Shangul 
Gumuz 
0.51 
 
47.6% 
 
18.2 
 
19.0 
 
38.8 17.74 25.5 8.6 
SNNP 11.8 56.5% 19.2 12.8 48.8 24.44 29.8 38.2 
Gambella 0.20 41.8% 26.5 14.8 26.2 29.33 51.2 12.3 
Harari 0.15 29.1% 63.1 41.8 95.3 54.54 59.6 63.3 
Addis- 
Ababa 
2.35 
 
30.0% 
 
97.50 74.1 95.5 82.52 110.5 175.0 
Dire 
Dawa 
0.29 
 
24.6% 
 
77.70 
 
55.0 87.9 51.53 57.6 28.7 
         
*The minimum standard per capita calorie is 2100 
Sources: Condensed from The 1994 Population and Housing Census; Ministry of Economic 
Development and Cooperation, Welfare Monitoring Unit 1999. Poverty Situation in Ethiopia, 
Addis Ababa, March 1999; 
Ethiopia UN Country Team, 1999, Common Country Assessment, September 1999, Addis 
Ababa 
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Table 4.4 Regional states’ Health and Nutrition Status 
 Infant  
Mortality 
 Rate 
(per 1000 
 live births) 
1994 
Under Five  
Mortality  
Rate 
(per 1000 
 live births) 
1994 
Life  
Expectancy 
1994 
Doctor/ 
population 
ratio 
1996/97 
Profile of 
calorie intake 
per adult per 
day 
1995/96 
National 116  50.7  1960* 
Tigray 123 181 49.6 1:39,050 1902 
Afar 118 174 50.3 1:75,429  1957 
Amhara 116 170 50.8 1:58,608  2004 
Oromia 118 173 50.4 1:63,735 1800 
Somali 96 137 54.8 1:46,013  1993 
Beni- 
Shangul 
Gumuz 
139 
 
206 48.6 1:16,989  1831 
 
SNNP 128 189 48.6 1:43,391  1734 
Gambella 99 142 54.2 1:12,172  2108 
Harari 113 166 51.4 1:3,418 2127 
Addis- 
Ababa 
78 
 
109 58.4 1:6,970  2040 
Dire 
Dawa 
115 
 
168 
 
51.1 
 
1:8,401  2085 
      
Source: Calculated from The 1994 Population and Housing Census; Ministry of Economic 
Development and Cooperation, Welfare Monitoring Unit, Poverty Situation in Ethiopia, Addis 
Ababa, March 1999); Ethiopia UN Country Team, 1999. Common Country Assessment, 
September 1999, Addis Ababa; World Bank (2000: 70) 
 
 
Nevertheless, socio-economic developments do not show much variation across the regional states; the 
accusation that the past regimes made regional or ethnic preferences in terms of socio-economic 
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investments does seem unfounded. The Amhara regional state, which is identified as a homeland for the 
ruling Amhara ethnic group, is showing the same level of poor socio-economic condition as other 
regional states; even in some indicators it shows the worst (see the detail in table 4.2 and 4.3). To give 
some revealing illustrations, proportion of people living below poverty line, in Amhara regional state 
was 56.7 per cent, whereas the percent in Oromia was 34.7, in Afar 51.8, in Somali 34.6, in SNNP 
56.5%, in Benishangul-Gumuz 47.6, in Gambella 41.8 and the national average was 45.5 percent in 
1995/96. Access to safe water in 1994 the national average was 24 per cent, whereas the per cent in 
Amhara was 21.4, in Oromia 22.4, in Benishangul-Gumuz 18.2, in Gambella 26.5 per cent. Access to 
sanitation services in 1994, the national average was 13 per cent, whereas in Amhara 5.8, in Afar 8.3, in 
Somali 10.9, in Benishangul-Gumuz 19.0, and in Gambella 14.8 per cent. The national literacy rate in 
1994 was 23.4, whereas the rate in Amhara was 17.79, in SNNP 24.44, in Oromia 22.4, in Benishangul-
Gumuz 17.74, in Gambella 29.33 and in SNNP 24.44 per cent. Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live 
births) in 1994 of the national average was 116, whereas in Amhara it was the same 116, in Afar 118, in 
Somali 96, in Benishangul-Gumuz 139, in Gambella 96. Doctor/population ratio in 1996/97, in Amhara 
was 1:58,608, in Tigray 1:39,050 in Afar 1:75,429, in Somali 1:46,013, in Benishangul-Gumuz 
1:16,989, in Gambella 1:12,172. The above indicators reveal that the living conditions of the Amhara 
people were not different from the rest of the people in Ethiopia.  Moreover, when one considers the 
distribution of industrial establishments, 69 percent of the country’s industrial establishment was 
concentrated in Addis Ababa city, followed by 14 per cent in Oromia, and 4 per cent in Amhara (see for 
the detail table 4.5).  
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Table 4.5 Regional Distributions of Public and Private Industrial Establishments in 1993 
Region Total Percentage  
Tigray 8 1.6 
Afar -  
Amhar 19 4 
Oromia 71 14 
Somali (including)   
Benishagul -  
Southern 12 2.5 
Gambella -  
Harari NA  
Addis Ababa 328 69 
Dire Dawa 16 3 
Not identified 20 4 
Total 475 100 
Source: Seminar Proceedings 1993. The Impending Federalism as a basis for 
Development in Ethiopia: some notes on constraints AMBO III, 1993, page 16) 
 
4.1.6 Administrative Structures in the regional states 
Administratively, in most cases the regional states are organized in four-tier administrative hierarchs, 
namely the regional government, zonal administration, wereda administration and kebele 
administrations. The regional states’ supreme legislative, executive and judicial powers are 
concentrated and centralized at the regional governments that are header by the regional states’ 
presidents. In all of cases, the regional states’ presidents are very powerful and supreme since they 
operate as leaders of the regional executives, legislatives and judiciaries. Due to such high 
concentration of power at the regional government level, the Ethiopian federal arrangement exhibits a 
concentration of power rather than a non-centralization of power.   
 
The zonal administration is the second tier of administrative structure in the regional states and its 
major function is to serve as a sub-regional administrative structure in order to co-ordinate and watch 
over the activities of the woreda administrations.  However, there are regional variations with regard to 
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its mandate, legitimacy and functions. In the SNNPR, for instance, zones have elected councils and in 
some cases represent a specific ethnic community, like in Sidama zone, Hadiya zone, Wolaita zone 
etc. and their mandate and functions are not only to serve as a sub-regional administrative capacity but 
also to serve as a self-government entity for the respective ethnic groups though it has limited power 
and legal jurisdictions. Except the SNNPR, in other regions, zones are simply acting as a subsidiary or 
sub-regional administrative structure in which most of its officials were appointed by the regional state 
and they are responsible for transmitting decisions and power of the regional government to the 
woreda administration. In these regions, the woreda administrations are directly accountable and 
responsible for the zonal administrations and in turn the zonal administrations is accountable to the 
regional government in which power is concentrated at the top at the regional level. There is no 
precise standard or criterion for structuring zonal and woreda administrative structures, the decision is 
left to the regional states to determine based on their regional context, but it is understood that 
administrative conveniences are the major reason in establishing the structures. 
  
Special woreda structures are provided to protect the self-government right for minority ethnic groups 
that do not have enough population to establish their own zonal or regional self-government structure. 
SNNPR has five, Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states each has one special woredas for 
minority ethnic groups. These special woredas are accountable directly to the regional state without 
any intermediary structures of zonal administration. In standard structures, woreda administrations are 
accountable to their respective zonal administrations.      
 
A wereda structure is the third tier of administrative structure in the regional states and it was provided 
with a power to ‘prepare, determine and implement activities within its own areas concerning social 
services and economic development.’ (Proclamation 7/92, Art. 40, 1). It has directly elected council 
members and, appointed as well as elected executive and judicial bodies. According to the 1992 
proclamation, in some cases, wereda administration has also served as a self-administrative 
constituency for minority ethnic groups. However, it is very impracticable to consider wereda 
administration as a self-government entity, because, first, the power and functions provided for wereda 
administration is very functionary, and second woreda administration is highly subordinated to the 
regional and zonal administrations. Thus, wereda administrations are not capable enough to provide 
self-governing rights for the minority ethnic groups as it has been pledged in the constitution, because 
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the woreda structure mandate was limited into functionary roles without any power of policy and other 
decision making power that matters most to the wereda areas. At last, the kebele administration is the 
lowest administrative structure in the regional states. Although its major functions are recognised as 
ensuring law and order in the kebele area and providing routine administrative service to the kebele 
people, it is recognised by the people as an instrument of imposing control and command on the local 
people. As it has direct contact with the local people, it is serving as an arm of the government to 
impose control and order in the name of promoting peace, security and development in the local area.    
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4.2 The Constitution  
4.2.1 Constitutional distribution of power 
A New Constitution was ratified in December 1994 and adopted in May 1995 and put into effect on 22 
August 1995. The constitution officially endorses the ethnic federal restructuring in the country by 
declaring the establishment of a federal and democratic structure and establishment of nine regional 
states by declaring that sovereign power should reside with the ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ of 
Ethiopia  (Article 1, 8, and 47, the 1994 Constitution). The constitution declares for the establishment of 
a parliamentarian system of governance that has a two-chamber parliament at the federal level, namely 
House of People Representative (HPR) and House of Federation (HF) (Article 45). HPR is the federal 
legislative body, which has the supreme authority. Its members are elected for a term of five years by a 
system of a plurality of votes cast from each electoral district or constituency that has 100,000 
populations. It has about 547 seats and the constitution put a limit on the number of seats of the HPR not 
to exceed 550.  
 
The HPR is granted a full power of legislation in all matters assigned to the federal jurisdiction by the 
constitution. Some of the major responsibilities or functions entrusted to the HPR by the constitution 
include: 
• Enacting of laws on matters specified for the federal level and ratify national policy standards; 
• Enacting of specific laws on utilization of land and other natural resources, of rivers and lakes 
crossing the boundaries of the national territorial jurisdiction or linking two or more States; on 
inter-State commerce and foreign trade; on air, rail, water and sea transport; major roads linking 
two or more States, postal and telecommunication services; the possession and bearing of arms;  
• It shall enact civil laws, which the House of the Federation deems necessary to establish and 
sustain one economic community. 
• It shall determine the organization of national defence, public security, and a national police 
force.  
• In conformity with Article 93 of the Constitution it shall declare state of emergency;  
• On the basis of a draft law submitted to it by the Council of Ministers it shall proclaim a state of 
war.  
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• It shall approve general policies and strategies of economic, social and development, and fiscal 
and monetary policy of the country.  
• It shall enact laws on matters relating to the local currency, the administration of the National 
Bank, and foreign exchange.  
• It shall approve the appointment of Federal judges, members of the Council of Ministers, 
commissioners, the Auditor General, and of other officials whose appointment is required by law 
to be approved by it.  
• It shall, on its own initiative, request a joint session of the House of the Federation and of the 
House of Peoples’ Representatives to take appropriate measures when State authorities are 
unable to arrest violations of human rights within their jurisdiction. It shall, on the basis of the 
joint decision of the House, give directives to the concerned State authorities (Article 55). 
  
The second chamber, which is called the House of Federation (HF), is composed of representatives of 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ (Article 61). It can be simply called as a house of nationalities or 
house of ethnic groups. According to the constitution (Article 61) that: ‘Each Nation, Nationality and 
People shall be represented in the House of the Federation by at least one member. Each Nation or 
Nationality shall be represented by one additional representative for each one million of its population’. 
In 2002, fifty-eight ethnic groups have been officially represented in the HF by about 107 members.   
  
Constitutionally, the HF has the power to interpret the Constitution and organize the council of 
constitutional inquiry (Article 62). Other major powers and functions of the HF include, making of 
decision on issues relating to the rights of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to self-determination, 
including the right to secession; promote the equality of the Peoples of Ethiopia enshrined in the 
Constitution and promote and consolidate their unity based on their mutual consent; make every effort to 
find solutions to disputes or misunderstandings that may arise between States; determine the division of 
revenues derived from joint Federal and State tax sources and the subsidies that the Federal Government 
may provide to the States; determine Federal intervention if any State, in violation of this Constitution, 
endangers the constitutional order (Article 62). 
 
Although the constitution allocates very vital powers and responsibilities to the HF, its ability to exercise 
its power has been impaired by the same constitution that permits the HF to establish permanent and ad 
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hoc committees to exercise most of its power and functions and the constitution does not require the HF 
to have frequent sessions, rather it requires the HF to have at least two sessions annually (Article 67). 
Thus, the HF is exercising most of its power and functions through by few individuals working in the 
committees without making frequent consultation and decision of the whole member of the HF. The 
weak role of the HF has created an opportunity for concentration of power on the winner party in the 
federal government.  
 
In addition, the procedure of representation in the HF allows more populous ethnic groups to have more 
representative in the house, and this means that they have more votes to than the smaller populous ethnic 
groups represented in the HF, as it is the case in the first legislative chamber, the HPR. As a result, more 
populous ethnic groups have more seats in both houses and thus more populous ethnic groups have a 
better (constitutional) power to protect their interest. This makes a case for the critiques that there is 
always huge difficulties to guarantee ethnic equality in Ethiopia in a straightforward manner. As this 
shows that in the Ethiopian federal system, both houses are apparently structured for proportional 
representation, but in many other federal systems, the first chamber is for a proportional representation 
and the second one is for an equal representation. Moreover, in the case of Ethiopia, the second 
chamber, namely the HF is not functioning as a legislative body, it is not involved in lawmaking process 
and it does not have regular session. As a result, it is very difficult to consider the federal system in 
Ethiopia as bicameral, thus it may be a noticeable deviation from the conventional federal principle that 
recognizes bicameral legislative structures as an inherent feature of the federal system (Lijphart 1977) 
(Davis 1978: 142). Besides, the second chamber is serving as ‘the house of every nationalities’ or a 
chamber for every ethnic groups in the country (Fasil 1999: 72). This shows evidence of the 
insignificant influence of the ethnic groups (as a group) in the legislative, policymaking and other 
important decision-making process in Ethiopia, wherein the Constitution declares, ‘sovereign power 
resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia (Article 8, 1). 
 
Besides the very fact that the regional state’s councils have the power to elect members of the HF, 
would also be disadvantageous for an ethnic group or ethnic constituency that elects an opposition 
candidate. Moreover, state councils in majority of the regional states are very weak and have very 
limited sessions per annum, thus in such situation the executive body of the regional states always have 
a tremendous power and influence in sending regional representatives for the HF. This practice could 
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diminish a check and balance system that could be very essential in multiethnic societies in which 
political competition is positioned around ethnic lines.  
 
Putting aside the operational deficiencies on the ground, a paradoxical constitutional decree has made 
the HF flimsy and ineffectual; the constitution can be criticized for its inconsistency in giving the HF 
very substantial power and functions such as interpreting the constitution, determining the division of 
revenues and subsidies to regional states and making of decision on issues relating to self-determination, 
including the right to secession, whereas making the HF highly dependent on the states’ councils and for 
that matter, as argued above, making it dependent on the executive bodies at the regional and the federal 
government levels. This phenomenon deprives the Ethiopian federal system the exclusive hallmark of a 
federal system, which is a division or separation of power (King 1982: 94). This may be a deliberate 
attempt by the framers of the constitution who foresee the difficulties in handling and satisfying various 
self-seeking and provincial demands of ethnic groups. However, in the absence of check and balance 
mechanisms, the political process could be easily abused by the ruling power to protect its own self-
seeking and provincial interest. As Horowitz argues that constitutional designs have effects on the 
distribution of power, and those who gain power as a result may wish to alter the design to favour 
themselves (Horowitz 1999: 33).  
 
The constitution states that the members of the HF are either elected by the state councils or elected by 
the people directly, however in the actual experience it has been the states’ council that appoints their 
respective members in the HF. This means that the majority party in the states’ councils has also a 
power to influence the HF in the federal government. This also shows the level of power concentration 
in the hands of a single winner party. In the current one-party dominant political process in Ethiopia, the 
EPRDF has used such constitutional loophole for its advantage to impose its power and also to protect 
its parochial interest in all level of the federal and regional power structures.  The integrity of the 
constitutional design depends on the integrity of demarcating the boundary since ‘the looser the design 
and the easier the adoption, the easier the alteration as well (Ibid. p. 32).  
 
The constitution grants equal powers and responsibilities to the various regional states as it states that 
‘Member States of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall have equal rights and powers’ 
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(Article 47). This entails that the Ethiopian federal system is constitutionally designed to be a 
symmetrical federal system. Each regional state has state council that function as the legislative body of 
the regional government. A president who is elected by the state council leads an executive power in all 
of the regional states. The Constitution (Article 52) reserves all powers to the states except those given 
expressly to the federal government alone, or concurrently to the federal and regional governments. 
Some of the major powers and functions entrusted to the regional states include: 
• To establish a State administration that best advances self-government, a democratic order based 
on the rule of law; to protect and defend the Federal Constitution; 
• To enact and execute the state constitution and other laws; 
• To formulate and execute economic, social and development policies, strategies and plans of the 
State; 
• To administer land and other natural resources in accordance with Federal laws; 
• To levy and collect taxes and duties on revenue sources reserved to the States and to draw up and 
administer the State budget; 
• To enact and enforce laws on the State civil service and their condition of work; in the 
implementation of this responsibility it shall ensure that educational; training and experience 
requirements for any job, title or position approximate national standards; 
• To establish and administer a state police force, and to maintain public order and peace within 
the state 
 
Constitutionally, it appears very difficult to reduce or alter the power and function of any of the regional 
states unless the council of the concerned regional state concedes to the alteration of its power, which is 
of course a very unusual scenario. The constitution puts a strong protection against any easy alternation 
or amendment of the constitution. Any proposal for constitutional amendment should be supported by a 
two-thirds majority vote of a joint session of the HPR and the HF, and should also be approved by a 
two-thirds of the Councils of the member States of the Federation by majority votes (Article 105). More 
strictly, amendment to Chapter three of the Constitution that contains human rights and democratic 
rights including the rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples and, the provision which deals with 
amendment of the constitution, require the approval of all state councils by a majority vote and the 
approval of the HPR and HF by a two- thirds majority vote. In this regard, the constitutional approach in 
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Ethiopia is in accordance with the basic federal principle that requires the consent of a very bigger 
majority group in constitutional alteration (King 1982; Elazar 1993; Watts 2000).   
 
Nonetheless, it is one thing to put the provisions in the constitution and another to genuinely pursue 
them. As Leenco anticipated that the TPLF can afford to be quite generous on paper since it will not be 
bound by those aspects of any legislation that appear to restrain its freedom to act with impunity, 
(Leenco 1999: 11). Despite a gesture to devolve power to the regional states and local self-government 
units, the process has been marked by a centralization of power at the center that was overwhelmingly 
dominated by the TPLF (Cohen 1995:160; Young 1989: 321; Clapham 2002: 26; Merera 2003: 121). 
Due to the concentration of power on the TPLF/EPRDF, the exercise of power from the federal 
government to the woreda and kebele administrative structures has been flowing through the centralized 
TPLF/ EPRDF’s party network, thus the declarations in the constitution do not reflect the actual power 
exercise in Ethiopia’s federal system.  Moreover, the higher centripetal character of the federal system in 
Ethiopia could also be gleaned from the concentration of policymaking power on the federal 
government, the concentration of financial power and budget allocation responsibility on the federal 
government and a weak capacity of the regional states in terms of skilled manpower (Vaughan and 
Tronvoll 2003: 12). Abbink (1998:167) also claims that the actual division of powers between member 
states and federal government in Ethiopia is ‘not federal enough’ because the states do not have any role 
in debating the policies and in proposing legislation formulated at the federal level. He justifies this 
claim by pointing at the fact that other federal systems, such as the German, Canadian, Nigerian and 
Mexican, have given more power of this kind to the member states.  Moreover, in issues concerning 
constitutional disputes, the regional states have a very insignificant constitutional role to challenge 
decisions made by the HF and Council of Constitutional Inquiry, which are structured within the 
jurisdiction of the federal government in which the federal executive particularly the PM has a 
tremendous power to influence their deliberation and operation.  
 
4.2.2 Article 39: The right to establish self-government or the right to secede  
Article 39 declares an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession of every 
nation, nationality and peoples in Ethiopia. According to the constitution, ‘nation, nationalities or people 
symbolizes ‘a group of people who have or share large measure of a common culture or similar customs, 
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mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological 
make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory’ (Article 39, 5). Evidently, 
this contradicts the federal solution that aims to deter secession.  According to Henze (1995: 35) that ‘the 
right to secede’ in Ethiopia constitution is narrowly specified without exhaustively elaborating various 
options of self-determination that could be more logical, practicable and humble than the destructive and 
impracticable ‘the right to secession’ cliché. Henze indicates experience in Spain in which autonomous 
communities are granted broader power of various magnitudes through a process of deliberation and 
bargaining in order to avoid the possibility of separation or secession. For Duchacek (1987: 207), the 
inclusion of the rights for secession in the federal bargain would facilitate the dissolution of the federal 
framework by encouraging centrifugal tendencies, but the right of secession would go along more with a 
confederal arrangement in which parts are completely autonomous to leave the confederation with very 
less difficulties and insignificant harm to each other.  
 
The insertion of the right for secession promises in the constitution may be clichéd from the USSR 
constitution that put the same right in the constitution but without any practicability after the 
independence of Finland. At the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the Russian federation emerged with a 
constitution of 1992 that allowed the right to secede as a heir of the USSR, but the 1993 constitution 
scrapped the right to secede and opted for a process of asymmetrical and separate arrangement with 
every ethnic territory for negotiated power sharing arrangements in order to deter the destructive burden 
of secessionism (Smith 2000).  Many federal arrangements such as Canada and Switzerland have 
embarked on granting feasible and fair broader local autonomy arrangements in order to discourage 
centrifugal tendencies. In the contrary, the Ethiopia’s constitutional pledges for secession; it puts a very 
audacious promise for ‘a right to secede’, but in reality the power holders are doing very little to 
promote genuine and feasible self-administrative structures that would discourage a pointer to the 
constitutional promise of secessionists’ bonfire. Rather, the Ethiopian federal experience matches the ex-
Soviet Union constitution that gave copious promises of self-determination including independence for 
its ethnic republics but responded with ruthless force when the rights were requested. To some extent, 
the same may be true in Ethiopia’s federal constitution, which is rich and overflowing in freedom 
vocabularies but the actual performance is very far and opposite to the declarations. But the danger 
could be very great in situation which official pronouncement provokes and makes cognizant parochial 
ethnic consciousness by reckless advertisement of the right to secede, whereas official actions are going 
 118  
in opposite and extreme directions of subjugation and curtailment of ordinary rights and freedoms which 
of course reinforce and justify the demand for secession.  
 
Moreover, unfulfilled flashy and celebrated promises could create a strong adverse reaction than 
discreetly and slightly presented ones since undelivered promise may generate more powerful 
resentment than the non-promised ones. In situation where the power and the resource of the regional 
governments are subordinate and dependent to the federal government at the center, the right to secede 
rhetoric could simply provide an incentive and justification to demand for secession. The regional 
governments in Ethiopia’s federal arrangement are highly dependent on the federal government; they 
operate in a manner that resembles a centralized administration.  The federal government has a supreme 
power to decide on land and natural resources, it appropriates huge tax bases, and it owns most of the 
nation’s industrial establishments. Besides, many of the ethnic groups are not exercising most of their 
rights listed in article 39, whereas a few are enjoying more than what they actually deserve. Therefore, 
with such sorry milieu that breeds and exacerbates resentments, the right to secede cliché can become a 
recipe for disaster.  
 
Paradoxically, in Ethiopian, the ruling group, which is dominated by a minority ethnic group from an 
impoverished region, has an unfair control over politics and economics nationwide. At the same time, 
the same ruling group promises the right to secede for the various ethnic groups who are relatively better 
endowed with resources. However, it denies an authentic representation of these ethnic groups. Instead, 
it uses surrogate groups and elites to manoeuvre and control ethnic groups. It is, however, becoming 
very difficult to sustain the proxy system for long in an efficient and credible manner. As it is accounted 
that many of proxy officials ‘tend to be undisciplined and corrupt, which occasionally resulted in 
massive dismissal and demotions’ (Merera 2003: 141).  
 
Furthermore, there is a procedural confusion regarding the constitutional provision that allows the right 
to every ethnic group to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and the right 
to establish, at any time, their own regional state.  The insertion of very ambiguous and complex 
procedures would make the right meaningless and the intention insincere. The constitution states that the 
demand for statehood should be approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Council of the 
Nation, Nationality or People concerned, and it should be supported by a majority vote in the 
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referendum (Article 47). But in majority of cases, except in SNNP region’s few ethnic groups (which 
have zonal council for their ethnic constituency), most of the ethnic groups do not have their own 
separate councils, paradoxically it is only those who have been allowed to have their own self-
administrative constituency that have a council, but those ethnic groups (or ‘nations, nationalities and 
people’ as constitutionally named) without self-administrative constituency do not have a council that 
supposed to approve their demand for self-administration constituency. For example, in Benishangul-
Gumuz regional states a demand by the Benishangul (or Berta) elite to have their own council was not 
entertained for political discussion either in the regional council or in the HF. The Benishangul people 
did not have their own council to approve the demand until 2003 and the state council, which was 
established by the five ethnic groups (the Benishangul people have only 28 out of 80 seats), rejected 
their demand. This created a strained relationship between the Benishangul elite and the Gumuz elite 
that severely thwarted the operation of the regional state and also the hostility has been deepening not 
only between the political elite’s of the two groups, but also among the ordinary people of Benishangul 
and Gumuz (A member of zonal executive from Berta, Interviewee 8 2002: 10; An Elder from Berta, 
Interviewee 7 2002:18; (A regional official, from Gumuz, 1, 2002: 1). A similar problem is occurring in 
the SNNP regional state, some of these were the Sidama group has resented against the SNNP’s council 
decision to deny them the ownership of Awassa city, the North Omo zone disintegrated in a bloody 
conflict due to the inability of the four ethnic groups to agree in a single council, the Gamo and Gofa 
elites are continuing their demand for a separate zonal administration and their own separate council.  
 
 
Thus, the constitutional pledges for a right to self-administration or secession is more of rhetoric than an 
achievable promise for many of the ethnic groups, as the long and complex procedures seem difficult to 
fulfil. In the future, however, it would be used for facilitating and legitimising an exit for a region that 
could build a capability to do so. Especially, there is a widespread suspicion that, Tigray could be the 
first candidate to ask for secession, if the hegemonic position of the Tigray elite in ruling Ethiopia is in 
jeopardy. It may be for such purpose that article 39 that pledges the right of secession is highly protected 
from any alteration and it needs the approval of all the regional states for its amendment, as it is declared 
in the constitution (Article 105) that article 39 which is included in ‘fundamental principles of the 
constitution’ can not be changed without the approval of all of the councils of the regional states, but to 
show a revealing comparison, article 47 of the constitution that declares the establishment of the nine 
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regional states can be changed by the approval of a two-third of the councils of the regional states. 
Currently, however, the rhetoric of secession has produced two great challenges. First, it becomes an 
incentive for various ethnic groups to demand for a separate self-administrative constituency and 
separate regional state that has resulted for bloody conflict, displacement and ethnic hostility. Second, 
the rhetoric has generated a big voice that denounced the ‘secession right’ as a hidden motive to destroy 
the Ethiopian state. However, such big denunciation has created confusion among many ethnic groups 
who are suspicious regarding the motive behind the denunciation. And the ruling group successfully 
manoeuvred the denunciation as an opposition to the rights of ethnic groups for self-administration, thus 
it restlessly worked for deepening the suspicion in order to capitalize political support from various 
ethnic groups for its hegemonic interest.     
 
4.2.3 A flawed structure: a concentration of power on the chief executive of the 
federal government 
The constitution (Article 45) states that Ethiopia should have a parliamentarian form of government in 
which the majority political party or a coalition of political parties that has the greatest number of seats 
in the parliament, namely the HPR have a power to establish a government. This constitutional design 
upholds a ‘winner takes all’ approach. This may be a very unsuitable political system for a multiethnic 
society that requires a coalition or power-sharing arrangement. A federal system in a multiethnic society 
could be well suited to a negotiated and consociational-like arrangement that attempts to construct unity 
in diversity (Elazar 1987; Watts 1999; Agranoff 1998; Lijphart 2002) As a result, a concentration of 
power on a single winner could not satisfy the various interests and needs of the numerous and diverse 
communities of multiethnic Ethiopia. Constitutionally, the winner part in the federal parliament (also 
similar in the regional states), has very extensive power and responsibilities, some of these are: 
 
• Responsible for appointing the prime minister who becomes a head of the government, leader of 
the cabinet and the commander-in-chief of the armed force.  (Article 76) 
• Responsible for suggesting nominees for ministerial posts 
• Supervision over the implementation of the country’s foreign policy 
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• Selects and submits for approval to the House of Peoples’ Representatives nominations for posts 
of Commissioners, the President and Vice-President of the Federal Supreme Court and the 
Auditor General. 
• Appoints high civilian officials of the Federal Government other than those referred above 
• Supervises the conduct and efficiency of the Federal administration and takes such corrective 
measures as are necessary. 
 
 
The majority party in the legislative always assumes an exclusive control of the executive and judiciary 
branches of the federal as well as the regional governments and thus the winning party assumes a total 
dominance of all branches of government, which is very unsuitable for a feature of multiethnic society, 
because federal arrangements in multiethnic would require either a coalition power centres or various 
centres of power. Many scholars, however, are uncertain regarding the efficiency and viability of an 
ethnic coalition arrangement or a proliferation of power centres in a polity (King 1982; Horowitz 1985, 
Elazar 1993). King, for example, argues that ‘a political system within which each power is precisely 
checked by another would not appear to be a feasible system at all…a political system in which each 
social force is nicely blocked by some others, seems to represent a non-system, not a system- more 
anarchy than a polity’ (King 1982: 64). Horowitz also claims that ‘the assumption that elites in divided 
societies are likely to be more tolerant of other ethnic groups or less inclined to pursue advantage for 
their own group is extremely dubious’ (Horowitz 2002: 21). Thus, he claims that creating and sustaining 
coalition in divided societies is a very difficult task, but, of course, not impossible. In his empirical 
investigation, Horowitz, finds out that ‘educated elites in some countries to be less ethnocentric than 
their followers, in others more, in some others neither less nor more, and in still others more with respect 
to some groups and less or the same with respect to other groups’ (Ibid.). However, in multiethnic 
Ethiopia in which autocratic rule is a norm, not an exception, it has been proved futile to quell ethnic or 
regional demands in centralized autocracy. The parliamentary system of governance based on the 
‘winner takes all’ principle would not be a viable prototype to Ethiopia that exhibits variations in 
political development, tradition of statehood, cultural assortments and ethnic and language 
configurations.  
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Furthermore, the constitution gives a strong power to the executive, particularly to the Prime Minister. 
The power of the Prime Minister in Ethiopia is unprecedented: he controls the armed force, the cabinet 
(the executive) is accountable to him; he is a head of a party that is a majority in the parliament or the 
legislative (90 percent majority from 1995 to 2005 and two-third majority since May 2005). As the 
constitution (Article 74) gives him a power to select and recommend to the HPR an appointment of 
Commissioners, the President and Vice-President of the Federal Supreme Court and the Auditor 
General, he has a significant power in influencing the judiciary and other important institutions that 
should be vital for checks and balances in the federal systems. Moreover, since the President and Vice-
President of the Federal Supreme Court are serving as a president and vice-president respectively in the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry that have powers to investigate constitutional disputes, (Article 82 and 
Article 84), hence, the prime minister has a greater influence to interfere with the function of 
constitutional inquiry. This makes the power of the prime minister in Ethiopia uncontrolled and 
unchecked by the executive, legislative judiciary and other federal or regional institutions. For instance, 
recently, connected to the May 2005 election, the Prime Minister declared an unconstitutional 
emergency law, but no federal institution has been able to interfere to challenge him, as there is no such 
constitutional power delegated to other federal o regional institutions. When the opposition party 
brought the case into the court, the issue was decided in favour of the Prime Minister. This is an 
example of a unconstitutionality12 that was backed by the court in favour of the Prime Minister by 
deliberately disregarding the constitutional decree that states, ‘it [the Council of Ministers] has the 
power to declare a state of emergency; in doing so, it shall, within the time limit prescribed by the 
Constitution, submit the proclamation declaring a state of emergency for approval by the House of 
Peoples’ Representatives (Article 77). Thus, the court shockingly favoured the Prime Minister’s 
authoritarian and unconstitutional action mainly because the court in Ethiopia is operating under a 
complete influence of the executive, particularly the Prime Minister.  
 
In addition, the constitution does not put limit on the term of the Prime Minister, who has much power, 
but a term limit (for two terms) was placed on the post of a President, who has only a ceremonial power 
(Article 70). This is a very intriguing and deceptive constitutionally decree; in principle term limit 
should be made on the tenure of the executive in order to discourage a tendency of autocracy and power 
                                                 
12 Fasil Nahum, a legal advisor to the Prime Minister in press interview, June 2005 explained that the emergency decree was 
unconstitutional.  
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abuse by the power holder due to a longer tenure in power, but in the Ethiopia case the tenure of the 
executive (the great power holder) has been made infinite whereas the term limit was made on the non-
executive, non-powerful and very ceremonial President. It should have been the other way round, if the 
purpose is it to limit abuse of power by the power holder.              
 
At the same time, the judiciary branch is also highly dependent on the executive body. The court system 
is structured in a very susceptible manner to the interference of the executive branch as the Prime 
Minister and his majority party in the parliament is responsible for the appointments of judges, the 
President and Vice-President of the Supreme Court. All the powers allocated to the parliament are 
indirectly allocated to the prime minister, as the prime minister is the head of the majority party in the 
parliament. Thus, the parliament is simply a rubber-stump to the executive body. Constitutionally, a 
majority party in the parliament always belongs to the PM and therefore expected to endorse the PM’s 
selection of the president and the vice-president of the Federal Supreme court that has supreme judicial 
authority in the country. On this point, articles 78 and 80 of the constitution declare that ‘Supreme 
Federal judicial authority is vested in the Federal Supreme Court; the Federal Supreme Court shall have 
the highest and final judicial power over Federal matters and; the Federal Supreme Court has a power of 
cassation over any final court decision containing a basic error of law’.  
 
Although the constitution declares that judges should exercise their functions in full independence and 
should be directed solely by the law, the Judicial Administration Council, which has a power to remove 
judges due to violation of disciplinary rules or on grounds of gross incompetence or inefficiency, is 
accountable to the parliament as its decision to remove a judge should be approved by a majority vote in 
the parliament (Article 79). The Prime Minister also has a tremendous influence in the operation of the 
Judicial Administration Council, because the Council is operating within the federal government 
executive structure. The Council has responsibilities to assess and determine code of professional 
conduct and discipline as well as transfer of judges of any court.  Besides, concerning appointment of 
other federal judges, the federal Judicial Administrative Council has a responsibility to select candidates 
that should be acceptable to the PM, because the Constitution declares that: ‘Regarding other Federal 
judges, the Prime Minister shall submit to the House of Peoples’ Representatives for appointment 
candidates selected by the Federal Judicial Administration Council’ (Article 81). The federal Judicial 
Administration has also a responsibility to give its views and recommendations to the regional states in 
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nomination of their judges (Article 81). Hence, cumulatively, the gist of the mater is that all key judicial 
powers are at the mercy of the Prime Minister or the head of the executive branch of the federal 
government.   
 
More critically, the Ethiopian federal project suffers from the absence of an independent constitutional 
interpretation procedure. The constitution states that the HF has the power to interpret the Constitution 
(Article 62, 1), but the HF is a political institution as its members are elected or appointed from elected 
party members, besides its members are strongly connected to and influenced by the winner party in the 
government. As a result, the power to interpret the constitution can certainly fall down into non-
independent and partisan arm of a government. In addition, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry that 
was given powers to investigate constitutional disputes would be organized by the HF and also expected 
to submit its recommendations to the HF. Making the matter worse the President and the Vice-President 
of the Federal Supreme Court would become a President and Vice-President of the Council respectively. 
As argued above, the PM has a tremendous influence in the appointment of the presidents of the Federal 
Supreme Court, thus he can get a direct influence in the operation of the Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry that could undermine its independence and impartiality. 
 
 
4.2.4 Ambiguities in the constitution 
First, there is ambiguity in the constitution that declares the rights of self-government for every ethnic 
group in Ethiopia, which are amounted to be about 80 ethnic groups, but only nine self-government 
regions were established and the constitution itself create hindrance for materializing the rights for self-
government for other ethnic groups by making very complicated and difficult procedures to request and 
establish self-government.   
 
Second, the constitution did not make or present any convincing explanation to form the nine regional 
states; the criteria are not clear or not consistently applied. No clear explanation was provided for the 
action in compacting the numerous (more than 60) ethnic groups with 12 million people in southern 
Ethiopia in a single regional self-government structure, whereas ethnic groups with lesser population 
and lesser viability with higher ambiguity such as the Harari people were provided a right to exercise 
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their self-governing opportunities in the region where they constitute less than 10 percent of the 
populations.   
 
Third, there is ambiguity concerning the sovereignty power, the constitution (article 8) declares that: 
‘All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia’. This may be 
tantamount to say that individuals or people are not recognized without their ethnic domain which can 
also contradict with the fundaments of human rights provisions of the same constitution which declares: 
‘Human rights and freedoms, emanating from the nature of mankind, are inviolable and inalienable’ 
(Article 10). The constitution itself is a cause for the curtailment of the rights of individual as it upholds 
the sovereignty of groups. It emphasises the precedent of group rights over individual rights, besides 
since the courts are not properly structured and function to enforce the bill of rights, thus this may reflect 
a deficit in the application of the provisions human rights declarations.   
 
Fourth, there is ambiguity regarding what ‘nation, nationality and people’ entails or represents. Very 
fundamental and significant rights, for example, have been granted to every ‘nation, nationality and 
people’, but actual power of executive, legislation and other authorities are granted to the regional states, 
not to the ‘nation, nationality and people’. ‘Nation, nationality and people’ are not the constituting part 
of the federal structure; rather the regional states are the constituting part of the federal arrangement. To 
make an illustration, in the SNNP regional state there are about 60 ‘nation, nationalities and people’, but 
only one regional state that is the constituent part of the federal system.   Since ethnic-groups or 
‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ as a uni-group or multi-group establish the regional states, there is 
clear distinction between the two levels of arrangements that the constitution doesn’t make any attempt 
to make a separation. Rather the constitution gave very ambitious rights to the ethnic groups (or 
‘nations, nationalities and peoples, as named in the constitution) but without making any attempt how 
these rights would be utilized in accordance with the professed federal system of governance. The 
constitutional rights provided to an ethnic group in a uni-ethnic regional state can be directly translated 
into the rights of the regional state, but the issue would become difficult in a multi-ethnic regional state. 
As it was presented in the constitution that the ethnic groups or the ‘nation, nationality and people’ are 
much more focused on their insular interest whereas the regional states are expected to operate beyond 
such insular and affective attachment. However, the ‘nation, nationality and people’ organize and 
control the regional state government. Thus, the regional state’s government structure in multi-ethnic 
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state has become an arena for competition between inward-looking and parochial interests that are 
discernibly solidified by the constitutional pledges. Contrary to many federal arrangements, the 
Ethiopian model gives the right to leave the federal structure to the so-called ‘nations, nationalities and 
people’ (Article 39), but not to the constituting federal states, however, ‘nations, nationalities and 
people’ are not the constituting part of the federal structure (Article 47). 
 
4.2.5 Summary 
Generally, Ethiopian federal system suffers from a concentration of power on the federal executive 
branch. Concentration of power on the federal government executive and particularly on the PM can 
make the federal arrangement close to a dictatorship (Abbink 1998:168). The EPRDF is powerful at all 
level of governance and TPLF is the dominant force in EPRDF. The prime minister, Meles Zenawi, and 
his close allies are dominating the TPLF; therefore this concentration of power in a few elite close the 
PM has made the Ethiopian federal exercise more of a caricature to mask authoritarianism. 
Consequently, the Ethiopian federal system suffers from the principle to limit the power of government, 
independence of judiciary and constitutional governance or constitutionalism. According to Vestal, 
Ethiopia is under a new form of authoritarianism, the ‘subtler tyrannies’ of the post-Cold War World. 
(Vestal 1999:188). The Ethiopian federal system reflects a scanty power of the regional states, the right 
to secede from the federation, absence of independent judiciary, absence of independent constitutional 
interpretation, fiscal power compete concentration on the federal government, superfluous constitutional 
ambiguities and concentration of power on an individual leader. It is a facade federal system, but with a 
caricature to misinform and pervert righteousness.  
 
The constitution shows either mere intentions or a cover for deception. As Paul B. Henze argues that the 
Ethiopian constitution contains glaring contradictions, such as ‘the right to secede’ and ‘federation’, 
which a concern seems to be the security of the regime, rather than the practicability and consequence of 
the constitution (Brietzke 1995: 35). Although democratic and human rights are unconditionally 
promised in the constitution, there is little tolerance for alternatives as those who come into conflict with 
the TPLF/EPRDF are hit just as severely by extra-legal executions, torture and imprisonment without 
trial (Pausewang 2002: 235).  Although the constitution declares that courts shall be independent and 
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judges shall ‘exercise their function in full independence’ and protected from unduly removal, there 
have been many cases in which judges were removed for political reasons (Young 1999: 330). 
 
It is important to give a possible explanation for such grave deficiencies of the 1994 constitution. The 
constitutional defect was the progeny of the defect of the transitional charter that was exclusively 
authored by TPLF/EPRDF with a minor role from other ethnic organizations like OLF (which withdrew 
from the transitional government after a year) but with the exclusion of many pertinent groups and most 
importantly without a genuine and free participation of the Ethiopian people. The transition charter that 
was produced in such flaw process became a code of conduct for the subsequent political process such 
as drafting of the constitution and drawing of the ethnic states. These two important functions were the 
basic foundations of the federal system in Ethiopia, but sadly, both of theses key functions were carried 
out at the process that did not involve a participation and negotiation of all parties that need to be 
considered. Most importantly, the TPLF/EPRDF-controlled transitional government exclusively 
monopolized the constitutional drafting process, as it was stipulated in the Charter that the transitional 
government was responsible to draw up a draft constitution (Article Ten, the Transitional Charter, 
1991). Consequently, the Constitutional drafting commission was established in 1993 and produced a 
discussion booklet, which was discussed in public meetings, international symposium and diplomatic 
missions. But as the whole process was controlled by the EPRDF, no substantive feedbacks were 
included from the public discussion. The key players were constrained from the discussion. The public 
discussion was simply an uninformed and uncritical deliberation that was designed for ‘a perversion of 
education into propaganda’ (Vestal 1999: 91). It was simply an attempt to secure political hegemony of 
the TPLF/EPRDF through a veneer of democracy. As Harbeson argues, ‘since 1991 Ethiopia has 
acquired virtually all the forms of democracy but little of its substance’ (Harbeson 1998: 62). 
  
Consequently, the draft constitution was ratified in 1994 by the constitutional assembly which was 
elected from the people in which EPRDF controlled almost 95 % of the members. The oppositions 
completely boycotted the election. The process starting from assigning the commission to electing the 
constitutional assembly and ratifying the constitution was absolutely dominated by the ruling party. It 
was purely a façade that masked an authoritarian regime (Ibid. p. 66).   
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This signifies the fail of the second (the first was the transitional charter) grand covenant, which could 
have been the very basic foundation of the federal pact. Many groups such as nearly all the opposition 
groups, the civil society movements, and the Ethiopian in Diaspora overwhelmingly rejected the 
Constitution. As a result, the constitution has become the document of the ruling party and its affiliated 
organizations. It was an imposed ‘federal covenant’ on the Ethiopian people without their genuine 
participation and consent. It was implemented in a manner completely dominated by a power at the 
center in collaboration with the co-opted elites at the regional as well as local levels and the unfairly 
privileged very tiny ethnic groups. Thus, the 1994 Ethiopian constitution is denoted as the constitution 
of the TPLF/EPRDF because it only reflects the ideology and wishes of the TPLF-led EPRDF. To 
conclude, I will cite from John Young, a close examiner of and more sympathetic to the TPLF, who 
states: ‘Constitutional making under the EPRDF has little in common with the bargaining, trade-offs, 
and compromises that usually typify such process; rather it reflects the weakness of the country’s 
democratic institutions, the political objectives of the governing party, and its position of dominance 
with a state where serious opposition had been crushed or marginalized (Young 1998: 195).    
 
4.3. Fiscal power and fiscal distribution 
4.3.1 Fiscal distribution and vertical imbalance  
In Ethiopia’s federal arrangement, the fiscal relation is characterised by a high level of imbalance in 
favour of the federal government. Almost every significant internal revenue sources are assigned under 
the jurisdiction of the federal government by making the regional states totally dependent on the federal 
transfers (or a budget subsidy) to carry out their responsibilities and tasks. The October 1992’s 
proclamation (Proclamation 33/92) on revenue sharing between the central government and the regional 
self-governments was the first official or legal document that laid down the, foundation for fiscal 
distribution between the central and regional governments. At the time of the proclamation, in fact, there 
was no de facto or de jure federal arrangement in Ethiopia.  However, later on, the major provisions and 
declarations of the proclamation, with very minor modifications, were incorporated into the 1994 the 
Constitution.  
 
According to the proclamation (Proclamation 33, 1992), the objectives of the revenue sharing were to: 
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• Enable the Central Government and the National/Regional Governments efficiently carry out 
their respective duties and responsibilities;  
• Assist National/Regional Governments develop their regions on their own initiatives;  
• Narrow the existing gap in development and economic growth between regions and;  
• Encourage activities that have common interests to regions  
 
The proclamation explained that the revenue sharing objectives were determined by taking in to account 
principles such as ownership of revenue sources; the national or regional character of the source of 
revenue; convenience of levying and collection of the tax or duty; population, distribution of wealth, and 
standard of development of each regions and; other factors that are basis for integrated and balanced 
economy (Proclamation 33/92) 
 
Similarly, the 1995 Constitution also declares: ‘The Federal Government and the States shall share 
revenue taking the federal arrangement into account’ (Article 95, the 1994 Constitution). Accordingly, 
the Constitution (Article 96) assigns the following power of taxation to the federal government: 
• The Federal Government shall levy and collect custom duties, taxes and other charges on imports 
and exports. 
• It shall levy and collect income tax on employees of the Federal Government and international 
organizations. 
• It shall levy and collect income, profit, sales and excise taxes on enterprises owned by the 
Federal Government. 
• It shall tax the income and winnings of national lotteries and other games of chance. 
• It shall levy and collect taxes on the income of air, rail and sea transport services. 
• It shall levy and collect taxes on income of houses and properties owned by the Federal 
Government; it shall fix rents. 
• It shall determine and collect fees and charges relating to licenses issued and services rendered 
by organs of the Federal Government. 
• It shall levy and collect taxes on monopolies. 
• It shall levy and collect Federal stamp duties. 
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The regional states also have the following power of taxations: 
• States shall levy and collect income taxes on employees of the State and of private enterprises. 
• States shall determine and collect fees for land usufructuary rights. 
• States shall levy and collect taxes on the incomes of private farmers and farmers incorporated in 
cooperative associations. 
• States shall levy and collect profit and sales taxes on individual traders carrying out a business 
within their territory. 
• States shall levy and collect taxes on income from transport services rendered on waters within 
their territory. 
• They shall levy and collect taxes on income derived from private houses and other properties 
within the State. They shall collect rent on houses and other properties they own. 
• States shall levy and collect profit, sales, excise and personal income taxes on income of 
enterprises owned by the States. 
• Consistent with the provisions sub-Article 3 of Article 98, States shall levy and collect taxes on 
income derived from mining operations, and royalties and land rentals on such operations. 
• They shall determine and collect fees and charges relating to licenses issued and services 
rendered by State organs. 
• They shall fix and collect royalty for use of forest resources. 
 
Concurrent powers of taxation are given to the federal and state governments jointly to levy and collect 
taxes on profit, sales, excise and personal income of enterprises they jointly establish; to levy and collect 
taxes jointly on the profits of companies and on dividends due to shareholders; to levy and collect taxes 
jointly on incomes derived from large-scale mining and all petroleum and gas operations, and royalties 
on such operations (Article 98). However, these joint revenue sources are still under the entire control 
and appropriation of the federal government as still there is no agreed procedure for distribution between 
the federal government and the regional governments. Though at present no significant amount is 
generated from such revenue sources, there could be potentials to generate substantial revenues.  
Undesignated powers of taxation would be determined by two-third majority vote in a joint session of 
the HF and HPR (Article 99). Some of the undesignated taxation may include value added taxes, motor 
vehicle taxes, entertainment taxes and the like. In order to promote cooperative relationship between the 
 131  
federal and state governments the constitution prohibits both the States and federal government to ‘levy 
and collect taxes on each other's property unless it is a profit-making enterprise’ (Article 100).  
 
The tax jurisdictions of the federal and regional governments are determined on the bases of tax 
categories. Federal government has an exclusive monopoly over taxes on foreign trade, corporation tax, 
federal stamp duties, taxes on monopolies and tax on income and national lotteries. However, the 
exclusive monopolies of the regions are very minimal and limited to fees for land usufructuary rights 
and royalty for use of forest resources. Taxes on employees’ income, sales, profits, dividends and profits 
from public enterprises owned by the federal government are collected by the federal government, 
whereas the regional governments likewise collect from public enterprises owned by the regions. 
Regional governments are also allowed to collect taxes from income of individuals like farmers and self-
employed individuals.        
 
With regard to private enterprises, regional governments are allowed to collect taxes from income of the 
employees of all private enterprises; sales tax, profits tax and excises from sole proprietorship private 
enterprises and farmers' co-operatives. Profit and dividends from companies, large scale mining income; 
all petroleum and gas operations and royalties on such operations are assigned jointly (Article 98). 
Regional governments are allowed to collect taxes on rental income of properties that are not owned by 
the federal government. However, the tax collection capacities of the regional states are in a very infant 
stage due to poor administrative and accountancy skills in the tax collection activities. Particularly, the 
conditions have been worse in the four disadvantaged regional states: Afar, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz 
and Gambella regional states. Besides, these regions have been in a severe shortfall to utilise public 
finance in a disciplined and efficient manner that could help to enhance the regional capability to 
produce financial resources. In Afar region, for example, ‘economic management went wrong from the 
beginning. Corruption and embezzlement became watchwords of everyday life in the region. What 
funds remained were left idle and the proportion of the capital budget used during 1993 and 1994 was 
well below 30 percent’ (Ali 1998: 113). In Benishangul-Gumuz, ‘few indigenous people have acquired 
an education, and this is proving to be a major impediment to economic progress (Young 1999: 341).  
 
Generally, as it is shown above, the constitutional revenue distribution framework has placed a 
concentration of fiscal power in the hands of the federal government by granting lucrative domestic 
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revenue sources such as total control of taxes on foreign trade (that accounts nearly half of the total tax 
revenue in the country) and two-third of revenue sources from indirect taxes and non-tax revenue 
sources in the countrywide. According to the World Bank estimation from 1993 to 1998, the share of the 
federal government from the aggregate tax revenue in the countrywide was 82 percent in average 
(World Bank, 2000: 26). Besides, the tax system is centrally controlled and standardised by the federal 
government’s Ministry of Finance.  
 
Furthermore, the regions have no authority to negotiate or make agreement to obtain international grant 
or loan, as the constitution grants the power to the federal government to ‘negotiate and ratify 
international agreements’ (Article 51, 8) and the power to decide on borrowing ‘money from domestic 
and external sources’ (Article 77, 4).  Although the constitution (article 51) implies that regional states 
can borrow money from internal sources on conditions and terms determined by the federal government, 
several regions are not borrowing from internal financial institutions. According to the World Bank the 
prevailing opinion in Ethiopia ‘seems to be that sub-national borrowing is not desirable as it is known to 
create major problems in macroeconomic management’ (World Bank 2000: 36). This may be due to 
anticipating irresponsible regional borrowings. In some federal countries like India and Brazil states’ 
borrowings have created unsustainable debt and severe indebtedness of sub-national government. 
Though borrowing has a risk like other business ventures, it has also an opportunity to expand 
production and employment by creating vibrant and enlarging economic activities.  Although the 
regional states are not borrowing for their spending, some regional states are using their annual budget 
as a collateral to farmers’ loan guarantee to banks. This means a guaranteed payback by the regional 
governments if the farmers are unable to repay due to different circumstances. For example in 1996-97, 
the Amhara regional government agreed with a bank to lend farmers 32 million Birr, but only 21 million 
was re-paid by the farmers. The regional government cut woreda budgets by reducing the money 
available for communities to build schools, health posts, and other necessities, thus penalizing the 
communities who were hit by crop failure or other unavoidable reason for default’ (World Bank 2000: 
34).  
 
The vertical imbalance in Ethiopia is higher than many federal systems in developing countries. For 
example, India has a vertical imbalance coefficient of 0.28, Malaysia 0.37, whereas Ethiopia has 0.52 
(Ibid. p. 25). ‘A high level of vertical imbalance also involves some loss of subnational autonomy since 
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expenditures are dependent upon transferred resources or budget subsidy from the federal government 
(Ibid.).  It also diminishes the advantages of responsiveness to local needs, which would normally result 
from decentralized governance (Berhanu 1999: 27). 
 
4.3.2 Horizontal imbalances 
Although the constituent regional states in the federal Ethiopia have different degree of internal revenue 
generating abilities and potentials, due to the federal government’s monopolization of countrywide tax 
and revenue sources, all of the regions have shown severe dependency on the federal transfer. In the 
current fiscal framework, according to the World Bank study, the regional states, with the exception of 
the Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, are classified into four categories: ‘one with ratios consistently 
between 20 and 30 per cent (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP), second of those consistently 
exhibiting ratios below 10 per cent (Benishangul/Gumuz and Gambella), third of consistently declining 
(Somali) and fourth fluctuating (Afar and Harari)’ (World Bank 2000: 26). In case of individual regional 
state, from 1993 to 1998 the regional budgets’ share of internal revenue for the five years average for 
Tigray was 23.6 percent, Amhara 18.6, Oromia 28.4, SNNP 20.4 and Harari 19.4. The better-off two 
city-states, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa covered averagely 76.6 and 60.0 percent respectively. Some of 
the ‘poorer’ regional states like Afar, Somali, Benishangul and Gambella have only covered less than 10 
percent of their respective regional budget through their own internal revenue (Ibid.). If regions were to 
be allowed to control the lion’s share of tax and other revenue sources within their regional state, a few 
regions with higher level of economic activity like Oromia would have self-financed their expenditures 
and other regions such as SNNP and Amhara could have also been in a better position to finance their 
expenditures.  
 
Horizontal imbalance could be a hallmark of ethnic federalism, which is entirely based on 
ethnolinguistic criteria. It is obvious that every region or all elites from every ethnic group could not 
benefit equally from the past development endeavours. In case of Ethiopia elites from few ethnic groups 
like Amhara, Oromo, Tigray, Gurage are relatively in a better or privileged situation, though in different 
degrees, to benefit from the past development efforts such as access to education and other public 
facilities. The difference within these elites is a matter of magnitude and scale. The Amhara elites may 
have been benefited relatively better due to the advantage derived from the Amharic language that has 
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been used as an official language since the middle of the 20th century. As Teshale elucidates that the 
Amharic language was necessary for upward mobility (Teshale 1995: 180). However, the past benefits 
were simply at the elite’s level without corresponding benefit to the Amhara people or region. Rather, 
state’s development programmes and investments were concentrated in a few urban areas and chiefly in 
Addis Ababa. Comparatively, access to state’s development programmes has been very minimal or 
negligible to the people in Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, Somali and other minor ethnic groups 
in southern Ethiopia mainly due to the weak capacity of the Ethiopian state to expand development 
programmes, but it was not a deliberate policy to keep these regions backward or inferior, rather it was 
because of the weak and limited capacity of the overall state-led development programmes in Ethiopia.  
In 1993, for example, 69 percent of the country’s industrial establishment was concentrated in Addis 
Ababa city, followed by 14 per cent in Oromia, and 4 per cent in Amhara (see for the detail table 4.6).  
The Ethiopia’s federalism is a ‘holding together’ federalism, not a ‘coming together’ federalism, thus it 
could create very complex challenges to allow the regional states to monopolies taxes and other revenue 
source in their respective territory due to the concentration of public enterprises and investments in a 
very few regions. Moreover, the public sector has been the largest investor and owner of massive socio-
economic enterprises and infrastructure development in Ethiopia. In 1975, almost all private 
manufacturing enterprises were nationalized by the state. This public property may need to be shared 
equally for the benefits of all of the people of Ethiopia, which therefore may require a control by a 
central authority or the federal government. 
 
Consequently, the vertical fiscal imbalance in Ethiopia is dialectically connected to the horizontal 
imbalances that have emerged because of the ethnic federal arrangement that has created regional 
constituencies based on an ethnolinguistic criterion alone, without considering others factors such as 
economic viability or geographical suitability. The emerged regional states have contained varied levels 
of economic activity and thus extreme disparity in internal revenue capacity. Thus, to offset these 
regional imbalances the federal government has assumed a dominant control (82 percent) of taxes and 
other major revenue sources in the countrywide by hoping to assume as an adjudicator to re-distribute 
available resources in order to reduce horizontal imbalances in revenue and expenditure among the 
regional states. Otherwise, if most of the taxes and revenue sources are left to the regional governments 
there could be a severe horizontal imbalance in budget that could create few wealthy regions, but by 
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putting many of the regions in a precarious financial condition, particularly the fiscal condition of the 
disadvantaged regions would be very fragile.   
 
4.3.3 Budget subsidy and allocation procedure to the regions  
Consequently, the 1992 proclamation on revenue sharing had explicit provisions regarding the 
requirement of the federal subsidies to the regional governments. It recommended that ‘national/regional 
Governments, where deemed appropriate, shall receive subsides from the Central Government’ in order 
to:  
• To promote social services and economic development of the National/Regional Governments  
• To accelerate the development of the hitherto neglected and forgotten areas 
• To narrow-down the gap in per capita income between regions 
• To support projects that will help control negative economic externalities that may be reflected 
from region to region and strengthen projects that provide benefit to neighbouring regions 
• To encourage foreign currency earning projects and other projects of national interests 
(Proclamation 33/92) 
 
The 1994 constitution has also stated that: ‘The Federal Government may grant to States emergency, 
rehabilitation and development assistance and loans, due care being taken that such assistance and loans 
do not hinder the proportionate development of States. The Federal Government shall have the power to 
audit and inspect the proportionate development of States (Article 94. 2). The constitution also assigns a 
power to the HF to determine ‘the subsidies that the federal government may provide to the states’ 
(Article 62, 7).  
 
From the period 1993/94 to 1997/98, all the regional governments combined were able to cover on 
average only 30 percent of their spending from their own internal revenue sources. The remaining 70 
percent was covered through federal transfer or budget subsidy (World Bank 2000: 27).  Federal budget 
subsidy to regional governments is allocated in the form of block grant and the regional states are 
‘allowed’ to determine the distribution and spending based on their development objectives and 
priorities. However, since political power in Ethiopia’s federal and regional structures is monopolized 
through EPRDF’s centralized party command structure, regional states’ policy orientations and 
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decisions in most cases are similar with the federal government’s policy directions and objectives. Thus, 
no major divergence and contradictions have emerged between the federal and regional preferences.              
 
As it is explained in the document prepared by the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation 
(MEDaC) in Ethiopia that: ‘All Regional Governments, including Dire Dawa Administration Council, 
but with the exception of Addis Ababa administration, are unable to fully cover their recurrent budget 
needs from their own revenue sources. Thus, to bridge the fiscal gap, the regional governments are 
reliant on funding from the federal government (MEDaC 2000: 3). The transfer to regional governments 
was started in 1992/93 Ethiopian fiscal year at the transitional period based on requirements of on-going 
projects and approved new projects. Grant allocation formula for capital expenditures was designed in 
1994/95 on the basis of five indexes: population 30%, development index 25%, tax effort 20%, capital 
expenditure in the previous year 15% and area size 10%. For recurrent expenditures the allocation was 
based on administrative structures and own revenues of the regional states (World Bank 2000: 29). In 
1995/96 fiscal year a more simplified formula was designed to allocate a total expenditure envelop for 
the regional states which was based on three equally weighted indexes: population, development index 
and internal revenue effort of the regional states. In 1996/97, a revision was made to reduce the eight 
indicators to five indicators to calculate the development index. The five indicators include number of 
health clinics, number of primary schools, number of telephone lines, electricity consumption and road 
lengths. In 1997/98 the formula was revised again by changing the weight given to the three indexes; 
according to the revision, population index was given 60 percent, development index 25 percent and 
revenue effort index 15 percent. Besides, the development index factor was re-estimated based on six 
indicators that contain education level, health sector indicator, road density, electricity consumption, 
water supply and telephone coverage (Ibid.). Consequently, the share of subsidy entitlement of the nine 
Regional Governments, including Dire Dawa in 1997/98 was presented in table 4.6. There was a 
demand to devise a new formula for the 2005/06-budget year, but because of delays the House of 
Federation approved (with protest) the budget based on the previous formula  
(www.ethiopianreporter.com/displayenglish.php?=2440).    
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Table 4.6 Share of Subsidy entitlements in 1997-98   
Regional 
Government 
 
Budget 
subsidy Share 
(Million birr)  
(percent) 
Share 
from total 
subsidy 
1997/98 
(Percent) 
Per capita 
subsidy 
(In birr) 
Share of 
subsidy to 
regional 
budget 
(Percent) 
Share of 
population 
to total 
population 
(Percent) 
Tigray 255.7  7.8 76.1 76.7 5.8 
Afar 225.8  6.9 199.6 95.6 2.0 
Amhara 725.1  22.2 49.1 81.2 25.7 
Oromia 826.2  25.3 41.3 74.4 35.0 
Somali 282.3  8.6 142.6 87.2 5.8 
Benishangul 161.1 4.9 326.8 95.5 0.9 
 
SNNP 554.1 17.0 50.1 81.5 19.7 
Gambella 126.1 3.9 646.7 95.2 0.3 
Harari 77.0 2.4 534.7 91.9 0.2 
Addis Ababa 00 00 00 00 3.9 
 
Dire Dawa 32.0 1.0 58.6 66.4 0.4 
 
Total 3265.3 100 58.6 85.1 100 
 Source: World Bank, Region Study, 2000, page 26 and 28,  
 Ethiopia UN Country Team, 1999, Common Country Assessment, September      
1999, Addis Ababa,  
Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation 2000, The Federal Budget 
Grant Formula in Ethiopia, March 2000, P.4  
 
The figure in the table 4.6 shows that the Amhara and Oromia regional states appropriate about 60% 
of federal subsidy. However, in terms of per capita both regional states get the lowest shares; these are 
49 and 41 birr respectively, whereas the per capita subsidy in Gambella reaches 646 birr, Harari 534 
birr, Benishangul-Gumuz 326 birr, Afar 199 birr Somali 142 birr Tigray 76.1 birr and Dire Dawa 58.6 
birr. Though Oromia gets the largest amount and share of subsidy, in real terms it gets the lowest share 
as it gets the lowest per capita subsidy share. Compared to share of population, Amhara, Oromia and 
SNNP get less share of subsidy than their share of population, whereas Tigray, Afar, Somali, 
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Benishangul-Gumuz and Harari regional states get more share than their population share, particularly 
Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella get nearly four times greater than their share of population. 
With regard to a share of budget subsidy to the regional budget, Afar, Benishangul, Gambella and 
Harari have shown distressingly the highest dependency that they require more than 90 percent of their 
budget to be covered by federal grants. The trend is also equally gloomy in most of the regional state, 
which require federal transfer to cover nearly 80 percent of their regional budget. 
 
The budget subsidy formula has become a typical budget subsidy formula all through with minor 
modification, in 2000 to encourage regional states to enhance their internal revenue. It was believed 
that the last formula, which has given a population index 60 percent, development index 25 percent 
and revenue effort index 15 percent, would consider equity and some degree of efficiency. However, 
the formula is criticized from different perspectives. Firstly, it is ineffective in pushing regional 
governments to make effort in developing their own revenue sources, to tackle regional imbalances, 
neglect of the size of the regions, settlement pattern and density of population. Secondly, it 
underemphasized the size of the regions, especially many of the ‘neglected’ regions have large land 
area and scattered settlement (low density), and relatively small population, besides their infrastructure 
development is relatively at minimum level. These regions relatively need more infrastructure 
development, but on the contrary, based on the subsidy formula, the magnitude they have got is 
insignificant though the per capita appears very high. Particularly, the smaller population regions like 
Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz region has shown the largest per capita share, but very inadequate 
amount of money in comparison to their actual need. On the other hand, it was also learned that these 
regions were having criticized for inefficient use of the budget allocating to them. A weak human 
resource capacity has resulted in inefficient use of the resources and poor outcomes. According to the 
report by the World Bank that ‘officials in Gambella mentioned that, although money could be 
allocated, it was extremely hard to ensure service delivery staff in school, health clinics in some 
remote regions’ (WB regional study 2000: 13) 
In 2002, a new budget subsidy allocation formula was produced, but the overall structure of the 
previous formula was maintained. The basic indicators used in the new formula and the corresponding 
weight were population size 55 percent, level of poverty 19 percent, level of development/ expenditure 
needs 20 percent, revenue raising effort 11 percent and sectoral output performance 4 percent (Op-cit. 
2000: 22) The basic indicators were divided into 22 sub-indicators, in particular, the level of 
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development or expenditure needs variable was divided into 16 sub-indicators and revenue raising 
effort and sectoral output performance has four indicators. Therefore together with the population and 
level of poverty indicators, the total sub-indicators were 22. The new formula was assumed to reward 
efforts to raise revenue, discourage overspending, address equity and facilitate infrastructure 
development in the so-called neglected regions (op-cit., 2000: 34-35). However, even in the new 
formula, the share of the ‘lagging’ regions was still smaller. Second, there is no precise indicator that 
could discourage overspending. Besides overspending has been the problem of the federal government 
that spend, for example, 7.2 billion for recurrent expenditure in comparing to its total revenue 9.6 
billion in 2001.  
 
Table 4.7 Subsidy share changes 1997 to 2000 
Regional 
States 
 
Share of 
population 
to the total 
population 
(Percent) 
Subsidy 
share 
1997/98 
(Percent) 
Subsidy 
share 
2000 
(Percent) 
Subsidy 
share 
2002 
(Percent) 
Tigray 5.8 7.8 8.26 8.29 
Afar 2.0 6.9 5.43 5.47 
Amhara 25.7 22.2 20.72 21.40  
Oromia 35.0 25.3 27.29 27.96  
Somali 5.8 8.6 8.17 8.12 
Beni- 
shangul 
0.9 
 
4.9 3.92 4.12  
SNNP 19.7 17.0 17.17 17.97  
Gambella 0.3 3.9 3.02 3.16  
Harari 0.2 2.4 1.92 1.54 
Addis 
Ababa 
3.9 
 
00 00 00 
Dire 
Dawa 
0.4 
 
1.0 4.08 1.96 
Source: compiled from the World Bank, Region Study, 2000, page 26 and 28,  
Ethiopia UN Country Team, 1999, Common Country Assessment, September 1999, Addis 
Ababa; Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation 2000, Subsidy, The 
Federal Budget Grant Formula in Ethiopia, March 2000, P.4 
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Since 2003 a system of assigning a block grant directly to the wereda administration was introduced in 
line with the wereda decentralisation programme. In this new system, although the budget subsidy 
calculation is similar, the money in a block grant form is directly granted to the wereda administration 
to make its own decision how to utilise the grant. However, the change was introduced without 
building adequate capacity or institutions at the wereda level. 
 
4.3.4 Shortcomings of the budget subsidy mechanism  
First, budget subsidy to the regions is determined after federal planned expenditure. 
According to the document prepared by MEDaC, (2001: 16) in the existing fiscal framework, the sum 
total of the regional states’ budget subsidy is equal to the total nation wide fiscal sources minus federal 
government’s expenditure needs, or:  
 
Regional States budget subsidy = Total fiscal resource – Federal expenditure needs 
 
This means that the regional states’ budget subsidy is not calculated based on the priority of regional 
state but priority is given to the federal government. This shows supremacy of the federal government, 
rather than considering both levels of government at a relatively equal level.  To show an illustration 
from the 2001 budget year, see table 4.8 below, from the total of 15 billion birr budget of the federal 
government, only 30 percent (or 4.5 billion birr) was transferred to the regional governments. The 
recurrent expenditure took 48 percent, capita expenditure 20 percent and regional subsidy 30 percent 
of the total federal budget. From the total budget, external assistance covered 34 percent and the share 
of external assistance to the capital budget was 60 percent. This means that new infrastructure 
development and major expansion infrastructure programmes were highly dependent on the 
availability of foreign assistance.   
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Table 4.8 The 1994 E.C (or 2001-2002) Federal budget  
For recurrent Expenditure   7,239,400,000 (48%) 
For Capital Expenditure   3,099,708,000 (20%) 
For Subsidy Appropriation to Regions 4,565,109,000 (30%) 
Federal government subsidy to Dire Dawa      87,913,000 
 
Federal Government total   14,992,130,900 
Dire Dawa Council Retained Revenue         20,820,000 
Grand total     15,012,950,900 
 
Revenue Source 
Domestic Revenue    9,644,600,000 (64.6%) 
External Assistance    2,095,411,800 (14%) 
External Loan     3,039,819,100 (20%) 
Total      14,779,830,900 
Domestic Borrowing         212,300,000 (1.4%)   
Total revenue, Assistance &Borrowing 14,992,130,900 
 
Capital Budget Source 
Total Capital budget    3,099,708,900 
From Treasury     1,204,000,000 (38.7%) 
From Assistance    551,908,800 (17.5%) 
From Loan     1,343,800,100 (43.3%) 
Source: Federal Negarit Gazeta no. 38, 5th July, 2001 
 
Although the Negarit Gazeta (No. 38 5th July, 2001) stated that 70 percent of the regional subsidy was 
covered from domestic sources, it was made more for a political gesture in claming that the federal 
government was generous in transferring grants to regional states. However, the actual calculation 
shows that the federal government recurrent and capital budget was 10.2 billion birr while the total 
domestic revenue was 9.6 billion birr, which was deficit of 0.6 billion birr. Thus, the 5.1 billion birr 
budget from the external source was used to cover the regional subsidy (4.5 billion birr) and the 
federal budget deficit (0.6 billion birr). Actually, this reveals that the federal government was not 
redistributing the money that it was collecting from the domestic revenue sources which it had 87 
percent monopoly, rather it used external funding (loan and grant) to transfer grants to the regional 
state. Besides, the federal government used the lion’s share (75 percent) of the domestic revenue (9.6 
billion birr) for its recurrent expenditure (7. 2 billion birr) that consisted of the national defence 3.0 
billion (which was about 40%), public debt about 2 billion, ministerial office (economic services and 
social service) about 1 billion and the rest 1 billion was allocated to organs of the state, justice and 
public order, and general services. In June 2006, a demand was raised by the regions to increase the 
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overall budget subsidy to the regions. The Oromia president requested that the budget subsidy to the 
regions is not adequate for recurrent expenditure in the regions and he demanded that the federal 
budget subsidy to the regions should be increased substantially (Ethiopian Reporter, June 04, 2006).  
 
Table 4.9 Subsidy amount to the regional state in 2001 
Regions  In birr Percentage of the total 
subsidy 
Tigray    371.2 million 8 
Afar    244.7 million 5.3 
Amhara   958.3 million 20 
Oromia   1.252 billion 27 
Somali    363.7 million 7.8 
Benishangul   184.5 million 4 
SNNP   804.5 million 17 
Gambella   141.5 million 3 
Harari   69.1 million  1.5 
Addis Ababa   174.9 million 3.7 
Dire Dawa   87.9 million  1.8 
Source: Federal Negarit Gazta no.38, 5th July, 2001 
      
Second, the subsidy procedure discourages foreign assistance directly to the regions. External 
assistance provided directly to the regional states is considered as a ‘budget offset’ and part of the 
budget subsidy therefore the external assistance amount would be reduced from the budget subsidy to 
the regional states receiving the external assistance. It was argued by the federal government that the 
measure would minimize donors’ unscrupulous unwarranted interventions, to share the available 
resources in accordance with nationwide priorities and to maintain equity among regional states 
budget capacity.  However, it could deter regional governments from seeking external sources to 
finance their development objectives within nationwide policy framework and also gives an exclusive 
power to the federal government to determine the overall direction and modalities of external 
assistance. In situation, in which the impartiality of the federal government is dubious, resentments 
have been widespread in connection with access to the foreign assistance.  Besides, the donors may 
also prefer to choose the beneficiaries and targets of their assistance at the regional or local level rather 
than pouring their assistance to the federal government.   
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Third, one of the most important issue is to determine whether the subsidy is efficiently and effectively 
utilized. Is the subsidy used in a manner to build regional capacities or is it misused and abused for 
political expediencies? Is the subsidy used as an instrument of co-option of elites or is it used to 
promote development? Is the subsidy used to buy cheap and fleeting political support or is it directed 
to bring a long term and substantive change in people’s lives? The subsidy can encourage inefficiency 
and irresponsibility in the way the regional states are utilizing resources, because expenditures are not 
covered by the regional states’ coffer, regional states may not be cautious in spending. As the World 
Bank study revealed that ‘because the costs of public expenditure are not fully internalised by the 
regions and are supported by transfers from other parts of the country, there is a reduced incentive to 
provide public services in an efficient manner’ (World Bank Regional Study 2000: 25). In Afar region, 
for example, it was reported, that during 1993 and 1994 period, less than 30% of the regional state’s 
capital budget was spent on the intended projects, the rest 70% was wasted in corruption and 
embezzlement (Ali, 1998: 113). Besides, huge amount of resources have been spent in office 
constructions (like in Afar), purchase of expensive vehicles and other luxury items, which are not 
directly and immediately related to development programmes. In Afar state, for example, hundreds of 
millions of dollars has been spent to build a new capital city while the nomadic inhabitants of the 
regional state are suffering from chronic shortage of water and veterinary services for their perishing 
livestock wealth, which are the only valuable and dearest asset for the people of the region. Similarly, 
in Assosa, the regional state was spending millions of dollars to build a minor and unessential asphalt 
road in centre of Assosa city while livestock diseases were killing large number of livestock in the 
region due to lack of proper veterinary13.  
 
 Fourth, high dependence on the federal subsidy could erode local legitimacy and weaken local 
accountability, because the regional officials may become more concerned to fulfil and respect the 
demand and command of the federal government that finances their spending. This situation could 
alienate the regional people from the regional power structure. Thus, it could undermine local needs 
and priorities in favour of policies and directions of the federal government, as the federal government 
can impose its policies and priorities because of its total power at all times to allocate resources. By 
and large the federal government is more worried to general countrywide goals and regional priorities 
and needs may not be always parallel to the federal one. This may be essential for common national 
                                                 
13 Base on the author field observation in May 2001      
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objectives, but in a condition in which the federal government is controlled by sectarian interests or 
regional favouritism, federal policies and priorities could become an instrument for such goals. At 
present, because of a complete control of the EPRDF in the federal and regional states, there is a 
discernible sign of centralized predisposition and there seem no noticeable deviations between the 
federal and regional policy orientations and priorities. Such similarities may not be surprising, in 
countries like Ethiopia with a nationwide’s low level of human development achievements, priorities 
could be more or less similar everywhere in the country. However, an extraordinary convergence14 of 
all priorities may also depict an absence of regional autonomy or authentic self-governing practice in 
the regional states.    
 
Fifth, the subsidy formula could be a disincentive to expand local revenue. In the subsidy’s allocation 
formula, the major objective of the internal revenue index was to encourage the regional states to 
develop their own internal revenue bases, but, as it was reported by the World Bank that ‘region’s own 
revenue is deducted from the gross budget subsidy in determining the net transfer’. In such 
mechanism, therefore regions may not be encouraged to increase their internal revenue bases or report 
their collections accurately because it is a disadvantageous as they would lose the equivalent amount 
of money from their subsidy share.   
4.3.5 Summary: The shortcomings of the existing fiscal framework 
The existing fiscal framework has been surrounded by many difficulties. First, the federal government 
spends the lion’s share of the internal revenue for its own recurrent expenditure. As it is shown in table 
4.10, from 1993 to 1998, the annum federal government public expenditure was more than all 
combined public expenditure of the nine regional states’ combined public expenditure.   In 2001, for 
example, the total domestic revenue was 9,6 billion Birr whereas 7.2 billion Birr was allocated to the 
federal government’s recurrent expenditure alone, which was seventy five percent of the internal 
revenue total (Federal Negarit Gazeta No. 38, 5th July, 2001).  
                                                 
14 For instance, in Ethiopia’s PRSP (or SDPRP) in all of the regions priorities are the same: education, health and 
road, and PRSD also shows the same pattern of sub division and budget allocation.  
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Table 4.10: Federal and Regional Shares in Public Expenditure in Ethiopia, 
1993-94 to 1997-98 
Year 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 
Total 
expenditure  
(Million Birr) 
7096.0 
 
 
8373.0 
 
8521.0 9458.0 11483. 0 
Federal share 
(Percent) 
65.6 61.7 58.8 56.5 54.5 
All Regional 
States’ share 
(Percent) 
34.4 38.3 41.2 43.5 45.5 
Source: Adopted from the World Bank’s (2000), Ethiopia Regionalisation Study, Report 
No. 1 8898-ET 
 
Second, due to the contrived character of the ethnic coalition in the federal government and the unfair 
predominance of the TPLF in the federal government, there is a widespread suspicion that huge fiscal 
resource under the federal government could create more opportunity for the Tigrayan political elite to 
transfer more resources to their province. Many suspect that the federal government is not doing in the 
way to create regional balances, rather to keep other regions subordinate to Tigray province in 
economics and politics. Is this a false claim? Tigray’s economic advancement since 1991 has been 
relatively very different from other regions. The Tigray region has acquired very big industrial 
establishments and infrastructures such as Garment factory, Cement factory, Pharmaceutical factory, 
Metal and Engineering firm, International Air Port, prominent universities and colleges. Tigray has 
also shown better results than any other regions in expansion of social services such as education, 
health services, water supply, road services and others. The town of Mekele was transformed from a 
medium size city to a big city, in Ethiopian standard, within one decade. Although cities like Awassa 
and Bahir Dar are also showing progresses, the rate of progress in Tigray is far a head, besides the 
progress in Awassa and Bahir Dar has been mainly related to private investment, whereas Mekele’s 
progress has been mainly connected to public investments, TPLF affiliated NGOs, endowment firms 
and private business such as REST, TDA, EFFORT, Mesfine Engineering and the like which operate 
many millions of dollars. Comparatively, there are no such kinds of mega organizations in other 
regional states. Although the Tigrayan political elite claims that such achievement in Tigray has been 
related to the relatively better efficiency and institutions in Tigray, it becomes very difficult for many 
Ethiopians to believe such claims, as it is well known about the capacity of the Tigray province and 
the ability of the Tigrayan elite. Rather, unconvinced by the claim of Tigrayan political elite many 
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Ethiopians link the relative success in Tigray with the predominant position of TPLF in controlling 
economics and politics in the Ethiopian state. It is not also possible for the Tigrayan political elite to 
prove otherwise. Vestal asks: ‘how did the Front, an armed movement with a narrow social base in a 
devastated area of a poor country, accumulate such capital in a relatively short time?’ (Vestal 1999: 
173). It is a naked truth; TPLF’s dominant political power in Ethiopia’s ethnic federal arrangement is 
the main factor behind such advancement in Tigray province, although the greater benefit has been 
channelled to the few Tigrayan elite who has close ties with the TPLF 
 
Third, in principle, Ethnic federalism means that regions are focusing on maximizing the welfare of 
their kith and kin, therefore very difficult to compromise such preference to ethnic group or ethnic 
constituency. Ethnic preference or ethnic solidarity can always take a zero-sum aspect because 
ascription can make interethnic compromise so difficult in divided societies (Horowitz 1985: 54). 
Nevertheless, currently, because of a power monopolization by the EPRDF from the top at the federal 
government level down to the regional states level, there seems to be a strong party discipline to 
follow and obey a shared national objective, but still with many resistances from regions and ethnic 
constituencies. Thus, it appears that at present Ethiopia is practicing a cooperative federalism due to 
power centralization by the vanguard party through co-option, coercion and deception.  It is difficult to 
claim that such centralization and uniformity would continue for long, because there has been 
resistance against such centralization due to the felt and visible hegemonic position of the Tigrayan 
political elite. Consequently, in the future, as the power of the vanguard EPRDF party diminishes, 
there would be a possibility for the emergence of unhealthy  ‘competitive federalism’ due to the 
existence of ethnically delimited constituencies. 
 
The federal government’s excessive monopoly over the national financial resources could be 
detrimental for a proper function of the federal compact and it could also breed suspicion and 
unhealthy federal-state relation which could be an hindrance for progressing into an health federal 
system in Ethiopia. The current practice of the federal government certainly shapes attitudes and 
induces actions in some regional states or ethnic constituencies that could undermine the credibility of 
the federal systems. It could incite more centrifugal attitudes and demands. Unbiased fiscal framework 
and neutral institution need to be responsible for managing the revenue sharing mechanisms between 
the federal and regional states governments. It is important to establish fair and transparent procedures 
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to determine regional budget subsidy share on the basis of the overall countrywide development 
objectives and also consistent with the federal bargain. Many federal systems such as India, Canada, 
Australia and Nigeria, have variety of methods to determine inter-governmental transfer procedures in 
order to ease wrangling and disputes arise due to doubts and assumptions on revenue distribution and 
allocation procedures.  
  
In a genuine coalition system, the federal government’s appropriation of the largest domestic revenue 
sources may not be a serious problem, as it has been the case in many federal systems. Particularly, 
Ethiopia has exhibited a concentration of the past investments either from public or private sources on 
a few central areas and a few urban centres. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s federal system has been evolving 
out of a centralised structure as ‘a holding together’ process rather than ‘a coming together’ federal 
process; therefore there must be a prudent and fair procedure to equally redistribute the wealth and 
investments that had been resulted from the centralized nation building efforts of the past 
governments. However, it is very vital to craft a fair coalition and representative federal government 
by deflating the TPLF’s unfair predominance and reducing its influence to match its corresponding 
constituency that it is claiming to represent. 
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Chapter Five: Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This empirical chapter focuses on the actual operation of ethnic federalism in Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional state. It is chiefly an empirical investigation based on a field work by aiming to discover 
possible knowledge regarding power and function of state structures, federal-state relations, 
resource control and allocation inter-ethnic and intra ethnic relations, political representation of 
indigenous and non-indigenous groups and trends in the State and peoples interactions.  The 
chapter also attempts to discover how the ordinary people living in these regional states perceive 
the federal arrangement; what they found that are positive or negative in it; what they would like 
to see changed and their overall anticipation regarding the federal process and structures.  
 
5.1 General Background 
The regional state of Benishangul-Gumuz is located in the northwestern part of Ethiopia. It shares 
boundaries in the north and northeast with the regional state of Amhara, in the south and southeast 
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with the regional state of Oromia, and in the west with the Sudan. The total population of the 
regional state in 1998 was estimated to reach half-a-million.  The region has an estimated area size 
of 50,380 square kilometres and density 9-10, persons per sq. km. The altitude in the regional state 
ranges form 550 to 2,500 meters above sea level. Almost 75 percent of the area is classified as 
lowland which is below 1500 meters above sea level. The average annual temperature reaches 
from 20-250C. The annual rainfall amount ranges from 500-1800 mm. 
 
Of the total population of the regional state 92 percent of the population live in rural areas, to a 
large extent in remote and inaccessible areas. Economically active population is estimated to reach 
57% (262,000). Agriculture, which is dominated by farming and cattle breeding, is the chief 
means of livelihood for 93.2 percent of the population. The indigenous communities are living 
sparsely in scattered settlements and practice very primitive agriculture. Other major means of 
livelihood include primitive gold mining, and charcoal and fire wood production. According to a 
report from MEDaC that 47 percent of the regions population is below poverty line in 1995/96 that 
was almost equivalent with the national average i.e. 45 percent.  
 
In respect of social services like education, health and road networks the region is very backward 
but not as such very far from the national standard.  Illiteracy rate in 1994 was 82.1% and primary 
education enrolment was 38 percent, whereas in 2003 primary education enrolment was registered 
90 percent, which is nearly threefold increase within a decade (BoFED 2003: 26). However, the 
region has not yet started primary education in mother tongue and the majority of the non-native 
communities are living in remote and inaccessible areas with very little knowledge of Amharic 
language. A Benishangul informant confirms that primary education in non-mother tongue is very 
problematic for the children to understand the teachings (A member of the regional council, from 
Berta, Interviewee 2 2002:2). It is therefore misleading to take the figure at its face value. The 
gross enrolment figure would not manifest the genuine picture in the ground; it simply tries to 
establish a linear connection between mere enrolment and actual learning or education. Amharic 
language will be a media for instruction in elementary schools for an unforeseeable future due to 
problems and inadequacies associated with difficulties and expenses to train teachers in five of the 
indigenous languages. Health coverage in the region is below 50 percent in 1997 and in 2003 it 
was recorded 54 percent; child mortality reaches 130 (1994-2000), access to safe water and 
sanitation coverage in 1999 are 27 and 19 percent respectively. In 1994 the figure for access to 
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safe water was 18.2, which was very close to the national average and not much lower than the 
four relatively advanced regions-Tigray 21.3, Amhara 21.4, Oromia 22.4, and SNNP 19.2. The 
region’s all-weather road network is very inadequate to interlink major administrative centres. In 
2000 the region has a total of 1784 km of roads and only 546 km is all weather roads. On average, 
50 percent of the regional capital budget is spent on road construction due to extreme 
inaccessibility. Many zonal capitals and woreda centres have no road access to the regional 
capital, Assosa. Zonal capitals and major towns in the northern part of the regional states use the 
long distance road network through Addis Ababa (1500 km) to reach the regional capital city, 
Assosa.  
 
Despite its potentials, the region’s economic activity lacks vitality and diversification; 
manufacturing or industrial activities are non-existing. Essential services like communication, 
banking and hotel services are very limited. But in making comparison with other regions, the 
conditions at the regional state level are not as such extraordinarily exceptional. Even in few cases, 
it is showing better results.  Table 4.2 and 4.3 in Chapter 4 depicts the overall picture.  However, 
the situation is certainly different and more terrible among the indigenous communities. A 
Benishangul informant holds that ‘most of the facilities were for the settlers or ‘mette15‘ people or 
‘outsiders. Assosa hospital gave more service to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army’s (SPLA) 
soldiers and others than the indigenous people’ (A member of the regional executive from Berta, 
Interviewee 6 2002:6). 
 
The region has an immense potential for agricultural development and cattle rearing. Nevertheless, 
the traditional agricultural practice is relatively very backward, meaning very weak in utilization 
of tools system and usage of relatively better practices. The indigenous communities use very light 
tools like wood and hoe, they do not have tradition of animal-plough agriculture, as it has been 
common in the rest of Ethiopia. Critical shortages of agricultural experts and extension service 
agents have been a big snag to improve the impoverished agricultural activities in the region. 
Animal diseases such as tsetse fly are major impediment for cattle raising activities. Vet services 
and other improved technologies are virtually non-existent due to the region’s unattractiveness for 
                                                 
15 Mette is an Amharic word used to denote non-natives. But its usage is very controversial, because it has been used 
to discriminate many people based on their ethnic background regardless of their residence time span. Many people 
who have lived for many generations in the regional state are considered ‘outsiders’ because of their ethnic difference 
with the so-called indigenous communities.     
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skilled manpower and professionals and also non-conducive conditions of sparsely scattered tiny 
villages in remote areas. 
 
Other livelihood options are not widely and adequately available. Commercial activities have been 
declining in the region. The traditional market outlet of the region is to neighbouring Sudan, but 
the road has been blocked due to war in Sudan, but, of course, more affected by the changing 
circumstances of relation between Ethiopia and Sudan as well. Almost all interviewees16 from 
Assosa town expressed that the closure of the boarder with Sudan has negatively affected business 
activities in Assosa and surrounding rural areas including Oromia areas. The region is very near to 
the conflict-ragged territory of southern Sudan and close to the military bases and operations of the 
SPLA and Oromo liberation front (OLF), therefore it has suffered from undying conflicts and easy 
accessibility of all sorts of weaponry that become hindrance for durable tranquillity and sustaining 
of the trading links with the neighbouring Sudan. Cereals, coffee, cattle and the likes used to be 
sent to Sudan and in turn clothes, electronics and other finished products were used to be traded in. 
(A leader of an Eder, Interviewee 10 2002:13; A leader of an Eder, Interviewee 11 2002:14; A 
civil servant from Berta, Interviewee 12 2002:17; An elder from Berta, Interviewee 13 2002:20).  
 
Generally, the Benishangul-Gumuz area has been characterized by higher shortage of competent 
civil servants, higher economic underdevelopment, immature political development, inadequate 
basic services and infrastructures. However, the region’s socio-economic indicators are not as such 
very different from the overall countrywide low standards of socio-economic development of 
Ethiopia. (See table 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 in Chapter 4). Nevertheless, the condition of the indigenous 
communities is worse.  
 
The region has a huge fertile land area with abundant water resources to develop advanced 
agricultural production systems that could set a promising economic development trajectory in the 
region. From the total of cultivable land, only 26.1% is covered by permanent crop and the 
irrigable area is estimated to reach one million hectares (BoFED 2003: 21). It has a potential to 
                                                 
16 However a Benishangul informant disclosed that the closure of the boarder area is ‘a blessing in disguise’, because 
there used to be sizeable migration to Sudan among the youngsters, when ever they quarrel with their father, the 
youngsters quickly take the option to migrate to Sudan. Now, because of the closure of the boarder to Sudan, 
migration to Sudan is very less and instead the youngsters are obliged to go to school.  Civil service graduate from 
Berta, Interviewee 12 2002: 17) 
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provide surplus agricultural products such as oil seeds to national and external markets like to 
Sudan.     
 
The region has not been much affected by drought and famine. Major river basins like Blue Nile 
and Baro Akobo are found in the region. Its vast and very suitably irrigable Metekel area is located 
close to the huge water reserves of the famous Lake Tana. The abundant water resources of the 
region can also be used for hydroelectric power, which a significant potential was estimated to 
reach about 150 MW. 
      
The region is rich in mining resources like gold, copper, zinc, base metal and marble resources 
(BoFED 2003: 21). Gold mining potentials have attracted foreign companies like Golden Star and 
St Genevieve to undertake studies to determine potentials17. Traditional gold mining activity are 
giving a livelihood for about 10 percent of the population, though it has not been recognized in the 
official or formally registered to be taxable. Marble production has also considerable potential. 
Medrock Ethiopia owns the major marble mining fields in the regional state18. Capacity for more 
gum production is also available.   
       
Regional Revenue collection ability was improved from 3.5 million in 1996 to 20 million in 2004 
whereas the regional budget in 2004 was 200 million. In 2003 the regional government collected 
about 20.2 million, its budget was 261 million and its expenditure was 224 million. (BoFED 2003: 
39).  
 
Its internal revenue amount is very abysmal, as it could not cover more than 10 percent of its 
budget. Neither adequate tax collecting capacities are in place, nor tax paying traditions are well 
established. Meheret affirms that the regional state has an acute shortage of adequately trained 
personnel in management, accounting and revenue collection and administration, basic budgeting 
and service delivery skills (Meheret 2001: xii). As a result, the region has been highly dependent 
on the federal government to finance about 90 percent of its expenditure. In addition, as about half 
of the populations of the regional state are below poverty line and diversified livelihood activities 
                                                 
17 According to Young (Young 1999: 340), both companies left the region in 1997. Golden Star was accused by the 
regional government that it had been infiltrated by the OLF  
 
18 Taxes and other revenues derive from the marble mining is controlled by the federal government…    
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and business enterprises are very negligible, the prospect for raising significant tax revenue is not 
promising at the moment.   
 
5.2 Ethnic composition and relations 
According to the 1994 population census, the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state has an estimated 
population of 460,459 of which Benishangul ethnic group (Berta19) accounts 26.7%, Gumuz 
23.4%, Amhara 22.2%, Oromo 12.8%, Shinasha 6.9%, Agew 3.8%, Mao 0.6%, Komo 0.2% and 
others 4%. Benishangul and Gumuz account 50% of the population. Non-native ethnic 
communities account about 44 % of the population of the regions.  Islam and Orthodox Christian 
are the major religion in the area that accounts 44% and 34.8% respectively and traditional 
religion accounts 13.1%, protestant 5.9%, and other 2.1%. The indigenous ethnic groups- 
Benishangul, Gumuz people and Komo people- belong into the Nilo-Saharan20 language group 
and Mao people belong to the Omotic stocks (Hudson 2005). Benishangul and Gumuz have also 
been exposed to Arabic and Islamic influences from Sudan and Egypt due to Turco-Egyptian and 
Mahdist incursions into their areas (Baihru Zewde 1991: 05). Thus, Benishangul communities 
predominantly practice Islam, whereas Gumuz follow Christianity and traditional religion and 
Shinasha mainly practice Christianity. Mao and Komo mostly practice traditional faiths.   
                                                 
19 There is a difference within Benishangul people about the name and identity of the ethnic group: Benishangul is the 
name of a stone, Berta is the name of the people, but those who had Arab influence do not like the name Berta, 
because in Arabic Berta means slave, therefore they prefer Benishangul. They argue that the name Berta designated to 
those who didn’t mix with others, but now the ethnic group is mixed therefore Benishangul is better.    
 
20 According to Encyclopedia Britannica the Nilo-Saharan languages are presumed to be descended from a 
common ancestral language and, therefore, to be genetically related. The family covers major areas east 
and north of Lake Victoria in East Africa and extends westward as far as the Niger valley in Mali, West 
Africa. The Afro-Asiatic group is the main language family of northern Africa and the Middle East and 
includes such languages as Arabic, Hebrew, Amharic, and Hausa.  
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Table 5.1 Ethnic composition (1996 CSO) (Census 1994) 
Ethnic group Total population Percent of the 
region population 
Percent of the 
total population of 
Ethiopian  
Benishangul 
(Benishangul) 
122,900 26.7% 0.22 
Gumuz  107,500 23.4% 0.19 
Amhara 102,200 22.2%  
Oromo 58,900 12.8%  
Shinasha 32,200 7.0% 0.05 
Agew 14,200 3.1%  
Mao 2800 0.6% 0.005 
Komo 920 0.2% 0.002 
Others 18,4000 4%  
Total Regional 460,459 100 0.86 
 
The other indigenous community, the Shinasha (Boro21) people seem to belong to an Omotic 
speaking group of the historical Gonga population who once lived on both sides of the Blue Nile 
that have absorbed the cultural impacts of Islam and Christianity in their development of a unique 
amalgamation of cultural trait (Tsega 2005). The present Shinasha ethnic communities are a 
leftover from the larger Shinasha community who had lost their ethnic identity by subsuming into 
the neighbouring Amharic, Agaw and Oromo speaking groups due to the sixteenth century’s major 
population movements in the area.  
 
According to Gumuz and Benishangul informants that Shinasha people are relatively better 
educated than the five indigenous communities. But due to their minority status in the region it 
becomes difficult to utilize their expertise adequately as the ethnic arrangement requires allocation 
of offices based on ethnic quota. The major key offices are held by either Gumuz or Benishangul 
elites because of their population share (A regional official from Gumuz, Interviewee 1, 2002: 1) 
A Shinasha informant has also complained that there was error in the 1994 census, otherwise the 
population of Shinasha would be more than 32, 000 (A council member from Shinasha, 
Interviewee 3 2002: 2).   
    
All the five indigenous communities have their own language, but they use Amharic language as 
official language in the regional administration, education and other related activities. There is a 
                                                 
21 Boro is the group’s self name widely in use after 1991. According to oral traditions Boro is believed to be their 
original ancestral father and they would like to be called after him (Tsega 2005). 
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plan and research to use the indigenous languages in education and local administration. An 
informant argues that since the constitution affirms the rights of every ethnic group to develop its 
own language, there is strong enthusiasm from every ethnic group in the regional state to develop 
and use its own language in education and local administration (A council member from Shinasha, 
Interviewee 3 2002: 03). In September 2004, it was announced that alphabets preparation was 
finalised of the three languages and accordingly Latin alphabets were prepared for the Benishangul 
and Shinasha languages, whereas Ethiopic alphabets were prepared for the Gumuz languages. In 
February 2005, Berta language was introduced as medium of instruction in education in selected 
pilot woredas22.    
 
In the past, despite living in adjacent territories, there was no significant interaction and mix 
among the five indigenous communities. However, the new regional state has enclosed the five 
ethnic groups in one political space to create a coalition government of the five ethnic 
communities. According to an informant that the general belief was that since all of the five ethnic 
groups belong to the disadvantaged and oppressed communities’ category, it would be appropriate 
and convenient to create a single political space that would be shared by the five ethnic groups in 
fraternal and amiable temperament. However, power competition and political expediency could 
quickly rupture apolitical assumptions and bend and twist moral aspirations.  
 
5.3 History and Evolution of the regional liberation movement 
 
Benishangul and Gumuz areas were incorporated into Menelik reign in 1897 but retaining some 
degree of autonomy by paying a fixed annual tribute to Menelik (Bahiru 1991:87). The area was 
ruled by sheikhdoms of Khomosha and Bela Shangul (or Beni Shangul) and Aqoldi (Assosa area) 
that grew out of the imposition of an Arabic-speaking mercantile aristocracy of Sudanese origin on 
the indigenous inhabitants, the Bert23. According to Baihru Zewde, ‘this ruling class was 
                                                 
22 It was reported in a government controlled mass media, Walta Information Centre in February 8, 2005 and 
September 11, 2004.  
23 This could be the reason for the controversy to name the ethnic group-Berta or Benishangul. Berta mean a ‘slave’ 
and Benishangul mean a ‘rock’. The indigenous was considered as slave by the aristocracy in the area, who were 
descendants from Arabs. The elite are convinced that the name, Benishangul is better. 
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superimposed over an earlier aristocracy of Funji origin, or at least association with the Funji, 
from the Kingdom of Sennar in Sudan’ Bahiru Zewde (1991: 19).      
 
In Gumuz area also ‘a similar process of superimposition was duplicated on the other side of the 
Abay or Blue Nile, and led to the rise of the sheikdom of Gubba, on the Gumuz-inhabited western 
fringes of Gojjam. By virtue of their Sudanese origin, all these sheikdoms were Muslims and 
fostered the propagation of Islam in the region.’ Baihru 1991: 19). The Mahdist penetration in the 
area was facilitated by Islam and trans-frontier trade. Before the Mahdist incursions, the area was 
under Egyptian dominance that had exercised annual tax-gathering raids. According to Wendy 
James ‘the Turco-Egyptian occupation of the Sudan led to more vigorous, even exploitative gold-
seeking, trading and slaving in the Ethiopian foothills…and Inzing (later to become the town we 
know as Assosa) was inhabited by several Arab traders notorious for slaving (James 2002: 260). 
The collapse of Mahidist rule in the region induced Menelik to (re) incorporate the sheikdoms of 
Bela Shangul (Beni Shangul), Agoldi (Assosa) and Khomosha in 1897 by launching an 
expeditionary force led by Ras Meonnen accompanied by Dajjache Jotte and Dajjach Dames of 
Wellega (Bahiru 1991: 66).  
 
Harold Marcus also wrote that between 1896 to 1897, the European threat to the Ethiopian 
periphery worried Menelik enough to order Ras Makonnen westwards into Beni (or Bela) Shangul 
country’ (Marcus 2002: 105). Lapisso (1983: 286) also explains that at the time of the battle of 
Adwa, Menelik ordered Dajjache Jotte, Oromo nobility from Wellega, to watch over the 
Benishangul area. Therefore, after his victory in Adwa over the Italian colonial ambition in 1896, 
Menelik extended his control to incorporate the Benishangul Gumuz to block the British colonial 
expansion in the area24.      
  
There was resistance from the regional sheikhs against the incorporation but they failed to 
establish a successful united resistance front. Though the regional sheiks’ resistance was broken 
by military force, Menelik restored the three Muslim leaders to their regions after a period of 
confinement. Menelik designated ‘Abd al-Rahman Khojale (of Beni Shangul) and Muhammad 
                                                 
24 If the area was not incorporated by Menelik, British Colonialism could have included it in its colonial territory in 
the Sudan, and could be part of the disadvantaged Southern Sudanese communities in the Sudanese state dominated by 
the Northerners.  
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Wad-Mahmud (of Khomosha) with the titles of dajjazmach and fitawrari respectively; Khojale al-
Hasan (of Assosa) with the traditional title of sheikh, which he wished to maintain.’ (Bahru 1991: 
67)   
 
At the time of fascist occupation of Ethiopia from 1936 to 1941, the Oromo nobilities from 
Wellega area who wanted to control the rich caravan trade link of Assosa to Sudan, had ousted 
Sheik Khojale from Benishangul area and briefly ended the indigenous or self rule status of the 
area. Though the Emperor Haile Selassie’s restoration to power in 1941 following the end of 
Italian occupation of Ethiopia had created another opportunity for Sheik Khojale family to regain 
control of the area, the highly centralized administrative structure put in place following the 
restoration of the king did not allow the same level of autonomy for the Sheik Khojale rule of the 
province as it was the case before. To the worst, the absolutist and highly centralization policy of 
the king had replaced the local rulers by centrally appointed nobilities and subordinately included 
the Benishangul area under the administrative jurisdiction of the neighbouring Wellega province.    
 
The military government in its final years in late 1980s mapped out a new administrative 
boundaries and policies throughout the country in order to deflect demands for self-administration 
and secessions due to the intensified armed liberation movements in Eritrea, Tigray and other parts 
of the country which had seriously challenged and threatened its authority. Following the new 
administrative policy shift of the military government, the Benishangul area had got its own 
administrative jurisdiction under the name of Assosa Administration Area in which very few 
indigenous individuals were included in the area’s administration.    
 
In general, it can be argued that the indigenous people of the Benishangul Gumuz area were not 
part of the leadership of the modern administrative bureaucracy of the Ethiopian state following 
the centralization of power by Emperor Haile Selassie since 1940s. The 1980s administrative 
reform of the military regime was able in including few indigenous individuals25 in the 
administrative power structure but without changing the highly centralized power relation to the 
centralized military authority. However, the patterns of political control and suppression were 
similar with the situation in most parts of the country which was characterized by absence of local 
                                                 
25 It may be not more than three individuals, according to information collected from Sheik Khojale family and 
member of the Derg’s administrative structure.  
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decision-making and regional administration. Apart from that, as an informant from Gumuz 
claims, ‘in the past the rulers were Amharas and Oromos, they were not from us’ (An Elder from 
Berta, Interviewee 7 2002: 8). 
  
Political oppositions against the central military authority was started in 1970 in Benishangul area 
through the support of the government of Sudan by reciprocating the military government’s 
support of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (Young 1999: 325). According to a 
Benishangul informant that other liberation movements like TPLF, EPLF and OLF which had 
operated in Sudan played a significant role in inspiring and encouraging dissent against the central 
military authority in Benishangul area (A civil servant from Berta, Interviewee 12 2002:16). 
Particularly, relationship with TPLF and EPLF in Sudan was more successful in catalysing 
Benishangul’s dissent against the Derg (A council member from Berta, Interviewee 2 2002:2). 
 
The Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM) was established in Sudan by 
Benishangul elites with few memberships from the Gumuz group in late 1980s. Wendy James 
explains that the first anti-Derg movement in western Ethiopia, Jebhah al Wataniyya, which later 
became the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movements (BPLM) was established by Khedir 
Ahmed Zayd, the first Derg cadre-appointed administrator of Assosa, who was dissatisfied and 
fled to the Sudan (James 2002: 265). According to an elder informant that the action and policy of 
Derg in imprisoning the local nobility, who were officially recognised by the preceding Ethiopian 
Kings- Menelik and Haile Selassie -, was the major factor in fomenting local dissidents and 
resentments in the area (An Elder from Berta, Interviewee 7 2002: 9).        
 
In Sudan, it became possible for the BPLM to get material and other support from similar 
liberation movements like the TPLF, EPLF and OLF. Particularly, close relations with TPLF and 
EPLF since 1988 was very essential in developing military and political capacity of the BPLM. It 
was also very instrumental afterward to give them legitimacy in the post-Derg TPLF dominated 
government that was formed by the TPLF/EPRDF in 1991 (A council member from Shinasha, 
Interviewee 3 2002: 3). 
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5.4 The regional state structure 
5.4.1 Administrative structures  
The Benishangul-Gumuz regional state is subdivided into 3 zones, 2 special woredas, 20 woredas 
and 474 kebeles and the governance framework is organized into four-tier hierarchically structured 
administrative units, these are: regional government, zonal (or special wereda) administration, 
wereda administration and kebele administration.  
 
At the regional government level, the highest and supreme political and administrative power of 
the regional state is concentrated at the top on the regional government, which is headed by a chief 
executive or a regional state president who is elected by the regional legislative body that is called 
a regional council. The regional council is organized to assume as a supreme legislative body of 
the regional state. The regional government’s executive body is established by the regional 
president with the approval of the regional council. Regional legislative power is apparently 
concentrated on the regional council, which is directly elected by the people. However, the actual 
operation does not coincide with the constitutional decrees and intentions. The regional executive 
branch, particularly the regional president has a supreme administrative power in the regional 
state.  
 
The highest judicial power of the regional state is residing on the Supreme Court of the regional 
state. The region has a total of 24 courts that consist of a Supreme Court, three zonal courts and 
twenty woreda courts. There are also 2 Sharia courts and 424 social courts at the village level. 
However, the judicial power is entirely limited into apolitical cases, except in cases which the 
politicians and government officials are using it as a tool for political purposes like imprisoning 
opponents. It rarely occurred in the activities of the judiciary in Ethiopia to protect the right of the 
citizens against the state’s encroachment. It is very difficult to find a single case that the judiciary 
in Ethiopia is interfering to protect a rights of a citizen against the state officials. In most cases the 
judiciary is used by the government officials to legitimacy their action against the citizens26.  
   
                                                 
26 To cite a case that in February 2001, a journalist in Addis Ababa was arrested and taken to Assosa, a capital of the 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, by security police from Benishangul-Gumuz region who had a district court 
warrant from the region as instructed by the regional president. 
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At zonal level, three zonal administrations are set up in Assosa, Kamashi and Metekel zones on 
the basis of ethnic designation, and therefore viewed as self-governing structures for the respective 
indigenous ethnic communities residing in the area, however in all of the three zones a 
considerable size of non-indigenous communities are residing and their political rights of 
representation are violated. For instance, the Assosa zone administration is considered as a self-
governing unit for the Benishangul ethnic group, but the Benishangul people accounts only 57 
percent of the total zonal population. In such case about 43 percent of the zonal population is not 
represented in the zonal administration. The picture is the same in the other two zonal 
administrations in Metekel and Kamashi zones, which are designated for the Gumuz people in 
which the Gumuz community accounts 77 percent in Metekel zone and 33 percent in Kamashi 
zone of the total populations of the zones. No directly elected political body does exist in zonal 
administration; rather it is established by the regional government for administrative convenience 
to serve as a branch office or intermediary for the regional bureaus to coordinate and follow-up 
services and tasks in the woredas under its jurisdiction. The regional government is responsible for 
appointing the members of the zonal administrations which consists of heads of various line 
offices and departments that are counterpart to the regional bureaus.     
 
 
Two special wereda administrative structures are organised for Amhara settlers in Pawe area and 
for Mao and Komo indigenous communities in Tongo area in order to provide them a self-
administrative unit. Their political and administrative hierarchies and importance are similar with 
zonal administrations, but they are designated as a special woreda because of their small size of 
population. Special woreda administrative structure is designed for those small-sized ethnic 
communities living intact in specific territory that deserves to establish their own administrative 
unit and directly communicate with the regional government without any zonal intermediary.     
 
There are about 20 woreda administrations that have their own directly elected woreda councils 
and a chief administrator elected by the respective wereda council among its members. The 
woreda council is the highest political power in the woreda administration, but putting aside the 
discourse of local power, its major responsibility does not go beyond enforcing laws and policies 
issued by the regional state and zonal councils. It is also responsible for managing social services 
and implementing local development activities; collecting government revenues and taxes, and 
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securing peace and order in the woreda through direct control of the kebele administrations which 
constitutes the lowest state structure in the federal government administrative hierarchy. It is 
relatively overburdened and under-resourced administrative structure despite its relative closeness 
to the people compared to the regional and zonal administrative structures. It is seldom endowed 
with professionals and expertise to plan, manage and monitor socio-economic development 
activities in its woreda jurisdictions. For example, due to extreme shortage of trained manpower in 
the regional state, the education, health and agriculture bureaus in the weredas are merged into one 
to form the ‘economic development and social service office (BoPED 2000).   
 
Though the woreda administration is elected by the people, it is more responsible and accountable 
for the higher authorities in the zonal and regional administration, which have potent political and 
financial power to seriously impact it. In the recent (2004) ‘Woreda decentralisation’ programme, 
it is believed that the woreda administration would be the most important unit of sub national full-
time governance structure. However, at the time of my field work in 2002 and in the subsequent 
two years the ‘Woreda decentralisation’ initiatives was not implemented. It is beyond the scope of 
this study to consider the process.    
 
At Kebele level, there are about 474 kebele administrations which are directly elected by the 
kebele to run political and administrative activities in the kebele area. It is the lowest 
administrative structure in the regional state administrative hierarchy, but has a very instrumental 
role for imposition of state control on the local communities. It usually has an elected council and 
chief administrator who are working on part-time base. As Meheret (2001: 03) observed that the 
kebele officials, for example, in Assosa town ‘do not receive incentives and hence they are not 
committed and motivated to provide effective and efficient service to the residents’. A paradox is 
that a kebele administration is the only administrative body that has a direct contact with the 
people at the local level, but without providing adequate service to the people. However it solely 
plays a role to impose the state authority and control on the local people without upward 
channelling local people’s interest and demand. It is structurally deficient to give power to the 
local people, as it does not have a mechanism to voice and advance local people’s demands and 
aspirations to upward power hierarchy.  
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Nevertheless, it has a tremendous and crucial role to ascertain and entrench the power of the 
higher authorities on the local people as it controls the local people. In urban areas it provides 
controlling services such as registration and issuing identity card, providing verification and 
confirmations tasks to the dwellers, forcing the people to attend kebele general meetings, 
distributing relief and other essential goods. In rural area, the kebele (peasant) administration is an 
effective arm of the higher authority by controlling the peasantry through land redistribution, 
collecting taxes, distributing fertiliser, collecting debts from the peasants, distributing relief and 
other security duties liking detaining, arresting or punishing the peasants. In rural areas, the 
peasant administration is everything: it is an administrator, a court, and a police.    
 
5.4.2 The regional legislative and executive powers   
The regional council, which is the supreme political body and the higher legislative body of the 
regional government, has 80 members who are directly elected by the people of each woreda. Each 
woreda, regardless of the size of its population number sends 4 individuals to the council 
uniformly. Except for independent candidates, who are of course very few, the majority of the 
candidates are nominated by the parties. In the ethnic mix woreda, the representation is based on 
share of population size of the indigenous communities, but it disregards the non-indigenous 
population.  
 
The regional council holds two sessions annually. Its main power and function include enacting 
various laws, establish administrative hierarchies, elect chief executive (or president) of the 
regional state approval of the regional government budget, approve executive nominees, debates 
and endorses regional bureaus reports (Article 29, The Constitution of BGRS, 2002). However, 
there is a peculiar kind of a nucleus called ‘the state’s council cabinet members’ created by 
members of the council who are also members of the regional executive. In reality, the state’s 
council cabinet members’ assembly, which is a blend of regional legislative and executive bodies, 
takes over the responsibility and functions of the regional legislative council27. The council 
members have no salary for their appointment in the council; however most of the members are 
                                                 
27 For example in December 2002, it was reported that the appointments of heads of bureaus, commissions and offices 
in the regional state was approved by ‘the state’s council cabinet members’, not by the regional council (Ethiopia 
News Agency, December 12, 2002). The regional council had only nine sessions in the ten years time of its operation, 
from 1995 to 2005. Walta Information Center, September 21, 2005.  
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hired in various offices of the regional government’s administrative and political offices in 
regional, zonal and woreda levels (A council member from Shinasha, Interviewee 3 2002: 4). As a 
result, the legislature overlaps with the executive branch and bureaucracy of the regional 
government.   
 
The Benishangul elite are unhappy regarding the representation procedure in the regional council 
and the issue has created serious tension within the regional government. For them, using woreda 
as a basis for seat allocation does not create proportional representation in the council, rather the 
preferred seat allocation should be based on population size which is in accordance with the 
constitution of the country (A Berta official, Interviewee 9 2002: 12). They repeatedly demanded 
the federal government to revise the representation procedure but it was not resolved still (A 
member of the regional executive from Berta, Interviewee 6 2002: 7). They also requested to 
establish their own legislative council at zonal level that could exercise major political and 
administrative functions like appointing zonal and wereda officials, controlling budget and other 
similar activities in their ethnically delimited zonal administration (A member of zonal executive 
from Berta, Interviewee 8 2002: 10). Although it was allowed in the revised constitution of the 
regional state in December 2002, to establish the nationality council for each ethnic group as the 
supreme political power of the respective ethnic group, the council of the nationalities is 
accountable to the regional council (Article 74, The Constitution of BGRS 2001).      
 
Close examination of the representation process evidently reveal that the procedure certainly 
disfavours more populous woredas and indeed, it has created a distorted representation in the 
regional legislative council. For example, according to the 1994 population census the total 
population of Benishangul-Gumuz was estimated 460, 459 and the Assosa zone (the delimited 
homeland of Benishangul ethnic group) has 194,084 population and 7 woredas and therefore it has 
been represented by 28 seats in the regional council, while Kamashi zone (the delimited home land 
of Gumuz ethnic group) has 50,783 population and 5 woredas and therefore it has been 
represented by 20 seats in the council. This means that per capita representation in Assosa Zone is 
6931, whereas in Kamashi 2539 by taking into the total population, but since the non-indigenous 
communities are excluded from the representation, the per capita figure will be different for the 
indigenous population. In Assosa zone, Benishangul accounts 57 percent, Amhara 26 percent and 
Oromo 11 percent of the population of the zone. In Kamashi zone, Gumuz accounts 77 percent, 
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Amhara 17 percent and Berta 4 percent of the zonal population (BoPED 2000). To show it more 
clearly, Assosa woreda has 73,000 people, but only got 4 seats in the regional council, because it is 
one woreda, whereas Kamasi zone which has 50, 783 people and four woredas has 20 seat in the 
council; meaning 73, 000 people of Assosa woreda have 4 representatives in the regional 
legislative councils whereas 50,783 people of Kamashi zone have 20 representatives in the same 
council, simply because they have more woredas.  
 
Many Benishangul informants claimed that this unfair representation was deliberately designed by 
the EPRDF to weaken Benishangul’s group influence in the regional state structure. They believed 
that the EPRDF prefers Gumuz ethic groups, which had insignificant contribution in the armed 
struggle or political movement against the Derg. The EPRDF would have worried that the 
Benishangul elite who have more experience in armed struggle and political movements might not 
become easily submissive to its hegemonic ambition (A member of zonal executive from Berta, 
Interviewee 8 2002: 10; An Elder from Berta, Interviewee 7 2002: 9; A member of the regional 
executive from Berta, Interviewee 6 2002: 7). However, Gumuz and Shinasha informants claim 
that the procedure was designed to block the hegemonic tendency of the Benishangul elite in the 
regional state (A council member from Shinasha, Interviewee 3 2002: 2; A regional official from 
Gumuz, Interviewee 1, 2002: 1). 
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Table 5.2 Seat allocations in the regional council among the five indigenous ethnic 
groups 
 Existing number 
of Seats in 
regional council 
Percentage of 
population 
Seat allocation 
on indigenous 
criteria should 
be 
Fair allocation 
of seats 
should be 
Benishangul 28  26.7 34 20 
Gumuz and 
Shinasha………. 
44 (for both of 
them) 
………………… 
23.4 
6.9 
29 
9 
18 
6 
Mao 4  0.6 4 1 
Komo 4  0.2 4 1 
Amhara 0 22.2  18 
Oromo 0 12.2  10 
Others 0 7.8  6 
Total 80 100 80 80 
Source: Calculated based on information from the census and interviews 
 
As table 5.2, above shows that seats allocation in the state council was highly in disservice of the 
Benishangul ethnic group and the non-indigenous communities. First, the Benishangul people should get 
at least 34 seats in the council based on its quota of the indigenous population of the regional state. A 
great favour was done to Gumuz and Shinasha ethnic group by granting them 6 more seats than their 
actual share of indigenous population. Eight seats were allocated to the two minority ethnic groups, 
apparently by reducing seats from Benishangul people. Rather it should have been reduced from all of 
the three indigenous group- Benishangul, Gumuz and Shinasha- in the manner that it would not affect 
the balance of their representation in the council. It can be done proportionally and fairly by subtracting 
three seats from each Benishangul and Gumuz and two seats from Shinasha without affecting the power 
balance in the legislative council. Or otherwise, additional seats could be allowed to the two minority 
indigenous groups regardless of their very small population size.  
 
The problem was aroused because of the on-going peculiar criterion that used woreda demarcation, 
rather than number of population as the basis for seat allocation in the legislative council. This may 
occur because of the extreme difficulty to use the size of population for allocating seats in the regional 
legislative council in a situation where, as it is presented above in Table 5.2 above, that the smallest 
ethnic groups, Mao and Komo have 2800 and 920 populations respectively, whereas Benishangul and 
Gumuz have 122, 900 and 107,500 populations respectively. The highly skewed population size among 
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the indigenous ethnic groups has made irrelevant a criterion of population size to determine seats 
allocations in the regional legislative council. As a result, the seats are allocated based on woreda in 
which each woreda is allocated uniformly to send four members regardless of its population size. 
Because of such strange system of representation, ethnic representation in the Benishangul state council 
has created grave inconsistency with the national electoral system and the constitution. It resulted that 
the seats occupied by the majority ethnic group are less than the seats occupied by the second majority 
ethnic group. To put it precisely, ‘the Gumuz with 107,500 people hold more seats in the regional 
legislation than the Benishangul with 122,900 people. This has also created a good opportunity for the 
Gumuz elite to control the key executive posts of the regional government like the presidential post.         
 
Second, since the regional state council is established by the five indigenous ethnic groups that consist 
of 52% of total population of the regional state, 48 percent of the regional population was not 
represented in the regional council. In Assosa zone 43 percent, in Metekel zone 50 percent and in 
Kamashi zone 20 percent of the non-indigenous communities are not represented in the regional 
legislative council. Non-indigenous communities are not allowed to exercise their democratic right to be 
elected to the regional legislative body due to the rule which stipulates that a member of the legislative 
council should speak at least one indigenous language of the regional state. It is obvious that Amharic 
language is the official language of the regional government and it is also a working language of the 
regional council, therefore putting indigenous language proficiency requirement in order to be elected 
for the regional legislative appears to be simply a discriminatory measure against 40 percent of the 
inhabitants of the regional state who are not able to speak the indigenous languages.  
 
The executive body of the regional government is composed of head of the various bureaus and headed 
by a regional president or the chief executive. There are about 19 bureaus like education bureau, health 
bureau, and finance bureau etc, which are established in similar prototype with the federal government’s 
various Ministries.  The executive posts are shared among the five indigenous elites somehow 
commensurate with their ethnic population size (A civil servant from Berta, Interviewee 12, 2002: 17). 
However, the major power of the regional executive has remained in the hands of the chief executive or 
the president of the regional state. According to the constitution of the regional state, powers and 
functions of the chief executive include leading the executive council of the regional state, select 
nominees for posts of the regional Auditor Generals, the President and Vice-President of the region’s 
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Supreme Court, exercise overall direction and supervision over the regional state’s security police forces 
(Article 61, The Constitution of BGRS 2002.).    
 
Yet, the chief executive position, a regional president post, has become very crucial and powerful 
position in producing stiff competition and tension between the two majority ethnic groups- Benishangul 
and Gumuz elites. The presidential post from 1991 to 1995 was controlled by different individuals from 
the majority Benishangul ethnic group, which accounts 26 percent of the total population of the regional 
state, a majority ethnic group in the regional state. Since 1996, following serious division within 
Benishangul political elites and also more importantly with the emergence of hostile relation between 
Benishangul elite and the EPRDF, the presidential post has been occupied by a person from Gumuz 
ethnic group. The Benishangul elite claim that the chief executive post in the regional government, the 
regional presidential post, should be occupied by the majority ethnic group, but this kind of demand 
could not be easily accepted by the EPRDF, as the case that the federal chief executive position in the 
federal government is occupied by a person from a minority ethnic group. Separation of power between 
the executive and the legislative power is invisible; power is merged and concentrated on the executive 
branch.    
 
Furthermore, the significant Amhara and Oromo population in the region who accounts about 22 and 12 
percent of the total regional population respectively did not have any political representation in the 
regional legislative or executive offices. Except that some individuals who are members of the EPRDF 
are granted some key positions in various offices of the regional government. Assosa town is a good 
example, the town has about 14, 701 (2000) population of which the majority inhabitants (67 percent) 
are not from the indigenous Benishangul community, but the political leadership of the town is 
controlled by the Benishangul elite, but the kebele administration can be organized by non-indigenous 
individuals so long as they are member of the EPRDF (A leader of an Eder, Interviewee 11 2002: 15). 
At zonal administration level also Assosa zone or Benishangul zone has 7 woredas, 5 are recognized as 
having only Benishangul inhabitants and the other 2 weredas are mixed with Oromo and Amhara, but no 
representative from either Amhara or Oromo in the zonal administration (A member of zonal executive 
from Berta, Interviewee 8 2002: 10).  
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5.4.3 Human resource in the bureaucracy 
Benishangul-Gumuz suffers from shortage of trained and educated manpower. In 1995, the regional 
state had about 9063 civil servants, of which only 167 (2 percent) are professionals and 2540 (28 
percent) were teachers and 511 health personnel, the rest are administrative and financial clerics, 
custodial and manual labourers. Adult literacy rate was about 15 percent (BoFED 2003: 37). However, 
virtually all professionals and educated manpower were from non-indigenous groups. Despite 
resistance28 from the indigenous elite the regional state has employed professionals and trained 
individuals from across Ethiopia without ethnic preferences. For instance in 1997 alone, more than 225 
non-indigenous professionals were hired (Young 1999: 338) Since the regional state officially uses 
Amharic language in government structures and education, it has been easier for professionals across 
Ethiopia to work in the region.  
 
However, key political, bureaucratic and administrative posts have remained in the hands of individuals 
from the indigenous ethnic communities in line with the rights of ethnic self-administration discourse in 
Ethiopia’s ethnic federal principles. This situation has crated a type of dual responsibilities and tensions 
within bureau structures in which the professionals are responsible for the technical input however the 
decision-making activities within these offices are controlled by indigenous individuals who have no 
relevant knowledge of the activities they are leading. For instance, a head of the health bureau and a 
head of the education bureau are high school graduates, but they were given a responsibility to lead 
these bureaus which are staffed, inter alia, by many professionals (A member of the regional executive 
from Berta, Interviewee 6 2002: 8). A regional state official confirms that all of the Woreda 
administrators29 have completed at least grade five (elementary school education) (A member of the 
regional executive from Gumuz, Interviewee 5, 2002:4). Therefore, it is evident that tension could easily 
and frequently flares up in such kinds of tricky bureaucratic relationships. Mainly because of such 
                                                 
28 An elder express that he knows that in Gambella region the president of the regional state is elementary 
school graduate, so it is not unique in Benishangul Gumuz regional state (Interviewee 7 2002: 09).  
 
29 Woreda administration structure has various offices which have variety of professionals and experts like 
doctors, agriculturalists, engineers and others. It would be very difficult for these professionals to work 
under the leadership of a person who is high school graduate. I also encounter in my fieldwork in June 
2002 that the head of commerce and transport bureau (a Gumuz) that respectfully declined to give an 
interview mentioning his lack of ability to comprehend the working procedures and rules of the regional 
government structures. (Interviewee 4 2002: 04) 
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reason and of course also owing to other better opportunities, there has been a high staff turn over and 
unceasing shortage of professionals and trained manpower in the regional state.  
 
Tensions and inefficiencies associated with appointing non-qualified and uneducated indigenous 
individuals in heading bureaus and other decision-making managerial positions have undermined the 
credibility of the regional state’s administrative capacity. Thus, the federal government pressured the 
regional state to use professionals outside the region to head bureaus and other offices that need 
qualified and trained manpower. In 1998 ‘approximately half of Benishangul’s bureau heads were 
outsiders and 17 out of 225 appointed professionals were indigenous (Young 1999: 338).  
 
As a result, the federal government has played a vital role in Benishangul-Gumuz regional 
administrative functions due to lack of experience in administration by the indigenous elites. This 
situation has created an opportunity for the EPRDF to play a controversial role in shaping and affecting 
politics in the regional state. As Young (Ibid. p. 343) documents that the EPRDF’s representative in the 
region who considered an advisor was from TPLF and has an immense political and administrative 
authority such as participating in the regional council’s legislative assembly, meddling between 
indigenous elites, crafting political positions, reviewing appointments and dismissals and commanding 
the gimgima (a sort of self-evaluation session). 
 
In order to indigenise the civil service in the regions, a civil service college was set up by the federal 
government in order to train regional officials and to educate students from the disadvantaged 
indigenous communities by circumventing the national standard on higher education standards in order 
to produce professionals from the indigenous ethnic communities.  According to an informant trained in 
such practice, that the method is appropriate to quickly catch up the other regional governments which 
are better endowed with educated manpower (A civil servant from Berta, Interviewee 12, 2002: 14). 
Other informant also mention an experience in which a Gumuz student has faced difficulty to cope with 
fellow students in agricultural training university in Alemaya that operate within the ordinary higher 
education standard (A member of the regional executive from Gumuz Interviewee 5, 2002: 6). As a 
result, for the indigenous political elites the only option to improve regional skills and efficiency is by 
raising educational capability of the regional state by concentrating in training indigenous professionals 
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that could replace the non-indigenous professionals who have monopolized the region’s professional 
pool (A member of the regional executive from Gumuz, Interviewee 5, 2002: 5).   
 
5.5 The political process since 1991: Turmoil and Unpredictability 
The post 1991 regional government in Benishangul Gumuz regional state has been characterized by 
unpredictability and ineffectiveness. Though economic underdevelopment and immaturity in political 
leadership could be cited as a cause, other factors such as intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic rivalries, and the 
intriguing and self-serving role of the TPLF/EPRDF have played a significant impact in creating turmoil 
and unpredictability in the regional state governance structure. The three most important factors that 
produced turmoil and unpredictability in the regional government are presented below.         
 
The first factor is the imposition of the Benishangul’s elite hegemony in the regional government. 
Earlier relationship with TPLF had helped Benishangul group to assume a prominent role in the 
formation and organisation of the regional state structure and also to play a hegemonic role. As a result, 
BPLM became a single dominant party by recruiting and acquiring more members from other 
indigenous ethnic communities in the region under the hegemonic role of the Benishangul elites. The 
EPRDF supported the Benishangul political elite’s hegemonic role owing to their collaboration in Sudan 
and their close relationship to the government of Sudan and Eritrea. The EPRDF army forced the SPLM 
to leave the region and favoured the government of Sudan to reactivate the Baro river trade and also to 
play a prominent role in the area.  This facilitated the hegemonic position of the Benishangul political 
elites who had friendly relation with the Sudan government. This was done, of course, at the expense of 
other indigenous ethnic communities like Gumuz and Shinasha people in the region30. Gumuz and 
Shinasha politicians were pressured and ‘persuaded’ to join BPLM without their consent and freewill (A 
council member from Shinasha, Interviewee 3 2002: 3; A civil servant from Berta, Interviewee 12, 
2002: 17; A member of zonal executive from Berta, Interviewee 8 2002: 10). This unfairly imposed 
arrangement has created resentment by Gumuz and Shinasha and produced inter-ethnic tensions within 
BPLM which had a dominant control of political power in the regional state since 1991.    
 
                                                 
30 For instance, in the first national parliament in 1995 the Benishangul ethnic group were allowed to take 
five seats, but they should have been granted only one seat, in accordance with the rules of seat distribution 
in the national parliament that is based on: one seat for 100,000 population.  
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The second factor was that the Benishangul political elites were divided because of provincialism and 
greed for power. The BPLM was established in 1986 by Benishangul exiles in Sudan. Since its inception 
BPLM was affected by internal division. According to a Benishangul informant there were many 
factions such as the ‘Sudan group’, ‘Assosa groups’, ‘Kumruk group’, ‘Khojale group’, ‘Mengea group’ 
within the BPLM (A civil servant from Berta, Interviewee 12, 2002: 14). However, the most prominent 
factions are three. The first group was identified with people affiliated to Sudan. Sudan used to mobilize 
Benishangul Moslems against the military regime in Ethiopia as a reciprocal action to avenge the 
Ethiopian government support for SPLM. This faction was accused of promoting radical Islamist 
ideology in the region. The second faction was from individuals from Assosa and Bambassi area who 
believed that they were closer to the local people than those coming from Sudan after long absence. The 
third faction was formed by those who were not happy concerning their relation with Sudan.  
The earliest division between the ruling aristocracy that migrated from Sudan territory and the 
indigenous community also had an impact in exacerbating internal split within Benishangul’s elites. In 
addition, the Benishangul political elites are manipulated by divergent political interests. The area was 
exposed to various liberation movements such as TPLF, EPLF, OLF31, SPLM, EPRP32 and others, 
therefore the indigenous elites were captured and manipulated by the interests of these various political 
assortments who have divergent interests and objectives.   
 
Nevertheless, the more significant one could be the new opportunity created for the elites by accessing 
the state power which has provided personal benefits in terms of social status and economic 
advantageous. The benefits and rewards distributed by the state are not enough to satisfy every elite 
operating in the newly created political dispensation. As a result, factional rivalry has become intense 
within the Benishangul elites political fora.      
 
Consequently, the internal division within Benishangul group becomes an additional setback for a 
proper functioning ethnic coalition government in the region. The Benishangul political elites are the 
major political force in the regional government and factionalism and continuous tensions within the 
group has greatly hampered a badly needed stability in the regional state for a decade. As a result, the 
                                                 
31 To neutralize a threat of OLF, following the intense 1992 conflict between OLF and EPRDF in the area, 
EPRDF favored BPLM’s dominant presence in the area. 
32 For example, in 1995 some members of BPLM were made an alliance with EPRP and Keffagne (KPDM) 
to forge a unity front (EUF) against EPRDF regime in Ethiopia http://www.eprp.com/doc/EUFMN.html.  
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BPLM suffered from intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic tensions and divisions and became very fragile to be 
easily manipulated and discarded.   
 
The third and most importantly factor was the disagreement that surfaced between the Benishangul elites 
and the TPLF/EPRDF (or the federal government). Due to the tension between the TPLF/EPRDF and 
the Sudan government in connection with the growing hostility between Eritrea and Sudan in 1994/5 
and also because of the assassination attempt of Egyptian president in Addis Ababa in 1995, the once 
friendly relationship between the TPLF/EPRDF and the government of Sudan suffered. The close 
relationship between the TPLF/EPRDF and the Sudanese government suffered because of the hostility 
between the governments of Eritrea and Sudan in 1994, in which TPLF/EPRDF was siding with the 
Eritrean government33. The already deteriorated relation with Sudan faced with a total break down when 
the Ethiopian government swiftly and officially implicated the government of Sudan in an attempted 
assassination of the Egyptian president in Addis Ababa in 1995.  
 
As a result, the TPLF/EPRDF has changed its policy of favouring the Benishangul political elites’ 
hegemony in the Benishangul Gumuz regional state government. It is obvious that many of the 
Benishangul political elites had a good relationship with the Sudan government due to the support they 
had received in the past resistance movement against Derg, which was also facilitated by TPLF and 
EPLF in Sudan at the time of their struggle against the central military regime in Ethiopia (A civil 
servant from Berta, Interviewee 12, 2002: 17; A council member from Berta, Interviewee 2 2002: 3). 
Besides, equally important, the majority of the Benishangul people are Muslims and many parents 
preferred to send their children to Sudan to attend education in Arabic schools and thus they have also 
more or less positive attitude toward their relationship with the Sudanese authority, which espouses 
Islamic principles in politics and governance. However an elder complained that ‘living in a boarder 
area is very problematic, both governments have suspicion on us and always want to divide and rule us. 
For Sudan government, we are Ethiopians, for Ethiopian government we are Sudanese and for the SPLA 
(Sudan People Liberation Front) we are Islam’ (An elder from Berta, Interviewee 13 2002: 16).   
 
                                                 
33 In my interview with a member of the national parliament that the Sudanese authority tried to convince 
the Ethiopian government officials that the hostility was between Sudan and Eritrea and therefore requested 
for impartiality of Ethiopia. But the Ethiopian officials declined the request and openly echoed that their 
support was for Eritrea. This was also influenced by the policy of the US, which wanted to alienate the 
Islamic Sudanese government. 
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For many observers, however it appeared that the EPRDF/TPLF led Ethiopian government had got a 
‘golden’ opportunity to construct a plausible case, but without adequate investigation, to break its 
relation with Sudan in order to completely jump into the Eritrean and the US bandwagon which it badly 
needed. It is also conceivable to suspect that the TPLF/EPRDF had wanted to cool down its relation with 
the Sudan government which was accused of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism by the US and some 
Western countries. John Young (1999: 331) writes that Ethiopia (EPRDF) was received money and 
support from the US to help forces like SPLA which was fighting against the government of Sudan.     
      
If the rush was not made for such political gambling, a proper and adequate investigation should have 
been done to prove whether the accusation and allegation that implicates the Sudanese government in 
the assassination attempt was true. To the surprise of many people, the government of Egypt34 itself did 
not believe in a direct involvement of the Sudanese government in the incident, as it knew that there 
were strong militant radical Islamic groups in Egypt who have tried in many occasions to assassinate the 
president. Therefore, the same radical Islamic groups from Egypt could also carry out the Addis Ababa 
attempt.  
 
Consequently, the above three factors combined have brought a significant consequence in reshaping 
political alignments and arrangements in Benishangul-Gumuz regional state by flinching the 
Benishangul elite’s political platform. The Benishangul political elites, who were inexpert to 
comprehend such tricky political game, failed to bring a united platform to protect their regional interest 
and therefore easily exposed to the punitive measures of the EPRDF/TPLF for their past and continuing 
good relationships with the Sudanese authority that the EPRDF was not worried about. As a result, the 
TPLF/ EPRDF had exploited the internal division within Benishangul political elites for its own political 
advantage by promoting Gumuz elites to hold key political positions in the regional state. 
                                                 
34 Because the Ethiopian government was accused the government of Egypt that it was not cooperating in 
the investigation, but the Ethiopian government in advance had implicated the government of Sudan. 
Rather, the Egyptian government blamed the attempt on members of Egypt's militant Gama'a al Islamiya 
(Islamic Group) organization and said the attackers were trained in neighboring Sudan’. 
(http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/eng_newspaper/Htm/No272/r272new1.htm). According to the 
London-Based AL-HAYAT daily that a man who called himself Abul Noor, who the paper said belonged 
to bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization, as saying in an interview that a foiled attempt to assassinate Egypt's 
President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995 had been planned for three months in Somalia and 
Afghanistan and that the people who planned it allocated $ 200,000 for the task. 
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Accordingly, in June 1996, then Prime Minister Tamrat Layne opened the so-called Peace, Democracy, 
and Development Conference in Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State by urging participants to unseat 
regional officials whom he called ‘narrow nationalists and agents of foreign powers’ (Ethiopian Register 
1997: 14). As a result, what followed was the dismissal of all members of the Regional Council, except 
its president. A report states that in August 1997 that at least 120 former officials remained in detention 
in the region without charges (Human Right Watch 1997: 21). An insider witness that ‘ten prominent 
leaders of the Benishangul People's Liberation Front-which was allied with the EPRDF, and which 
controlled the regional government until its rift with the EPRDF-remained in detention in military camps 
and transferred to official prison in Assosa in January 1997. The dispute between the EPRDF and local 
officials provided the context for the dismissal of most of the regional police force, about 800 men, and 
the recruitment of new officers’ (Ibid. p. 21).  Young also argues that the dismissal of officials and civil 
servants alleging for ‘anti-peace and antidevelopment' activities’, was a phrase assumed to cover 
accusing of being Sudanese agents. Some of the dismissed include the vice-chairman of the region, the 
education bureau head, the Ethiopian ambassador to Yemen, Yussuf Hammed Nasser, who was from 
Benishangul, and other lower ranking officials’ (Young 1999: 333). 
 
As a consequence, BPLM lost most of its leadership and therefore reorganized under a different name 
and new leadership. An informant claimed that the new leadership of both the party and the regional 
government did not have the mandate of the Benishangul people (An Elder from Berta, Interviewee 7 
2002: 9; A civil servant from Berta, Interviewee 12, 2002: 16; A member of the regional executive from 
Berta, Interviewee 6 2002: 7). The new regional administration headed by Yaregal Ayesheshume (a 
Gumuz) since September 1996 has been a source of fierce resentment from the Benishangul group. It 
has become an acceptable by the Benishangul elite who believe that their ethnic group should get an 
upper hand in leading the regional government owing to their majority population, hosting the regional 
government’s capital city and their significant contribution to the armed struggle (A regional official 
from Gumuz, Interviewee 1, 2002: 1). The presidential post is associated with high personal privileges 
and benefits and also it also brings greater ethnic symbolism and group satisfaction. Thus it continues to 
be a highly contested political apex by the political elites and ethnic communities. 
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The option picked by the EPRDF in 1996 to solve the political predicament in the region marked by an 
egoistic option that serves the EPRDF’s interest better. As a result, assigning the highest executive 
power of the regional government to the Gumuz individual (Yaregal Aysheshm) has not brought the 
much needed stability or effective governance in the region. Rather, it created tensions within 
indigenous ethnic groups. According to information from Benishangul as well as Gumuz informants that 
the relationship between the two indigenous ethnic communities has started to suffer. There have been 
open and frequent ethnic naming and accusation. According to a Benishangul informant that ‘we have 
never been in such kinds of hostility and hate against Gumuz people. We feel that Gumuz people are 
collaborating with the EPRDF by plotting against us who are their close neighbour’ (A member of zonal 
executive from Berta, Interviewee 8 2002: 10). This attitude if shared widely would be very destructive 
and detrimental for their relationship to live in a single political space.  
 
This divisive political game by the EPRDF/TPLF appears to aggravate resentments not only limited to 
the Benishangul elites but also slowly encompassing the Benishangul community. All Benishangul 
informants, including those organised in the new party organised by the EPRDF has expressed that the 
people of Benishangul are not fairly and adequately represented in the regional state. Almost all 
informants from the region also believe that relations between Benishangul and Gumuz and, relations 
between Benishangul and settlers have also been deteriorating very badly.  
 
5.6 The major emerging problems  
The major problems generated in connection with the ethnic federal restructuring and arrangements in 
Benishangul Gumuz regional state are heightening ethnic tensions, the curtailment of human and 
political rights of the indigenous communities, and inefficiency and pervasive corruption in the 
administration. I present these problems below.      
 
5.6.1 Emerging ethnic tensions  
The pre-1991 ethnic tensions in Benishangul-Gumuz areas were limited to conflict between adjacent 
communities for various reasons of livelihood challenges and social facets such as land grapping, cattle 
raiding and cultural clashes. Very low intensity sporadic clashes used to occur between Gumuz and 
Amhara in Metekele area and between Gumuz and Oromo in south part of the region. John Young 
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(Young 1999) also mentioned about the existence of slaves raiders until 1993, but it seems that he 
exaggerates claims of sporadic abduction of young boys for military purpose and household services. 
However the post-1991 ethnic tensions are very new and induced in connection with the establishment 
of the regional state government. Competition for political leadership, positions in the state bureaucracy, 
group’s hegemonic ambitions, budget allocation, language issues and other factors are inducing 
sectional and sectarian interests.    
 
The major battleground among the indigenous elites is in bureaucratic posts and political offices. In 
particular, the Berta elite are expressing resentments regarding representation and appointments in the 
regional executive and bureaucracy. Seats in the regional legislative council are not allocated based on 
the size of population; therefore the Benishangul elite consider the arrangement as a deliberate device to 
deny them to be a majority ethnic group in the regional council. As a result they claim that posts in the 
regional government are unfairly allocated to Gumuz and Shinasha ethnic groups at the expense of 
Benishangul people. In addition, they are unhappy concerning the zonal structures in which the Gumuz 
area has two zonal administrations whereas the Benishangul area has only one zonal administration. 
They claim therefore that the smaller ethnic group is getting benefits and budget at two zonal 
administrations (An elder from Berta, Interviewee 13 2002: 19). Their resentment in terms of losing 
administrative bureaucracy may be true, however administrative bureaucracies are more beneficial to the 
elites than the ordinary people, because more administrative structures need more budgets that could be 
used in expanding social infrastructures for the ordinary people, but for the elites, bureaucratic positions 
are more attractive.    
Similarly, Benishangul informants mention that Gumuz dominated regional government prefer to 
appoint non-indigenous individuals as bureau head, but rejecting Benishangul individuals with relatively 
adequate education to lead bureaus, simply because of fearfully anticipating Benishangul group’s 
hegemony in the regional state (A member of the regional executive from Berta, Interviewee 6 2002: 8; 
An Elder from Berta, Interviewee 7 2002: 8). An elder elucidate that: ‘We are considered as a threat 
because of our majority number; our population size has been envied and thus this envy turned 
damagingly against us. They call us Islamic fundamentals, extremists and Sudanese. But we are always 
Ethiopian, Sudan is our historical enemy, many of our grandfathers were dead while imprisoned in 
Sudan (An elder from Berta, Interviewee 13 2002: 19). 
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For the Benishangul elites, it is the situation in which the minority ethnic group is imposing its authority 
on the majority ethnic group which is contrary to the ethnic federal principles that stipulate a 
proportional representation in accordance with the size of ethnic group’s population. As a result, they 
demanded to establish a separate Benishangul state by seceding from the existing regional state or to be 
granted their own autonomous zonal self-administration unit that enables them to control budget 
allocation and official appointments. (A regional official from Gumuz, Interviewee 1, 2002: 1; An elder 
from Berta, Interviewee 13 2002: 19). They feel rage35 that Gumuz and Shinasha elites are betraying 
them by collaborating with the EPRDF that wanted to demote and disfranchise the Benishangul elite 
(An Elder from Berta, Interviewee 7 2002: 9). Their anticipation of their relation with the other 
indigenous groups is filled with despair and reprisal, and the resolute elites are spreading the despair at 
the community level and it became difficult for some of the Benishangul elite who wanted a conciliatory 
solution to work at the community level. ‘They are blamed as unfaithful for the Benishangul cause and 
framed as collaborators with those groups who want to sabotage their cause and therefore the 
Benishangul community is rejecting them’ (A member of the regional executive from Berta, Interviewee 
6 2002: 8). Gumuz and Shinasha officials claim that the Benishangul community is highly indoctrinated 
by the hardliner elite to reject conciliatory arrangement and becomes difficult for the regional 
government officials including those open-minded Benishangul personnel who work in collaboration 
with the Gumuz and Shinasha group to operate in the Benishangul area. The elites claim total ownership 
and monopoly over their ethnic community and easily influence clan and religious leaders and others 
because of their strong call and cry for the good of the ethnic community (A member of the regional 
executive from Gumuz, Interviewee 4 2002: 5; A council member from Shinasha, Interviewee 3 2002: 
3).  
 
For, Gumuz and Shinasha officials that there has been fair representation in the regional government, 
but tensions have emerged because of the hegemonic ambition of Benishangul elites who claim a right 
to have the presidential post and other key executive posts simply because of their majority population 
and also because of their previous close relation with TPLF in the period of the armed struggle (A 
council member from Shinasha, Interviewee 3 2002: 2). Nonetheless, according to an informant that the 
                                                 
35 In my field research in May 2002 in the area, I personally observed and even experienced the rage of the 
Benishangul elites  
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regional state’s presidential post is very alluring because of its power, privileges and symbolic 
significance (A Women, Berta official (A member of regional council from Berta, Interviewee 9 2002: 
13) The regional president has a significant power in key decision making and in appointing regional, 
zonal and wereda officials; he is the highest authority in the regional state and he has also an extensive 
personal36 privileges.          
   
For an independent observer, the regional government is simply captured by power mongering 
individuals; it becomes a drama forum among power hungry individuals. The council representation is 
unfair; minority ethnic groups are imposing their will and interest on the majority ethnic group. There 
must be an appropriate and fair multi ethnic regional structure that could fairly and convincingly 
represent each group. It is always possible that when one controls a key post, the others could be 
offended or discriminated or covetous (An elder from Berta, Interviewee 13 2002: 19). 
 
It is evident that the Benishangul Gumuz regional state was established by the elites from the five 
indigenous communities and the Benishangul elites were at the core and played a dominant role owing 
to their contribution in the armed struggle against the Derg, their majority population size (of the 
indigenous communities), their close cooperation with TPLF and EPLF in Sudan and their relatively 
better politically engaged elites. Thus, they controlled key political and administrative posts like the 
regional state president. However, since 1996 the dominant role of the Benishangul elite has plummeted 
and replaced by the Gumuz elite with opportunistic alliance of the Shinasha elite, and this has created 
unhealthy relationship among the major indigenous ethnic elites that have dominated the state 
government. Instead of cooperation and/or compromise, the ethnic relations have been filled with 
mistrust, rejection and open hostility that drastically reduced the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
regional state government to deliver the needed livelihood improvement of the impoverished indigenous 
communities of the regional state.  
 
Although there is a consensus among the indigenous elites that ethnic federalism is beneficial to them, 
they are not showing a cooperative disposition and commitment to promote and materialize the 
                                                 
36 Living in a presidential residence with maximum seurity and frequent travel to Addis Ababa.  
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supposed benefits; rather they have been immersed with damaging revulsion37 against each other by 
exaggerating differences, erecting fences and constructing hostilities that could be very hurtful for future 
cooperation and compromise among the ethnic communities sharing the same administrative and 
political structures and institutions.  
 
The federal government’s (EPRDF) approach in imposing forced agreement and forced cooperation is 
fuelling resentments and rage, because it has lost its impartiality. The federal government, which is 
highly dominated by TPLF interest, is viewed as a source of the problem, therefore no chance to get a 
role of a reliable and respected arbitrator in the matter. As a result, it opted for imposing partisan and 
egocentric solution that failed to convince the dissenting elites, but resorted for a carrot and stick 
approach by rewarding those who accepted its solution and at the same time by punishing those rejected. 
However, neither the rewards, nor the punishments are good enough to create a badly needed stability 
and vitality in the regional state. The regional state has remained very weak, inefficient and corrupt38.  
 
The Budget allocation activities are also another conflictual issues amongst the indigenous elites in the 
regional government. Budget allocation used to be made at sectoral level like education sector and 
likewise; therefore, there was a widespread suspicion that a head of a respective sector would give 
priority to his ethnic area in allocating budget for his sector office. For instance, a Benishangul official 
blatantly complains that: ‘Health bureau head is from Shinasha, thus he sends the medicine to Metekel 
zone and Bulel woreda. Agriculture head is Amhara, thus agricultural package projects are for Metekel 
settlers’ (A member of zonal executive from Berta, Interviewee 8 2002: 11). There was also a case that 
high school was opened in area that did not have enough students to attend high school level education 
(A council member from Shinasha, Interviewee 3 2002: 4). As a result, Benishangul elites prefer budget 
subsidy from the federal government to be directly transferred to their zonal administration’s coffers by 
circumventing the regional government’s power in budget allocation and approval for the zonal 
                                                 
37 For instance, a Benishangul informant explain that there is much difference between Gumuz and 
Benishangul in respect of language and religion, we have never lived together, it was the EPRDF 
government that put us together. And we rarely heard regarding Shinasha, but in our oral history they were 
known as troublemakers An official from (Berta, Interviewee 8 2002: 11). 
38 For instance, in its third session in October 2002, the regional council affirmed to get rid of tribal, 
parochial and corrupt practices in the regional government. (Ethiopia News Agency, October 25, 2002). All 
over again, after three years in September 2005, the new cabinet members promised to tackle the 
widespread ethnic favouritism and corruption that are upsetting efforts ‘to extricate their region out of the 
quagmire of poverty’. (September 26, 2005: Walta Information Centre).  
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administrations. Though this demand is absolutely unsound and unconstitutional, it may show the level 
of mistrust and indignation that prevail among the indigenous elites.  
 
Moreover, selections of students for scholarship opportunities have also become very sensitive and 
controversial. A relatively better educated indigenous communities like the Shinasha people have better 
entry opportunity or access, however, the elites from Gumuz and Benishangul have worried that the 
practice would upset the ethnic balance by rewarding the relatively privileged ethnic group and 
punishing the disadvantaged one. In addition, it could have also a complex effect in the future by 
preparing a ground for the Shinasha elite to play a dominant or leading role in the regional state, but they 
account for less than 10 percent of the total population of the regional state.  
  
5.6.2 Political and human rights abuse of the settlers and other ‘non-
indigenous’ group  
Benishangul elites are showing a domineering stand in their administration by disrespecting and 
disfranchising many of the inhabitants in Assoa zone. Gumuz elites are also showing the same tendency 
in Metekel zone. The indigenous ethnic elites are showing a similar behaviour and ambition of 
oppressive power control practice and discriminatory treatment of non-indigenous communities in their 
respective territorial jurisdictions.    
 
In Assosa zone 43 percent, in Assosa town 67 percent of the inhabitants are exempted from political 
representation at zonal administration and regional government level. In Metekel zone also the settlers 
are not represented adequately in zonal and regional government structures. A desire of monopolistic 
control of regional political spaces and administrative structures combined with historical legacies and 
grievances have induced the indigenous elite to opt for exclusionist stance in regional politics. In the 
past, there was unpleasant attitude in degrading the personalities of the indigenous communities as 
inferior and unequal. The past-inflicted stereotypes have now brought the expected reciprocal 
counterattack in targeted mistreatment and discrimination of the non-indigenous communities. A 
regional official believes that many of the non-indigenous communities are still holding deep the past 
stereotypes and appear disrespecting and downgrading the leadership of the indigenous elite and envy of 
the privileged status accorded to the indigenous political leaders (A member of the regional executive 
from Gumuz, Interviewee 5, 2002: 6). Many Benishangul people also suspect that the neighbouring 
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Oromo people as having ambition of expanding their territory and political influence in their area, 
therefore they are uncomfortable and very reluctant to include them in the administrative and political 
leadership. Past memories of domination by Oromo nobility may have its impact.    
 
The most serious and frequent discrimination and abuses, of human as well as political rights, have been 
made against the settlers in Assosa zone. The settlers, which are estimated about 50,000 were brought to 
the area by the Derg regime due to the major 1984 famine in Ethiopia and at present they account about 
25 percent of the population in Assosa zone, the enclosed homeland for Berta ethnic group. These 
settlers in 55 settlement villages have no political representation at regional, zonal and woreda 
administration levels. Their administrative and political representation is restricted at the Kebele 
administration level, but the kebele platform is designed to impose orders and control from the higher 
authorities from the wereda, zonal and regional authorities without a reciprocal power to influence 
higher decisions and authority.  
 
They are exposed to gross violations of their rights like eviction, limiting their freedom of movements, 
destroying their property and other similar cruel atrocities. It becomes possible to assure relative peace 
and order in the area with the involvement of the federal military force, however deep in the villages and 
in routine interaction, the settlers are always exposed to every type of harassment and intimidation. 
Minor tensions such as quarrels in school children can grow into ethnic clashes in which the zonal and 
wereda officials are interfering in partisanship to their communities. In 1993 many settlers were killed, 
their property destroyed and their homes were burned (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 11 2002: 14). In 
order to end their ill-treatment and discrimination the settlers have demanded the federal government to 
intervene to respect their constitutional rights and demanded for political and administrative 
representation in the regional government structures, but the response they got was insufficient. The 
EPRDF, which had a warm relation with the BPLM, was not keen to spoil its relation with the 
indigenous Berta elite. According to an informant that the electoral board and the EPRDF’s official39 
strongly rejected the settlers demand for political and administrative representation in the regional 
government (A member of the zonal executive from Berta, Interviewee 8 2002: 11). The election board 
                                                 
39 A Berta official explains that in 1993 Nekempt conference Abbay Tsehaye openly stated that the settlers 
were settled in the region for the only reason of getting land and food, which are more important than 
political power, and therefore their demand for representation was rejected in the conference (An official 
from Berta, Interviewee 8 2002: 11).  
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rejected the demand based on the electoral declaration that stipulates fluency in one of the regional 
indigenous languages is a requirement to stand for a political office. Nonetheless, a demand for fluency 
in the regional language is unnecessary, since Amharic is the official language in the regional state. 
 
The indigenous community feels that their land was unjustly taken from them by the previous military 
regime; therefore they wish the settlement should be dismantled and the land should be returned to the 
community. The land under the holdings of the settlers is relatively well utilized and thus it is inducing 
past ownership claims by some personalities from the indigenous communities. The Berta political elites 
are also yearning for the settlers’ eviction due to political motives, because massive population 
concentration of non-indigenous community in their ethnic enclave could raise a demand for political 
representation in near future that could reduce the hegemonic position of the indigenous elite at wereda, 
zonal and regional levels. (A member of regional council from Berta, Interviewee 9 2002:12; a member 
of the regional executive from Berta, Interviewee 6 2002:7). They are wishing for ‘Bertanising’ their 
ethnic enclave; therefore they could resort to evicting the settlers and ethnic cleansing if they have the 
opportunity and the capability (A council member from Berta, Interviewee 2 2002: 2; A regional official 
from Gumuz, Interviewee 1, 2002: 1; A member of the regional executive from Berta, Interviewee 6 
2002: 7). They claim that the settlement was motivated for political and strategic reason in the past 
associated with the conflict, rather than for humanitarian or drought reasons. They also remind in 
animosity that in the past the settlers were provided with new clinics, water services, schools and 
government’s security protection, but without providing a similar level of service and protection for the 
indigenous people.    
 
Split and provincialism within the Berta elites have also brought hurdles to solve the settlers’ issues, 
especially Berta groups from Bambassi (settlement) area, which contained the major settlement villages, 
were strongly resisting the settlement. They were afraid of expanding more settlement in their land and 
also worried that the settlers would share the scarce resources allocated for starting development projects 
for the indigenous people that are relatively disadvantageous (A civil servant from Berta, Interviewee 
12, 2002: 17). 
 
Actually, since the settlers are living compactly in adjoining areas, they should have been provided some 
sort of semi-autonomous administrative territory and political representation in the regional government. 
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However, in the EPRDF’s early 1990s political calculation, political expediencies are more important 
than people’s rights, as in the case the EPRDF did not want to sacrifice its good relation with Berta elites 
because of siding with the rights of the Amhara settlers. In early 1990s the EPRDF was also worried 
about the strong operation and presence of OLF in the area, thus rift with the Berta elites could become 
counterproductive in its effort to reduce OLF’s influence in the area.  
 
There was similar tension in Metekel zone, which contains tens of thousands of settlers in 50 settlement 
villages.  According to a Shinasha informant that there were various conflicts between Amhara and 
Shinasha, and Amhara and Gumuz people in 1991 to 1992. The Amhara settlers were very keen to be 
incorporated into the adjacent Amhara regional states, however their demand was rejected by the 
regional as well as the federal government (A council member from Shinasha, Interviewee 3 2002: 4). 
Creating a separate wereda administration for the Amhara settlers in Pawe area has temporarily reduced 
the tension (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 11 2002: 14). 
 
Sadly, all groups used the settlers for political motives. The settlers’ issue was very controversial and 
divisive in the regional state. The Gumuz and the Shinasha group were in favour of granting political 
and administration representation for the settlers, whereas the Berta group was very resistant. It was one 
of the major reasons that forced the Berta group to withdraw for a year from the regional state and the 
zonal administration in 2000, following the settlers demand for representation was approved in regional 
conference in 2000.  The Berta elites felt that Gumuz and Shinasha political elites are allying to 
challenge their majority status, especially the Gumuz group who controls key regional political and 
administrative offices including the regional president posts are using the settlers issue to promote their 
hegemony.  
 
As a result, with the intense ethnic rivalries among the indigenous groups, the relationship between the 
indigenous and the settlers was used for political purpose in exploiting their support to balance the 
political power of the rival ethnic group. This in turn has exposed the settlers for violence and atrocity 
from the other group. This is the case of the Amhara settlers in Assosa zone in which the Gumuz group 
are using them as a shield to promote their egoistic interest in order to weaken the power of the rival 
Benishangul group. In turn the Benishangul group has felt that the settler Amhara, living in Benishangul 
delimited zonal area, are a threat to its ambition and also its weakest point to be easily exploited by is 
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rivals. Therefore, repeated aggression, eviction and abuse of their rights in daily bases has been a reality 
the settlers have to live with.  
 
The EPRDF has also exploited the settlers’ issues for its self-cantered political gains. Initially 
in early 1990s it was in favour of the interests of the Berta group by disregarding the rights of 
the settlers, with the aim of defusing the threats of the OLF in the area by allying with the 
Berta community. The EPRDF was also deliberately ignoring a cruelty of indigenous elites 
against the non-indigenous community in the regional state in order to create a golden 
opportunity for it in an attempt to attract members who need its protection or shield against 
local despotism and extremism. The irony is that people seek shelter into the organisation that 
brought a policy for their marginalisation and discrimination; this may be a deliberate 
Machiavellian strategy of the TPLF, a minority ethnic group, which is anxious to attract 
followers by making them defenceless and victims, with the purpose of ascending into a 
hegemonic position in Ethiopian statehood.  
 
5.6.3 Inefficiency and Corruption  
Firstly, Internal party factions, inter-ethnic hostilities and the dichotomy of indigenous and non-
indigenous categories have intensified corruption and favouritism in order to erect or reinforce sectarian 
and factional loyalties. In a conference held in the region in June 1996, the then Prime Minister Tamrat 
Layne40, accused the regional government for widespread corruption and inefficiency and orchestrated 
follow-up actions that removed the majority of the leadership of the regional government. John Young 
also accounts for the plague of a high degree of corruption in the regional administration (Young 1999: 
334). 
 
Secondly, initially, federal transfer was mainly targeted toward rewarding political allies in the regional 
government, therefore there was no detailed project plan, implementation follow-up, appropriate 
accountancy, and auditing, but the money was just sent to the regional offices and used by the officials 
as they please to spend it. The EPRDF wanted to consolidate its rule through a bribe since 1991 in which 
the regional officials without accountability and auditing procedures used the regional government 
                                                 
40 Summary of World Broadcasts, Africa June 18, 1996: Deputy PM in Ethiopia Says Officials 
‘Embezzled’ Budget in Western Region 
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budget. The EPRDF was more interested to consolidate its hegemonic position through the support of 
regional groupings that have been rewarded by huge money, which they have never dreamt for. The 
money was used to buy political allies in the regions for the EPRDF’s hegemonic project. Therefore, the 
initial malady has become a norm. Everything is infected dangerously that no cosmetic reform could 
clean it therefore the need is a fundamental surgical operation that should cut out the roots. However, the 
EPRDF has acted to cut out the roots when it feels that this can serve its political goal to alienate the 
Benishangul elites that itself installed previously and ignored their abuse of power and corruption for its 
own sectarian political objectives. Finally, the EPRDF used the malady, which it facilitated in growing, 
to weaken the regional elites who became a threat to its objectives. Though the EPRDF is able to 
weaken the Berta elite, the corrupt practices that it facilitated initially has become unremitting and 
endemic. In its 3rd regular conference in October 25 2002, the regional council urged to get rid of tribal, 
parochial and widespread corrupt practices in the regional government, the same call was repeated in 
2005 and the problem has continued to be the major problems in the region (Ethiopia News Agency, 
October 25, 2005). 
 
Thirdly, inefficiency and corruption are rising due to the labelling of ‘insider’ and ‘outsiders’ 
professionals in the regional state’s bureaucracy.  The appointment of the so-called ‘outsiders’ in the 
bureaucracy is officially pronounced as a temporary and transient option due to ethnic biases and 
discourses. It sounds weirdly intriguing that ‘we want you just for a time being because we do not have 
our blood kin professionals, but we will throw you out sooner when we train our kin professionals’.   
The so-called ‘outsiders’ or non-indigenous professionals know that they are in the posts for a temporary 
period and also know that they would be replaced immediately if ethnically fit indigenous professional 
are available. As Huntington puts, ‘if one enters a new social situation and is perceived as an outsider 
who does not belong, one is likely to think of oneself that way’ (2004: 23). Therefore because of such 
de-motivating factors and the obvious insecurity of tenure the propensities for inefficient and dispiriting 
performance are very evident. Besides, since their higher political bosses are from the so-called 
indigenous people who have neither the competence nor the knowledge of the job to check the 
performance and efficiency of the bureaus heads or subordinate, it is easier for these individuals to be 
overlooked, to engage in corrupt, and to escape from day to day follow up, timely monitoring and 
appropriate evaluations.  
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Lastly, the system has resulted in waste and misuse of available resources. There are unemployed 
educated and trained college graduates in other regions, but the EPRDF’s ethnic federalism wait for 
indigenous groups to finish school and to fill the bureaucracy in the region; or otherwise the norm has 
been providing a short cut courses of three years to make them a junior judge, accountant etc, but it is 
very difficult to produce competent doctors, engineers and others that could transform the region with 
such kind of shortened period of training. The indigenous elites are keen to control administrative and 
bureaucratic positions whereas they expect non-indigenous professionals to provide skills and expertise 
in health services, construction and other vital areas. The region relies heavily on private contractors for 
construction activities, but these contractors are sacking the regions’ financial resource by transferring 
back to Addis Ababa. The regional government used to re-send unutilised budget to the federal treasury, 
whereas the regional state has been characterized by absence of rural clinics, rural roads, clean water 
services and other essential pubic services (A member of the regional council from Berta, Interviewee 9 
2002: 12).  
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Chapter Six: Southern Nations, Nationalities and People 
(SNNP) Regional Sate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 General Background 
The Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) regional state (henceforth referred to as 
the Southern regional state) is located in south and south-western part of Ethiopia, bordering with 
Kenya in the South, Sudan republic in the South-west, Gambella Region in the Northwest and 
Oromia Region in the North and East. The region has the area of 113 539 sq km and about 13 
million people (in 2003), consisting of about 60 officially recognised ethno-linguistic groups41 and 
various fragmented communities that signify remarkable heterogeneity and immense diversity in 
language and ethnic identities.  
                                                 
41 In the House of Federation 46 ethno-linguistic groups are represented, whereas in the regional state’s council of 
nationalities the ethnic groups are 61. From these, five ethnic groups have more than a million people in 2003; these 
are Sidama, Wolaita, Hadiya, Guraghe, Siltie and Gamo.  
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Ninety percent of the regional state’s population live in rural areas. Population density in the 
region is 104.6 people/sq km in 2000 (which was 91 in 1994), but in the highland areas which 
represent 40 percent of the land area and contain 80 percent of the regional population, the density 
is 400 to 500 persons/sq km: 479 in Gedeo Zone, 341 in Sidama Zone, 329 in Kembata and 
Timbaro, 296 in Hadiya and 222 in Guraghe in 2000. In contrast, the density is very low in area 
that represents 60 percent of the land area that accommodate 20 percent of the regional population 
(mostly pastoralists): 15 persons/sq. km in South Omo zone and 16 persons/sq. km and in Bench-
Maji zone. Agriculture density is also high in Gedeo (394 people/sq.km), Sidama 295, Kembata 
Timbaro 285, Hadiya 258 and Gurage 197, while it is 56 in Keffa zone, 15 in South Omo zone and 
14 in Bench Maji zone (Source BOPED 1998, SNNP). Ethnic territorial enclaves and entitlement 
could certainly affect resettlement and population movement to sparsely populated areas. 
 
Agriculture including pastoral activities provides 90 percent of the total employment in the region, 
although farmland holding is less than 2 hectare for 72 percent of the total population. Food 
production deficit in the region has reached 30 per cent in 2000, and 10 percent of the population 
has affected by chronic food shortage (BOPED 2000).  
 
In countrywide comparison, the region represents 25 percent of the Ethiopia’s total population and 
10 percent of the total landmass. It is also home for 75 percent of the 80 ethnic groups that are 
officially identified in the country. Economically, the region supplies 50 per cent of the country’s 
coffee production that accounts more than 50 percent of the national’s export earnings. In 1997 the 
Gedeo zone produced 35 per cent and the Sidama zone 22 percent of regional state’s total coffee 
supply (Regional Agriculture Bureau 1997).   
 
 6.2 Ethnic composition and relations 
The Southern regional state is home to about 60 officially registered ethnic groups with diverse 
languages and cultures belonging to the Cushitic, Omotic, Semitic and Nilotic language families. 
Sidama, Wolaita, Guraghe and Hadiya are the four major ethnic groups each with more than a 
million members in 2004. According to the 1994 national census, Sidama is the largest ethnic 
 189  
group with 1.8 million people and followed by Wolaita 1.1 million, Guarge42 870, 000, Hadiya 
861,000 and Siltie 727, 000. In 2004, with a national population growth of 3 percent per annum43, 
it is believed that Sidama people would reach 2.5 million, Wolaita 1.5 million, Guraghe 1.2 
million and Hadiya 1.1 million populations (see table 6.1 for details). Although no single ethnic 
group has a majority, the five ethnic groups (Sidama, Wolaita, Gurage, Hadiya and Siltie) account 
for more than half of the population of the regional state.  
 
It is recognized that out of the officially registered 60 ethnic groups about 45 of them have a 
population of less than 100,000, and from this about 30 have less than 10,000 populations. This 
reveal the massive difficulties faced in the Southern regional state to guarantee the constitutional 
pledges that declare for every ethnic group an ‘unconditional right to self-determination including 
secession, a right to establish its own governmental organisation pertinent to its geographical 
settlement and a rights to use and develop its own language and culture.          
 
Prior to 1991, ethnic tensions in southern Ethiopia were limited to conflicts and competition for 
resources like animal watering, pasture area, land ownership and other routine or trivial issues 
among bordering ethnic communities and were mostly mediated by local elders and traditional 
mechanisms However, since 1991 ethnic tensions and conflicts among the southern ethnic groups 
have become widespread mainly due to the ethnic elites’ competition for resources, political 
power and administrative offices (An ex-official of the regional government, Interviewee 36, 
2002: 32). On many occasions, the ethnic tensions and conflicts have demanded for the 
intervention of the federal government’s security forces because thy had become beyond the 
capacity of local mediation efforts as used to be the case prior to 1991. The local mediation 
mechanisms have been eroded because of two major factors. One, the prevalence of ethnic 
prejudices due to ethnic restructuring and ethnic favouritism have made difficult to create 
impartiality in local mediation efforts. Two, the power and influence of ethnic elites have 
suppressed the role of local elders and traditional mechanisms due to the heightened role granted 
to elites in connection with the new state structures introduced in local areas. The state structure 
utilizes the ethnic elites to extend its authority and control in every local area.              
                                                 
42 In the figure, the Guraghe population includes Sebat bet Guraghe and Sodo Gurage’s population 
43 Based on a report by UN Country Team 1999, Common Country Assessment, September 1999, Addis Ababa, page 
27 
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With regard to a common regional language, it has become difficult to find a convenient region-
based official language that can be agreeable and feasible for all ethnic communities in the 
regional state, therefore Amharic language is accepted as an official working language for the 
regional government. In a region of more than sixty ethno-linguistic groups, it would be highly 
unlikely to reach a consensus in selecting an official language from the diverse regional languages; 
therefore a selection of Amharic as a lingua franca for the regional government is a very prudent 
and rational option. However, some regional officials complained that the regional government is 
promoting a non-regional language due to the arbitrary nature of compacting about 60 ethnic 
groups in a single state structure.     
 
On the other hand, few self-administrative units at zonal and special woreda levels are using their 
respective ethnic languages in local administrative matters and elementary education within their 
respective administrative territories. Twelve ethnic groups have already started using their 
language in office and elementary schools, and studies are also in progress to allow many more 
ethnic groups to start using their ethnic languages in education and local administration. 
According to an informant the interest is very high among the ethnic groups to develop and use 
their language in offices and elementary education (A regional council member from Sidama, 
Interviewee 23, 2002: 02). However, tensions have emerged among the constituting ethnic 
communities in many of the multi-ethnic administrative territories like in North Omo, Kefa-
Sheka44 and K.A.T. to adopt a single official language among the constituting ethnic communities. 
Although language is the major nodal point of ethnic identity in Southern region, fluency in 
particular ethnic language does not necessarily give recognition as members of an ethnic 
community, rather parental or ancestral lineage and ties are highly determinant.   
 
However, it is going to be very difficult and beyond the capability of the regional as well as the 
federal government to satisfy the demands and interests of more than the 50 ethnic groups as 
resource and trained manpower are very scarce (A member of the regional executive, Interviewee 
33, 2002: 23). According to a planning expert, in 2002, at the regional government level, 40 
                                                 
44 For example in the dissolved Kefa-Sheka zone, despite very close similarity between the languages of Keffa and 
Sheka, there was tension to adopt a working language for the zonal administration (A member of the regional ruling 
party from Sheka, Interviewee 40, 2002: 45). 
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percent of job positions at various public offices are unfilled, it is more serious at zonal and 
woreda levels (A civil servant, Interviewee 24, 2002: 06). Initially, appointments based on ethnic 
preferences have resulted in flight of highly trained manpower from the regional state (An ex-
official of the regional government, Interviewee 36, 2002: 33). The policy is that leadership 
positions at regional, zonal and wereda level shall be occupied by individuals from the local ethnic 
groups, however, the majority of the professionals (about 60 per cent) working in various public 
offices and bureaucracies in the regional states are not member of the local ethnic groups. In some 
areas due to a lack of competent individual to lead key offices from local ethnic communities like 
in south Omo zones, ethnic preference has been withdrawn in appointing zonal or special wereda 
executive positions. However, the regional state has followed a policy to train massive manpower 
from individuals from ethnic groups in the region in order to totally ‘southernise’ the professional 
pool of the regional state (A regional council member from Sidama, Interviewee 23, 2002: 05). 
Nonetheless, according to an informant, a member of the TPLF and working in the regional 
government, even the regional government itself is described as incompetent to run the regional 
state (A civil servant and member of the TPLF, Interviewee 21, 2002: 01). According to an elder 
also that most of the elected officials are less educated, because party loyalty is the main criteria 
for appointment  (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 26, 2002: 09).  
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 Table 6.1 Ten major ethnic groups* in the SNNP regional state in 1994 and 2004** 
Ethnic group Population 1994  Share of regional 
population 
(percentage) 
Estimated 
population 
2004 
1. Sidama 1,818,172 18.1% 2,443,471 
2. Wolaita 1,187,299 11.4% 1,595,630 
3. Gurage***    871,717 8.3% 1,171,514 
4. Hadiya    861,055 8.1% 1,157,185 
5. Siltie    727,788 7.2% 978,086 
6. Gamo    693,732 6.6% 932,317 
7. Keffa    545,960 5.1% 733,361 
8. Gedeo    458,102 4.5% 615,650 
9. Kembata    424,912 4.0% 571,046 
10. Kulo    264214 2.5% 355,081 
Others  2,537,392 24.1% 3,410,042 
Total 9,978,053 100 13,963,384 
* Not necessarily all of their populations live in their own self-administration territorial unit 
**2004 estimation is based on the national population growth rate of 3 per cent per year 
***Gurage includes the population of Sebat Bet Gurage and Sodo Gurage 
  
The 5 major ethnic groups accounts 52 percent of the regional state population and has 30 percent 
of the seats in the state council (the legislative council). 
 
The 10 major ethnic groups account 65 percent of the regional state’s population and have 50 
percent of the seats in the state council. 
 
The 16 major ethnic groups account 75 percent of the population of the regional state and have 60 
percent of the seats in the regional state council 
 
The 44 minority ethnic groups account 20 percent of the regional state population and controls 40 
percent of the state council’s seat.   
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6.3 SNNP regional state Constitution  
The regional state has adopted its first constitution in June 1995 and a revision was made in 
November 2001 with the purpose of broadening the powers of the constituting ethnic 
communities by stressing the ethnic diversity of the regional state.  In its aspiration and 
declarations, the regional constitution is very identical to the federal constitution. Similar to the 
federal constitution, the very first words of the preamble of the southern regional constitution 
start with: ‘We, the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’, in the same way as the 
preamble of the federal constitution which states: ‘We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of 
Ethiopia’. The emphasis on ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ in both constitutions entail that 
the concept of the sovereignty or will of the people is reduced to the sovereignty or will of the 
ethnic communities which are provided by the constitutional right to form their ‘own’ self-
administrative entity with the power to issue laws and to determine its advancement.  
 
The 2001-revised constitution attempted to correct some of the flaws in the 1995 constitution. 
First, according to the 1995 SNNP regional state constitution, three-fourth majority vote of the 
state council is needed to amend the constitution, but in the 2001-revised constitution, 
amendments can only take place ‘when the State council and Council of Nationalities, in a joint 
session, approve a proposed amendment by a two-thirds majority vote; and when two-thirds of 
the Councils of Zonals and Special Weredas approve the proposed amendment by a majority 
votes’ (Article 125, the SNNP Constitution 2001). This shows that in the 2001-revised 
constitution an attempt was made at least at the theoretical level to give a greater power to the 
constituting diverse ethnic communities in amending the constitution. In the 2001-revised 
constitution the power of constitutional interpretation is vested on the Council of Nationalities. 
The Council of Constitutional Inquiry, organized by the Council of Nationalities, is responsible 
for investigating constitutional disputes and making recommendations regarding the need for 
constitutional interpretation.    
 
Second, in the constitution of 1995, there is a higher overlap between the legislative and 
executive bodies of the regional government due to the fact that it assigned a responsibility to the 
regional president for presiding over the state legislative council as its speaker and thus made the 
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regional president simultaneously a head of the executive and legislative branches. But the 2001 
constitution abandoned this overlapping power of the chief executive by establishing separate 
speakers for the state council and the council of nationalities.    
 
Nonetheless, as it was similar to the process in the federal constitution, the Southern region’s 
constitution was drafted, adopted and revised in a process overwhelmingly controlled and 
dominated by the ruling regional party, the South Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Front (SEPDF) 
which is a key ally and member of the EPRDF that controlled the federal government. In fact, 
the SEPDF45 was established by the EPRDF in 1992 to represent the Southern Ethiopian people 
in the TPLF’s attempt to extend its authority upon the diverse ethnic communities in southern 
Ethiopia.   
 
6.4 Regional legislative, executive and judicial Structures 
6.4.1 A Regional Legislative Body 
 
The 2001 Regional Constitution declares that the regional state’s legislative body shall have two 
councils: the State Council and the Council of Nationalities. Prior to 2001, the state legislative 
body had only one chamber, i.e., the State Council but with the revision of the constitution in 
2001, the second chamber, the Council of Nationalities was established in order to cope with the 
challenges and demands arising out of the immense heterogeneity of the regional state. The State 
council (or the regional parliament) is vested with the highest regional political power (Article 
46, SNNP Constitution 2001). The constitution stipulates that the people shall directly elect 
members of the state council for five years period according to a plurality electoral system and 
the constitutional pledges to give due consideration for the interests of minority nationalities and 
peoples in the region. Some of the key powers and functions of the State Council include issuing 
different laws and approving social and economic programmes; establishing additional 
administrative hierarchies or self-administering areas; electing the regional president and 
approve the appointment of the members of the regional executive council, the President and 
                                                 
45 SEPDF was reorganised in September 2003 by dissolving its 20 constituting ethnic organisations and 
merging their members into one single organisation called SEPDM (South Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic 
Movement).      
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Vice-President of the State Supreme Court, the Auditor and Vice Auditor General; establishing 
security and police force and approving the state budget (Article 51, Regional Constitution).  
Since the council meets only twice a year, most tasks of the council are done through various 
committees.  Members of the state council receive no salary from their position in the council as 
such, but get salary for their appointment or employment in various regional state’s offices at 
regional, zonal and wereda levels. Besides, many members of the regional council are also 
simultaneously serving in zonal or wereda councils.  
 
Representation in the council is based on the number of electoral districts in each zonal or special 
wereda constituencies, but minority ethnic communities are likewise represented.  Each electoral 
district has a 100,000 population which elects three representatives for the regional council; the 
minority ethnic groups with a population of less than 100,000 also elects three representative 
each. Based on the 1994 population census, there are only 16 ethnic groups with a population of 
more than 100,000 and the rest, about 50 ethnic groups, each have lesser population and many 
even below 10,000 populations. This skewed population size affects voting procedures and 
powers in the council46. The impact could be very high because of the existence of too many 
minority ethnic groups that can influence the decision making process by curtailing the rights of 
majority ethnic groups. Divide and rule and mischievous politics of groups also complicate the 
matter further. Groups in the regional as well as the federal governments could easily manipulate 
the slot to promote their sectional interests.  
 
The second chamber, the Council of Nationalities was established in February 2003 by elected 
representatives from zonal, special wereda or woreda council members of the respective ethnic 
groups. Every ethno-linguistic group47 is represented at least by one member and those ethnic 
                                                 
46 For instance, the major five ethnic groups that account for about 52 percent of the regional population control only 
30 percent of the seats in the regional council, while 44 minority ethnic groups that account for about 20 percent of 
the regional population control 40 percent of the seats in the council. An informant from Sidama explained that, for 
instance Mossiya ethnic group has less than 10,000 populations and has three representatives or one representative 
for 3000 people, whereas Sidama with 1.9 million people has 57 representatives or one representative for 33, 000 
people, which is almost 10 times under represented (A member of the Sidama zonal legislative (also member of the 
ruling party), Interviewee 30, 2002: 18).                  
47 Official list of registered ethnic groups vary from source to sources, for example in House of Federation only 46 
ethnic groups were listed; in the report of the regional planning bureau the figure was 32 and in Walta Information 
report, February 26, 2003 (WIC) speaking at the founding conference in Awassa in February 26, 2003, Hailemariam 
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groups with more than a million populations are granted a right to send one additional member 
for each one million of their additional population (Article 58, SNNP Constitution 2001).  
 
Major power and function of the Council of Nationalities include the power to interpret the 
regional constitution; to organize the regional Constitutional Inquiry Council; to decide on issues 
relating nations’, nationalities’ or peoples’ right to Zone, Special Wereda and Wereda 
administration according to the state constitution; to find solutions to disputes or 
misunderstandings that may arise between administrative hierarchies; to create favourable 
conditions for the study of the history, culture and languages of the nationalities and to approve 
(or reject) the regional constitutional amendment by a two-thirds majority vote. It has also a 
responsibility to promote and consolidate the unity and equality of the peoples of the region, 
based on their mutual consent. This duty is more of a kind of advocacy than arbitration, it could 
be very challenging for it to give a fair judgment on demands of ethnic communities to establish 
their own self-administration units as one of its major tasks is to promote unity, rather than 
separation.    
 
  
6.4.2 The regional executive body  
In accordance with article 64 of the regional constitution, ‘the highest executive power of the 
regional state is vested in the regional president and the executive council’. The regional 
president is a chief executive of the regional state and thus serves as the head of the executive 
council, which is composed of the president, vice-president and head of bureaus. The regional 
president is elected by a majority vote (a majority party or parties) in the state council or the 
regional state legislative body. 
 
Some of the major power and functions of the regional president include: 
• Leading, coordinating and representing the regional executive council.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Desalegn President of SNNP region, said that the council will be comprised of 68 members from 68 nationalities in 
the State.  
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• Selecting nominees for the post of the Vice-President of the regional state and head of 
various bureaus for the approval of the State council. 
• Selecting nominees for the post of the President and Vice-President of the State’s Supreme 
Court, the Auditor General and Vice-Auditor General for the approval of the State Council. 
• Direct and control the state’s security police forces.  
• Direct, coordinate and control administrative hierarchies in zonal, special wereda, and 
wereda structures.  
 
The regional president is responsible for selecting the nominees for positions of the executive 
council that require the approval of the state council. Since the president is drawn from the 
majority party or parties in the council, there is always a higher probability that his nominees 
could get immediate approval from the state council. This pattern can make the power of the 
regional president very dominant and overbearing. The constitution also affirms the 
concentration of the regional executive power in the hands of the regional state president as it 
proclaims that the executive council shall be accountable to the chief executive while its 
accountability to the state council is only related to the decision it makes (Article 65, SNNP 
Constitution 2001).  
 
The regional executive council (or regional cabinet) is composed of the regional president, vice 
president and heads of various bureaus (or regional ministries) of the regional government who 
are nominated by the regional president and approved by the state council. No written rules or 
procedures exist to determine ethnic composition of the regional executive body; however it is 
tacitly agreed that it must reflect the diverse ethnic communities constituting the regional state. 
Merit and loyalty are highly considered, but merit without loyalty to the party is not acceptable, 
loyalty to the ruling group is indispensable to serve in the regional cabinet  (A regional council 
member from Sidama, Interviewee 23, 2002: 02). According to an informant the executive 
positions are very alluring for the ethnic elites as well as the ethnic communities, people ask 
‘who is in office from my ethnic community’, and they are keen to see their kith and kin in 
bureaucrat positions and also prefer to approach them for whatever reasons (An ex-official of the 
regional government, Interviewee 36, 2002: 32). 
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Major powers and functions of the executive council include implementation of laws and 
decision issued by the State Council and Federal government, issuing directives, preparing the 
regional budget submitted to the state council for approval, draft laws, formulate economic and 
social policies and strategies of the state as well as declare state of emergency (Article 66, the 
SNNP Constitution 2001). The power of the regional executive council to implement laws and 
decisions issued by the federal government without consulting or demanding approval from the 
state legislative could circumvent the power of the regional legislative council, which is the 
highest legislative body in the regional state, thereby making it easier for the federal government 
to interfere in the regional legislative power. This would be harmful for federal project. The 
concentration of regional state’s executive power in the hands of the regional state president and 
direct accountability of the regional executive body to the federal government may facilitate 
state-federal relations, but it could also turn the regional state into a puppet of the federal 
government. Nonetheless, the regional state legislative power is highly reduced due to the 
constitutionally legitimised power concentration of the regional president and the constitutionally 
guaranteed power of the regional executive council to directly implement laws and decision 
issued by the federal government without seeking the approval of the regional legislative council. 
This could make the regional government instrumental or vulnerable to the interests of the 
federal government.  
 
6.4.3 The regional judicial power 
The regional constitution proclaims in Article 74 and 75 that the judicial power in the State is 
exclusively vested in the courts. The regional justice system is organized into a three-tier judicial 
structure that comprises the State Supreme Court, High Court, and Wereda court. This means a 
Supreme Court at the regional government level, High courts at zonal and special wereda levels 
and wereda courts at wereda level. The highest and final judicial authority over State matters is 
vested in the State Supreme Court and the First Instance Judicial Authority of the State is vested 
in the Wereda Court. The State Supreme Court is responsible for the preparation and 
implementation (upon approval by the State Council) of the administrative budget of courts in 
the regional state. The State Supreme Court has likewise power of cassation over any final court 
decision on State matters which contains a basic error of law, but its decision on federal matters 
are appealable to the Federal Supreme Court (Article 75).  
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With regard to the appointment of judges, the President and Vice-President of the State Supreme 
court are appointed by the state legislative upon recommendations by the president of the 
regional state. The state’s legislative council, upon a recommendation by the regional state 
Judicial Administrative Council and advice from the Zonal and Wereda Administrative Councils 
and the Federal Judicial Administrative Council, appoints other judges of the high courts and 
wereda courts. Although the advice required from the federal judicial institution could help to 
maintain national standards and professional quality, it could also facilitate the intrusion of the 
federal government into the affairs of the regional state judicial authorities. As discussed (above 
in Chapter 4) the Federal Judicial Administrative Council is highly exposed to manipulations and 
influences of the federal executive body, particularly the prime minister. Under the 
circumstances, the state judicial power can also be exposed to similar pressures and interferences 
by the federal government’s executive authority.  
 
The State’s Judicial Administrative Council is established by the majority of judges working in 
the regional state and the president of the State Supreme Court serves as its leader. It is 
responsible for determining codes of professional conduct and discipline as well as transfer of 
judges of any courts in the regional state (Article 77). At this level also, since the regional 
president has a significant influence on the appointment of the President of the State Supreme 
Court, it is evident that the significant executive’s influence and control of the judicial operation 
deprives its independence and thus hinders the highly needed separation of power in the 
regional state.     
 
Perhaps, because of budget constraint three important functions of the judicial authority, namely 
the Supreme Court President, the Chairman of the Judicial Administrative Council and a 
President of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry are given to a single individual that is very 
close and accountable to the regional President. The pattern is similar and even worse in the 
federal government where the Supreme Court President, the Chairman of the Judicial 
Administrative Council, the President of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry and the President 
of the National Election Board are concentrated on a single individual favoured by and allied to 
the prime minister, who is the chief executive of the federal government. It is evident that the 
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regional states judicial power is centralized and concentrated at the regional government level at 
the expense of the zonal and wereda structures due to the multitude of judicial and administrative 
power of the state’s Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court is acting as the highest and final 
judicial authority in the regional state with a power of cassation; it has authority in the 
appointment of regional judges and in preparation of administrative budget of courts in the 
region.   
 
 
6.5 Zonal or Special Wereda administrative structures 
Administratively, the region is divided into 13 zones, 8 special woredas, 104 woredas, and 3772 
kebeles, (initially it had 9 zones, 5 special weredas 96 weredas)48. The Zonal or Special Wereda 
structures are established hierarchically next to the regional government and have their own 
legislative (zonal or special wereda councils), executive (zonal or wereda administrative 
councils) and judiciary organs (higher courts). The intention had been that ethno-linguistic 
identity should be used as a base in fixing the boundaries of zonal and special wereda 
administrations (BoPED 1998). However, except for the 12 ethnic communities49 most of the 
ethnic communities (about 75 percent) are constituted into multi-ethnic administrative 
constituencies.  
 
A special wereda structure is designed for small ethnic groups, which are too small to establish a 
zonal administration, but concentrated in a specific territory that can have ‘political significance’ 
to the establishment of their own self-administrative constituency. The special wereda structure 
has a similar constitutional and hierarchical status like the zonal structures; however it usually 
has a smaller population. From the total of about 50 small ethnic groups only 8 small ethnic 
                                                 
48 More zonal, special wereda or wereda administrations mean more budgets for administration or 
bureaucratic purposes, the desire is to have less of them, but due to the discourse (and policy) of ethnic 
rights for self-administration, there has always been a demand for separate or additional administrative 
structures.        
49 These 12 single-ethnic constituencies are Sidama, Wolaita, Hadiya, Keffa, Siltie, Gedeo, Dawro, Alaba, 
Amaro, Yem, Konta, Basketo, but still in these constituencies 10 to 20 percent of their populations consist 
of people from other ethnic communities.     
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groups50 are granted a right to establish their ethnic constituency that could allow them to 
exercise self-administration.      
 
 The zonal or special wereda councils are the highest political authority within the zonal or 
special wereda structures but without overriding the power of the regional state council, which 
has the highest political authority in the regional state. The zonal or special wereda people elect 
directly members of the councils and the political party or parties that have the greatest numbers 
of seats in the Council. The council must have at least two sessions annually.  It is assumed that 
the speaker and vice-speaker of the council represent the council in day-to-day manner in order 
to check and balance the executive power. But what is actually taking place is that the speakers 
work in collaboration with the zonal or special wereda executives by drastically reducing the 
separation of power at zonal or special wereda level.  
 
According to the SNNP constitution, some of the major powers and functions of the councils 
include determination of the working language; protection of the rights of nationalities to speak, 
write and develop their languages, and preserve their history; approving of the appointment of 
the members of Zonal or Special Wereda Administrative Councils and choosing Presidents and 
Vice-Presidents of High and Wereda Courts, upon recommendation by Chief Administrator from 
among judges of respective courts (Article 81).  
 
The executive power of the zonal or special wereda structure is vested on the administrative 
council, which consist of a chief administrator (the zonal leader), deputy chief administrator, and 
heads of the various government departments at zonal or special wereda level. The chief 
administrator, who is elected upon recommendation by the political party with the greatest 
number of seats in the administrative council, has more significant power than the administrative 
council and is accountable to zonal or special wereda legislative council and the regional 
president. He has a responsibility of directing the administrative council, nominating its 
members, ensuring the proper implementation of the State and Federal constitutions, policies, 
                                                 
50 The four ethnic groups: Konta, Konso, Alaba, Amro (Koyra) have a little more than 100, 000 populations, Gidole 
(Derashe), Yem has a little above 50,000 and Basketo and Burji have less than 50, 000 populations. But there are 
many groups which have the same level of population like Meienit, Mocha Malie Mareko, but did not get the 
opportunity for special wereda status. Since there are no clear objective criteria, the demand may arise in the future.  
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laws, directing and controlling the security and police forces, selecting nominees of the High and 
Wereda Courts from among judges, and other similar duties (Article 87).  
 
Although the zonal or special wereda administrative unit in the SNNP regional state is supposed 
to be a sort of self-administrative political space for ethnic groups, the constitutional provision in 
article 87 stipulates that the chief administrator of the zonal or special wereda administration is 
also accountable to the regional president. This direct power of the regional president certainly 
limits the power and autonomy of the zonal or special wereda administration that is designed to 
guarantee ethnic autonomy and self-administration in accordance with the key promise as well as 
the rationale behind the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia. The speakers of zonal or special 
wereda council in the legislative branch and the chairman of zonal or special wereda 
administration council in the executive branch can apparently institute a separation of power 
between the executive and legislative bodies. However, the chief executive who controls the 
financial, security and other key state offices, always has a tendency to overrun and dictate. In 
addition, the speakers can allay the pull of the executive and can easily join the network of power 
in the local areas. Thus, the administrative structure simply facilitates the imposition of tyranny 
through conscription of the local elites in to the network of the ruling group. 
 
Furthermore, the judicial power of the zonal or special wereda structure is almost non-existent, 
as its authority is limited in selecting the President and Vice-President of the Higher Courts from 
among the judges appointed by the regional government. The independence of the judiciary is 
impeded due to the fact that the executive branches have a vital power to influence the selection 
of the President and Vice-President of the Higher Court. The judiciary branch at all levels has 
become subordinated to either the executive or the legislative branch. The pattern is similar at the 
federal government level as well. In addition, since members of the regional state council are 
working at the same time in zonal and wereda councils and are also employed in various 
administrative positions in the regional, zonal and wereda state structures, it impedes the 
existence of a separation of power among the various governance structures and state-organs. 
Moreover, the zonal administration has also a direct control over the wereda administrations in 
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budget allocation51 and appointment of the public officials (A wereda administrator, Interviewee 
41, 2002: 47).  
 
In the SNNP regional state, it is evident that the ruling party the SEPDF/EPRDF exclusively 
controls all political and administrative spaces in the regional state in accordance with the 
EPRDF’s political ideology of ‘revolutionary democracy’ that stresses centralization of party 
structures and governance at the same command and hierarchy. Opposition groups are allowed to 
operate just to make a visibility for multiparty politics at the election time, but without getting 
any crucial role in the executive, legislative or judicial function of the regional state at all levels 
of governance. In May 2000 election, for example, the opposition party the Southern coalition 
led by Dr. Beyene Petros managed to win in a zonal administration and secured some seats at the 
regional as well as federal parliament52. However, its victory caused much punishment to the 
zonal population like dozens of killing, thousands detention and imprisonment, denying fair 
budget allocation and other grave human rights abuses (A member of the federal legislative from 
the opposition party, Interviewee 43, 2002: 50; Pausewang and Aalen 2002: 223).   
 
         Opposition groups like the Sidama liberation movement (SLM) are allowed to open an office in 
Awassa town but with a restricted right to campaign and operate in the rural areas; their 
operation is highly controlled and interfered (A member of the opposition party, Interviewee 32, 
2002: 21). The people’s support for the opposition groups was not tolerated by the regional 
government, as areas that voted for the opposition such as, in Hadiya zone there were killings, 
imprisonment and vengeance measures of the regional government (A development agent, 
Interviewee 22, 2002: 01; Tronvoll 2002: 172)  
 
         Generally, the participations of the people in the 1995 and 2001 elections were very poor, the 
ruling party’s nominees at all levels dominated the elections and the people had no adequate 
knowledge regarding the background and history of the individuals they voted for. No frequent 
                                                 
51 Since 2003 wereda budget was allocated in block grant to wereda administration by the regional government, but 
in SNNP regional state, zonal administration are considered as an ethnic administrative constituency therefore they 
still have tremendous power over wereda administrations structured at a lower hierarchy within the zonal 
constituencies.   
52 In 2000 election, the opposition groups in Southern regional state has won 21 seats in the state council which has 
346       seats and less than 10 seats in the national parliament. 
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discussions and contact with candidates was made; people were not aware of what the officials 
were actually doing (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 28, 2002: 12). The ideology in the SNNP is 
that, according to the regional state official, a centralized leadership and vanguard party is very 
essential in transforming the lives of the people of the regional state as the SEPDF/EPRDF is 
highly committed to bring socio-economic transformation in the region, ‘thus to perform the 
task, it has to be the dominant political force and the leader of the regional state’ (A member of 
the regional executive, Interviewee 37, 2002: 38). 
6.6 Financial capacity and autonomy of the SNNP regional 
state 
SNNP regional state gets a large amount of financial transfer or subsidy from the federal 
government. For instance in 2001/02, from the total regional state budget of 978 million birr, 82 
percent of the fund was covered through the federal transfer (BoPED 2002: 49). Sixty-two 
percent of the amount was allocated to cover recurrent budget and the rest for capital budget. The 
regional government alone appropriated 26 percent of the federal subsidy and distributed the rest 
74 percent to zonal and special wereda administrative units.  From the total regional state’s 
capital budget in 2001/02, which is about 370 million birr (38 percent of the total budget) almost 
81 percent was covered through external loan (34%) and aid (47%); only 19 percent of the 
capital budget was covered through domestic financing sources.  
6.6.1 Budget subsidy distribution and the problems 
The subsidy from the federal government to the regional government is distributed to the 21 
ethnically delimited administrative units (13 zones and eight special weredas), with the aim of 
allowing some sort of self-administration for the diverse ethnic groupings constituting the 
regional state. As a result, budget allocation to each zone or special wereda administration is 
viewed in terms of resource distribution among the ethnic communities in the regional state. 
Thus to reduce tensions and damaging competition for financial resources, a subsidy allocation 
formula is prepared in order to make discernible and fair budget allocations. Initially, in 1994/95 
fiscal year, a grant allocation formula for capital expenditures was designed on the basis of five 
indexes: population 30%, development level index 25%, income generation effort 20%, capital 
expenditure in the previous year 15% and area size 10%. For recurrent expenditures the 
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allocation was based on administrative structures and own revenues of the regional states (World 
Bank 2000: 29). In 1995/96 fiscal year, the overall budget allocation formula was prepared on 
the basis of three major indexes, namely size of population, level of development and internal 
revenue generation effort. Size of population index is allotted the largest portion with 60%, and 
the level of development and internal revenue generation indexes are allocated 25% and 15% 
respectively.  
 
The 1994 population census result has been used to determine the size of the population of each 
zone or special wereda administrative territory, but some ethnic groups claimed that errors were 
made in the census that made their number less than what they found out in other survey53. The 
level of development index includes indicators such as education services, health services, safe 
drinking supply, road network, and electricity coverage and telephone service. The internal 
revenue generation capacity index is based on the amount of revenue and tax collection of the 
zone or special wereda administration. This indicator is included in order to encourage internal 
revenue generation capacities (BoPED 2002: 8). In 1996/97, a revision was made to reduce the 
eight indicators to five indicators in order to calculate the level of development index. The five 
indicators include the number of health clinics, primary schools, telephone lines, electricity 
consumption and road lengths. Nomadic people are given a special treatment where 1% of the 
budget has been allocated to them in addition to their share (A civil servant, Interviewee 24, 
2002: 06). In 2002 a revision was made to allocate 55 percent for population size, 30% for 
development level and 15% for revenue capacity, but the regional council approved the formula 
despite a significant opposition54 from members from the majority ethnic groups  (A regional 
council member from Sidama, Interviewee 23, 2002: 4).   
 
The SNNP regional state’s financial framework is characterized by a high dependency on the 
federal funding (85 per cent), high subsidy spending at the regional government level, high (81 
percent) external assistance in capital budget allocation, and very low internal revenue share in 
overall regional as well as zonal and special wereda units budget. The internal revenue 
                                                 
53 For instance, Sidama officials claimed that the polio survey afterwards has shown higher number than the census 
figure, (A member of the Sidama zonal legislative (also member of the ruling party), Interviewee 30, 2002: 13), 
54 According to a different informant that from 346 total council members, 80 members mostly from Sidama, 
Wolaita and Guraghe ethnic groups voted against the new formula.  
 206  
generating capacity was less than 35 percent of the total budget in all of the 21 administrative 
constituencies. These certainly make the regional government highly vulnerable to the federal 
intervention and control. 
Table 6.2 Budget subsidy distributions in the SNNP, 2000  
Zone or Special 
Wereda 
Share of 
regional 
population 
Percentage  
Share of 
Budget  
Subsidy 
Percentage 
Share of internal 
revenue from 
total budget 
Percentage 
1. Sidama 19.71 16.74 24 
2. Wolaita 11.24 10.00 17 
3. Gurage 10.90 10.54 30 
4. Gamogoffa 10.41 11.83 17 
5. Hadiya  9.23 7.58 21 
6. Keffa  5.59 7.26 17 
7. Silte  5.55 5.05 21 
8. Gedeo  5.44 5.82 34 
9. Kembata Timbaro  5.21 4.76 21 
10. Bench Majji  3.27 4.21 23 
11. Debub (South) 
Omo 
 3.16 3.58 17 
12. Dawro  2.63 3.54 13 
13. Shaka  1.27 1.46 35 
14. Konso Special 
Wereda 
 1.52 1.36 13 
15. Alaba Special 
Wereda 
 1.24 1.01 29 
16. Amaro Special 
Wereda 
 0.95 1.19 15 
17. Derashe Special 
Wereda 
 0.87 0.89 16 
18. Yem Special 
Wereda 
 0.62 0.92 14 
19. Konta Special 
Wereda 
 0.50 1.00 13 
20. Burji Special 
Wereda 
 0.37 0.54 16 
21. Basketo Special 
Wereda 
 0.32 0.62 14 
Total  100 100 18 (the Regional 
state) 
Regional 
government alone  
 26 3 
Zones and Special 
Weredas combined 
 74 22 (average) 
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Source: Bureau of Planning and Economic Development 2002. ‘Zones, Special Weredas 
and Weredas Budget distribution formula’ 
Moreover, the subsidy formula is surrounded by many problems. Firstly, allocating the highest 
amount (60 percent) to the population index for calculating the budget subsidy formula could be 
inimical to demographic or population policy that stresses the need of controlling population 
explosion. Since the budget allocation procedure magnifies the luring role of population size in 
securing more federal finance, it becomes very difficult to convince the ethnic elites to 
implement population control policies in their respective areas. Larger populations could be 
interpreted as a way of obtaining more money and power by the ethnic elites who control power 
and politics in their respective constituencies. Secondly, census results have become political as 
the elites are rejecting census figures that cannot fit with their assumptions or expectations. For 
instance, the Sidama politicians mentioned that the population of the Sidama zone was 4 million 
as it was reported in the census result for the polio vaccination in contrary to the 1994 census 
result of 2.4 million (A member of the Sidama zonal legislative and member of the ruling party, 
Interviewee 30, 2002: 13). Thirdly, the regional state’s formula is similar to the federal budget 
subsidy procedure and computation. This is mainly due to a lack of expertise and adequate 
regional information to design appropriate formula reflecting the socio-economic conditions of 
the regional state (BoPED 2002: 1). Fourthly, the internal revenue generation index can create a 
dilemma by favouring the privileged and wealthy areas because those with better qualified 
manpower and more resources could benefit more than those with shortage of experts and 
resources that could be marginalized further. Lastly, the earlier apparent cooperative attitude 
among the elites of the various ethnic groups was turned into hostilities and harmful competition 
for budget allocations. This was especially, related to the fact that the Sidama and Wolaita zones 
are getting relatively large budget, and many believed that this happened because that the SNNP 
leadership was dominated by these two groups (An ex-official of the regional government, 
Interviewee 36, 2002: 32). 
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6.7 The right to self-determination in practice in the SNNP 
6.7.1 Impracticality of an ethnically homogeneous territory 
The ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia presupposes and projects an ethnically homogeneous 
territorial space, which may have been influenced by the reality of the Tigray province and the 
perception of the TPLF leadership. In the SNNP regional state which is home to about 60 
officially registered ethnic groups, an attempt has been made to create ethnically delimited 
administrative structures at zonal and wereda levels, despite the rare existence of ethnically 
homogeneous zonal or wereda territories. In 2002, there were about 13 zonal and 8 special 
Wereda administrative structures in which the attempt was made to give about 21 ethnic groups 
their own ethnically delimited self-administration status at zonal or special wereda structures (see 
the list in Table 6.3). But in fact, the greater majority, two-third of the ethnic groups share the 
same zonal or wereda administrations with other ethnic groups without having been accorded 
their own self-administration status, which is promised in the federal and regional constitutions. 
Although many of the ethnic groups have majority in their respective administrative zone, the 
large minority population resides in each zone as well.             
             
As a result, even most of these 21 zonal and special wereda ethnic administrative units are not 
structured in the way to exercise local autonomy or ethnic self-administration, as the regional 
constitution itself clearly declares in Article 80 that ‘the Zone and Special Wereda administration 
is an administrative hierarchy next to the region’ which exercises its political power without 
defying the State Council that is the highest political power in the regional state (Article 51 (2), 
The Regional constitution, 2001).  In some multi-ethnic zones like the Kembata Alaba and 
Timbaro (K.A.T) minority ethnic groups as the Alaba have felt that they were unfairly 
represented in political structures and resource allocation55 and therefore granted a separate 
ethnic administrative constituency for their ethnic community (A member of the regional ruling 
party from Alaba, Interviewee 42, 2002: 49). Though the Alaba group was able to get its 
territorial administrative constituency, others like Gofa, Timbaro are denied such rights, as there 
                                                 
55 According to the informant the problems include bias in budget allocation to Kembata area, scholarship 
allocation favors students from Kembata group, Alaba wereda officials are accountable to zonal 
administration which was overwhelmingly controlled by the Kembata group, which is the dominant ethnic 
group in the zone.   
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is no clear rule or regulation in granting self-administration to some while in denying it to others. 
Such arbitrary and discriminatory treatment by the political system itself could breed resentment 
that easily could flare up into violence as occurred in North Omo, Benchi-Maji and Sheka 
zones56.  
 
Further fragmentation as the result of the establishment of more administrative constituencies for 
each ethnic community is indisputably beyond the capacity of both the national and local 
economies to cover the cost of such structure. Administrative and bureaucratic costs would 
become a burden for the poor local communities and the already impoverished economies. In 
reality, the source of the problem is the arbitrary nature of ethnic restructuring in Ethiopia, 
particularly in SNNP region and the inconsistency in tackling the emerging problems.  The 
ruling group in the federal as well as its allies in the regional government may be more interested 
in consolidation and integration, but their preferred implementation approaches seem to rely 
more on imposition and punitive measures. As such federal restructuring is a process of 
continuous negotiation and bargaining, as Elazar (1989) has argued forceful imposition is 
inimical to federal restructuring. Mechanisms and strategies can be designed through negotiation 
that could downgrade the attractiveness of self-administrative zonal or special wereda structures 
by drying up luring inducements for ethnic elites. The recent wereda decentralization programme 
can also be cited as an example57.  
 
Furthermore, due to the fact that zonal and special wereda territories are based on ethnic criteria, 
there is high asymmetry in capacity, resource and population size of the different units. For 
instance, only four zonal administrations (the Sidama, Wolaita, Gurage and Gamogofa) represent 
more than 50 percent of the total population of the regional states, while the six smallest self-
                                                 
56 The violence in North Omo zone in 2001 was attributable to dissatisfactions with the zonal 
administrative structure and resulted in splitting the zone into three zones and two special weredas. Violent 
conflicts occurred in 1991, 1993 and 2002 in Benchi-Maji zone due to the dissatisfaction of the Mejinger 
ethnic groups in zonal representation and resource distribution (A member of the regional ruling party from 
Keffa, Interviewee 39, 2002: 42).  
 
               57 For instance since 2004 budget allocation is made directly for wereda structure by allocating block 
grants to wereda administration without any power to the zonal administration, though the change was 
made not as a result of local demand and negotiation, but it was imposed from above in line with the World 
Bank’s decentralization programme.         
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administrative units of Basketo, Burji, Konta, Yem, Derashe and Amaro special weredas 
represent less than five percent of the regional population. In other words, while the largest four 
ethnic administrative constituencies together represent 52 percent of the regional population, the 
smaller five ethnic administrative constituencies together represent less than 5 percent of the 
regional population.   
 
The other major problem is the selection of a working language, particularly in multi-ethnic 
zones. Although the constitution of the SNNP regional state proclaims that zonal and special 
wereda councils have the right and duty in determining the working language of their respective 
administrative unit and protecting the rights of nationalities in their respective territory to speak, 
write and develop their languages, in the majority of cases the ostentatious constitutional 
intention has remained theoretical. Only few zonal administrations like Gedeo, Hadiya, 
Kembata, Sidama and Wolaita zonal administrations have introduced their languages in their 
respective zones. Two major problems occurred in the language usage. Firstly, in multi-ethnic 
zonal administrations such as Guraghe, Gamogofa, Benchi Majji, Debube Omo, and Sheka zones 
it has become difficult to select any of the indigenous languages for administrative purpose or in 
elementary education programmes. Secondly, in the so-called ethnically homogenous 
zones/special weredas, despite the dominance of a single ethnic group and introduction of a 
single language in administration and elementary education, there are large communities who do 
not belong to the dominant ethnic group. In most cases the languages of the dominant ethnic 
groups are imposed on others in many of the administrative constituencies, and this has resulted 
in unending ethnic tensions and hostilities by generating harmful competition and sectarian 
goals. Finally, in almost all ethnically delimited zonal and wereda administrations, a 
considerable proportion of people, who do not belong to the dominant ethnic groups, are living 
in the areas for many generations, but they are disenfranchised due to an exclusive control of a 
dominant ethnic group in the constituencies. These disenfranchised people are not only those 
identified as coming from ‘out of the region’, (or ‘settlers’) but also it includes a sizeable 
population of the regional state who are coming from the adjacent territories due to a movement 
of people for generations. For instance, in Hadiya zone 20 per cent of the zonal populations are 
coming from the adjacent territories like from Siltie, Sodo Guraghe and Kembata, but since the 
zone is delimited as Hadiya ethnic group constituency, these people from the same regional state 
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are counted as ‘strangers’ or ‘alien’ and thus disenfranchised. In Kembata-Timbaro zone 20 
percent, Benchi Majji 33 percent, Shaka zone 40 percent and Derashe special wereda 31 percent 
of population, coming from the same regional state are counted as outsiders.  (See the ethnic 
configuration of each ethnically delimited territory: zones and some special weredas in Table 
6.3). The discrimination is not only limited to depriving electoral rights, but it includes also 
denying access to fair judicial process, discrimination from employment and other similar 
prejudices (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 27, 2002:10)58. According to an informant that due to 
massive human rights abuse and poor governance, support for ethnic federalism has deteriorated, 
thus ‘it should be dismantled and replaced by governance structure that serves everybody with 
equality and justice’ (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 26, 2002: 09). In its rhetoric on group 
(ethnic) rights, ethnic restructuring has brought massive abuse of individual rights. Individuals 
have become ‘subjects’ of ethnic groups with reduced citizenship rights. Group’s rights in self-
administration, language promotion and other rights are introduced without concern for the 
rights- both political and human rights- of an individual. Moreover, a numerical strength of an 
ethnic group in a given territory has been determinant in granting a separate administrative 
constituency, dominant political power and access to resource such as a subsidy distribution. The 
numerical strength yardstick would be counterproductive in making census results very 
controversial and alluring for ethnic cleansing and expulsion.  
 
 
Table 6.3 Ethnic groups and their share of population within the 21 administrative 
structures 
Zone or 
Special 
Wereda 
Number of  
Population 
(2000) 
Share of 
regional 
population 
Major Ethnic groups and their share 
of zonal or special wereda 
population in percentage 
Working 
and 
School 
language 
1. Sidama 2,466,132  19.71% Sidama 88%, Amhara 4%, Oromo 
3%, Welaita 2%, Siltie 1%, Others 
2% 
Sidama 
2. Wolaita 1,406,450 11.24% Wolaita 96%, Others 4% Wolaita 
3. Gurage 1,364,715 10.90% Sebat Bet Guraghe 70%,  Amharic 
                                                 
              58 Many interviewed individuals from Wolaita, Kembata, Gurage and other Southern ethnic groups who 
lived fore generations in Awassa city complained that they faced various kinds of discrimination and 
treated as ‘strangers’ by the city administration because of their ethnic background. The trend is the same in 
many of the urban areas like Hosahena, Arba Minchi, Shebedino, Wolaita sodo, Mizan Teferi, Teppi and 
other towns thought the region wherein people live mixing together. 
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Sodo Guraghe 14%, Mareko 3%, 
Amhara 3%, Others 10 
4. Gamo Goffa 1,302,408  10.41% Gamo 60%, Gofa 21%, Others 
19%, 
Amharic 
5. Hadiya 1,155,135 9.23% Hadiya 78%, Silti 10%,  
Sodo Guraghe 2%, Amhara 2%, 
Kembata 2%, Others 6%  
Hadiya 
6. Keffa    699,759 5.59% Keffa 71%, Amhara 7%, Oromo 
4%, Others 18% 
Amharic 
7. Siltie    694,258  5.55% Siltie 90%, Others 10% Siltie 
8. Gedeo    680,289  5.44% Gedeo 81%, Oromo 8%, Amhara 
4%, Sidama 1%, Siltie 3%, Others 
4% 
 
9. Kembata 
Timbaro 
   651,625 5.21% Kembata 65%, Timbaro 12, Siltie, 
9%, Hadiya 6%, Others 7% 
Kembata 
10. Bench 
Majji 
   408,702  3.27% Bench 42%, Meienit 15%, Keffa 
7%, Amhara 6%, Diz 6%, Suri 5%,  
Others 15% 
Amharic 
11. Debub 
(South) Omo 
   395,417   3.16% Ari 42%, Malie 13%, Hamer 12%, 
Dasenech 10%, Amhara 5%, 
Nyangatom 4%, Others 11% 
Amharic 
12. Dawro    329,663  2.63% Dawro 92%, Others 8% Amharic 
13. Shaka   159,032 1.27% Shaka 60%, Others 40%  
14. Konso 
Special 
Wereda 
   190,052 1.52% Konso 87%, Gewada 9%, Amhara 
1%, Oromo 1%, Burji 0.5%, Others 
1% 
Amharic 
15. Alaba 
Special 
Wereda 
  155,718 1.24% Alaba 75%, Others 15%, Amharic 
16. Amaro 
Special 
Wereda 
  118,571 0.95% Koyra 98%, Mara 1%, Others 1% Amharic 
17. Derashe 
Special 
Wereda 
  108,422 0.87% Gidole 58%, Gewada 19%,  
Mossiya 10%, Amhara 2%, Konso 
2%, Others 6% 
Amharic 
18. Yem 
Special 
Wereda 
     78,213  0.62% Yemsa 91%, Oromo 5%, Hadiya 
1%, Others 3% 
Amharic 
19. Konta 
Special 
Wereda 
     63,101 0.50% Konta 80%, Others 20% Amharic 
20. Burji 
Special 
Wereda 
     46,729  0.37 Burji 84%, Koyra 11%, Konso 1% 
Others 4% 
Amharic 
21. Basketo 
Special 
     40,609 0.32 Basketo 92%, Others 8% Amharic 
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Wereda 
The Regional 
state  
12.5 million  Sidama 18.2%, Wolaita 11.5%, 
Hadiya 8.2%, Sebat Bet Gurage 
7.0%, Gamo 6.9%,  
Amharic 
Source: Bureau of Planning and Economy 2001, Zonal, Special Weredas and Weredas 
Budget allocation formula. (In Amharic: Yezonoche, Lliyuweredawochena Weredawoche 
Budget Makefafiya Kemer).     
 
Moreover, due to a long process of inter-ethnic integration in southern Ethiopia and population 
movements for many generations from other parts of the country, people of mixed ethnic 
background are paramount residents of most of the towns in southern regional state. Immense 
difficulties have been created for the residents of many towns because of demarcating of these 
towns under a jurisdiction of a single ethnic administrative constituency or ‘ethnic homeland’. 
The political and human rights of this group of people have been drastically reduced in matters 
regarding political representation, language usage in office and elementary school, equal 
employment rights in public institutions and other similar rights59.   
 
For exmple, the SNNP regional state’s capital, Awassa city has been inhabited by a multiethnic 
communities, however the Sidama ethnic group was responsible for administering the city from 
1991 to 2002 while the Sidama people represent a minority of the city’s 69,000 populations. 
Because the city was under the jurisdiction of the Sidama zone until 2002, the city administration 
including kebele administrations were as a rule run by individuals from the Sidama ethnic group, 
thus Sidama language was a working language for administration. Since the majority population 
of the city are ethnically mixed and non-Sidama, the exclusive dominance of a single ethnic 
group (the Sidama group) resulted for immense problems of discrimination and abuse of the 
rights of the majority dwellers of the city who do not speak Sidama language. In employment, 
priority is given for individuals from Sidama ethnic group (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 26, 
2002: 09). Although the city is a center and capital of the regional state, there was no fair or 
equal consideration for other Southern ethnic group: The Gurage, Wolaita, Kembata and others 
do not have the same right as the Sidama people in Awassa town; ‘they openly request us to 
                                                 
               59 For instance in Awassa town, a long time residents belongs to Kembata ethnic group, who is considered 
as belonging to one of the oppressed southern ethnic communities, complained that his brother was killed 
by an individual from Sidama ethnic group but it becomes difficult for him to pursue the case in zonal court 
because of the impartiality of the Sidama administrators for their kin (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 27, 
2002: 10). 
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leave the town by saying: ‘go to your area’ (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 27, 2002: 10). 
However, the Sidama elite feels that principles of ethnic federalism and the Constitution grant 
them a right to use and promote their language, to have their own self-administrative 
constituency and promote the overall interests and benefit of the Sidama people (A leader of 
Eder, Interviewee 28, 2002: 12).  
 
 For the last ten years the residents of the town had passed their grievances and dissatisfaction on 
the administration of the city to the regional as well as federal governments, but they felt that a 
regional president, himself a Sidama, was not considerate to their demands. In its part the federal 
government was more concerned to strengthen its relationship with the regional government, 
which was its chief ally, rather than siding with the people (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 27, 
2002: 10). However, after the removal of the regional president60 the issue was decided by the 
state council in 2002 that the status of Awassa city to be an independent city accountable to the 
regional government which became effective in 2003. It is difficult to assume whether it is 
because of a concern for the grievance of the city’s dwellers or a change of policy from the 
TPLF/EPRDF to shift its alliance from Sidama elites to Wolaita elites by favouring the 
ascendancy of Wolaita individuals to the top office of the regional government. It can also be 
assumed that TPLF/EPRDF, which is, worried about the demand of the Sidama elites for 
separate regional state and had got a good opportunity to punish the Sidama elite61 in deflating 
their ambition by reducing their leading role in the regional government and drastically 
narrowing the power base of their ethnic constituency. Nevertheless, the action of EPRDF was 
met with a violent resistance that led to the massacre of civilians by the government’s security 
forces after the Sidama people’s demonstration in Awassa town in May 2002. The Sidama elites 
believe that Awassa city is within the Sidama constituency and therefore it is under the right of 
Sidama people to decide the status of the city (A member of the Sidama zonal legislative and 
member of the ruling party, Interviewee 30, 2002: 16). An elder also claimed that ‘other 
                                                 
            60 The President, Abate Kisho was arrested in 2001 with alleged in corruption charges, but many believed 
that the true motive was connected to a split in TPLF in which the ex-president was close ally of the 
dissidents within the TPLF. Abate Kisho was promoted by EPRDF to a position of a regional president in 
1991 from a position of a very junior teacher of an elementary school).    
 
61 In 1996 there was a purge of Sidama political elites such as Tesfaye Fuchala, Vice Minster of Culture 
and Sport Ministry  
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nationalities came to our land, and we were kind to accept them, but now they wanted us to leave 
our land, where shall we go, how on earth should our sons leave Awassa. No, we will not’ (An 
elder from Sidama, Interviewee 35, 2002: 29).  
 
Despite the resistance, in May 2003 Awassa became an independent city directly accountable to 
the regional government. In this particular case, the Sidama elites were demanding for broaden 
their rights like to become a regional state, but in contrast, the regional government headed by 
the EPRDF wants to reduce the existing right. This appears like not a compromise, but a 
punishment. Close negotiation and bargaining could have produced a win-win situation, instead 
of the forceful imposition of rules that reduces the privilege and benefits of the Sidama 
administration that produced fierce resistance.  For instance, one win-win solution could be that 
Awassa city can get a city administration from the city dwellers, but under the jurisdiction of the 
Sidama zone by recognising the city is territorially located within the Sidama consistency, but 
due to its non-Sidama majority, it has to get a special protection from the regional government.  
 
The Awassa town has an ethno-symbolic and economic benefit for the Sidama elite, but the 
rights and interests of the non-Sidama residents in the city have also been severely curtailed and 
abused for the last ten years by the Sidama political leadership who controlled the city 
administration. However, the action taken by the ruling EPRDF government was not made in 
consistent with the general pattern, as abuses of town residents’ are common in most of the urban 
areas throughout the country. Therefore, selective and inconsistent impositions of rules and 
producers in Sidama area, which may be motivated by punitive measures, could easily trigger 
resentment and opposition. It is better to map out a countrywide strategy that can protect the 
right of the ethnically mixed urban dwellers whose rights have been massively violated by the 
leaders of the ethnic constituencies in most of the regions since 1991. Moreover, the Sidama 
group demand for a regional autonomy to establish their own regional state may be better tamed 
by allowing Awassa to remain under Sidama zone jurisdiction but with the right of the Awassa 
city dwellers to run the city administration with a rule of law. But the path selected by EPRDF to 
silence and penalise the demand was not a viable option that can create trust and cooperation in 
the regional state.   
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6.7.2 A demand to secede from the regional state   
In Sidama zone, the Sidama political elites argue that there is inconsistency in the ethnic federal 
project in Ethiopia regional state status was granted to an ethnic group with a 20,000 population 
like the Harari people, whereas it refused the same status for ethnic groups with 2 million people 
like the Sidama people. Thus the project is seen as discriminatory and suppressive (A regional 
council member from Sidama, Interviewee 23, 2002: 4). The argument is also made that the 
Sidama area has better resources than the Tigray region to finance its regional government 
budget (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 28, 2002: 12). The Sidama officials claim that the 
condensing of the earlier five regional states into a single regional state was unfair and a gross 
mistake which was effectuated without consulting the people of the region. It was imposed on 
them by the ruling group in the center, while they preferred the earlier arrangement which 
provided them a separate regional state with other three ethnic groups with whom they have 
close ties and better cooperation (A member of the Sidama zonal legislative and member of the 
ruling party, Interviewee 30, 2002: 13).  
 
The Sidama council which is, constitutionally, the highest political authority of the Sidama zone 
decided in 2002 to establish a self-governing regional state for the Sidama people, but the 
demand was coercively and quickly rejected by the regional government as well as by the federal 
government (A member of the Sidama zonal legislative and member of the ruling party, 
Interviewee 30, 2002: 14). The Sidama elite argues that the ruling party, the EPRDF, which had 
promised the right for self-administration in the constitution, completely rejected their 
constitutional right. Instead the ruling party has waged an intimidating propaganda campaign 
against the Sidama political elite by portraying them as narrow nationalists62.   
 
The Sidama people’s resentment was manifested in a demonstration in May 2002 which turned 
into violence by taking the lives of 30 to 40 civilians as a result of excessive force by the federal 
troops. In the past 12 years, nine chief administrators were dismissed or replaced in the Sidama 
zonal administration, reflecting the political trouble in the zone. Actually the constitution accords 
                                                 
            62 EPRDF dismissed many Sidama officials like Tesfaye Fuchale, Vice Minster of Culture and Sport and 
others who were member of SPDO/EPRDF in 1996 accusing them of narrowness, and in August 2002 
arresting of 10 Sidama officials, who were member of SPDO/EPRDF, accusing them of instigating 
violence in Awassa.  
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the right to self-determination including secession to ethnic groups. Therefore the Sidama people 
have legality on their side to demand self-administration, but because of fear of fragmentation, 
the ruling group in the regional and federal governments are reluctant and have used coercion 
against the Sidama elite and people to quell the challenge. The Sidama Liberation Front (SLM), 
which was established in 1970s to struggle for a self-determination of the Sidama people, is 
demanding for self-determination including secession for the Sidama people and has created an 
alliance with the OLF to engage in armed struggle against the EPRDF (A member of the 
opposition party, Interviewee 32, 2002: 21). Allowing the Sidama people to secede from the 
regional state could endanger the entire structure by triggering other demands for self-
administration in the regional state as well as in other multi-ethnic regions like the Benishangul-
Gumuz and Gambella in which the respective constituted ethnic groups are still sceptical to share 
the same regional state with the other ethic groups in their respective region. In 2006, after the 
May 2005 election, it seems that the TPLF/EPRDF has provided some concession to the Sidama 
political elite, such as appointing a Sidama individual as a president of the SNNP and other key 
appointments in the federal and regional governments in order to dissuade the Sidama political 
elite from pursuing the self-government agenda. The TPLF/EPRDF’s reward tactic may satisfy 
the political elite, but may not convince the majority of the Sidama elite and the people.        
 
Similarly, in the Sheka zone, the minority Mejinger community demanded to be included in the 
Gambella regional state in order to be re-united with the Mejinger ethnic group of that sate in 
order to form the greater Mejinger community, however when their demand was rejected, the 
resentment manifested itself in violence. According to the regional official, the demand and the 
violence was instigated by power greedy Mejinger elites and their political party, while the bulk 
of the community did not know and care in which regional state or zonal administration they 
belonged (A regional council member from Sidama, Interviewee 23, 2002: 3). 
 
In fact, the ethnic federal restructuring of the SNNP regional state has neither taken into 
consideration for self-administration of every ethnic community nor the human and political 
rights of individuals regardless of their ethnic background. Neither group rights, nor individual 
rights are respected in fair and satisfactory manner; the outcome has been the opposite of the 
pronouncement, it has resulted in massive abuse and curtailment of individual rights by illusory 
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promise of protecting group rights. The emerging phenomenon is the ascendancy of officious 
ethnic elites who impose their authority in their respective ethnic community by securing support 
and protection from the ruling group at the regional as well as federal government levels. As a 
result, the pattern resembles a neo-patrimonial structure in which the ruling group at the 
central/federal level monopolizes both the rewards and compelling powers to subdue and/or 
persuade the ethnic elites at the regional and local levels to remain its loyal at the expense of the 
interest and demands of their respective ethnic communities.  
 
It can be argued that such arrangement may be necessary to consolidate a federal structure in 
multi-ethnic societies like Ethiopia, which may have difficulties to satisfy all the demands that 
arise from the manifest immense diversity. However such argument could be convincing if the 
ruling group at the center/federal government level operates in a genuine coalition spirit of all 
ethnic groups with fair and impartial judgment. Contrary to this, the reality of Ethiopia’s federal 
arrangement is characterized as a project of hegemonic ruling group at the center dominated by 
elites from the Tigray regional state, who are constantly perceived as favouring their region. In 
addition, the Tigrayan political elite is ‘elected’ and represents the Tigray region that is less than 
10 percent of the total population of Ethiopia. They control key power positions in the federal 
government which is non-proportional to what they should be accredited if the principle of ethnic 
federal restructuring in Ethiopia was respected. The 1994 Constitution, which is the sole 
covenant of the federal bargain, declares that: ‘We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of 
Ethiopia’ strongly committed, in full and free exercise of our right to self-determination, to live 
together on the basis of equality with equal rights and powers, and fully cognizant that our 
common destiny can best be served by rectifying historically unjust relationships (FDRE 
Constitution 1994). Given this background, the hegemony of the federal government unduly and 
inaptly dominated by elites from a particular ethnic or regional group is counter-productive in 
nurturing trustworthy federal relations in multi-ethnic societies. 
 
6.7.3. Problems associated with ethnic entitlement or ethnic 
preferences 
The intense heterogeneity of the SNNP has become a most formidable challenge to the 
constituting of viable regional and local administrative structures in spite of the fact that ethnic 
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federalism was introduced as a device to manage the extraordinary diversity in the construction 
of a viable state framework in what was described as ‘a museum of nationalities’ (Cerulli 1956) 
or ‘a prisoners of nationalities’ (Gellner 1983). The major predicament is due to widespread 
egoism on the part of elites at the federal, regional and local levels that has degraded the 
diversity into destructive competitions and conflicts. Firstly, the ethnic elites are exclusively 
focused on their group interests making negotiations and compromises very difficult. For 
instance, as mentioned by an informant, despite the fact that Awassa is a regional capital where 
every group agrees that the city needs improvement of services for common utilisation, when it 
comes to approving construction projects, many feel that the benefit goes to the Sidama ethnic 
group. As a result, the others are reluctant to support city improvement projects (A member of 
the regional ruling party from Kembata, Interviewee 38, 2002: 41). Secondly, expanded 
opportunities of appropriating state resources at the local and regional levels connected with 
ethnic restructuring have created opportunities for the ascendancy of new dominant ethnic elites. 
Particularly in multi-ethnic constituencies, elites from majority ethnic communities act in a way 
to suppress demands from minority ethnic groups from accessing to political power and 
resources63.   
 
Thirdly, inter-ethnic elites competition for key posts of the regional government has grown into 
group competition; for instance, friction has emerged between the Sidama and Wolaita political 
elites for controlling of the presidential post of the regional government64. Since 2002, tension 
has been high between the ordinary Sidama and Wolaita people in Awassa city and even in rural 
areas, because the presidential post has been connected to ethno-symbolism. The Sidama 
political elites believe that, because of the size of their ethnic group that the regional presidential 
post should be preserved for their ethnic group (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 26, 2002: 9).  
 
Fourthly, in many cases the demand for separate ethnic constituencies is initiated by ethnic 
elites who manipulated the communities by speaking their language and appealing for kin 
                                                 
63 For instance, in the Sidama zone the minority ethnic group, Hadicho people and in the Keffa zone, Menga people 
are suppressed by the majority Sidama and Kefa ethnic groups respectively. 
 
64 From 1991 to 2001, for ten years, Abate Kisho from the Sidam ethnic group occupied the post, after his 
imprisoning in 2001 connected to the split in TPLF, Desalegne Haile Mariam from Wolaita has taken the 
presidential post. According to an informant, the regional president, Desalegne Haile Maiam was not accepted by 
the Sidama elite (A development agent, Interviewee 22, 2002: 01).  
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solidarity. For instance, although the Sidama elite demands separate regional states, it is 
observed, according to the regional planning expert, the budget allocated for the Sidama zone 
was under utilised due to inefficiency and high corruption in the leadership (A civil servant, 
Interviewee 24, 2002: 6).  Furthermore, separate administrative structures usually bring 
additional administrative costs that divert resources from the expansion of social services like 
education and health to the community. Even in cultural terms that the elites show great interest 
in promoting their ethnic language, the communities, although pleased by the promotion of their 
language, they are keen to have their children to learn the Amharic language as it can give them 
better prospects to find employment in other parts of the country (An elder from Sidama, 
Interviewee 35, 2002: 31). Fifthly, the promotion of ethnic or local language in administrative 
institutions may offer opportunities for the local elite to prevail over competitors or ‘outside’ 
experts for local offices by acquiring language proficiency advantage over those who do not 
speak local language. But language proficiency does not necessarily lead to acquiring 
professional competency or technical skill. Such scenario could be disadvantageous for the local 
community who would have been benefited from the professional contribution of the ‘outside’ 
experts.   
 
Sixthly, ethnic entitlement has resulted in patron-client arrangement through cooption of local 
elites. Local ethnic elites function as agents of control for the central authority because of an 
expanded incentives system created by the state’s rewarding mechanism. Actually, very 
attractive financial incentives65 particularly at the wereda level can buy loyalty and serve to turn 
local leaders into instruments of central control. Thus, ethnic federalism has opened possibilities 
for the local elites to reap benefits from the state’s rewarding capacity in resource and political 
power connected to their exclusive rights to occupy all regional, zonal and wereda administrative 
structures. Neither ethnic federalism nor the new ethnic constituencies have brought any major 
change to the lives of the majority of the local people; rather they changed the persona of local 
power holders by replacing ‘elites from the center’ with ‘elites from the local’, but both have 
been promoting the interests of power holders at the center. The former were evidently an 
extension of the central power in the local areas, whereas the latter are co-opted into the system 
                                                 
              65 It is recommended that wereda administrators should get about 1200-1500 birr monthly salary which is 
20 times greater than the national per capita and could be very higher from the local income standard  
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of ‘the coalition of oppressed elites’ (Vestal 1999). Consequently, the ascendancy of ethnic elites 
in state power and their access to state coffer and privileges are being equated with the 
satisfaction of ethnic communities’ demands for recognition and self-administration. This 
facilitated an opportunity for the hegemony for the Tigrayan political elite or the TPLF that 
controls the state center. Ethnic federalism creates an advantage for the Tigrian political elites 
initially to get a genuine support in many of the Southern ethnic communities by their 
denunciation of the Amhara ruling group as brutal and chauvinistic toward the Southern ethnic 
communities. However this genuine support has quickly dissipated as the intention of the 
Tigrayan elites has become clear that their major motive was to become a hegemonic power 
through co-option and surrogate mechanisms that helps what John Abbinik (1998) called a 
‘Tigraynisation’ of the regional power structures in Ethiopia. The TPLF is exploiting tensions 
among the ethnic groups for its self-serving interference and hegemonic ambitions. It 
exaggerates and fabricates past wounds to create ethnic mistrust and vengefulness.  
 
6.8 Summary 
            Generally, in the SNNP regional state an ethnic entitlement for a self-governing territorial 
autonomy has resulted in accelerating more demands for separate regional state, zonal or special 
wereda administrative constituency. Many ethnic groups with a territorial concentration of their 
ethnic community demand separate administrative units, but only few are able to get a new self-
administrative entity to appease their resentments. These are the Wolaita, Dawero, Sheka, Silte66, 
who got their zonal administration and the Alba who seceded from the K.A.T zone to form its 
own special woreda, and the Basketo was granted its own special wereda after dissolving of the 
North Omo zone following the bloody crisis in 2001. Many of the newly created self-
administrative entities contain ethnic minorities whose autonomy and rights are restricted due to 
the new arrangement and therefore these minority groups are demanding for their own self-
governing entities.  However, the expansion of self-governing administrative structures require 
                                                 
              66 Actually Siltie was not only established its own zonal administration, but it also decided in referendum to claim it 
is a non-Gurage ethnic group. Previously, the identity of Siltie people was identified as a sub-group of Gurage ethnic 
group and therefore Siltie people were provided a wereda administration within the Gurage zone. In referendum, 
however, the Siltie people decided that their ethnic identity is distinct from the Gurage ethnic group and recognised 
themselves as a separate ethnic group. Thus, granted their separate zonal administration.   
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additional resources for the extended bureaucracy which become a burden on the scarce regional 
resources that ought to be prioritised in order to address in tackling poverty and other precarious 
or emergency conditions of the people of the regional state.  More administrative constituencies 
means more administration costs that could be disadvantageous for the ordinary people, because 
resources that could be used for providing social services would be spent on administration 
related expenses.   
 
By hoping to discourage ethnocentric demands and divisions, the ruling party in the SNNP 
regional state, the Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Front (SEPDF) has transformed itself 
in 2003 into a unified single party by dissolving the 20 ethnic-based political organizations and 
merging them into the new South Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement, (SEPDM). It was 
believed that the unification would discourage ethnocentric demands and competition by 
facilitating integration aiming at the creation of a single political space (A member of the 
regional executive, Interviewee 37, 2002: 38). But this merger is one more imposed project from 
the federal and regional government who hope to tackle the on-going ethnic tensions in the 
SNNP regional state. This may be a face saving strategy by the EPRDF in order to claim that its 
ethnic rights discourse is creating a voluntary ‘unity in diversity’. However, many of the quick 
fix solutions that have been imposed by the federal as well as the regional governments without 
genuine consultation and discussion with the regional or local people have not convinced many 
of the ethnic communities and elites concerning the authenticity of the intention of the 
TPLF/EPRDF to respect ethnic rights and ethnic equality. As Elazar argues that ‘federalism has 
not proved to be a particularly good device for integrating diverse nationalities into a single 
political system unless it has accompanied by other factors compelling integration’ (Elazar, 
1987: 169).    
 
            A similar top-down imposition was made in the merging of the five regional states into one 
regional state in 1994. This evolution can explain the intricacies of ethnic self-administration in 
the SNNP regional state as well as the inadequacy of the on-going ethnic federal arrangement to 
manage properly and sincerely the multifaceted problems and requirements of ethnic rights and 
demands. Furthermore, it is evident that the elites from the various groups are keener to promote 
their exclusive group demands and interests. As Horowitz (1985) argues that without an 
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incentive for cooperation, it is always very difficult to create a genuine coalition of elites in 
divided societies. Particularly, in Ethiopia in which resources are very scarce there may be a little 
incentive for ethnic elites to make compromise and cooperation with other groups that may bring 
no reciprocal benefit. Thus, faced with such intricate difficulty the ruling TPLF/EPRDF party 
has resorted in creating a superficial coalition making strategy through cooption, coercion and 
deception. Particularly, minority ethnic groups are used as an instrument of divide and rule in 
order to impose the will of the federal government, which is controlled by the TPLF/EPRDF.   
             
            Moreover, a criterion for a territorial concentration is often not relevant to the territorially 
dispersed mixed groups. For example it is estimated that there are about 300, 000 Amhara people 
dispersed throughout the regional state, but these ordinary people do not have access to any 
political representation and protection as citizens, rather they are faced with continued 
denunciations as part of ‘oppressors’ and ‘neftegna’. In April 2006, it was reported that symptom 
of ethnic cleansing has been emerging in some urban areas in the SNNP, such as in Dilla, Yerga 
Cheffe, because of the May 2005 election in which the multiethnic pan-Ethiopian party, the 
CUD, won significant votes against the EPRDF. Thus the local EPRDF officials interpreted a 
vote for CUD as a rejection of ethnic self-administration by the ‘non-indigenous’ people such as 
Amhara and Gurage who voted for CUD. Thus, many families have been terrorized and expelled 
by cadres of the ruling party (EU-EOM 2006). Thus, ethnic rights discourse has also become 
detrimental for the democratic transition in Ethiopia. To conclude that ethnic federalism in the 
SNNP regional sate neither has protected the rights of the disparate ethnic groups nor has 
facilitated for a transition to democratic governance. Both of them- ethnic right and democratic 
governance- have been severely deficit in the SNNP regional state under the rule of 
EPRDF/SEPDF.  
 
 
 224  
Chapter Seven: The regional State of Oromia  
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7.1 General Background  
Following the 1992 proclamation of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, the Oromia regional state 
was established in July 1992. The Oromia regional state can be described as a mirror image of the 
realities of the Ethiopian people in its vast territories and the diverse population with varied livelihood 
conditions such as pastoralism, agriculture, and relatively developed and semi-developed urban centres. 
Moreover, ‘all the problems found in Ethiopia are found in Oromia’ (World Bank 2002: 04). 
Geographical Oromia is located in a central area and borders all of the regional states except Tigray. Its 
land area is estimated to reach 359.619 square kilometres, which is about one-third of Ethiopia’s total 
land area.  Although the region contains abundant and suitable agricultural land that accounts 75 percent 
of the total land area in the region, it also suffers from severe environmental degradation and food 
shortage.   
 
The population of Oromia is estimated to reach 25 million in 2004 that is about one-third of the total 
population of the country. It is estimated that 88 percent of the population are living in rural areas and 
thus only 12 percent in urban areas, which is similar with the overall trend in Ethiopia. Ethnically, it is 
estimated that about 15 percent of the populations of Oromia are non-Oromo that comprises mainly 
Amhara, Gurage and other mixed groups. Particularly, the ethnic mixes in urban areas are considerable 
that contain 55 percent Oromo, 30 percent Amhara, 8 percent Gurage and 7 percent other groups. With 
regard to religion, 50 percent of the population practice Christian religion (41 percent Orthodox 
Christian and 9 percent Protestant Christian) and 47 percent practice Islam (The Oromia State 
Government 2000).  
      
Agriculture is the major economic activity in Oromia that provides a livelihood for 89 percent of the 
populations and it is largely dominated by subsistence agriculture. Pastoralism is also a dominant 
economic activity in the low land areas that account 25 percent of the regions land area. Oromia’s 
agriculture produces vital exportable commodities such as coffee, hides and skins, pulses and oil seeds 
that comprise a significant share of the Ethiopia’s export earnings. The industrial sector in Oromia is 
very weak, it provides livelihood for less than 10 percent of the regional population. Although Oromia 
shows lower poverty incidence than the national average and better than many of the regions,  ‘it is 
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home to the second-largest number of poor people among regions in Ethiopia: almost seven million’ 
(World Bank: 2000: 04) 
  
Historically, the Oromo people have a long period of interaction with the rest of the Ethiopian people, 
particularly since the 15th century’s the great expansion of the Oromo people, the contact was 
characterized with continuous conflicts, expansions and subjugations (Bahiru 1994; Marcus 2002; 
Messay 1999). However, the Oromo nationalists like Asafa Jalat (1993), Mohammed Hassen (1990 and 
1999), Leenco Leta (1999) argue that ‘Oromia was conquered by Ethiopian armies in 1890s and the 
Ethiopian control over Oromia was consolidated by 1900s, after which time Oromia’s new rulers 
systematically dismantled the Gada67 system and imposed a harsh and violent system of overrule’ 
(Forrest 2004: 154). Likewise, Mohammed Hassen (1999: 235) argues that Ethiopian rulers instituted a 
policy of cultural Amharization in Oromia by banning Oromo language in school and public use. 
Markakis also argue that the southward expansion of the Ethiopian state in the second half of the 20th 
century resulted in expropriating a major part of the land in Oromo areas and also turning the majority of 
Oromo peasants into tenants by the expanding state rulers and armies which thus created a mass 
discontent against the Ethiopian state (1994: 231).  
 
The new rulers of the regional state of Oromia has also claimed that until 1991 the Oromo people were 
denied its own traditional system of self-governance known as the Gada system due to ‘the invasion and 
cultural domination of the neftegnas system, which introduced the iron rule of the neftegnas, that 
resulted in undermining the culture, language and history of the Oromo people (The Oromia State 
Government 2004: 1). Nevertheless, since 1992, they claim, that ‘the Oromo people, together with other 
nations and nationalities of the country, are starting a new era of equality, which enabled them to 
practice the right of self determination and self rule, as per the affirmation of the Transitional Charter of 
1991 that issued a proclamation which provided for the establishment of regions, with a power of self 
government’ (Ibid. p. 2). Consequently, the regional state of Oromia was established in 1992 in 
accordance with the charter that proclaimed ‘the rights of nations, nationalities and peoples to administer 
                                                 
67 Gada is a generic term applied to the extremely complex and varied systems of generation-set cycles based on 
eight-year time unit (Baxter 1994: 180). It is a political and social organisation, marked by [male] age-set (8 years), 
participatory assemblies, advisory council and coordination of military actions through district officials and 
messengers’ (Forrest 2004: 154). 
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its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the central government on 
the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation’ (Article 2, b, The Transitional Charter 1991).    
7.2 The Constitution of the Oromia regional state 
The first Oromia Constitution was adopted in June 1995 and it was revised in 2001. Most of its 
provisions are similar with the federal constitution, particularly provisions on Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms, and fundamental principles of the Constitutions are completely identical with the federal 
constitution. The Constitution defines ‘the Oromo people’ in the same manner as the Federal 
Constitution that defines ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ as a group of people who have or share a 
large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a 
common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, 
predominately contiguous territory. Even though the Oromia Constitution states that the State 
Constitution is the supreme law of the regional state, in Article 9 it accepts the primacy of the federal 
constitution68.  
 
There are some important matters that need an investigation in connection with the Oromia’s 
Constitution. First, with regard to the regional official language, the Oromia constitution in article 5 
declares that the official language of the regional state is Oromiffa (the name of the language of the 
Oromo people) that uses Latin alphabet. This is in accordance with the federal Constitution Article 5, 
which states that members of the federation may by law determine their respective working languages. 
However, no concern was given for the significant non-Oromiffa speaking population of the regional 
state that estimated to be about 3 million.  
 
Second, concerning the rights of citizenship, the Oromia constitution states that every Ethiopian national 
who reside in the State and can speak the working/official language of the State has the right to be 
elected and employed in any public or government office (The Constitution of Oromia 2001, Article 33). 
                                                 
68 Article 9 of the Federal Constitution declares that the Federal Constitution is the Supreme law of the land and any 
law, customary practices or a decision of an organ of state or a public official which contravenes the Constitution 
shall not be of no effect. Article 52 of the federal constitution also declares that the constitute states have a 
responsibility to protect and defend the Federal Constitution. 
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This article implies that discrimination based on ethnic category is unconstitutional; therefore a non-
Oromo resident who speaks Oromiffa can have equal rights as an Oromo resident. However, putting 
aside constitutional pledges, the actual practice is very far from such constitutional pledges due to many 
factors. One, in political and other key bureaucratic appointment, ethnic affiliation is the only criterion. 
Parental linkage and language proficiency are the major criteria but without parental linkage language 
proficiency alone does not meet the requirements for political as well as bureaucratic appointments. 
Except that there is allegation of a notorious practice that has been exercised by the EPRDF/OPDO in 
adopting Oromo names for non-Oromo individuals, but who speak the Oromo language, in order to 
claim an Oromo69 parenthood and to give them key political powers and bureaucratic positions in order 
to implement the policy and objectives of the TPLF/EPRDF (A representative of the ONC, Interviewee 
63, 2002: 21).  
 
Two, many non-Oromo individuals who cannot speak Oromiffa are working in various regional 
government offices at a position of technical experts and other, but it is very difficult for these 
professionals to get promotion, scholarship and other benefits even if their service years and 
contributions have made them to qualify for such promotions and benefits. The preference is always 
given to the ethnic Oromo personnel regardless of their lower qualification (A leader of the city 
administration, Interviewee 53, 2002: 5). Open and discernible discriminatory practices have also been 
observed toward those individuals who can speak very well the State’s official language and can meet 
the criteria to get higher posts and promotions (A representative of AAPO, Interviewee 58, 2002: 13).  
Three, prejudice based on a political loyalty is also quite prevailing. Significant Oromo individuals who 
are suspected of harbouring opposition opinion are mistreated and abused.  There is a widespread 
practice by the ruling EPRDF/OPDO party in labelling dissenting Oromo intellectuals as a member or 
sympathizer of the OLF (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 61, 2002: 16; A representative of ONC, 
Interviewee 63, 2002: 20).  
 
                                                 
69 For instance, it is alleged that the real name of the ex-president of the Oromia regional state, Kuma Demekessa 
was  (Taye) the current Oromia president Abadula Gemeda had also a different name. It has been a common practice 
among the TPLF and EPRDF officials to change their real names and adopt pseudo names. For instance, the real 
name of the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was Legesse Zenawi, the Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin was Ambay 
Mesfin, Abay Tsehaye was Amha Tsehaye (Aregawi 2003: 579) 
 229  
Moreover, many qualified Oromo professionals have been mistreated and their constitutional rights 
curtailed because of their alleged link with the ‘illegalised’ Oromo liberation front70 (A representative of 
ONC, Interviewee 63, 2002: 20). Since 1991 thousands of Oromo individuals and Oromo civil society 
groups have been constantly harassed and imprisoned by the ruling EPRDF/OPDO party by alleging 
them for connection with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) (Amnesty International 2005). It is 
reported that: thousands of members of the Oromo ethnic group (or 'nationality') were detained without 
charge or trial on suspicion of supporting the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) (Amnesty International 
2001). This tendency might have created a tremendous disadvantage situation in denying the Oromo 
people from adequately exploit the skill and qualification of their learned and educated elite. Generally, 
putting aside the constitutional commitment, the Oromia regional government massively abuses the 
rights of both the non-Oromo as well as the Oromo residents in the region in various ways.   
 
Third, in connection with the right to secession, the Oromia Constitution in article 39, alike the federal 
constitution, affirms the unconditional right of the Oromo people to self-administration, including the 
right to secession by stating similar preconditions as it was stated in the federal constitution for realizing 
the right to secession. It is just a copy of the federal constitution in many aspects (The Oromia 
Constitution 2001, Article 39, no. 5). 
 
At the current context, it is very difficult to satisfy the conditions for secession, as it is observed, that the 
ruling EPRDF party controls both the federal and regional government exclusively and heavy-handedly. 
However, the repercussion in the future could be very harmful, especially when the status of the regional 
states are subordinate to the federal government and when the federal government is accused of serving 
or favouring the interests of a particular region. Furthermore, it looks unrealistic for the State to secede 
in such smooth amicable process. There are many complex issues like agreement on boundary, resource 
division, the rights of non-Oromo people within Oromia, the statues of many of the urban centres, which 
are predominantly inhabited by non-Oromo people and other relevant critical issues.  Hence, it could be 
better to stress more on bargaining and compromise mechanisms to address grievances and resentments, 
rather than to make a pretence provision that claim secession can be made amicably and so easily. It 
could be better to leave for the state or ethnic group what action they want to take if their rights would 
                                                 
70 The OLF was illegalised by TPLF/EPRDF because it is waging an armed struggle for self-determination of the 
Oromo people by claiming that TPLF-led EPRDF is not committed for a genuine federal arrangement. 
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be abrogated or abridged, rather than to give a promise of secession that would be very difficult to fulfil, 
but has a very bad implication and undertone in prescribing incentive to demand for secession.  
 
Fourth, with regard to the right to property, land ownership and non-eviction, in the same manner with 
the federal constitution, the Oromia constitution declares that: ‘Land is a common property of the people 
of the State and shall not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange (The Constitution of Oromia 
2001, Article 40). In connection with fixed property in the land, the Oromia constitution states that ‘any 
person shall have the full right to the immovable property he builds and to the permanent improvements 
he brings about on the land by his labour or capital. This right shall include the right to sale to bequeath, 
and, where the right of use expires, to remove his property, transfer his title, or claim compensation for it 
(Ibid, Article 40, No. 7) 
 
Nevertheless, there may be some controversies between the State and the federal constitution. In the 
federal constitution, land is the property of the peoples of Ethiopia whereas in the State constitution it is 
the property of ‘the people of the State’, but not necessarily mean that it belongs to the Oromo people 
because the State constitution gave the right to ownership not only for Oromo people but for the ‘people 
of the State’ which includes all who reside in the State. Moreover, the Oromia Constitution in article 40, 
states that the peasants of the State have the right to obtain land without payment and the protection 
against eviction from their possession. Yet, regardless of the constitutional guarantee of prohibiting 
eviction from land, in some cases either there have been misconceptions and errors by some regional or 
local officials and resident groups or there may be a deliberate breach of constitutional rights of non-
Oromo peasants who have faced eviction from their farmland. For instance, in Wellega settlements 
villages many peasants were evicted or expelled from the settlement area by disallowing them the right 
to have a land in Oromia or ‘Oromo land’ (Discussion with some of the evicted peasants, Interviewee 
73, 2002: 36). Many factors such as ethnic revulsion, revenge and divide and rule tactics of the 
politicians have also complicated the issue, and still there is widespread misconception regarding the 
constitutional right of the non-Oromo people in Oromia regional state. Since, the Oromia constitution 
has included the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it has accepted that any discrimination 
based on race, ethnicity, language or other factors is unconstitutional, but, despite the constitutional 
decree, there has been widespread human right abuse of the non-Oromo people by the ruling party in 
Oromia.     
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Moreover, there is also a discrepancy between the federal constitution and Oromia constitution with 
regard to the right of the peasants to obtain a land. In Oromia constitution ‘the peasants of the State’ 
have the right to obtain land without payment and the protection against eviction from their possession 
(The Oromia Constitution 2001, Article 40, No. 4). Whereas the federal Constitution states that ‘the 
Ethiopian peasants have the right to obtain land without payment and the protection against eviction 
from their possession’ (The FDRE Constitution 1994, Article 40 No. 4).  According to the constitution 
of Oromia, it is ‘peasants of the State’, not peasants from other states that have a right to get land 
without payment, whereas the federal constitution guarantees this right anywhere as far as they are 
Ethiopians and without any preference to state residence. Based on the federal constitution, it is 
constitutionally possible to resettle peasants of one state to another state freely, but the Oromia 
constitution has not recognized such resettlement in Oromia from other state. To make a comparison 
from a parallel case, one can examine article 41, no. 1 of the Oromia constitution that states: ‘Every 
resident of the State or other Ethiopians who want to reside in the State has the right to engage freely in 
economic activity and to pursue a livelihood of his choice’. Analogically, therefore Article 40, no. 4 has 
not extended free land to the other Ethiopian peasant who may want to resettle in Oromia. Nonetheless, 
the constitution of Oromia in article 9 accepts the primacy of the federal constitution, therefore 
constitutionally inter-state resettlement is allowed and Oromia regional government is also answerable 
to the federal constitution. In future, therefore there could be a resettlement of peasants in Oromia from 
other states, but still it could be contentious and conflictual71. Currently intra-state resettlement is 
undertaking in Oromia, Amhara, and SNNP regional states.  
 
7.3 The State Structure and division of power in Oromia 
Following the 1992 proclamation of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, the Oromia regional state 
was established in July 1992, but actually the regional government’s proper administrative function was 
started in 1994. Initially, the region was divided into 12 zones and 180 weredas. Additional 10 weredas 
and two special zones for two major urban centres (Nazareth and Jimma cities) were created in 2002: 
                                                 
71 In an interview with a top official of the Oromia regional state, it is learned that although there has been an 
interest by the federal government to resettle peasants to Oromia from other regional state, a resettlement of peasants 
to Oromia from other states is not acceptable as the state itself has a need to resettle its peasants to a relatively better 
farmland (Interview 51, 2002: 01). 
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Nazareth is considered as the capital city of the regional state72. The regional State’s administrative 
structures are organized hierarchically into four tiers of administrations, namely the regional 
government, zonal administration, wereda administration and kebele administration. Political as well as 
administrative power is highly concentrated at the regional government level, particularly at the mercy 
of the executive branch that consisted of the regional president (or the chief executive) and head of 
various bureaus. The legislative branch of the regional government, which is called Oromia Council (or 
‘Caffee’ in Oromiffa language), is constitutionally, the highest political power in the State. The people 
in a plurality vote system directly elect the 537 members of the Council for a term of five years. 
Constitutionally, the members of the council are accountable to the people of the State (Article 48).  
Some of the main activities of the Council (Cheffe) include: 
• It elects the State President from members of the Council, and approves members of the State’s 
Administration Council (or the regional cabinet) most of its members are head of various 
bureaus. 
• Establishes audit and inspection organ, and appoints the Auditor General  
• Approves the State’s social and economic policies, strategies and plans 
• Approves the State budget (but it highly depends on the transfer from the federal     government)       
• Appoints the president and vice president of the State Supreme Court 
• Levy State taxes  
• Declares state of emergency 
• The power to call and question the State President and investigates the conduct of the State 
Administrative Council    
 
Although it has numerous legislative functions and powers it looks a very nominal Council. It does not 
have regular and frequent meetings; it meets only twice a year therefore it is very difficult for it to fulfil 
its key functions of serving as a supreme political authority of the regional state and other essential 
legislative functions. Three standing committees, each with 14 members elected from the council 
                                                 
72 But after the May 2005 election, because the Opposition party, the Coalition and Unity for Democracy (CUD) 
exclusively won the election for the national parliament and the city administration, EPRDF reversed its decision 
and allowed Addis Ababa (or Finfine in Oromiffa) to be a capital city of the region. Previously, in 2003, EPRDF 
ordered the Oromia regional government to leave Addis Ababa and to use Nazareth (Adama) city as its capital city; 
the decision was firmly resisted by Oromo university students and other Oromo political and civil organisation, but 
the response of the EPRDF was massive arrest, harassment and suppression.     
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members by the council, pursue its day-to-day legislative functions. The three standing committees are 
the Administrative & Legal Affairs Standing Committee, the Economic, Budget & Finance Affairs 
Standing Committee and the Peoples Organization & Social Affairs Standing Committee. Moreover, the 
speaker and vice speakers of the council are also expected to follow closely the daily activities of the 
regional government.  Almost 99 percent of members of the Oromia council are drawn from the ruling 
EPRDF/OPDO party, for instance in 2000 to 2005, out of 537 seats 535 seats which were 99.6 percent 
were controlled by the ruling OPDO/EPRDF/OPDO party and are allocated to the remaining 2 seats was 
controlled by All Amharas People Organisation (AAPO). 
 
As regards to the regional Executive power, constitutionally, the supreme executive power of the State is 
vested in the President and the State Administrative Council. The State’s administrative council (or the 
regional cabinet) is the highest executive organ of the State (The Oromia Constitution 2001, Article 53). 
Member of the State Administrative Council consisted of the regional state president, vice president and 
bureaus heads various bureaus like Agriculture, Education, Health, Water, Finance Planning and others. 
The State Administrative Council is responsible for the State President and the State Council (Cheffe).  
Some of the major powers and functions of the Administrative Council include controlling and 
organizing executive institutions, preparing the State budget, formulating and implementing the State 
economic and social development policies, strategies and plans. It submits draft laws to the State 
Council. At the submission of the nominees by the State President it appoints Heads of higher social 
economic institutions in the State, Head of Bureaux, Zone administrators and vice administrators (Ibid. 
Article 55).  
 
The chief of the state’s executive, the state president is elected for the term of five years by the State 
council on the submission or proposal of the winner or majority part in the State Council. He is the 
leader and chair of the State Administrative Council and the highest executive power of the regional 
states vested on him. Constitutionally, the president is accountable for the State Council, but the State 
council lacks proper working mechanisms to control him due to its dysfunctional procedure, as it was 
discussed above with regard to the power and function of the State council.  Major power and functions 
of the State President include to select and submit for approval to the State Council the appointment of 
the President and Vice President of the State Supreme Court, Auditor General and member of the State 
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Administrative Council; to lead, co-ordinate and control the State Administrative Council, 
Administrative Councils of the regional government, Zones, Weredas and Kebeles (Ibid. Article 56).  
 
With regard to the state judicial power, the state’s constitution declares that state’s judicial power is 
vested in the State courts that operate independently and free from any interference or influence of any 
government body, government officials or from any other sources (The Constitution of Oromia 2001, 
Article 63). The constitution also states that no judge shall be removed from his duties before he reaches 
the retirement age determined by law except by a decision of the state legislative council due to 
disciplinary rules or on grounds of incompetence or inefficiency. In appointment of judges, the state 
council upon the recommendation by the regional state president appoints the President and vice 
President of the State Supreme Council. Other judges of the State Supreme court and Zone High Court 
and Wereda judges are appointed by the State Council upon recommendation by the State Judicial 
Administration that is established by judges appointed by majority vote and the President of the State 
Supreme Court serves as its leader.  
 
Structurally, the regional state’s judicial organ is organised in State Supreme Court, zone higher court, 
and wereda court. The state Supreme Court is the highest and final judicial power over the State matters, 
and it has a power of cassation over any final court decision of State courts on State matters which 
contain a basic error of law. The state’s High court, in addition to state jurisdictions, exercises the 
jurisdiction of federal first-instance court. Decisions rendered by a State High Court exercising the 
jurisdiction of federal first-instance court are appealable to the State Supreme Court. Decisions rendered 
by a State Supreme Court (exercising the jurisdiction of federal high court) on federal matters are 
appealable to the Federal Supreme Court. The wereda court is the lower and the first-instance judicial 
power in the State. Moreover, religious and customary courts are recognized by the constitution. With 
the consent of the parties, disputes relating to personal and family laws in accordance with religious or 
cultural laws can be adjudicated in religious or customary courts (Article 62, Constitution of Oromia, 
2001) 
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7.4 Zonal, Wereda and Kebele structures  
Zonal administrations in Oromia state are structured as an executive subdivision or like branch offices of 
the regional government without any legislative power or function. There are eight zonal and two special 
zonal administrations in the regional state.   Uniformly, the zonal administration consisted of a team of 
heads of line departments and a chief and vice chief administrators of a zone who are appointed by the 
State Council upon recommendation by the State President. Some of the powers and functions of the 
zonal administration are to coordinate wereda administrations; support, follow and co-ordinate all 
departments and institutions in the zone; responsible for law, order, peace and security in the zone and 
reports overall zonal working activities to the State President.   The zonal administration is headed by a 
chief administrator who is appointed by the State Council upon a recommendation of the State President. 
The Chief administrator, who is directly accountable to the State President, has a significant power at 
zonal level in commanding the activities of various regional government’s departments and institutions 
at the zonal level and also responsible for leading and controlling zonal security and police forces.  
 
Nevertheless, there is overlapping between legislative and executive organs in all zones, as some of the 
members of the zonal administration are also members of the regional legislative council. Moreover, in 
many cases, the chief administrator is also a chief of the zonal party structure. Therefore, there is a clear 
concentration of political, legislative and executive functions on an executive body and in the hands of a 
single individual.      
 
Wereda structure consists of wereda council, wereda administrative council and wereda judiciary. There 
are about 200 Wereda structures in Oromia. Wereda council is the legislative body of the wereda 
structure which is established by the wereda people for five years term through direct popular vote. 
Constitutionally, members of the Wereda Council are responsible for the people. Some of its 
constitutional powers and functions include approving the Wereda’s economic development, social 
services and administrative activities draft plans and programmes; appointing Wereda administrator 
from member of the majority party in the council, approving the appointment of vice Wereda 
Administrator and other appointments upon submission by the Wereda Administrator and ensuring the 
collection of land use fee (tax), agricultural income tax and other service taxes as determined by the law. 
(The Oromia Constitution 2001, Article 82). However, most of these functions, to a great extent, are 
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duties coming from the top officials at the zonal and regional level to be implemented in the woreda area 
rather than having its real power to make decisions on its own to protect the interest and benefit of its 
electorate. Moreover, it is also expected to have only four secessions per year and therefore its Speaker 
performs most of its duties on daily bases by collaborating with the Wereda administrative council and 
the wereda chief administrator.    
 
The executive functions at the wereda level is the responsibility of the woreda administrative council 
which consisted of the Wereda Administrator, vice Administrator and head of sector offices organised in 
the Wereda. It is responsible for the Wereda Administrator and Wereda Council (Ibid. Article 84). Some 
of its constitutional power and functions include implementing policies, laws, rules, plans and 
programmes in the wereda; preparing Wereda budget, submits to the Wereda Council and implements 
upon approval; leading and co-ordinating the wereda security and police force and preparing the wereda 
social, economic and administrative plans and submit to the Wereda Council (Ibid, Article 85). The 
Chief Wereda administrator who is appointed by the Wereda council is a leader of the Wereda 
Administrative council, but he is also responsible for the regional state president. This direct 
accountability of the chief wereda administrator to the regional president certainly creates a tendency of 
centralising of power at the regional executive, particularly at the regional president who has enormous 
power to control and influence all key power centres at all levels of the regional state structure.  
 
The lowest and smallest administrative structure of the regional state is a Kebele administration, which 
has relatively very close contact with the local people. A Kebele administration has a kebele council, a 
kebele administrative council and social court. Constitutionally, the kebele council is the highest 
political authority in the kebele and it is elected by the kebele people for five years term. It has a power 
to organize the kebele administration council and appoint the kebele administrator, but only upon the 
recommendation of the majority party, which is OPDO/EPRDF (The Oromia Constitution 2001, Article 
97). It is expected to meet once every month. Major functions of the kebele council are limited to 
implementing the plan and regulations of the wereda council and the wereda administrative council, 
ensuring law and order in the Kebele and organizing the kebele administration. The council is headed by 
the speaker and vice speaker who are appointed by the ruling majority party in the Kebele council, 
which is OPDO/EPRDF.   
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The kebele executive function is carried out by the kebele administrative council, which is elected by 
and from the kebele council for the five years term. Some of the key functions include ensuring peace 
and security in the kebele, carrying out natural resource protection and development activities; and 
motivating the public for development activities (The Oromia Constitution 2001, Article 96). The 
Kebele administrative council is headed by a kebele administrator who is appointed by and from the 
Kebele council upon the recommendation of the majority party in the Kebele Council. The Kebele 
administrator is accountable for the Kebele Council and wereda administrator. Major powers and 
functions of the kebele administrator include leading the Kebele Administrative council, ensuring a 
proper implementation of policies, laws, rules and regulations in the kebele, recommending judges of 
the kebele social court for the kebele council and executing other functions as ordered by the kebele 
administrative council, the kebele council, the wereda administrative council. The kebele administration 
also has a vice kebele administrator who is elected by and from the kebele council and accountable to 
the kebele administrator. A social court is also established in each kebele administration to adjudicate on 
trivial neighbourhood social and private cases. Though the kebele administration is very close to the 
local people, the predominant influence and manoeuvre of the ruling party in its overall operation has 
hindered the local people from owning and controlling their grassroots kebele structure. As a result 
kebele administration has become an awful instrument in imposing higher command and control on the 
local people. 
 
7.5 A concentration of power at the regional executive or the 
regional president 
The multitude and sweeping powers and functions assigned to the chief executive by the constitution 
have made the state’s president to monopolies power at the expense of the state legislative branch. 
Nonetheless, first of all, it is very difficult for the President to properly fulfil these functions because of 
the vast and intricate nature of the activities in all these four-tiered levels. Secondly, massive 
concentrations of power in his hand certainly makes the President too powerful by undermining local 
administrations and popular participation, and also deprives the local people in controlling their local 
leaders.  
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Thirdly, dictating the nomination of head of regional bureaus and other powerful regional officials like 
presidents of the regional Supreme Court and Auditor General certainly    make the President very 
powerful in the face of very weak and quiescent the State’s legislative branch. It is very easy for him to 
create his own ‘oligarchy’ and clique in the executive. In case of responsible and efficient governance 
system such massive power may give a president a chance to form a very efficient executive organ, but 
in case of a patron-client model of governance, massive concentration of power on an executive organ 
could result in creating an oligarchy. Check and balance controlling systems are weakened because the 
institutions designed for such controlling functions like the Supreme Court, Judicial Administration 
Council and Auditor General are directly influenced by the regional president, and their actual operation 
has also exhibited such subordinated role to the executive branch.  
 
This kind of power construction in the executive body may result in the development of elitism and self-
servicing bureaucracies. Major drawback of the ethnic federal structure is its inducement of despotism 
of ethnic elites. According to the constitutional arrangement, the power of the legislative branch, that is 
the State Council that is directly elected by the people, looks very insignificant in controlling and 
involving the administrative and governance process of the State. The State Council is nearly inactive, 
which only meets very rarely, at least twice a year according to the state’s constitution. This situation 
may be one of the reasons in expansion of inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy, which resulted in 
mismanagement in the state (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 55, 2002: 09; A leader of Eder, Interviewee 
57, 2002: 11; A member of the TPLF, Interviewee 59, 2002: 14; A leader of Eder (an Oromo), 
Interviewee 61, 2002: 16). The elected representative are very far to monitor and control the activities of 
the executive, even if constitutionally they are responsible for the State Council, there is no 
administrative mechanism to implement the constitutional right of the State Council adequately.  
 
The State Council is assumed to be the supreme regional political authority by representing the regional 
people, but its mode of operation does not give it any significant role to play congruent with the 
authority entrusted to it. This happens due to various reasons. First, the members of the state council 
have no salary for their membership in the council. Most of them are employed in various regional 
government institutions at regional, zonal and wereda levels and this make them vulnerable to 
manipulation, kickbacks, reward or pressure from the executive branch. Second, the legislative body has 
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no regular sessions, meeting twice a year would hardly provide any opportunity to monitor and control 
the operation of the executive branch.  
 
Furthermore, the state judicial body has also been very weak to check and control the excessive power 
of the state’s executive branch. Some of the challenges of the judiciary branch in Oromia are, first, 
though, the Constitution put provisions to protect judges from interference and unduly removal, it has 
been very easy for the executive body to remove judges from their appointment as it is very easy to get 
approval of the State Council as it is made ineffective to challenge the executive power, but has become 
a rubberstamp of the executive and the dominant ruling party. So it is still very easy to remove judges 
even by following the constitutional procedures. In many occasions, judges have been removed from 
their posts (Ethiopian Bar association 2003).  
 
Second, the state judicial structure may not properly help the local people, because they need to travel to 
zone towns to get higher court decisions, since the wereda court is constitutionally powerless and also 
usually staffed by non-qualified judges. This adds tremendous cost for the local (mostly poor) people to 
get justice (An advisor to the regional president, Interviewee 51, 2002: 2). Even in some cases zone 
higher courts are not efficient and powerful to make decisions, and frequently seek the support of the 
regional and federal courts. So such kinds of excessive bureaucratic court structure may deter people 
from exercising their constitutional rights and may breed a situation of lawlessness and local despotism 
of the executive. Because local courts like wereda courts are powerless they tend to rely on local 
executive for their functions. In most local areas, it is evident that, the public officials are often those 
who breach people’s constitutional rights. So in such inefficient and powerless local judicial authority, it 
is very difficult for the court system to protect the rights of the local people (A representative of AAPO, 
Interviewee 58, 2002: 12; A leader of ANDM/EPRDF in Nazareth, Interviewee 62, 2002: 17).   
 
Finally, the appointment of judges is highly influenced by the state president; above all, he is the one 
who recommends the President and vice President of the State Supreme Courts.  Moreover, the president 
of the Supreme Court also has an influential position in the State Judicial Administration, which has 
multitude powers in appointment, promotion, and removal of judges. Generally, the courts are operating 
under frequent interference from the executive branch at all levels of the regional government and the 
same is also true at the federal government level. There are substantial amount of cases in which the 
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police have declined or violated court rulings due to instructions from the executive officials. Many 
individuals continue to be detained by polices despite the court’s ruling against their detention73 (A 
representative of ONC, Interviewee 63, 2002: 20).  
 
7.6 The financial power and the federal subsidy  
In the same manner as other regional state, the Oromia regional state relies heavily on federal transfer. It 
gets 60 to 80 percent of its regional budget spending from the federal government and this shows high 
level of vertical imbalance between the regional government and the federal government with regard to 
financial power. In 1998 and 1999 for example 70 percent of the regional government’s total 
expenditure was covered through federal transfer or federal subsidy74. (World Bank, Oromia Public 
Expenditure Review, 2001: 8) (In accordance with the federal constitution, the Oromia regional state has 
provided with a right to collect income taxes; taxes from profit and sales taxes on business; agricultural 
income tax and land use fee; personal income tax from employees of the regional government, royalty 
from forestry activities. The total collection from these sources accounts less than 30 percent of the 
regional budget and about 2 percent of the regional GDP75. 
 
Actually, such high level of imbalance was created because of the federal government’s appropriation of 
almost all of the lucrative revenue sources throughout the country. It is estimated that the federal 
government control 87 percent of the national revenue bases and leaving the rest 13 per cent for the nine 
regional states (Befekadu 1998). In the Oromia, therefore, it is felt by the regional officials that the 
federal government would have collected far greater than what it is transferring for the regional 
government in the form of federal subsidy. Actually, a regional official claims that this is not subsidy; it 
may be just giving back the regional state’s revenue (A member of the regional executive, Interviewee 
                                                 
73 In Oromia, many cases of illegal detentions were reported despite the order of the court to release the detainees (A 
representative of ONC, Interview 63, 2002: 20). A parallel practice was practiced in the federal government 
regarding the famous case of Seye Abrha, the ex-defence minister who was released on bail, but immediately 
detained by the police when he left the courtroom, and he is still in prison. Many believed the Prime Minister is 
behind all this naked illegal practice of undermining the court order.  
 
74 The lowest, 60 percent share of the federal subsidy to the regional budget was recorded in 2000 due to 
the shrinking of the federal transfer as a result of a boarder war with Eritrea. 
75 MEDaC experts question the accuracy of the regional governments estimation of their GDP due to a 
weak professional capacity in the regions to compile data.  
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74, 2002: 38). It is true that Oromia, next to Addis Ababa administration, contains a substantial size of 
government (federal) owned businesses, industries and big hydropower dams that can generate huge 
revenue for the federal government. These public properties, however, were constructed in the past by 
the central state owing to Oromia’s pivotal and central location in the country as well as its relative 
proximity to the capital city, Addis Ababa. The previous centralized state system had accumulated and 
invested the national wealth in the capital city and in a nearby urban center which most of them are 
under the ownership of the federal government, though they are territorially located in Oromia state. It 
could be therefore unfair and unacceptable to leave this national wealth for few regional states. This is 
one the major difficulties for a shift from a centralized or unitary state structure into a federal system of 
state restructuring.    
 
Furthermore, Oromia is continuing benefiting more from federally owned enterprises and spending. 
According to the regional government official that Oromia is benefiting from federally owned 
enterprises and spending in the region that are injecting a lot of money in the regional economy through 
employment generating opportunities, disposable incomes of the workforce and other economic 
opportunities that directly help to nourish and revitalize the regional economy (A chief executive of the 
Zonal administration, Interviewee 54, 2002: 8). In addition, a large part of Oromia territory is located at 
the central part of Ethiopia by encompassing the capital city and all major highways that are constructed 
to connect the region’s capital city to the federal capital city by passing through Oromia, as a result 
Oromia has been benefiting more from such opportunities.    
 
The Regional Finance and Planning Bureau with consultation with the sectoral bureaus prepares budget 
distribution and the regional executive body approves the final budget, but of course, with ‘adaptation’ 
of the regional council. Oromia follows a centralized budget system in which the regional sectoral 
bureaus distribute the budgets for zonal and wereda offices through their own bureaucratic structures. 
The centralized budget system has been changed since 2003 by the new ‘woreda block grant’ system of 
budget allocation due to the decision of the federal government. 
 
External assistance or aid shares 10-17 percent of the regional budget, for example in the five years 
period (1995-2000) 1.82 billion birr capital budget was used. From this 1.46 billion (80.2%) was from 
government budget and the rest 0.36 billion (19.8%) was from external grant and loan (Oromia Finance 
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Bureau Report 2001). This figure, however, only represented the amount specified as ‘external sources’ 
in the federal subsidy to the regional government. External assisted federal projects in the region (like 
highways) and some other bilateral aid and foreign-funded NGO activities are not clearly included in the 
regional budget (World Bank, 2001: 11). Likewise, the regional governments are not allowed to borrow 
or get financial grant directly from external financial institutions; external finance always comes through 
the federal government as part of the federal transfer as a federal grant. External loan money by the 
federal government is not transferred as a loan to the regional government, the regions receive only in 
the form of federal grants, (not loans), but by distinguishing the source of the external finance between 
grants and loans for the budget specification. No specific rules or procedure is set regarding the role and 
participation of the regional states in debt repayment responsibilities. The external assistance is 
surrounded by high unpredictability, complex requirements and difficult reporting procedures, therefore 
regional states generally prefer federal subsidy rather than external assistance. In addition, the regions 
are not clear about the way the federal government estimates expected donor assistance to the regions 
and deduct or ‘offsets’ such expectation from the federal subsidy to the regional states, but there is 
frequent disagreement and mistrust concerning the federal government’s handling of the external 
assistance to the region (A member of the regional executive, Interviewee 74, 2002: 38). 
 
The major challenges of the financial sector in Oromia include inadequate resource, constraints in 
capacity, high centralization at the regional government level in budget allocation and other key 
budgetary process decisions like budget transfer and shift between items, sectors or sub sectors. Revenue 
collection capacity is also very weak at zonal and wereda levels, zonal administrations have no power to 
collect taxes (World Bank 2001; A member of the regional executive, Interviewee 74, 2002: 40).  It is 
believed that the new woreda block grant system that directly allocates budget to the wereda 
administration could create an opportunity for the local people to have influence in making decision on 
priorities in budget allocations based on their needs, however, such expectation may not materialize 
simply because of block budget allocations procedure per se. There are various impediments that hinder 
local people participation. First, it does not make much difference in Oromia in which about 70 percent 
of the budget is appropriated by the recurrent expenditure which most goes to pay salary for civil 
servants. For instance total public expenditure in 1998 was 1.3 billion Birr (which was roughly 8 percent 
of the regional GDP) or 62 birr per capita (equivalent to USD 186 million or USD 9 per capita). With 
regard to composition of spending, the typical trend is that recurrent expenditure appropriate the lions’ 
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share, (70 to 80 percent) of the regional spending and from this expenditure the bulk (about 70 percent) 
goes to salary76. Thus, even if the decision would be made at the wereda level, the recurrent budget 
system has to follow the existed recurrent expenditure framework that is dominated by expenditure on 
salaries for teachers, agriculture experts, health professional, administrators and the like. The capital 
budget, which is about 30 percent of the total allocation, can be very small to make an impact in meeting 
wereda people’s immediate priorities77.  
 
Second, the centralized state and political structure is not changed, as the state’s government and ruling 
party’s mode of operation and the constitution entail that the wereda has remained accountable to the 
regional executive and local control is still very weak mainly because of a negligible public participation 
in the local politics, administration as well as decision making process. As it is reported that, ‘while the 
system appears rather decentralized on paper, in practice it is not’ (World Bank 2001: 33).  
 
The federal system in Ethiopia is characterized by a centralization of power through the ruling 
TPLF/EPRDF party. Since 1991, the regional state has been governed by the OPDO, which is a member 
of the ruling EPRDF party. The OPDO was created in 1989 by the EPRDF in order to mobilize political 
support in Oromo areas. As I have discussed in chapter three in connection with the birth of the EPRDF, 
most of the members of the OPDO were from ex-Derg soldiers who were captured in the battlefront. As 
a result, it is very difficult to claim that OPDO is a true representative of the Oromo people; rather it is 
imposed on the Oromo people as a ruler by the TPLF-led ruling government in Ethiopia since 1991.  
The ruling party has controlled all political and local community spaces, it becomes difficult for the 
local people to establish their own administrative structure without the interference of the ruling party, 
which is operated in highly centralized and Stalinist manner (Vaughan and Kjetil 2003: 18). As a result, 
the local leaders are more accountable to the ruling party than their electorate, as it is declared in the 
constitution that the wereda administrator, the wereda council speaker, the kebele administrator, the 
kebele council speaker have to be from the majority or the ruling party.  This kind of political party 
                                                 
76 The figure was calculated based on the trend from 1998 to 2001 (World Bank, 2001). 
77 For illustration, in 2002 Oromia total budget was 1.5 billion birr and roughly 20 percent was 
appropriated by the regional government, therefore each woreda can get 6 millions in a block grant, from 
which capital budget could be about 2 million birr (250 000 USD) for more than 100,000 people and it 
means about 20 birr per capital (2.5USD) per capita, the amount cannot build a medium health facility for 
about 100,000 people which mostly live in extreme poverty and without access to essential basic services.  
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domination in local governments (wereda and kebele level) can make the public powerless, and also 
weaken the role of non-party affiliated community organisations and initiatives in local areas.  Party 
politics usually weaken local people participation in governance and make the local space a battleground 
for party politics or an arena of party dictatorship rather than a space for social and economic 
development activities. Moreover, many people are penalized for electing opposition parties such as the 
ONC, OFDM, CUD.  
  
7.7 Summary:  
One of the major challenges of ethnic federalism in Oromia is a mistreatment of non-Oromo residents in 
the region. In the region there are about 2.7 million urban population that is about 12% of the total 
population and a large group of people predominately from the Amhara and Gurage ethnic group are 
living dispersed throughout many of the urban areas. In many of the urban centres, it could be the case 
that Oromos are outnumbered by non-Oromos as many towns in Oromia are predominately inhabited by 
the non-Oromo ethnic groups because of the historical reasons that most of the urban centres were 
established predominately as a center of central administration and trade in the past. Currently, however, 
there is no administrative mechanism put in place to respect the rights of these mixed groups who have 
lived in many of the towns for a number of generations. What complicates that matter more was that the 
wereda administrative boundaries of most of the towns include the surrounding rural areas, which are 
virtually inhabited by the Oromo people and thus makes the town population minority in the wereda 
administrative constituency. This arrangement has resulted in hindering the political rights of the non-
Oromo people living in many towns and the issue has become one of the major contentious issues in the 
State. A report prepared by the Oromia Economic Study Project Office affirms that the urban population 
in Oromia is more heterogeneous, while the populations living in the rural areas of the region are 
predominately Oromo that account 88.4 percent. According to the report, Oromos, Amharas and 
Gurages are the three largest ethnic groups that account for 54.4, 28.8 and 8.1 percent, respectively of 
the 2.7 million urban populations (The Economic Study Project Office 1999: 237). This figure may not 
necessarily tell ethnic composition in many of the major towns, in which non-Oromo ethnic groups 
might have been the majority inhabitants. For example in Nazareth town, the non-Oromo population 
account 74 percent (from which Amhara account 44, percent and Gurage 20) and the Oromo account 
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only 26 percent of the population of the town. However, the Oromo group predominantly controls the 
town administration because the town is situated under Oromia regional state. 
 
Although, in the Proclamation no. 26/1999 of the Oromia regional state, residents of many towns at 
different level have a right to elect councils and executive management committees to administer the 
towns, the proclamation did not give any specific right for the inhabitants of the towns to decide some 
crucial issues like representation and working language, rather it is assumed that the towns’ 
administrations would be occupied by the Oromo individuals and use the regional language, Oromiffa, 
regardless of the population mix and the dominant mother tongue in the towns. For instance, in Nazreth 
the dominant mother tongue in the city is not Oromiffa, but it is expected to use Oromiffa in its 
administration and education. So this Proclamation did not answer the basic right of the population to 
select its working language, so in such case it did not answer the basic rights of the town dwellers.  
 
Nonetheless, the Oromo population in Amhara regional state, which estimated to account 3% of the 
regional population, have given a special woreda status, which was argued because of their 
concentration in particular areas. Likewise, the 3 million Amhara people residing in Oromia region have 
not granted such kind of special status. The official reason is that because they are widely dispersed in 
the region, it has become difficult to give them a self-administrative arrangement like a special woreda. 
However, different kinds of institutional arrangement can be found if there is a genuine concern for the 
rights of these people, besides, significant Amhara population are living in many towns as a 
concentrated majority like in Nazareth town, but they are without any significant political rights. 
 
 
Since 1991, there have been frequent abuses against the non-Oromo residents in the regional state. From 
1991 to 1992, the Oromo Liberation Front was accused for inciting and inflicting violence against the 
non-Oromo residents in Oromia (Alem 1993). Particularly, portraying the Amhara people in general as 
instruments of past injustice against the Oromo people has igniting violent and brutal revenges that 
resulted in killings and expulsion of many Amhara and other non-Oromo people, destroying of villages 
and properties of the non-Oromo people, particularly the Amhara people in Oromia. Some other Oromo 
political organizations such as the Islamic Oromia Liberation Front (IFLO), Oromo People's Unity 
Organization, and Oromo Abo Liberation Movement were accused of participating in violence against 
 246  
non-Oromo people in Oromia region (Alem 1993). Particularly, although many of the Amhara people 
have lived for generation by mixing with the Oromo population, ‘they were branded as ‘neftegna’ or 
colonizer, and murdered or otherwise gravely mistreated. Ethnic cleansing has been reported in the city 
of Harar itself, Dire Dawa, the Chercher area (Asbe Teferi, Hirna), the Kulubi and Chelenko areas’ 
(Alem 1993). Although the Oromia constitution accepts the UN Universal Human Rights Declaration in 
its entirety, the wide gap between constitutional commitment and actual performance could be 
uncovered by the prevailing abuse of human rights and curtailment of political rights of the people living 
in the regional state. This reveals that constitutional acceptance is one thing and practical 
implementation is another matter. 
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Chapter Eight: Implications of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia    
 
This chapter discusses the advantages and disadvantages of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia by analysing 
the emerging trends in the three regional states. It also aims to determine whether the Ethiopian ethnic 
federal model is successful in promoting ethnic autonomy and ethnic equality as officially professed. Is 
it successful in nurturing ethnic cooperation or accelerating ethnic conflict; is it creating ethnic 
empowerment or widening ethnic dissatisfaction. Is it the empowerment of the ethnic communities or 
the ascendancy of the ethnic elites? Is the federal arrangement going in a direction of forging a workable 
polity? Is it a sustainable political arrangement for the people of Ethiopia?  As a whole, the chapter 
attempts to determine the essence of the federal model that is evolving in Ethiopia.   
8.1 Achievements connected to ethnic federalism in Ethiopia 
8.1.1 Expansion of education possibilities and other development projects 
One of the highly pronounced achievements of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is its ability in expanding 
education and other infrastructures in the areas not covered by the previous regimes. In the Benishangul-
Gumuz region, for example, since 1991 there has been evidence of an expansion of educational 
institutions (A civil servant from Berta, Interviewee 12, 2002: 14; (An elder from Berta, Interviewee 13 
2002: 18). It is reported that in 2003, there were about 291 primary schools, 11 secondary schools, and 1 
college. Before 2002 there was hardly any institution of higher education in the region, but in 2002 one 
college was established and there is also a plan to open more in few years time. Some projects like road 
construction, water supply, electricity projects, telephone services, which were inexistent in the past, are 
undertaken in deep hinterlands like Kamashe town (A member of the regional executive from Gumuz 
Interviewee 5, 2002:4). In the past, road construction, hospital and other infrastructure expansions were 
in few areas and only motivated by security and military concerns (A member of the regional executive 
from Berta, Interviewee 6 2002: 6).     
 
Significant numbers of students and civil servants from indigenous communities are also trained and 
educated in a special college in order to produce massive educated and qualified personnel from the 
indigenous ethnic communities. The special college, named the Civil Service College was established in 
Addis Ababa in 1993 in order to tackle the shortage of skilled and educated manpower in the regional 
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states, particularly in the relatively disadvantaged ethnic communities like Afar, Somali, Benishangul-
Gumuz and Gambella regional states. Though the effort is directed at creating ‘surrogates of oppressed 
masses’, rather than genuine representatives of the ‘oppressed masses’. However in the long run the 
indigenous communities would be in an advantageous position in producing skilled manpower and 
professionals who are socially and culturally very close to the indigenous communities.        
 
The very idea of self-administration has propelled the interest of the indigenous communities to seek 
better education in order to answer the challenging task of modern administration. As Mesfin (2000) 
argues education, in the past, was not sufficiently attractive for many indigenous ethnic groups to send 
their children to schools. For most of these ethnic communities, there was no inducement or rational 
grounds to send their children to modern education institutions. For them, modern education was an 
alien phenomenon that could spoil their children’s behaviour and encourage them to rebel against their 
traditions and customs. More importantly, it is a well-known fact that the education system was imposed 
on the indigenous communities along with the oppressive administrative structures of the central state by 
ejecting the local and traditional chiefs. Such a pattern certainly would fail to attract the indigenous 
communities toward the modern education system that came along with the system that has alienated 
their traditional administrative and legal institutions. However, at present faced with the promise and 
challenge of self-administration, the indigenous communities are to some extent inclining to recognize 
the need for modern education, and as a result there has been a rising demand to send their children to 
schools. According to a Gumuz informant, the prevailing negative attitude of the indigenous community 
regarding modern education has slowly been changing for the better with growing interests for modern 
education. Traditionally, a high esteemed achievement for the young men in the community has been to 
have a gun and wife. Local leaders used to bribe central officials by providing gold to dissuade them 
from opening schools in the area by fearing that modern education would undermine the traditions of the 
community, as the Gumuz official laments: ‘We bought ignorance by our gold. We never had an 
individual who had graduated with a high school education among the indigenous community, but now 
we have BA graduates, Masters and PhD level students within our communities’ (A member of the 
regional executive from Gumuz, Interviewee 5, 2002:4). 
 
It is indisputable that there is improvement in the expansion of primary education in the region; in 2003 
there are about 269 primary and 14 secondary schools in the regional state, which has a total of 474 
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kebeles. It appears that in an average one primary school serves two kebeles, which could be a very 
positive development in terms of physical access. Nevertheless, firstly, it is important to ask whether the 
success is only possible because of the ethnic federal framework? Is it not possible to educate young 
people it in a different administrative framework? For instance, by respecting local people’s right to 
have education for their children in their mother tongue, but without making it as an ethnic right, rather 
as a child right or human right to have education in the mother tongue. Secondly, in terms of equity and 
quality, the education sector in the region suffers from uneven distribution of schools, high rate of 
dropouts and low quality of education (BoFED 2003:26). The coverage figures may also not necessarily 
depict the actual conditions among the indigenous ethnic communities who live in remote and 
inaccessible villages. For example, in relation to school attendance in Assosa high school  ‘of 300 
students attending the school only 20 were indigenous, mostly Benishangul, and only 3 of these were 
girls (Young 1999: 341). Thirdly, the teaching language in elementary school is the Amharic language, 
but a mother tongue for the children from the indigenous communities is not Amharic thus making it 
also very difficult for the children to understand the teaching.  
 
8.1.2 Recognition of the right for self-administration and ethnic identity  
Almost all of my informants from the Oromo, the SNNP’s ethnic groups, and Benishangul-Gumuz 
indigenous groups are keen to have their own self-administration rights, to use their vernacular language 
in office and schools and to promote their culture and identity. However, most of their complaints were 
on reduction of their ethnic rights, central interference, budget allocations and internal fragmentation.  
 
More importantly, many believed that self-administration also brings self-confidence for the indigenous 
community. A Shinasha informant expresses that in the past many of the Shinasha elite including 
himself were ashamed to give indigenous forename to their kids in order to avoid to be laughed at or to 
appear uncivilised (A council member from Shinasha, Interviewee 3 2002: 03). Some indigenous 
communities like the Mao and Komo were previously unheard-of and lived in isolated and inaccessible 
jungle, but now they become known and recognised as well as provided with a right for self-
administration (A member of the regional executive from Berta, Interviewee 6 2002: 6). A Gumuz 
informant also claims that in the past, we used to be portrayed as a little better than wild animals, but 
now, ‘our sons’ are running courts, working in the police force and giving us leadership (A member of 
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the regional executive from Gumuz Interviewee 5, 2002:5). Another informant also claims that ethnic 
federalism is advantageous in providing an opportunity for the indigenous communities for self-
administration; non-ethnic federal structure could compel us to be ruled by non-indigenous leaders who 
may have relatively better education. A rule by the indigenous leaders is better and very nearer for the 
indigenous community (A civil servant from Berta, Interviewee 12, 2002: 14). Outsiders are not able to 
provide solutions to the problems of our community (A council member from Shinasha, Interviewee 3 
2002: 2). Thus the regional, zonal and wereda administrative structures are completely controlled by the 
elites drawn from the local communities despite the discontent of many groups who are unhappy in 
ethnic self-administration that often downgrade and attack the self-administration rights of the various 
ethnic groups (A development agent, Interviewee 22, 2002: 01).  
 
Furthermore, most of the ethnic groups in the SNNP and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states have been 
considered as marginal minorities. The centralized Ethiopian state structure since the beginning of the 
19th century has imposed its authority on the diverse ethnic communities in Ethiopia. The imposed 
authority of the centralized state was not tolerant in recognizing and promoting local identities; as a 
result the culture of these ethnic communities including their languages were marginalized at the 
national level. Though the 1975 land reform was highly instrumental in abolishing the economic 
exploitation of the ‘southern’ people the central ruling elites and their local agents, it did not allow local 
self-governance and recognition of ethnic rights to self-administration. Since the advent of ethnic 
restructuring in 1991, however, ethnic identities have become a nodal point for political mobilization 
and local administrations, and thus newly restructured ethnic administrative constituencies have become 
a venue for official expressions of ethnic identity and ethnic self-administration by providing at least 
symbolic importance (Smith 1996) for recognition and dignity of ethnic elites and communities. 
Moreover, the promotion of local language in local administration and elementary schools can be 
considered an advantage for the local community because it can facilitate better communication, 
understanding and learning.  
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8.2 Some Disadvantages of ethnic federalism in regions 
8.2.1 The paradox of an ascriptive criterion  
In Benishangul-Gumuz regional state and in most of the ethnic constituencies in SNNP, the local elites 
control bureaucratic posts and key decision-making positions whereas the so-called ‘outsiders’ provide 
virtually all-professional skills. As Young describes the situation in the Benishangul-Gumuz ‘while 
indigenous people are favoured in public service appointments, promotions and educational 
opportunities, only 17 out of 225 recently appointed professionals are indigenous (Young 1999: 338). 
The EPRDF’s model of ethnic federalism has recognized primordialism- ethnic loyalty and ethnic 
solidarity- as the most important factor in organizing politics and society in Ethiopia. Whereas excluded 
by such primordial categorization, the professionals and trained employees from ‘outside’ (or Amharic 
term Mette) are expected to provide highly needed services, thus in conflict with the primordial rules 
that underpin the logic of ethnic loyalty. But, why should they commit or dedicate themselves to the 
ethnic constituency and the political framework that categorize them as ‘outsiders,’ ‘neftegna’ or 
‘oppressors’? The assumption may be that ‘money can buy everything’, but it is very difficult to believe 
that money can create durable solidarity and commitment. In addition, since these qualified employees 
are categorized as outsiders, they may have very little incentive to be motivated viewing the fact that the 
public sector salary in Ethiopia is much lower than the private sector or non-government organizations. 
A report by the World Bank confirms that the private sector salaries were estimated at 125 percent of 
comparable public sector salaries and in most occasions, better opportunities are available in the urban 
areas (World Bank 2001: 33). Thus, it is natural that these qualified individuals may become more 
motivated for maximizing their personal benefits, rather than to show motivation for achievement and 
professional integrity. This could be one of the major factors that could explain for the widespread 
inefficiency and corruption in the regional states.  
 
Although professionals and expertise are severely lacking throughout Ethiopia, the ascriptive criterion of 
ethnic federalism has exacerbated the problem in the regions. Development projects like micro-dams, 
medium and small-scale irrigations and, improved agricultural and veterinary services could not be 
executed or implemented because of lack of skilled manpower. Ethnic federalism has drawn a 
dichotomy of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’; the ‘insiders’ have no professional skills whereas the ‘outsiders’ 
are not happy and willing to work in the area which considers them ‘outsiders’. They do so as a last 
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resort when other opportunities are not available. As a result, without high incentives or change of 
attitudes or modifying the ethnic philosophy, it is unlikely that the problem could be solved in the near 
future. As Vaughan and Tronvoll state that ‘there have been widespread complaints that the combined 
requirements to recruit personnel on the basis of ethnic quotas, and political affiliation or loyalty means 
that the most able and efficient functionaries are continually overlooked’ (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 
14). Young also observed that ‘the whole complexes of partially completed government buildings can be 
seen in Assosa, testimony to corrupt relations between politicians and contractors’ (Young 1999: 336). 
Thus Young concludes that Benishangul-Gumuz region ‘is not meeting its potential in either agricultural 
production or industrial development, and again political factors seem to be the major obstacle’ (Young 
1999: 336).  
 
Low competence of the political elites and regional administration officials in the regions have resulted 
in deficit of governance in the regional states’ overall administrative structures. In most of the ethnic 
constituencies, the administrative and political elites have assumed key leadership roles straight away 
without making any preparations or training as how to carry out the new responsibility assigned to them 
in running the state institutions entrusted to them. Particularly, in Benishangul-Gumuz and SNNP 
regional states, absence of experience in politics and modern administration among the local elites has 
created difficulties to build an accommodative political framework through compromise that could 
facilitate inter-ethnic cooperation and efficient administration. Instead, the political frameworks at the 
regional, zonal and wereda levels have become an arena of zero-sum politics in which the elites from the 
various ethnic groups mistrust each other and egoistically fight one another78. Furthermore, most 
regional politicians and officials are not also happy to use experts and professionals from the so-called 
‘outsiders’ in leadership positions claiming that the principle of self-administration could suffer. This is 
partly in line with the EPRDF’s principle that recognizes the precedence of ethnic attachment, and 
partly, could serve as a pretext to neutralize potential contenders for power and offices.  
 
Moreover, the highly exaggerated dichotomy between ‘indigenous’ and ‘non-indigenous’, ‘natives’ and 
‘outsiders’ or ‘oppressed’ and ‘oppressors’ has spread fear and suspicion among ordinary people. The 
ethnic federal arrangement cadres have made a severe mistake in associating past oppressive rulers’ 
policies and actions with ethnic labelling such as neftegna Amhara and ‘outsiders’ as oppressors. Thus, 
                                                 
           78 In most of the interviews, many of the informants accused and label negatively the elites from other ethnic groups 
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such dichotomised labelling by ethnic demagogies has fashioned a categorization of ordinary people 
across the board as belonging to either to oppressor or oppressed group. Particularly, in Benishangul-
Gumuz, despite its potentials for investment, the region could not attract significant amount of private 
capital. In the region, people who do not belong to the so-called indigenous ethnic communities are 
often portrayed as ‘subversive’, ‘part of the past oppressive rules’ ‘chauvinists’ and others offensive 
remarks. Such environment would not encourage bringing more needed investors to the region from 
other parts of the country. Yet, those businessmen who are operating in the regional state are not even 
inclined to expand their investment because of the de-motivating behaviour, intention and action of the 
exaggerated ethnic dichotomy. A businessman argues before investing capital in more extended 
activities; they want to be sure that the prospect is favourable to recover their money, but at the moment 
they do not see an encouraging sign from the regional officials. ‘We often hear discouraging and hate 
speech such as labelling us as ‘outsiders’ by the political groupings’ (A leader of Eder, Interviewee 10 
2002: 13). This is can be seen as evidence of the lack of ‘political incentives for economic security’ (Sen 
1999: 246).   
 
8.2.2 Inhibits population movements between regions and within multiethnic 
regions 
Ethnic federalism has enforced ethnic entitlement of land and other local resources in the delimited 
ethnic constituencies or ethnic homelands; thereby becoming an obstacle for intra-regional and inter-
regional people’s movement. For instance, there is a high density or over-crowdedness in some parts of 
the SNNP regional state and less population density in others; alleviating this situation may require 
migration of people from overcrowded areas to the sparsely populated areas. This has been part of the 
history of Ethiopia and other human societies. The current ethnic restructuring, however, has made such 
solution difficult and conflictual. Particularly, in the SNNP regional state, population and agriculture 
densities are very high in the highland areas that contain 80 percent of the regional population on 40 per 
cent of the regional territory, in contrast population and agriculture densities are very low in the lowland 
areas that are inhibited by 20 per cent of the regional population covering 60 of the regional state 
territory. In highland areas like in the Gedeo, Sidama, Kembata and Timbaro, Hadiya and Guraghe 
zones, population density reaches between 400 to 500 persons/sq. km and agriculture density is between 
197-394 persons/sq. km. In lowland areas like in the South Omo, Bench-Maji and Keffa zones, 
population density is between 15 to 50 persons/sq. km and agricultural density is between 15 to 16 
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persons/sq. km. However, in accordance with the current ethnic homeland administrative delimitation, 
resettlement of people from the highland to the lowland areas could be illegitimate.     
 
8.2.3 The ascendancy of elites or elitism  
The ethnic empowerment ideology in the regional states is more concerned in appointing elites from 
ethnic groups in political and administrative offices, but without due focus on their ability and skill to 
carry out the responsibility entrusted upon them. As a result of the ethnic empowerment philosophy, the 
elites ascendancy to power in the regions has become an end by itself; it has opened possibilities for the 
ethnic elites to access the state’s rewarding capacity in resources and political power based on their 
exclusive rights to occupy all regional, zonal and wereda administrative structures.   
 
It is evident that the new ethnic constituencies have not brought any major improvement to the lives of 
the majority of the local people; rather they changed the personal of local power holders by replacing 
‘elites from the center’ with ‘elites from the local’, with both have been promoting the interests of power 
holder at the center. The former were evidently an extension of the central power at the local areas, 
whereas the latter are integrated into the system as member of the coalition of the co-opted elites of the 
‘oppressed’. In this manner the ascendancy of ethnic elites to state power and their access to state coffer 
and privileges are equated with the satisfaction of ethnic communities’ demands for recognition and 
self-administration.       
 
Particularly, in regional states such as Benishangul-Gumuz and other peripheral areas, the new ethnic 
state structure, which was imposed on the people, neglected the local tradition of power control and 
exercise. Furthermore, it has pressured the local people to fit into its mould and aphorism. The 
indigenous ethnic communities in these areas did not have experiences of running modern state 
structures, but they were expected to fit in the new arrangement. The underlying assumption of the 
framers of the ethnic federal project is that local communities and indigenous groups would be provided 
rights that should be exercised within the political structures and arrangements that are prescribed and 
controlled from the center.  Neither have the indigenous communities in the regional state been asked to 
identify what kind of administrative structures they would prefer, nor have detailed studies been made to 
identify and incorporate the existing traditional administrative and legal institutions.  
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Rather, the regional state formation procedures and setting up of administrative structures were carried 
out in a very swift way through superficial agreement with the regional elites who happened to be 
comrade-in-arms in fighting the previous military government. In the process others elites from other 
indigenous groups have also joined the process through co-option, manipulation and indoctrination 
without having an appropriate mandate from their communities. The indigenous elites have manoeuvred 
their communities by propagating the EPRDF’s fabricated and exaggerated claims of past oppression 
and promises of instantaneous ethnic freedom and future prosperity in order to get authentication of their 
self-assumed positions as spokespersons and representatives of the indigenous communities. Most of the 
elections that have been carried out in the indigenous communities are tailored to give ‘democratic’ 
credential to the self-appointed indigenous elites who have been nominated and favoured by the EPRDF. 
As a result, the indigenous elites are made highly susceptible to the interest of the ruling party and they 
are used in serving the interests of the center, rather than their community. The indigenous elites have 
become instrument of extending central control in the local area, which is similar to the traditional 
pattern of Ethiopian statehood.  The difference, however, is that in the current prototype the rights of 
ethnic self-administration discourse have been invoked constantly and vociferously in co-opting and 
capturing the indigenous elites. Consequently, the indigenous communities have no control over 
regional politics and regional administration, as their leaders are more accountable to the center than to 
their constituencies.     
 
Despite the claims of the EPRDF, as well as a scholar like John Young (Young 1999: 321) who argues 
that local political power is in the hands of indigenous leaders, the EPRDF has in fact introduced a 
patrimonial rule by raising local elites to position of prominence without local legitimacy, in order to 
make them loyal and entirely dependent on the central rule. This may be a deliberate policy on the part 
of the EPRDF to alienate local leaders from their own constituencies in order to turn them into devoted 
supporter to the EPRDF as they become easily susceptible to the EPRDF’s manipulation and coercion.    
However, the ethnic federal structure in Ethiopia is creating tensions between the emerging political 
elites and their traditional networks and leaders as the new state structures do not have a space for the 
traditional administrative and legal systems. For example, in Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, in some 
wereda areas in Oromia, such as Borena and Guji and, in many ethnic constituencies of the SNNP, such 
as in most of the special wereda constituencies, the traditional leaders and systems have been left out 
from the political and administrative bodies because the new state structures demand a minimum ability 
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to read and write while most of the traditional leaders are illiterate. For instance appointment to the 
wereda administration offices requires completion of elementary school. Nonetheless, traditional leaders 
and elders are still active in the traditional institutions like the traditional courts and mediation practices 
at their localities. The newly imposed and centrally inclined modern administrative structures have 
excluded local legal and administrative mechanisms and thus alienated local communities who have 
neither the required experience nor preparation to run the new state institutions. Thus, the elites’ 
personal promotion goals intertwined with ethnic loyalty and ethnic identification have facilitated the 
ascendancy of elitism at the expense of the local community.  
 
An illustration for the development of elitism can be gleaned from the operation of the Benishangul-
Gumuz regional state. It is evident that the people of the regional state have faced with a severe shortage 
of essential services that could improve their living conditions, whereas budget spending in the regional 
state is characterized by constructing luxuries offices, purchasing expensive vehicles and yearning for 
higher salaries. For instance, the construction of a hundred million birr budget asphalt road in Assosa 
town is an extravagance in the regional state wherein 90 percent of the inhabitants are living in the 
impoverished and inaccessible rural villages in which animal diseases (such as gendi) are gravely 
reducing the livestock resources of the community due to lack of proper veterinary services. The huge 
money spent on the asphalt construction could have been used to expand veterinary services in rural 
areas to save the livestock and to improve the economic capacity of the regional state through an 
expanded production and income potential for the people as well as for the regional government. 
8.2.4 Increase of ethnic tensions and rivalries  
The regional governments, particularly in the SNNP and Benishangul Gumuz regions, have become an 
arena of ethnic hostilities and elites rivalries. Inter-ethnic relations are full of unyielding competitions 
and destructive hostilities, intra-ethnic frictions are rife, settlers-indigenous tensions are endemic, 
religion and cultural variations are used to exaggerate differences. In the Benishangul-Gumuz region, for 
instance, rivalries between the Benishangul and Gumuz political elites for key political power, splits 
within the Benishangul elites due to provincialism and external factors, disagreements and anxieties in 
distribution of funds, projects, bureaucratic posts and other deputies have become detrimental for 
effective operation of the regional government. Its effectiveness has been thwarted and its legitimacy 
has been put into question on several occasions. In Southern Ethiopia there has been age-old conflicts 
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over control of agricultural or pasturelands between neighbouring communities like Gedeo and Guji. 
However with the introduction of ethnic restructuring the controversies concerning local resources are 
inflated into inter-ethnic contradictions by being projected as matters of collective interests of the ethnic 
group communities that needing ethnic solidarity. Conflict on land and petty quarrels are turned into 
ethnic tensions and take on ethnic dimensions due to politicised ethnicity and ethnicised politics79. As 
John Markakis (1998) claims many hostilities in the Horn Africa have occurred because of the scarcity 
of resources; but since 1991 due to ethnic entitlement, resource disputes easily flare up into bloody 
ethnic conflicts. The bloody conflicts between the Gedeo and Guji, Gerri and Borena communities can 
be cited as recent examples.   
8.2.5 Federal interference in the regions facilitates the hegemony of the TPLF  
Intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic tensions within the regional government have opened a good opportunity 
for the TPLF to divide and rule in order to ascertain its hegemony. Weak and internally divided regional 
governments could be an advantage for a central government, dominated by a minority ethnic group 
from Tigray. The TPLF, in order to counterbalance pressures and threats from the major ethnic groups-- 
Oromo and Amhara, which represent about 60 percent of the total population of the country--, badly 
needs the collaboration from various minority groups in the regional states. As a result, it actively 
operates in all regional states as EPRDF and as ‘advisory’. An informant makes the accusation that the 
TPLF representative in the region is well known in muddling between the indigenous elites by 
exaggerating tensions (A member of zonal executive from Berta, Interviewee 8 2002: 11).  
 
Inter-ethnic cooperations have been damaged in establishing genuine coalition governance structures 
because of the absence of negotiated and fair procedures and arrangement among many of the ethnic 
group in the SNNP and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states. Stiff competitions are endemic between the 
elites of various ethnic groups for political power, bureaucratic positions, budget allocations and other 
interests. This reinforced the EPRDF’s claim that the regional governments need federal support and 
federal interference, thus giving the federal government a good opportunity for interfering in the day-to-
day operation of the regional governments through ‘advisory’, direct intervention in political and 
administrative decisions, appointment and dismissal of officials and overall running of the regional 
                                                 
           79 For instance, debate in the council on project allocations in particular area always brings ethnic tensions and antagonisms, 
because an individual opposition easily translate into opposition to an ethnic group that would be considered as a potential 
beneficiaries of the proposed project (A member of the Sidama zonal legislative (also member of the ruling party), 
Interviewee 30, 2002: 18). 
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states behind the back of the regional leaders. This makes the regional states a trust territory of the 
TPLF/EPRDF cadres that can install and dismiss officials based on their interests.  
 
Particularly, in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, there is a unique federal ‘support’ structure in 
which the regional state is almost directly managed and followed by the federal government from the 
center. Similar practices have been observed in other similar regional states like the Afar, Somali and 
Gambella wherein the federal government has been directly and closely involved in the regional states 
overall operations. Though some scholars (John 1999: 345; Kinfe 1994) interpret the federal 
government’s direct involvement in these disadvantaged and relatively undeveloped regional states as 
the ‘only viable course at this time, many observers question the motives and actions of the 
TPLF/EPRDF as insincere and self-serving (Vestal 1999; Merera 2003; Ottawi 1995; Siegfried 2003). 
Many local informants are also very unhappy concerning the way the federal government is controlling 
the regional states. Observing the modus operandi of the ruling party, the TPLF/EPRDF, in the federal 
government, one can doubt the sincerity of its motives. The TPLF/EPRDF has always been keen to 
shape the political arrangement in the regions in the way that suits its interest and objective. In 
Benishangul-Gumuz, the federal government has been involved in shaping the political power in the 
region since the inception of the regional government in 1991 by installing its favourite ethnic elites; 
eventually, in mid-1990s replacing them by another group that was supposed to fulfil its interest better at 
the point in time.   In this regard, the action of the federal government reveals the intention of the TPLF, 
which is more interested in promoting ‘the surrogate of oppressed masses’ than in nurturing genuine 
representatives of the local communities. (Vestal 1999: 121). Many accuse the TPLF in playing a 
conspiracy to keep other regions in a state of crisis and limbo in order to accelerate development in 
Tigray by diverting resources and budget (Vestal 1999; Assefa 1996; An Elder from Berta, Interviewee 
7 2002: 8; A member of the federal legislative from the opposition (from the SNNP), Interviewee 43, 
2002: 52; An elder from Berta, Interviewee 13 2002).   
 
Initially, the Tigrian political elites received some support from many of the ethnic communities in the 
SNNP and Benishangul-Gumuz because of their denunciation of the past ruling groups as brutal and 
chauvinistic toward minority ethnic communities. But in fact the TPLF is exploiting tensions among 
ethnic groups for its self-serving interference and hegemonic ambitions. It exaggerates past wounds to 
create ethnic mistrust and vengefulness. The original support dissipated as the intention of the Tigrayan 
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elites has become clearer; that is to become a hegemonic power through co-option and surrogate 
mechanisms that resembles the ‘Tigrayanisation’ of the regional power structures in Ethiopia. The TPLF 
may have assumed that because it defeated the military regime and introduced ethnic federalism that it 
should get a reward by becoming the hegemonic power in Ethiopia; but it is very difficult for the 
majority of Ethiopians to accept willingly the replacement of an old dictatorship by a new dictatorship.  
As Tehodore Vestal put it ‘meanwhile, Ethiopia, having completed its transition from one Marxist-
Leninist regime to another, limps on, wearing the thick boot of authoritarianism at the end of one leg, 
and the iron of ethnic hatred on the other’ (Vestal 1999: 207). 
 
Although the discourse of ethnic autonomy is paramount, in most cases it is a façade. It has been proved 
advantageous for the TPLF to ascertain its hegemonic ambitions by easily influencing the regional elites 
who are easily susceptible to the demands of the federal government. The extreme dependence on the 
federal budget transfers has made the regional politicians highly vulnerable to the central demands and 
interests. Without adequate regional financial power to finance regional spending, it is unlikely to expect 
effective regional self-administration exercise in the regional state. In addition, inexperience of regional 
officials in state administration has opened an opportunity for the federal government for playing an 
active and key role in regional politics and administration. For example, the Benishangul-Gumuz region 
is under direct control of the office of the Prime Minister from Addis Ababa. The disadvantageous 
conditions of the region in facing critical shortage of manpower and finance have given the federal 
government an opportunity for to take direct control of the region by appointing an ‘advisor’ directly 
from the Prime Minister’s office. The advisor has a considerable power in influencing decision in key 
political and administrative matters in the regional state.   
 
In the SNNP as well, the interference of the federal government is paramount from the beginning.  The 
existence of diverse ethnic groups in SNNP is not a problem in itself; the major source of the problem is 
the imposition of policies or decisions favoured by the ruling party from the centre in compacting the 
diverse ethnic groups into a single regional state. According to many officials from the regional 
government,80 there had been no open negotiation or discussion either with the wider Southern elites or 
southern community groups to determine the appropriate nature and type of state structure in the region. 
                                                 
80 In the interview, almost all regional officials interviewed confirm that there was no public decision undertaken to unite the 
five southern states into one state, but most of them, except some, particularly from the Sidama and Gurage group, believe 
that the merger was a right decision. However, opposition groups such as the SLM and SEPDC oppose the process and the 
merger itself.  
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Discussion was held only within the EPRDF party and they decided to combine the previous five 
regional states into a single regional state structure without adequate study or convincing arguments (A 
regional council member from Sidama, Interviewee 23, 2002: 02). The imposed unity was openly 
opposed by the opposition groups as well as internally, within the ruling party coalition itself (An ex-
Minister in the federal government, Interviewee 31, 2002: 20). 
 
An informant, a member of the EPRDF party, confirms that his party is highly interested in the 
unification of every ethnic groups in a single administrative entity in order to prepare a foundation for 
creating a single social, political and economic society in the SNNP, rather than carving out an ethnic 
homeland for every community by following the demand and interest of ethnic elites and ethnic parties 
(A member of the regional ruling party from Sheka, Interviewee 40, 2002: 45). It seems that EPRDF is 
worried by the difficulty in satisfying the demand that can arise from the numerous ethnic groups on the 
SNNP, which nave been promised, ideologically and constitutionally, in establishing their own self-
administration. However, owing to the reckless inconsistency of the ethnic federal structure that has 
granted a regional state capacity for a very small ethnic group, like the Harari with a populations of 20, 
000, it is unlikely to convince some of the SNNP region’s ethnic groups which contain hundreds 
thousands to millions of people.  
 
Even if one accepts at face value the proclaimed intention that the ruling party is interested to promote 
unity and regional strength, the matter has to be decided through discussion and debate in an open and 
genuine manner among the various ethnic groups and others living in the SNNP regional state in order 
to hammer out a compromised and negotiated solutions that can fairly answer and satisfy the demands of 
various disparate communities. The imposed decision, however, contrary to creating a unified socio-
political space, has created a destructive pattern by pitting ethnic groups against each other. The two 
major ethnic groups in the regional state, Sidama and Wolaita elites are caught in a strife to control key 
powers in the regional government and this intense friction among the elites at the top, as discussed 
above, developed into tensions and hostility at the community level. The Siltie and Gurage communities, 
which used to identify their ethnic identity within a broader common Gurage ethnic community, are now 
split by a referendum as distinct communities. The split has created an antagonistic and hostile attitude 
in which many Gurage feels that Siltie elites are very opportunistic and divisive. The Gamo and Gofa 
are not cooperative in their single administrative constituency, the minority Gofa elites have demanded 
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their own separate constituency, but their demand was not approved by the regional government and 
thus have remained in the zone without their consent. The 2001 fierce violence in Sheko-Mejenger, that 
resulted in the death of about 100 people, the displacement of 5000 people and destruction of more than 
2000 houses, occurred because of a demand arising out of opposition to the existing territorial and 
political arrangement.          
 
The Wolaita and Gamo groups have also inflicted heavy damages to each other in mass killings and 
ethnic cleansing in 2001 due to the failed Wegagoda project. The Wegagoda fiasco was another 
illustration of an imposed scheme that was intended to promote integration through political force and 
administrative fix. It failed devastatingly by causing massive social, economic and political debacle. In 
addition to the loss of human lives and 40 million birr text book destruction, the Wegagoda fiasco 
destroyed the evolutionary integration process of the four ethnic groups who are in a process of 
developing a common single language, culture and psychological make-up because of substantial 
intermix and close communication for generations between these neighbouring ethnic communities. 
Their language is almost becoming identical, the majority of the people share the same religion and they 
also identify themselves with the common Omotic language family (An ex-official of the regional 
government, Interviewee 36, 2002: 33). Contrary to this evolution, the Wegagoda scheme has created 
conflict and hostility among these close ethnic groups that can certainly have an impact for the 
foreseeable future; the reciprocated killings and ethnic cleansing carnage committed by both Wolaita 
and Gamo groups against each other will not be forgotten so easily. Evolutionary integration process 
was forcefully and hurriedly pushed by administrative and political measures; the result of such hasty 
strategy culminated in disasters that would have long-term consequences. Ostensibly designed, the quick 
fix integration project of Wegagoda has terribly failed and instead promoted fractures and 
disintegrations that are contrary to its alleged intentions. Wegagoda can be explained as an 
administrative fix that was intended to change culture for administrative expediency, but it ended up in 
creating administrative inexpediencies by splitting one zone into three zones and one special Wereda, 
which resulted into four administrative constituencies.  
 
Similarly, forced unification was carried out again in September 2003 by abolishing the 20 ethnic parties 
in Southern Ethiopia by changing the coalition South Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Front (SEPDF) into 
a single party structure with the name of South Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement (SEPDM) 
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(Ethiopian Press Agency, 16 September 2003). Though the ruling party claimed that the merger was a 
demonstration of ‘the strong commitment and resolve of the Southern people for unity and integration’, 
the merger aimed in suppressing the increasing demands of the ethnic groups for resources, separate 
administrative constituency and other sectional rights. Similarly, the merger was a result of a decision by 
the ruling elites that did not get the opinion or approval of the communities of the various ethnic 
communities.   
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
This concluding part is divided into three sections. The first section pinpoints the major empirical 
evidence that is directly related to answering the main research question of the dissertation, i.e. how 
effective is the ethnic federalism arrangement in fulfilling the demands of the various ethnic groups for 
self-administration and equal representation within the context of a viable Ethiopian state? It also aims 
to determine how successful ethnic federalism is in promoting self-rule and shared rule simultaneously? 
In general, in this section the dissertation focuses in identifying the empirical flaws in the 
implementation of the ethnic federal arrangement. The second section identifies the conceptual 
shortcomings and immense challenges of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The third section will conclude 
by presenting the contribution or significance of the PhD dissertation, and a recommendation.   
9.1 Empirical flaws behind ethnic federalism in Ethiopia 
As revealed in the empirical findings of the preceding chapters, the TPLF/EPRDF has not kept its 
promises in providing genuine self-administration for the various ethnic groups at the local level and 
equal representation at the federal level. Although many of the ethnic groups find satisfaction in the 
ideological commitment behind the promise to recognize their identity, language and political rights, in 
most cases, however, they are disappointed with the actual implementation, which is devoid of genuine 
self-administration. In addition, at the national level, the federal government has not been organized as a 
coalition government of the various ethnic groups that constitute the Ethiopian state. Disproportionate to 
its share and contribution, the TPLF, largely dominates the federal government in a style of imposing its 
pre-eminence at the federal as well as regional levels by using the EPRDF as a cover to hide its 
hegemonic position in the Ethiopian state.  
 
More importantly, the ethnic federal arrangement has been faced with a severe predicament that may not 
be easily resolved due to the inherent weakness of the sole protagonist of the ethnic federal arrangement. 
As argued in Chapter three, the TPLF has been the major force behind the conceptualisation and 
implementation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The paradox, however, is that the TPLF could have 
been the main loser of a genuine implementation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. The TPLF, which 
claims to represent the province of Tigray, would have been at a disadvantage in satisfying the twin 
criteria of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia: ethnic entitlement and federation. Firstly, in terms of ethnic 
entitlement, the Tigrayan ethnic group accounts for 6 percent of the total population of Ethiopia, 
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therefore its share in the federal government, in accordance with the ideology of the ethnic federal 
formula, should have been proportional to its population share as foreseen by the ethnic entitlement 
formula. In practice, with the current federal arrangement, the Tigrayan elite and the TPLF have a 
dominant and leading role in the federal government. Secondly, the Tigray province has been a 
comparatively highly impoverished and environmentally degraded region without any significant natural 
resource in comparison to most of the other regions in Ethiopia. Consequently, a genuine federation 
would mean that the social and economic development in Tigray would be greatly dependent on 
resource transfers from sources beyond the province of Tigray; this could be very difficult, in view of 
the fact that almost all of the regions suffer from endemic poverty and scarcity of resources as well. 
Without the hegemonic role of the TPLF, the disproportional benefit enjoyed by the Tigrayan elite and 
the Tigray province could not have been possible.  
 
Consequently, the hegemonic role of the Tigrayan elite or the TPLF has been the main factor in 
derailing the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia. As discussed in the empirical chapter, the 
TPLF/EPRDF single-handedly carried out and dominated the constitutional drafting process and setting 
of procedures and arrangements for establishing an elected government that replaced the transition 
government. In such a situation it is not difficult to comprehend the motives and agenda of 
TPLF/EPRDF, although it claimed commitment to a genuine ethnic federal arrangement. As its actual 
performance tells, the TPLF is more interested to protect its hegemonic position at the expense of a 
genuine ethnic federal restructuring. Here, the most important point to understand is that the 
TPLF/EPRDF has not been an honest force in implementing a genuine ethnic federalism. Contrary to 
critics who argue that the TPLF has been excessively empowering ethnic groups, the real practice is that 
the TPLF is co-opting elites from the various ethnic groups who are accept the dominance of the 
Tigrayan elite in the Ethiopian state.    Hence, the TPLF/EPRDF is not giving power to ethnic groups, 
but to elites from various ethnic communities in order to stretch its influence and rule. Since the EPRDF 
has been orchestrated by the TPLF and the TPLF has remained the supreme core member of the EPRDF 
the implication is that the ethnic federal arrangement has been used by the TPLF in order to extend its 
authority beyond its own territory. It appears that the TPLF is using the ethnic federal arrangement to 
install itself in the dominant position of the Ethiopian political space through the support of surrogates 
and ethnic entrepreneurs who have been rewarded and benefited more than the ethnic community they 
claim to represent.  
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Although the TPLF claims that it has been, first and foremost, struggling for the rights of the Tigrayan 
people for self-determination, its legitimacy in Tigray has not been tested democratically. Nevertheless, 
it is evident that the TPLF has been able to secure immense moral and political support from the people 
of Tigray because of its commitment for the assertion and promotion of Tigrayan nationalism. Thus, the 
ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia has been used by the TPLF to establish the hegemony of the 
Tigray nationalism over other nationalisms, including Ethiopian nationalism. Though it is difficult to 
know whether the Tigrean people as a whole support or benefit from the strategy of the TPLF, there is 
ample evidence that the Tigrayan elites are benefiting and have assumed a dominant position in the 
federal structures disproportionate to their share.  
 
According to the principles of its own ideology of fair and equal representation of ethic groups, the 
TPLF, which represents the Tigray province with 6 percent of the Ethiopian population, should have 
assumed a minority role, if its intention has not been an ethnic hegemony via ethnic federalism. But, 
because it has operated contrary to the rule of its own game, the TPLF and EPRDF are behaving like an 
instrument of coercion and domination rather than equality and freedom. As a result, the ethnic federal 
arrangement in Ethiopia has been characterised by the suppression and oppression. In a nutshell, the 
ethnic federal project in Ethiopia has become a device for the implementation and protection of the 
hegemonic position of the Tigrayan elite that has its origin in a minority ethnic group. The TPLF uses a 
system of patron-client relationship by co-opting of elites from various ethnic communities and regions 
to serve the extension of its dominant power in order to have dominant control of the resources the 
Ethiopian state.  
 
By alienating the major section of Ethiopian society and setting the foundation for the unpopular and 
lonesome journey, the TPLF/EPRDF has been ruling Ethiopia by relying heavily on its military strength. 
Nevertheless, there has been a lot of resistance from different sources and directions. Since 1991, the 
TPLF/EPRDF has faced strong opposition from the two major ethnic groups- Oromo and Amhara- that 
account for nearly 60 percent of the total population of Ethiopia.  As discussed in chapter 3, section 3.2, 
most intellectuals have been unhappy with the TPLF/EPRDF’s ethnic agenda; many Amhara 
intellectuals are hostile to the ANDM, which was formed by the EPRDF to represent Amhara. Similarly, 
Oromo intellectuals and a significant portion of the Oromo population have showed stronger sympathy 
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toward the OLF than the OPDO; it has been very difficult for the OPDO to attract faithful members. 
Since 1991, the Oromia regional state has been experiencing political turmoil, frequent manifestations of 
resistance from Oromo students in universities and high schools, defections of individuals from the top 
leadership81 of the regional government, massive arrests and harassment of civil society groups in the 
region. In the SNNP, the various ethnic groups in the region who have resisted the dominance of the 
TPLF/EPRDF in the region formed a coalition party. This political grouping has been a challenge to the 
ruling SEPDF that was orchestrated and installed to power by the TPLF. As confirmed by international 
election observers’ teams in 1995, 2000 and 2005, the oppositions’ coalition could have been successful 
in controlling the SNNP regional government, if the ruling party had truly been committed to free and 
fair elections. There are numerous credible reports that the ruling party has been constantly intimidating 
and imprisoning members of the opposition in the region. The Oromia, Amhara and the SNNP regional 
states, which are the core regions of the federal Ethiopia and account for 75 percent of the total 
population of the country, are not genuine allies of the TPLF. The TPLF uses its coercion and cooption 
strategy to dominate the regions by operating in the name of the EPRDF, which is acting as ‘a 
monopolistic holding company’ for the advancement of its sectional interests. In other regions, such as 
the Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz and Somali regional states, the trend and the resistance have been 
the same. However, the TPLF/EPRDF, which is determined to protect its hegemony, continues to show 
its defiance of all resistances and utterly dominates the ethnic federal structure in a centralized manner.  
 
As discussed in chapter four, five and six of the empirical part of this dissertation, the TPLF’s co-option 
strategy has also promoted inexperienced, less educated, submissive and non-popular individuals in the 
regions. These were calculatingly picked by the TPLF in order to facilitate its ambition of dominating 
the overall political space in the country. Prominent, better-educated and self-confident individuals are 
deliberately pushed aside by the TPLF/EPRDF cadres because it is realized that these people might not 
have been submissive and faithful followers of the TPLF’s hegemonic project. Generally, the ethnic 
federal formula in Ethiopia is empirically flawed; it has been simply used as a device to ‘legitimise’ the 
domination of a tiny minority ethnic group over the majority and other ethnic groups. The next section 
likewise discusses the conceptual weaknesses of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia.     
                                                 
81 The defections of the Vice President of Oromia, Hassen Ali to the US in 1999, Almaz Meko, a speaker of the 
Upper Chamber of the Parliament in 2001, Yonathan Dibissa a founder and one of the leaders of the OPDO in 2000.  
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9. 2 Conceptual flaws behind ethnic federalism in Ethiopia 
 
It is conceptually wrong to introduce ethnic restructuring and ethnic entitlement in a county like 
Ethiopia. Firstly, it is evident that with more than 80 ethnolinguistic groups, it is a gigantic task in 
Ethiopia to satisfy the rights of all these groups for ‘a full measure of self-government which includes 
the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that [they inhabit] and to equitable 
representation in the State and Federal governments’ (Article 39, the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution). It is 
also a very challenging to select some and to omit others in providing a right for self-government at the 
local level and equal representation at the national level as this involves a difficulty of establishing a 
criterion that respects the rights of some groups while at the same time neglecting those of others. 
Especially, since, the ethnic entitlement and ethnic restructuring policy in Ethiopia has aroused 
expectations that could not be so easily and modestly satisfied. Although ethnic cleavages have existed 
in Ethiopia, with the exception of very few groups that had demanded political rights for their group, for 
the majority ethnic groups there had been no significant political demands along ethnic group lines. 
Nevertheless, it is the introduction of ethnic federalism that has produced an increasing demand for 
political involvement and political organisation along ethnic lines. Thus, the projects of ethnic 
federalism in Ethiopia has further exacerbated the growth of ethnic consciousness and ethnic 
classification around which a political life should be organised and also giving ethnicity a political 
significance- ‘ethnicising politics and politicising ethnicity’. Although as argued by some, a highly 
heterogeneous society may need to have a powerful centre (Horowitz 1985: 620) or electorally and 
culturally dominant ethnic group or Staatsvolk (O’Leary 2001), in order to hold the nation together in a 
stable federal framework, in the case of Ethiopia wherein the centre is dominated by a minority ethnic 
group, force and intimidation have become a norm in dissuading ethnic groups from demanding their 
constitutional rights for unconditional local autonomy and self-government that have promised them. 
However, the powerful centre dominated by the tiny minority Tigrayan elite, which is more interested 
and determined to protect its hegemony in whatever way required, is not willing to respect such 
constitutional promises.  
 
Secondly, since favouritism and prejudices are the hallmarks of ethnic entitlement, it is very difficult to 
sustain the ideology of ethnic entitlement in the context of Ethiopia which has experienced a long period 
of intermix and interaction between the various groups. The introduction of ethnic entitlement has 
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resulted in gross violation of rights of the minority and other groups in many local areas. Many states’ 
officials and local leaders are implicated in ethnic cleansing and massive human rights violations. In 
October 2002, the Ethiopian Prime Minister82 admitted that his party and state official were responsible 
for the ‘abuse of the constitutional rights in many places in Southern Ethiopia and he acknowledged that 
members of the ruling party are using the emblem of the EPRDF as a masquerade to violate 
constitutional rights. The SEPDF/EPRDF demoted and dismissed one-third of the ruling party central 
committee members and dismissed more than half of its politburo members by accusing them of various 
charges like ‘engaging in pitting people against each other, squandering public money, creating cliquish 
working relationships, engaging in acts of parasitism and the advancement of self interest, corruption 
and anti democratic activities, and creating their own ethnic islands that helped them to abuse their 
authorities for their own personal gains’83. Though, the ethnic entitlement ideology in Ethiopia has 
presupposed that providing power for the ethnic groups would resolve conflicts in the country once-for-
all, it is evident that the creation of more power-exercising centres have been associated with the rise of 
more power abusing centres as well. As a result, ethnic preferences have become an open policy of 
discrimination and abuses.  
 
Thirdly, ethnic entitlement has created a situation in which the distribution of resources would be 
scrutinized in terms of a zero-sum politics. It was believed that many of the ethnic groups in the SNNP 
and Benishangul-Gumuz regions have traditionally shared various common traits in culture, historical 
experience, religion and psychological make-up. However when it came to the distribution of resources 
and benefits, every group revealed itself to be uncompromising and fierce in its sectarian demands. In 
situations where resources are scarce and destitution is chronic and widespread, the incentive for sharing 
and compromise can be very minimal. By its very nature, ethnic entitlement is exclusivist and 
egocentric. As a consequence of the recent ethnic entitlement discourse, assertive and exclusionist ethnic 
consciousness is on the rise. However, the on-going arrangement is not strong enough to answer or deal 
with the demands arising from some of assertive and exclusivist ethnic interests. As it becomes difficult 
to create institutions for toleration and concession, this accelerates ferocious competition and hostile 
                                                 
82 Reported in Addis Tribune: http://www.addistribune.com/Archives/2002/10/11-10-02/Meles.htm, though 
many opposition groups doubted on the sincerity of the Prime Minster in taking basic changes in this regard, as the 
main source of the problem, ethnic entitlement, has not been addressed.    
83 Reported in government’s news agency, Walta information Center on October 12, 2002, 
www.waltainfo.com/EnNews/2002/Oct/12Oct02/Oct12e5.htm)  
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ethnic relations. Thus, the institutional weakness to tackle the emerging factional and sectarian demands 
of ethnic groups has reproduced more resentment and strife that may only be calmed down through 
tougher government intervention and punitive power involving widespread intimidations, purges, 
incriminations and liquidations. Such punitive and coercive measures have resulted in more resentment 
and resistance, which manifest itself in the form of ethnic clashes, revengeful killings of civilians, ethnic 
cleansing, resignations and other measures that in turn heighten further ethnic resentment. Consequently, 
ethnic entitlement in Ethiopia has resulted in vertical and horizontal conflicts. Vertically, the ruling 
group has been frequently using military force to quell demands from various groups for more rights. 
Horizontally, the ethnic restructuring has generated more inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic hostilities and 
conflicts than voluntary and sustainable cooperation. Ethnic tensions and violence in Nazareth, Ambo, 
Assosa, Awssa, Teppi, Kembata-Alaba, Wolaita, Arbaminche, Gamo-Gofa, Gurage-Siltie, Sidama-
Wolaita, Wolaita-Gamo, BenchiMajji, Gedeo-Gujji have been examples of horizontal ethnic violence. 
 
Fourthly, ethnic entitlement or preference is more geared to satisfy the interests and privileges of the 
elites (Horowitz 1985: 677). The elites, which claim exclusive rights in representing an ethnic group, 
can easily be enticed to exaggerate differences and exclusionism for self-seeking benefits.  Secessionism 
or demands for more autonomy in many areas have been initiated and spearheaded by the elites 
regardless of the opinion, interests and benefits of the respective ethnic communities. A separate and 
new administrative structure requires more bureaucratic budget expenditures and resources that can 
deprive resources allocation for social service programmes and other development projects for the local 
communities. Moreover, local elites can also benefit from more autonomy or secession because they can 
satisfy their interests better with the elimination of any accountability to the higher body. It can be 
difficult for the central elite to convince and shape local attitudes where local elites have a monopoly. 
The situation becomes worse, as the local elites identify themselves ethnically with the local community, 
which is the undesirable factor behind ethnic entitlement and ethnic criteria. In a different scenario, local 
elites can also become an instrument for centralisation through co-option and patron-client relationships 
with the centre by intertwining central and local despotism.  
 
Fifthly, ethnic entitlement produces a weak leadership structure, as it uphold ascriptive requirement 
rather than criterion based on achievements and merits. Ethnic restructuring in Ethiopia has resulted in 
the appointment of incompetent individuals in leadership and administrative positions in the ethnic 
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constituencies. In the Benishangul-Gumuz region, in many areas of the SNNP and Oromia regional 
states, the elites in power severely lack adequate capacities and proper qualifications to run 
administrative and political offices; but the ethnic restructuring policy requires that regardless of their 
abilities the elites should assume leadership in administrative structures. In such an injudicious 
arrangement, neither the local community nor the regional people benefit. Steps to replace the elites with 
qualified and ‘non-indigenous’ experts have been met with stiff resistance and resentment. It is 
unacceptable for local elites to easily give up their benefits, which have constitutional and ideological 
legitimacy deriving from the policy of ethnic entitlement. There are numerous disadvantaged and 
minority groups in Ethiopia, which never had access to modern education and did not have a chance to 
acquire appropriate skills in running state structures and bureaucracies. However, with the advent of the 
ethnic entitlement policy, many ethnically-based administrative units have been created that are 
controlled and run by the local elites. Despite their lack of adequate skills and education in running the 
new alien (modern) state structures, the local elites have assumed leadership and managerial positions in 
the administrative and political organs.  
 
In the Benishangul-Gumuz region, for instance, the five indigenous ethnic groups were marginal to the 
process of the state formation. In most cases, the existing social services and other infrastructures like 
health facilities, schools and roads are largely out of reach for the indigenous communities who live in 
scattered and inaccessible villages. Under the given circumstances, ethnic federalism is not moving in 
the direction of closing the ‘gap’, rather it widens or exacerbates it by negatively affecting socio-
economic progress through the promotion of a self-defeating development policy based on untrained or 
unskilled manpower. As presented in chapter five, the bulk of the budget subsidies from the center 
allocated to the regional state has disappeared in corruption, inefficiency and under-utilisation.  
  
Sixthly, ethnic entitlement has become inimical to democratic governance. Particularly, in many of the 
urban areas, which are inhabited by multiethnic communities, ethnic restructuring has denied the 
majority of the residents the right to participate in local politics and administration, as ethnic 
identification has been the criteria for assigning political and administrative responsibilities. In addition, 
voting for other multiethnic parties in elections is considered by local political elites as a rejection or 
opposition to the rights of the ethnic communities for self-administration; in some cases this has resulted 
in massive killing, harassment and expulsion of the civilian population in many urban areas. In 
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numerous cases from the federal level to local areas, especially in most urban areas, the Ethiopian 
federal arrangement has become an oligarchic system wherein the few have a right to rule over the 
majority.  
 
At the federal level, the ethnic coalition formation strategy has taken the shape of a patron-client 
arrangement, mainly based on personal reward and advancement. The pattern is similar at the lower 
levels of the federal structure in wereda and kebele levels. In fact, the federal arrangement established 
through the consent of few elites or groups would be ineffective in controlling or castigating power 
abuse; this is because the allegiance of the elites or ethnic leaders is built in the survival and keeping the 
political system intact. Thus, mismanagement and human rights abuse by regional as well as local 
leaders have been used as a bargaining mechanism for the ruling TPLF/EPRDF to secure the allegiance 
of the regional and local elites. The result has been the creation of an oligarchy in which the few rule 
over the majority in a tyrannical manner that neglects the rule of law.  Generally speaking, the ethnic 
federal structures have been accompanied by frequent flare-ups of violence, human rights abuses, ethnic 
strife and conflicts, misuse of power, inefficiency and corruption. It has become antithetical to its own 
discourse and promise of respect for ethnic self-administration and ethnic empowerment. As the 
empirical and conceptual flaws reveal, the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia has been faced by two 
major obstacles: first the agenda of the minority, the TPLF and the Tigrayan elite to install themselves in 
a dominant position through the ethnic federal arrangement; the second difficulty is associated with the 
challenge of providing a self-government rights for the 80 ethnolinguistic groups in Ethiopia.  
9.3 Contribution and recommendations  
The writing of this PhD dissertation has not only been an academic endeavourer for me. As an 
Ethiopian, the process has also been a dutiful journey to search for a political solution for a polity that 
has been suffering from internal conflicts arising from secessionist and regional autonomy demands 
since 1950s. It is in this spirit that I offer the following remarks summarizing the results of my findings 
and some suggestions as to the way to indicate the difficult situation facing the Ethiopian society. In this 
context, I have arrived at the conclusion that a strategy of encouraging ethnic criteria and ethnic 
entitlement for political organization and political rights is not a viable policy. Thus, it is advisable to 
discourage ethnic criterion or ethnic entitlement for political organization and political rights as much as 
possible. Ethnic demands are very difficult to satisfy and also very difficult to suppress. Ethnic 
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entitlement often creates more demands than the original claims, as its demonstration effect is so strong 
as to incite more expectations which are difficult to fulfil. Particularly, in poor societies where resources 
are severely scarce, ethnic restructuring can contribute to the breeding of mistrust and deadly conflicts 
around the question of resource appropriation. Constructing walls, erecting ethnic pillars are very 
destructive in the long run due to the narrow and egocentric nature of ethnic demands. Moreover, it is 
always difficult to dismantle ethnic entitlement once it has been introduced; it can grow into permanent 
cleavages as the elites harvest more benefits and privileges in the bifurcation. It is thus, preferable and 
advisable to emphasize incentives for political integration, rather than to encourage cleavage by 
crystallizing distinctiveness and differences. Seen in the light, however, force is neither the means to 
bring integration nor to suppress down ethnic demands. 
 
Consequently, in multi-ethnic societies it is preferable to facilitate mobility and integration, 
simultaneously with recognition and respect of ethnic groups and their legitimate claims. Although 
ethnic rights and demands are difficult to satisfy, it is important to recognize these in a manner that do 
not exacerbate ethnic division and ethnic hostilities. More emphasise needs to be given to political 
arrangements that spur ethnic accommodation such as introduction of election procedure that can 
encourage inter-ethnic cooperation and ethnic coalition parties. It can also be helpful to produce a more 
accurate and encompassing national history by treating issues that could trigger ethnic hostility and 
mistrust very sensitively. A national history must reflect the virtue and achievements of all groups in a 
respectful manner. It may be worthwhile to refrain from associating rulers and kings with the ordinary 
people because of ethnic classification. Furthermore, it is important to create a hybrid model that can 
respect ethnic groups, encourage inter-ethnic cooperation by suppressing hubris and upholding humility; 
by engineering a political interaction that promotes respect and trust while undermining and dissuading 
vengeances and arrogant behaviours and activities. A political system that recognises and respects 
identities, upholds achievements and merits in place of ascriptive requirements and nepotism can lead to 
the creation of a desirable system based on trust and tolerance among ethnic groups.   
 
Nonetheless, it is not easy to completely discard the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia, as shown by 
the constant and severe challenges of two major opposing and contending groups. The first group is 
composed by those who claim more ethnic autonomy and the second group is those who demand the 
precedence of individual rights over group rights. Although both groups seem to have irreconcilable 
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positions, it is advisable to consider both demands in order to map out a hybrid federal model that can 
tone down the major predicaments of the ethnic federal. First, the federal model in Ethiopia needs to 
consider multiple criteria such as geography, socio-economic factors, settlement patterns, population 
mix and other essential factors in delimiting the regional states. For instance, most of the urban areas of 
the country are inhabited by synchronized multiethnic communities where ethnic identities are so diluted 
and less significant making ethnolinguistic criterion inappropriate and inapplicable. Thus, the 
ethnolinguistic criterion should be discarded in establishing political and administrative structures in the 
urban areas. The rural areas are, in most cases, inhabited by a concentration of a specific ethnic 
community in a distinct territory, raising the need for some kind of structure that could recognize such a 
concentration. More importantly, the federal arrangement in Ethiopia should facilitate the creation of a 
genuine multiethnic coalition freely by means of incentives and political frameworks in rewarding 
multiethnic parties. The federal project should reward ethnic fluidity and intermix by politically 
discouraging exclusive arrangements and fragmentations.    
 
Second, the federal structures in Ethiopia should adopt a hybrid model that can institutionalise a genuine 
ethnic coalition through a bi-ethnic hegemonic and majoritarian system. The two major ethnic 
groups, the Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups represent about 60 percent of the population, the lion’s 
share of the intellectual and trained manpower, and a significant territory with paramount contribution in 
the Ethiopian state. The coalition of the Oromo and Amhara group can make a decisive majority as they 
are demographically and electorally dominant. Although not an effective dominant group as a single 
‘Staatsvolk’, or a national/ ethnic people, they can become a bi-hegemonic core and majoritarian to lead 
the federal project and to nurture a stable and cohesive political community. In addition, the coalition of 
the other ethnic groups can serve as a check-and-balance arrangement to persuade and require the 
majority groups to behave in a moderate manner by valuing interethnic bargaining and concession.  
 
In the current arrangement, the TPLF that represents the Tigray province, which accounts for about 6 
percent of the total population of Ethiopia, holds a dominant position in the political structure. This has 
to be changed and the TPLF should assume an influence that matches its share and capabilities. It is 
totally unfeasible and unsustainable for a small minority ethnic group to assume an hegemonic and 
leadership position in a context where the consciousness of the people as well as of the ethnic groups is 
sufficiently mature to distinguish between what is appropriate and what is not. Military force and other 
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deceptive strategies such as co-option of elites and divide and rule may work for some time, but such 
strategies can not create a genuine framework that can nurture a workable political system in a 
sustainable way. It is evident that the willingness of the people to accept the rule of the TPLF/EPRDF 
has been weakening. In the May 2005 Ethiopia’s election, the TPLF/EPRDF forcefully changed the 
outcome of the election’s result (as reported by the European Union’s Election observers mission and by 
virtually all the civil society groups in Ethiopia). The election is a clear message to the TPLF/EPRDF 
that the Ethiopian people are ready for a democratic change.  
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Appendix  
1. Checklist of the qualitative interview and list of Interviewees or informants 
These questions are used as a checklist for the qualitative interview.  The interview process did 
not necessarily follow the sequence, and also not limited to these questions. These questions 
served as guide in directing the interview process.  
Political participation of the people  
How do the people elect their representatives in regional, zonal, and other political offices? 
Do the opposition parties and groups have rights to participate in the elections? How? 
Do they support the policies of the ruling party or the oppositions? Why? 
What is their views regarding the relationships between the people and the local leaders? 
What do they expect and demand from each level of government? 
Do they feel that local administrations have adequate power? How?  
  
Ethnic rights and ethnic relations 
What are the benefit or shortcomings of ethnic entitlement? 
What benefit (or difficulty) have you accrued because of ethnic entitlement?  
How is the relationship between various ethnic groups in local area? 
What are the rights of ‘non-natives’ and minority groups in their area? 
What are the implications (positive and negative) of redrawing of internal boundaries in 
linguistic and ethnic lines? 
What are the major causes of tensions in their area? 
 
 
Resource allocation 
What are the procedures of resource allocations at federal, regional and local levels? 
Do they feel it is transparent? How? 
Do they have confidence in the modalities of financial resource allocation, management and 
utilisation? How? 
How does ethnic federalism affect economic relations? 
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Representation 
Do they feel that they are represented at the different level of governance structures-federal, 
regional and local levels? How? 
Do they feel that their respective ethnic groups are capable of representing the people? How? 
Do they consider that all ethnic groups are fairly represented in local, regional and federal 
structures? How?  
 
Anticipation 
What is their anticipation regarding the ethnic federal arrangement?   
What are their anticipation concerning the local, regional and federal administrations? 
What would they like to see changed? Why and How?  
 
 
List of Interviewees Benishangul Gumuz regional state 
1. A regional official from Gumuz, Interviewee 1 
2. A council member from Berta, Interviewee 2 
3. A council member from Shinasha, Interviewee 3 
4. A member of the regional executive from Gumuz, Interviewee 4 
5. A member of the regional executive from Gumuz, Interviewee 5 
6. A member of the regional executive from Berta, Interviewee 6  
7. An Elder from Berta, Interviewee 7 
8. A member of zonal executive from Berta, Interviewee 8 
9. A member of regional council from Berta, Interviewee 9 
10. A leader of Eder, Interviewee 10  
11. A leader of Eder, Interviewee 11 
12. A civil servant from Berta, Interviewee 12 
13. An elder from Berta, Interviewee 13 
14. A civil servant, Interviewee 14, 2002 
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List of interviewees In the SNNP regional state  
1. A member of the TPLF, Interviewee 21 
2. A development agent, Interviewee 22 
3. A regional council member from Sidama, Interviewee 23 
4. A civil servant, Interviewee 24 
5. A Kebele leader, Interviewee 25 
6. A leader of Eder, Interviewee 26 
7. A leader of Eder, Interviewee 27 
8. A leader of Eder, Interviewee 28 
9. A leader of Zonal executive, Interviewee 29 
10. A member of the Sidama zonal legislative and member of the ruling party, Interviewee 30 
11. An ex-Minister in the federal government, Interviewee 31 
 
12. A member of the opposition party, Interviewee 32 
13. A member of the regional executive, Interviewee 33 
14. A development agent, Interviewee 34 
15. An elder from Sidama, Interviewee 35 
16. An ex-official of the regional government, Interviewee 36 
17. A member of the regional executive, Interviewee 37 
18. A member of the regional ruling party from Kembata, Interviewee 38 
19. A member of the regional ruling party from Keffa, Interviewee 39 
20. A member of the regional ruling party from Sheka, Interviewee 40 
21. A wereda administrator, Interviewee 41 
22. A member of the regional ruling party from Alaba, Interviewee 42 
23. A member of the federal legislative from the opposition party, Interviewee 43 
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List of Interviewees In the Oromia regional state  
1. An advisor to the regional president, Interviewee 51 
2.  member of the regional executive body, Interviewee 52 
3. A leader of the city administration, Interviewee 53 
4. A chief executive of the Zonal administration, Interviewee 54 
5. A leader of Eder, Interviewee 55 
6. A leader of the Kebele administration, Interviewee 56 
7. A leader of Eder, Interviewee 57 
8. A representative of AAPO, Interviewee 58 
9. A member of the TPLF, Interviewee 59 
10. An expert from an NGO, Interviewee 60 
11. A leader of Eder, Interviewee 61 
12. A leader of ANDM in Nazareth, Interviewee 62 
13. A representative of ONC, Interviewee 63 
14. A civil servant, Interviewee 64 
15. A school principal, Interviewee 65 
6. A representative of ANDM, Interviewee 66 
7. A leader of zonal administration, Interviewee 67 
 
8. A representative of ONC, Interviewee 68 
9. A representative of the Zonal youth association, Interviewee 69 
10. A leader of Eder, Interviewee 70 
11. A leaders of Eder, Interviewee 71 
12. A leader of Eder, Interviewee 72 
13. Discussion with some of the evicted peasants, Interviewee 73 
14. A member of the regional executive, Interviewee 74 
25. A legal expert, Interviewee 75 
26. A civil servant, Interview 76 
27 J. An expert in a NGO, Interview 77 
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64 total interviewees 
30 interviewees of government officials 
27 interviewees of non politicians: mainly elders, Eder leaders, experts, civil servants school 
director, teachers, field workers,  
7 interviewees from opposition groups  
 
Regional Distribution of interviewees 
14 interviewees in the Benishangul Gumuz regional state  
23 interviewees in the SNNP regional state 
27 Interviewees in Oromia regional state  
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2.  Pre-198, 1988 to 1991 and post-1991 Internal administrative 
boundaries 
 
Pre-1988 Map of Ethiopia: Geographically delimited provinces   
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The 1998-1991 Derg’s Map, Regional administration and autonomous regions 
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Post-1991 Map- Ethno-linguistically delimited regional states    
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3. Ethiopian Languages and mother tongue speakers  
 
Ethiopian Languages (with over 500,000 mother-tongue speakers) 
Language Mother-
Tongue 
Speakers 
Proportion 
of 
Ethiopian 
Population 
Substantial Population in 
Neighboring Countries 
Amharic 17,372,913 29.0%  
Oromifa 
Borana-Arsi-
Guji 
Eastern 
Western 
17,080,000 
3,634,000 
4,526,000 
8,920,000 
28.5%  
Kenya:  152,000 
Tigrinya 3,224,875 5.4% Eritrea:  1,900,000 
Somali 3,187,053 5.3% Somalia:  5,400,000-
6,700,000 
Kenya:  312,339 
Djibouti:  181,420 
Gurage 
East Gurage 
West Gurage 
1,881,574 
827,764 
798,202 
3.1%  
Sidamo 1,876,329 3.1%  
Gamo-Gofa-Dawro 1,236,637 2.1%  
Wolaytta 1,231,673 2.1%  
Afar 979,367 1.6% Djibouti:  300,000 
Eritrea:  300,000 
Hadiyya 923,958 1.5%  
Gedeo 637,082 1.1%  
Kambaata 606,241 1.0%  
Kaficho 569,626 1.0%  
Source: Grimes, Barbara F., ed. (2000).  Ethnologue:  Languages of the 
World, 14th ed.  
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Selected Ethiopian Ethnic Groups and Mother-Tongue Languages 
 
Ethnic Group 
 
Population 
 
Mother-Tongue 
Speakers 
%  Ethnic Group Speaking 
Mother Tongue 
 
Amhara 16,007,933 17,372,913 100.0 
Tigrinya 3,284,568 3,224,875 98.2 
Somali 3,160,540 3,187,053 100.0 
Sidamo 1,842,314 1,876,329 100.0 
Wolaytta 1,269,216 1,231,673 97.0 
Afar 979,367 979,367 100.0 
Hadiyya 927,933 923,958 99.6 
Gamo 719,847 690,069 95.9 
Gedeo 639,905 637,082 99.6 
Kaficho 599,188 569,626 95.1 
Kambaata 499,825 487,655 97.6 
Source: Grimes, Barbara F., ed. (2000).  Ethnologue:  Languages of the 
World, 14th ed. 
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4. List of some of the TPLF’s Companies in Tigray, Investment Projects in regions and 
TPLF’s leadership family ties    
 
List of some of the TPLF’s Companies established between the years 1992-1997 EC. 
Company Name  Established  Capital  Headquarter  
Almedan Garment Factory  1995  660,000,000  Mekele  
Addis Engineering Consultancy  1995  10,000,000  Addis Ababa  
Addis Pharmaceuticals Production  1995  53,000,000  Addis Ababa  
Africa Insurance  1995  30,000,000  Addis Ababa  
Almeda Textile Factory  1995  180,000,000  Mekele  
Mesob Cement Factory  1995  240,000,000  Mekele  
Mesfin Industrial Company  1995  500,000,000  Mekele  
Sur Construction  1995  150,000,000  Addis Ababa  
Trans Ethiopia  1995  100,000,000  Mekele  
Tesfa Livestock  1995  20,000,000  Mekele  
Star Pharmaceuticals  1995  25,000,000  Mekele  
Selam Bisline  1995  10,000,000  Mekele  
Sheba Tannery Factory   1995  40,000,000  Wukro  
Segel Construction  1995  10,000,000  Mekele  
Rahwa Export  1995  25,000,000  Mekele  
Meskerem Investment  1995  40,000,000  Axum  
Mega Net Corporation  1993  10,000,000  Mekele  
Hiwot Agriculture Mechanization  1995  25,000,000  Mekele  
Hitech Park Share Co. 1996  10,000,000  Mekele  
Tana Trading House Share Co.  1994  50,000,000  Addis Ababa  
Global Auto Spareparts  1992  26,000,000  Addis Ababa  
Fana Democracy plc.  1995  6,000,000  Addis Ababa  
Ezana Mining Development  1995  55,000,000  Addis Ababa  
Express Transit  1995  10,000,000  Addis Ababa  
Experience Ethiopia Travel  1995  26,000,000  Mekele  
Ethio Rental Share Co.  1995  10,000,000  Mekele  
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Dedebit Saving & Loan  1997  60,000,000  Mekele  
Dilate Brewery  1995  15,000,000  Mekele  
Dessalegn Caterinary  1995  15,000,000  Mekele  
Berhe Chemical 1995  25,000,000  Mekele  
Addis Consultancy House  1995  10,000,000  Mekele  
Birhane Building Construction  1995  10,000,000  Addis Ababa  
 
 
 
Distribution, Per Capita, of Investment Projects (July 1992 – March 1996) 
 
Region 
 
Percentage 
of Total 
Projects 
 
Percentage 
of Total 
Capital 
 
Per Capita 
(birr) 
Tigray 14.6 18.3 899 
Afar 1.8 5.8 955 
Amara 8.6 5.9 77 
Oromiya 20.6 14.2 145 
Somali 0 0.6 43 
Binshangul-Gumuz 1.1 1.6 302 
SNNP 4.9 4.2 65 
Gambela 0.1 0.1 213 
Hareri 2.4 1.8 1556 
dd s b ba 45.2 47.2 3886 
Dir  Dawa 0.8 0.3 92 
Total 100.1 100 748.45 
Source:  Hansson 1997 Hansson, Göte (1997).  Ethiopia 1996: Government Legitimacy, Aid and 
Sustainable Development (Stockholm:  Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency). 
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Some of family ties of the TPLF’s leadership (as reported in press and also some it 
confirmed by the author through personal connection)   
1. Prime Minister Melse Zenawi – A Chairman of the TPLF and Ethiopian Prime Minister 
 
2. Sebhat Nega – TPLF’s politburo and President Meles Zenawi's advisor 
 
3. Kidusan Nega, Sebhat Nega's sister, TPLF central committee member and she was mayor 
of Mekele for many years 
 
4. Tsegay Berhe (Kidusan Nega's husband) – Tigray province president and TPLF politburo 
member 
 
5. Aberash Nega (Sebhat Negas's sister) - run for Addis Abeba city council in May 2005 
election but not elected. 
  
 
7. Sebhat Nega's sister is Eritrea's defence Minister Sebhat Efphrem's wife 
 
8. Arekebe Ekubay's sister - the wife of Adis Alem Balema who is the TPLF central 
committee member, he was ambassador in China . Arekebe Ekubay was a mayor of Addis 
Ababa (2000 to 2005). 
 
9. Arekebe Ekubay's wife, Nigist Gebre Kirstos, is the sister of Berhane Gebre Kirstos who 
is TPLF’s central committee member and former Ambassador to the USA and current 
Ambassador to EU in Brussels.  
 
10. Abay Woldu's wife, Turufat Kidane Mariam, is Meles Zenawi's security chief, and 
TPLF’s central committee member. Abay Woldu  is a TPLF politburo member 
 
11. Mulugeta Alemseged, who is Meles Zenawi's nearest family member - Meles zenawi's 
security chief and personal bodyguard 
 
12. General Birhane Negas - Meles Zenawi's Palace security chief and a godfather of Meles 
Zenawi's daughter. 
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